The Migration Myth in Policy and Practice
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Dreams, Development and Despair
Migration has appeared as one of the most crucial issues of the contemporary world because of the ubiquity, upshot and the attendant impacts. Migration is about people, their aspirations and fears, triumphs and tragedies. The subject of migration is not only interesting and important but also compelling and fascinating. Hence, it has become one of the most crucial stories of our time. We should not forget that it is people who create extraordinary stories along with the many ways of migration.

The book offers unique insights into the growing significance of migration and its impact on individuals, societies, nations and the world. It analyses the nexus between migration and development. The authors examined the core notion of the South-North-South migration. They successfully identified the potential impacts—positive and negative—of migration on the well-being of the communities in both origin and destination.

It is a pleasure seeing that the authors have gone beyond the conventional belief that migration is inevitable for socio-economic development arguing that the opportunities for development coming from migration cannot be limited exclusively to remittances. There are myriad of other factors that need to be taken into consideration in analysing the migration and development nexus. The authors have appropriately addressed the migration governance diligently so that the analytical balance is not compromised.

The debates that many facets of migration processes are driven by economic considerations have received deep academic attention over the last decades. A prominent example is the debate on so-called high-skilled migrants. However, due to the invisibility of irregular migration and the challenges of collecting quality statistics, conducting research has been notoriously difficult. The world lacks
political will, and perhaps the capacity, to develop a robust regime to protect the migrants seeking to cross international borders.

I am sure the book will appeal to academics, researchers, policy makers and stakeholders.

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Preface

About nine years ago in 2010, in his foreword for the book *Rationalizing Migration Decisions: Labour Migrants in East and South-East Asia* William Lacy Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) mentioned that there were about one billion migrants in the world. He attached particular emphasis on one of the arguments that in calculating benefits of migration, there is no way we can ignore the invisible cost migrants’ pay in pursuing migration. This volume in fact is an attempt to expand on this argument.

Human progress throughout history has been possible due to population mobility. Economic evidences suggest that migration has been instrumental in excelling the growth in both developed and developing economies. However, contemporary debates have highlighted its long-term consequences. This has challenged the long-standing theories about the positivities of migration.

Migration has always mattered—but today it matters more than ever before (Koser 2010). Koser’s assertion has solid ground. Migration is one of the most challenging complex issues of the twenty-first century. The ever-growing volume of migration and the associated remittances; the multidisciplinary explanations; the unexplored drivers and motivations; and the unknown potential impact on states and their economy have contributed to the complexity. Historians see migration as a phenomenon to continue as it happened in the past. Demographers view it as a function of population pressure, and hence, migration does a job to redistribute them. Economists fundamentally explain migration as a function of demand and supply. Political scientists explain that every human being is a political entity and hence they must migrate. Rights-based activists take a radical position in viewing migration that migration is a human right.

Since the time migration came under academic investigations, several scholars have posed so many pressing questions to seek answers. Why do some people leave their homes and why some don’t? What are the forces that make them leave and what are the factors attracting them? Who are the winners and who are losers? Who are looking to the short-term gains and why, and who are the ones looking to long terms gains and why? Is the claim that migrants steal ‘local job’ based on fact? If so, what is the consequence? Do migrants ‘drain’ or gain or waste skills? Does
migration enhance migrants’ and their family’s social status or undermine it? Surely, there is no precise answer to those questions. Researchers and academics made sincere efforts to answer some of the questions. However, most answers are region, country and time specific.

Migration has been an extraordinary phenomenon for academia and policy makers for policy makers and academia particularly because it has potential to have huge impact on economy, demography and society in a myriad of ways. Academic and researchers may reveal potential positive and negative impacts, and policy makers can implement recommendations of the studies to better the migration management.

Blaming one another (receiving vs. sending ends) has pushed the migrant population into an uncertainty, which resulted in jeopardizing the safety issues of the migrants. Much debates and discussions on the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration have been taking place; however, safety for migrants still remains a far cry.

The exorbitant cost migrants pay to finance their migration; the psychological cost, the opportunity costs they pay are the side issues of the agenda of the policy makers. The vast number of mobility orphans and their sacrifices are sadly ignored because the policy takers have little to no voice in the migration process. Most returnees come back old and with obsolete skills. Once returned, they remain unemployed. Of course, success stories are many, but documentations on such stories are even more. Systematic studies on ugly sides of migrations are rare though on media are not. There is an abundance of money to fund migration research from receiving countries. This implies that sponsored researches are aimed at looking into the sponsor’s side favourably and labelling the migrants as a social ill. Goldin (2013), therefore, noticed that in fact we live in an era of two competing narratives: first is that migrants are crossing borders and that they are stealing jobs and eroding host country’s social fabric, and second is that despite short-term dislocations, international migration is a boon. The belief about stealing jobs by migrants and the long-standing notion that the migrants take up the jobs (4Ds) that are not taken by natives contradict. This is an important discourse. This warrants further debate because this notion of ‘stealing jobs’ has contributed to many xenophobic crimes around the world. We tend to eclipse the woes the migrants go through by often magnifying the fact that their remittances contributed to only positive development.

Many scholars tend to term migrant remittances as development mantra. Evidences for such claim are not in shortage. We have never challenged this either. What we attempted to do is to contribute to the migration knowledge by sharing experiences, concerns and perceptions about what development is in reality to them. Is it all about some money and the freedom to spend? Migrant remittances have become an important feature of modern economic life. Second-generation migrants never know what miseries their parents went through in settling in. Post and Parcel (2007:1) featured a story of one Bangladeshi migrant, which said it all about how migration is like. ‘It was very difficult for us. I was one of seven children and often there wasn’t enough food to eat. We were very hungry. The winters were extremely
cold and we were not used to such bitter, harsh weather. We couldn’t afford coal so had to burn cardboard boxes we found. We missed our culture, our food, and our family very much. Now, we’ve been here over 20 years and have built up a chain of very successful textile stores throughout the southern part of the country. We generally feature success stories but not the story behind. This is how migration got over-glorified.

Complaints of violation of rights of migrants and unsafe working conditions are widespread. Chances for legal redress for a human rights violation are almost non-existent for them. Lodging complains of any police or any concerned authority against the employer means immediate loss of the job. If even the job retains, abuse escalates. Multiculturalism is believed to be the key in [im]migration system. When migrants do something that they practised in the origin countries but do not match host country culture and religion is considered a failed policy of multiculturalism. This means an imposition and a force are on the migrants to melt them into the host pot. If even they assimilate into the host country and contribute to the multiculturalism, locals may think this may diminish the pride that they have in their history. They believe that migrants bring their own culture, language and values that ultimately displace the culture, values and traditions of their new country of residence. Locals’ blame on migrant workers is that they often accept work for lower pay than the average wage, which has the effect of reducing salaries for the locals. All this unsubstantiated and sweeping comments and belief has a toll. We claim these facts are no way trivial in migration research. This volume tries to touch upon these facts critically with hopes that policy makers and policy takers come to a common ground for a greater cause of the world.

We record our thanks to Eman Moursy, American University in Cairo (AUC), for her continued support in sending documents and articles whenever we requested. We acknowledge Diotima Chattoraj for her unconditional favour in fixing the long list of references. We record our thanks to Air Vice Marshal (Retd.) Mahmud Hussain for his support in various ways. We record our boundless thanks to our family members.

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Abbreviations

ABD Brazilian Association of Dekasseguis
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AVRR Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
BSSMSB Brazilian Service in Support of Micro and Small Businesses
CARAM The Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility in Cambodia
CIATE Centre for Information and Support for Migrant Workers
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CPRC Chronic Poverty Research Centre
DD Dutch Disease
EAP East Asia and Pacific Region
ECA Europe and Central Asia
ECLAC The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EU-MMP EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFMD Global Forum on Migration and Development
GMG Global Migration Group
HDI Human Development Index
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HLDMD High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development
HRC Human Rights Convention
ICPD International Conference on Population and Development
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
ILO International Labour Organization
IMDI Institute for Migration and Development Issues
IMF International Monetary Fund
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>INED</td>
<td>Institut National d’Etudes Demographiques</td>
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<td>INSTRAW</td>
<td>International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>KNomad</td>
<td>The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
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<td>MDHS</td>
<td>Moldova Demographic and Health Survey</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MIF</td>
<td>Multilateral Investment Fund</td>
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<td>MTO</td>
<td>Money Transfer Operator</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NBER</td>
<td>The National Bureau of Economic Research</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NEA</td>
<td>National Employment Agency</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>RPW</td>
<td>Remittance Prices Worldwide</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
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<td>SEBRAE</td>
<td>Service in Support of Micro and Small Businesses</td>
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<td>SNB</td>
<td>Swiss National Bank</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>THCG</td>
<td>The Havana Consulting Group</td>
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<td>TLMP</td>
<td>Temporary Labour Migration Programmes</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture</td>
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<td>The United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>USCFR</td>
<td>US Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>WAGI</td>
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The United Nations estimates that more than a billion people are voting with their feet, migrating within their countries or across international borders. Millions are fleeing violence: war, persecution, criminality, and political chaos. Many more, suffocated by poverty, are seeking economic relief beyond their horizons. The roots of this colossal new exodus include a globalized market system that tears apart social safety nets, a pollutant-warped climate, and human yearnings supercharged by instant media (Salopek 2019: 45).

Human characteristic is to migrate. Migration crisis still makes headline news. More than a million desperate people fled to Europe in 2015, and nearly 4000 died trying (Mackenzie 2016). Different countries are making different policies (hard and soft), which would be detrimental, to some extent, to the ones need asylum. For example, the US is talking about building a wall while tens of thousands of lone children flee violence in Latin America across the US-Mexican border. In the top ten priorities for conflict prevention, the US Council on Foreign Relations (USCFR) concluded that the political instability in the EU that the influx of migrants cause. As the world’s economy becomes more globalised, migration will continue to grow. Is this an alarming issue? If no, this is a sensitive issue.

Academically speaking, migration has never been discussed intensely within a development framework until recently. Migration has been seen as a way of fleeing unwanted situation in search of a desired situation. Migration continued but it was not an issue at all to discuss in the academe or at the policy sphere. Some countries also formalized migration only recently. China, for example, did not allow people to move internally and internationally until 1979 (Xiang 2016).

However, perspectives about migration began to change as remittances, international trade, labour market, development and security issues associated with migration have taken lead in the globalization and development discourse. Over the past five decades, the impact of migration on ‘development’ in sending communities and countries has been the subject of heated and continuous debate (Castles 2015; Taylor 1999; Ullah et al. 2019). The opposing views of the migration optimists and migration pessimists have created a division among migration scholars. This division reflects
deeper paradigmatic divisions in social theory (i.e., functionalist versus structuralist paradigms) and development theory (i.e., balanced growth versus asymmetric development paradigms) (Ritzer 1993; Adams and Sydie 2001).

Development and migration association is real. The debate about the level of impact of migration on development has been an ongoing fact. However, scholars come up with the fact that migration contributes robustly in both negative and positive terms to development in both origin and destination countries. Evidences are mounting that leveraged by appropriate policies, migrants’ support—whether through cash or in kind—could be best used in changing the society in myriad of ways. They could be turned as the best vehicle for enculturation, acculturation, technology transfer, and skills and knowledge circulation. The member states of the United Nations (UN) have put forward an initiative to address the migration—development dynamics through a range of actions of Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). The actions include the commitment to concrete arrangements making sure that migration is efficacious for development. These arrangements are committed at the gathering in the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (HLDMD) and the GFMD in 2006 (UN 2007).

Since migration is growing big day-by-day, migration regimes and policy makers are thinking deeply into how to make migration work better for development. Since the moment population migration came under academic investigation, most research studies tended to glorify migration. Researchers and policymakers have tended to demonstrate a positive correlation between migration and development, students of social sciences showed interest in it and regarded as a great area of investigation. There are clear evidences that migration has provided relief, to some extent, from unemployment to labour surplus countries, and labour supply for the resource-rich but labour deficient countries.

This book does not mean to undermine migration or to glorify it. We tend to investigate the long-term rather than the short-term impact of migration on development—income, life standard, education, health, infrastructure, etc. We delve into the facts that the social costs [female] migrants and the left (or remained) behind pay in the long run. To that end, we engage in an analysis of the costs the migrants pay throughout the migrancy. Feminization of migration, Dutch disease, remittances and usage, costs of remitting, and security and safety issues are fundamentals of analytical units. Feminization of migration is portrayed as a victory of women’s emancipation from discrimination and marginalization. In the analysis, we include in the calculation of migration cost, psychological cost and opportunity cost paid by both migrants and their remained behind families in order to gauge the contribution the migration is making. This book advances with the debates whether migration is something we should count on for a long-term development; is migration really inevitable for development; and, if no, then what?

As migration has become a significant phenomenon at the global stage, migration thinkers and analysts have divided into three blocs. One bloc is dead against migration while another bloc is for migration and another took a moderate position. One bloc argues that migration facilitates the most talented and gifted citizens leaving the country in search of more rewarding opportunities, and sending ends apparently
sound contended with the remittances received. This means migration works like a filter through which talents pass by and less talented stay behind. The other bloc tends to counter-argue that migration has enabled many countries to increase the growth through migrant’s remittances. Migration is bringing a demographic balance (by the mobility between labour surplus and labour deficient countries). Other liberal bloc argues that migration is not bad for developing economies. This bloc contends that the developing countries gain the diversity through migration that is required to be an effective member of the global village. The bloc that connects migration with security generally is from Eurocentric scholars.

As scholars and policy makers tend to associate migration with positive development, abundant studies have been generated that engaged favorably into migration-development nexus. The other side of the debate (negative and challenging issues of migration) is barely adequate in order to take a position because the change in the phenomenon has been so dramatic that policy makers and researchers were reluctant to spend time to vilify it.

Two distinct kinds of people tend to relocate: one that considers that relocation would open more windows for opportunities than staying put. Another group moves out generally without any deliberation. Individual consideration about future economic security has nothing to denigrate. However, as the migration volume is escalating exponentially, some elements that might harm the society are likely to intrude. Hence, the governance issue (that we call today, global compact) has occupied significant space in public and private spheres.

Salopek (2019) portrays economic migrants as the destitute millions with time to plan ahead who seem to favour the shoe of the twenty-first century’s poor: the cheap, unisex, multipurpose Chinese sneaker. Salopek goes on to explain another form of migrant that are war refugees escaping violence, by contrast, must trudge their wretched roads in rubber flip-flops, dress loafers, dusty sandals, high-heeled pumps, booties improvised from rags, etc. These people flee burning cities; abandon villages and farms. They pull on whatever shoes lie within reach at a moment’s notice.

Migration, to another new bloc, is associated with security. In line with this bloc, Faist (2005) contends that fears of communist takeover and infiltration have been replaced in popular and mass media coverage by more diffuse perceptions of transnational threats associated with organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental disasters and international migration. Currently, the policy areas such as international migration, terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human have been characterized by securitization. After 9/11, securitization has emerged in a new academic literature in the field of international relations and international politics, and international migration (Faist 2005). Under the domain of security issues, policy makers and research as well portray migrants as the enemy of the state. This notion in fact has made migrants vulnerable to hate crimes and discriminations. Security domain should encompass the security of the migrants themselves as well (en route, origin and destination). Looking at one side and overlooking migrants cause may only contribute to the escalation of irregular migration resulting in the escalation of deaths of migrants enroute (The Guardian 2019).
Migration began from time immemorial. Migration landscape that time was not as it is today. It is today more informed than before. This means that migration today is supposed to be less hazardous, less defenseless and less insecure than before. Insufficient information about the country of destinations, about the routes, job possibility may make migration risky. The question is, then why still people make risky journeys to get to the desired destinations? Day-by-day, the space for migrants is being shrunk and as a result they try to sneak into the desired destination through unreliable means. Unsafe journeys culminate in deadly events.

Prejudiced views in dealing with security and migration may be detrimental in the long run (Ullah et al. 2014; Ullah 2009). Some origin countries (such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Moldova, and countries in Africa and Latin America) receive on average 10 dead bodies per day of their migrants. At least one million people, mostly from the Middle East and North Africa, crossed the Mediterranean bound for Europe in 2015, with the number fell to 327,000 in the first 10 months in 2016. In order to cross the Mediterranean, potential migrants board on small and unstable boats in open rough waters, and growing number of deaths from drowning is a result (SCMP 2017; Connor 2014). Leaders in the Western world seem to be more concerned with the cost ($12 million monthly) for rescuing efforts than the life of the migrants. In the first nine months of 2014, over 2500 people died en route to Europe (Amnesty International 2015). This implies that ‘western’ world is more concerned about the money spent on rescuing the migrants from being died in the seawater but not about the life of them. It has been estimated that between 1998 and 2013, 623,118 refugees and migrants reached the shores of the EU irregularly—an average of almost 40,000 people a year. Total arrivals by sea through the Mediterranean amounted to 69,000 in 2011—the large number being due to the beginning of the Arab Spring (Alexander 2014; Ullah 2014a; UNHCR 2016). Importantly, we tend to forget about the left-behind family members of the migrants who die enroute and in destinations. Diversity seems to be the norm when it comes to characterizing migration with respect to reasons for departure, length of migration, frequency of return to place of origin and ties to home communities (Goldscheider 1987; Lucas 1997; Massey et al. 1990).

The common pattern characterizing migration of men in developing countries is that they leave their wives and children in the place of origin while they migrate in search of work. This pattern has taken permanence due to a number of reasons such as the intention to save money; intention to leave someone at home to take care of the elderlies and assets. In most cases, however, they cannot afford bringing their family along with them (Kanaiaupuni 2000). In some cases, wives and children were not legally sponsored to migrate as spouse of male migrants. The policy is tailored to meet a short-term demand for labour, with single males rather than entire families being given temporary work permits, which are renewed annually. When economic conditions change and the services of the immigrant work force are no longer required, the work visas are not renewed, in the hope that these immigrants will return to their native countries (Laczko 2002). In most cases, husbands are the only breadwinners. The entire family counts on him for financial, security and
emotional support. In the absence (caused by migration or death) of the husbands, they fall into an uncertain future.

1.1 Migration in the Global Context

The claim that globalization has escalated the mobility of people has gained prominence in recent times. The decline in fertility and working-age population in many advanced economies has led to a growing demand for workers from labour abundant countries to get their national economies going. Economic migrants are the world’s fastest growing group of population. In the contemporary migration domain, a question is frequently asked: is migration inevitable for development or the other way around? This question was addressed by a range of scholars in different contexts and times. Some migration scholars and stakeholders seem to be over emphasizing on the necessity of migration for development and some others found no relationship between migration and development. They argue that non-migrating countries are developed while migrant sending countries are not. To many scholars, however, this claim is shallow and not substantive. The colonial powers (except a few) that are considered today developed were migrants as well. European nations used their maritime prowess, backed by naval might, to create colonies all around the globe. Many “Old World” empires like Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, relied on maritime dominance to maintain power over their colonies (Tayyab 1997). For example, Africa today is known as poor continent, not because of any innate inability of Africans to raise themselves up, but because Africa’s poverty is necessary for corporate profit, and the the exploitation of Africa began with slavery in the 1500s and accelerated under colonialism after the Berlin Conference of 1886 divided Africa up among the European powers (Wengraf 2018). As a result, today not only Africa, many countries in the world are still struggling for the survival. This is how they became migrant sending nations for economic reasons and other reasons. Population movements have played significant part in shaping the world for thousands of years (Curtin 1997). However, the pattern of human mobility has largely been disrupted by the colonialism, which brought economic exploitation, political hegemonies, and cultural change because of the fact that after their colonization, they kept moving around and within the countries to explore resources, and they made millions to move as well. The sources, nature and legacies of colonizers have been the subject of renewed interest over the last decade and the question of empire has come to occupy an increasingly central place in cultural and political life in this post-colonial moment (Ballantyne 2002). Movement from place to place has been an integral part of humanity’s interaction with the environment for hundreds of thousands of years. In fact, until the time of the agricultural revolution, human mobility was an almost daily occurrence. The search for more and better resources, freedom from war and conflict, and religious and ideological toleration contributed to encouraging human migration.
The hypothesis of migration-development nexus in fact is built on the notion that the remittances sent by the migrants play a role in contributing to development and the level of its contribution to the gross domestic products (GDP) of receiving countries. These assumptions are generally made without checking the fact how remittances at the micro level behave. Therefore, remittances’ contribution to development is, to many, a sweeping conclusion. Some micro level studies demonstrate that financial empowerment has been a great contribution of remittances (Rahman and Ullah 2012; Yong and Rahman 2013; Yong et al. 2014a). However, what is ignored is the fact that financial management during the exposure to migration (Ullah 2013a) rests on the left behind wives, in general. Wives’ responsibility doubles often triples that makes their life challenging. They are overburdened with new role in the family. Their role still does not go without criticism from the husbands or/and their families. As this comes to development debate, some scholars tend to say that this adds skill and power to the left behind meaning that their new role makes them empowered. However, what is clearly not known is that whether they can make major decision about using/investing the money. This means while this contribution could not be undermined, the contribution is largely calculated by excluding certain allied factors such as the cost of migration (monetary, psychological, etc.). Some estimates show soaring remittances to developing countries, triple the value of all foreign aid. Economists have difficult time to detect any effect of all that money on economic growth in the countries that migrants come from. Remittances often work as a destroyer of social fabric in the way that migrants’ families try to separate themselves from those of non-migrants. Some families think that their social status is higher than others. Migrants and non-migrants family—a new disparity is created. At a point, the children from the migrant families start to stay away from the friends or the other way around. Non-migrants, according to many, envy the migrants families. Some stakeholders said that migration though brought some happiness to some families but it contributed to an unpleasant situation in many societies.

Existing body of literature on migration and development is predominantly occupied with the positive impression and short-term prospects and promises. In a random search conducted between mid 2018 and late 2018 of literature that deals with migration and development, we found 2745 articles, reports and books. About 98% of them demonstrated positive association between migration and development. Our argument, of course, does not essentially eclipse the long-standing hypothesis about migration and development nexus. Rather, we bring the fact to the ongoing debate that we should not simply generalize the claim that the impact of migration on development has always been positive. The remittances (both recorded and unrecorded) being transacted across the globe may bring mayhem to small economies under the circumstances of failure in tackling or undermining associated risky factors.

Of course, the level of impact of migration on development varies across regions depending on a number of factors such as livelihood pattern and strategies, and economic, political and environmental atmosphere, geographical location, relative wealth, security regimes, kinship structure and other informal institutions, the nature of local governance and social network, access to land, food, infrastructure, markets, water and other resources. Some countries embed migration policies (for promoting
outmigration, such as the Philippines) and some countries remain indifferent (deliberately or un-deliberately). Migration, however, continues. Another debate is getting prominence that whether money (remittances) is transferable to the skills lost due to migration. As migrants return their home, is the skill they earn overseas relevant to the market demand in the country of origin? Migration happens due to the difference in the necessity of labour (skilled and unskilled) and the supply of the labour domestically. For example, in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC countries) especially Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s population size is about 33 million, 65% are working age population, which may imply that they may not need about 9 million foreign workers should the Saudi working age population have necessary skills (IOM 2016).

High-income countries are the dominant source of global remittance flows, led by the United States (US$148,489,000,000 in 2017) and followed by Saudi Arabia (US$46,725,000,000 in 2017 (Pew Research 2019). Developing countries receive somewhere between 10 and 29% of their remittance flows from other developing countries (South-South flows) equivalent to US$18 billion to US$55 billion, respectively. Other instance, middle-income countries such as Russia and Malaysia are important sources of remittance flows to other developing countries (World Bank 2019). The entire amount of remittances channeled into receiving countries is not necessarily used for development purposes. After 9/11, the claim received attention that a chunk of remittances in some countries in Africa and South and Southeast Asia goes into ‘terrorist’ activities. This blame or claim may have been transpired by the lack of transparency in transactions (Table 1.1).

1.2 The Migration Geography

Political landscape, economic conditions, and demographic dynamics determine the geography of migration. This implies that any country can turn as a source [country] depending on certain circumstances. In a bigger scale, we divide the geography between the global South and the Global North. Migrants and refugees stock come from two distinct destinations though. The world’s migrant stock continues to concentrate in a limited number of countries. What happens if all, say, the about 350 million international migrants congregate in a particular place (Table 1.2)? With this population, about 1000 countries like Brunei may be created. This population warrants handling efficiently and carefully so that the outcome turns fair for the world. These people make more than 1.5 billion separate financial transactions per year (IFAD 2017).

The pressing issue is how did the disproportional demographic distribution between the Global North and the Global South happen. Asia, given the majority of the global population is living in this hemisphere, sends more migrants in number, which is in fact less as compared to the global proportion. Underdevelopment and population growth have a correlation. Demographic disparities have to do with shaping the mobility of labour during the twenty-first century. Richer societies and some emerging economies are already experiencing rapid population aging and declining
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant flows</td>
<td>Intra-regional (South-South) in addition to South-North migration (US and Europe) and migration to the Middle East</td>
<td>Intra-regional (South-South) in addition to South-North migration (Europe, US) and migration to the Middle East</td>
<td>Inter-regional (South North migration) (US) in addition to South-South migration and limited flows to Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main destinations within the region</td>
<td>Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong (NICs), from neighbouring countries. India and China as new destinations</td>
<td>South Africa, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, from neighbouring countries</td>
<td>Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, from neighbouring countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main destinations outside the region</td>
<td>Middle East, Canada, US and EU (UK)</td>
<td>EU (France, Italy, Spain, the UK), Middle East and US, China as a new destination</td>
<td>US and Canada (mainly from Mexico and Central America). From other destinations also to Europe (Spain and Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration inducing factors</td>
<td>Labour demand—economic growth in neighbouring countries Active labour recruitment (pull, combined with push factors) (poverty) Path dependency (colonial and trade relations), political hostility, corruption, poor governance, misinformation about overseas</td>
<td>Poverty and economic crisis (push, combined with pull factors) Labour demand—economic growth in neighbouring countries, combined with push factors (poverty) Path dependency (transhumance/colonial and trade relations)</td>
<td>Active labour recruitment, combined with push factors (economic crises) Regional integration processes (NAFTA, etc.) US investments in Mexico and Central America (maquiladoras)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional setting (area of destination)</td>
<td>(within Asia) Temporary labour contracts; no possibilities for permanent stay and/or family reunification</td>
<td>(within Africa) Circular migration in a context of regional integration (ECOWAS, SADC, etc.)</td>
<td>(within US) Assimilation/ integration (melting pot) Pan-identity of immigrants in US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
### Table 1.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of government managing migration</td>
<td>Border control, Keeping migration temporary, Data collection</td>
<td>Border controls, Mobility partnerships/migration management, Co-development (with Europe)</td>
<td>Border controls, Negotiations between diaspora and government, 3X1 program (public–private partnerships)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source* Modified from Zoomers and Gery (2012)

### Table 1.2 Top 10 countries by relative share of the population made up of [im]migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of migrants</th>
<th>% of world total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vatican City</td>
<td>100 (1000)</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates (UAE)</td>
<td>83.7 (7.8 million)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>73.8 (1.6 million)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>70 (2.9 million)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>64.2 (21,000)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Maarten</td>
<td>59.7 (27,000)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>56.9 (42,000)</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>54.7 (729,000)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>49.3 (206,000)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>43.3 (249,000)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source* IOM (2017), UN (2018), and Pew Research Centre (2018)

fertility, while working-age populations will continue to grow in other emerging economies and in most low-income countries (Munz 2013). Only 17% of the global population lives in North America and Europe, and around 57% in Asia alone (UN 2017). Therefore, the question is, does Asia send 57% of the total global migrants;
and does Asia receive 57% of the total global remittance (Tables 1.2 and 1.3)? The answer is, of course, no. This implies that skill differentials, among others, may be one the most powerful determinants of the migration volume.

Since the last six decades, the average annual net migrants moving to the developed regions have been on the rise. The projection has been that in 2010–2050 about 2.3 million people per year would move out of the countries of origin (IOM 2009; IOM 2018). However, it is unknown what will be their countries of destinations? This is because demand-supply function may change, and skill requirement may be different due to technological changes, global political condition, migration policies as well as the motivations and migration volition of people may change. Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) had been experiencing negative net emigration for two decades from 1960 (Table 1.1). Until the early 1980s, countries in these areas experienced modest levels of net emigration. Starting in the 1980s, however, the magnitude increased markedly (United Nations 2011; IOM 2017; McAuliff et al. 2017).

Migration denotes that the people relocate to a destination where migrants find relatively better opportunities. This implies that other than monetary calculation migrants move on to a place that they consider being a safer zone than the previous one. What does this in fact encompass? We emphasize that migrants look for a comfort zone, which can include better income, better environment, weather, better safety system, and better health system etc. (Ullah and Huque 2019). Some people may move when they find better promises for financial security. There are some people who move with an assumption: whatever will be will be.

Table 1.3 Top 10 countries with the largest migrant populations 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of migrants (thousand)</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>34.988</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>13.259</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7.349</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6.947</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.277</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>6.271</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5.255</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4.705</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 1.1 Changing pattern of global migration. Source: Gray Alex, World Economic Forum, 2017 (with permission)

Slavery enters human history with civilization. Hunter-gatherers and primitive farmers have no use for a slave. They collect or grow just enough food for themselves. One more pair of hands is one more mouth. There is no economic advantage in owning another human being (Manning 1990). Over the period of the Atlantic Slave Trade, from approximately 1526 to 1867, some 12.5 million slaves had been shipped from Africa, and 10.7 million had arrived in the Americas (Miller 2018). The Atlantic Slave Trade was likely the most costly in human life of all of long-distance global migrations. The first Africans forced to work in the New World left from Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth century, not from Africa (Map 1.1). The first slave voyage direct from Africa to the Americas probably sailed in 1526 (Manning 1981).

It is of course a daunting job to explain (except the slave mobility) the motives, volition, drivers of the 27 million people who made the journey to the United States between 1880 and 1930 (Manning 1981). Most of them used steamship to get to the USA, however, as vessels grew safer, larger, sturdier, and faster, ocean crossings became less of an ordeal. Starting in 1867, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company established a line from Hong Kong to San Francisco, which carried American merchants, missionaries, and government officials to Asia, but the company made most of its money ferrying Chinese labourers to and from the United States (Kemble 1990). Migration is reshaping the World’s population map constantly.

There are so many nations in the world that were built by migrants. The above table shows how some countries’ workforce is formed and shaped by immigrants. Amidst, some countries are very much against migrants’ inflows. There are debunked myths about migration that immigrants are taking over many sectors of the country; some say immigrants are not educated; some blame immigrants for destroying the economy and some say they are terrorists or supporters of terrorists (Ullah et al.
1.3 Income Disparity and Migration Aspiration

The world community consists of some 200 countries with annual per capita incomes ranging from less than US$250 to over US$137,000 (World Bank 2015). In 2016, one-sixth of the world’s population lived in the 30 high-income countries with a gross national income of US$32 trillion, representing four-fifths of the global wealth of US$40 trillion (Martin et al. 2008; UN 2016). This stark disparity is pertinent rendering because the economic differentials function strongly as a driver for migration. Economic differential creates a desire to try the luck for better opportunities. Desire sometimes turns desperate desire among the people from low-income countries leading them to run life-threatening risks.

The Global North refers to the 57 countries with high Human Development Index (HDI) (above 0.8) (UNDP 2016) and most of these countries are located in the Northern Hemisphere (Fig. 1.1). The Global South refers to the countries of the rest of the world, most of which are located in the Southern Hemisphere including both countries with medium human development (88 countries with an HDI of less than 0.8 and greater than 0.5) and low human development (32 countries with an HDI of less than 0.5) (UNDP 2016). The countries of the South are those the World Bank classifies as low- and middle-income countries (Shaw and Ratha 2007).
In terms of GDP, as of 2018, only four countries with a per capita GDP above US$100,000: Monaco; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg and Bermuda are known for attracting wealthy residents as well as for having very small populations, ranging from 38,155 (Liechtenstein) to 590,321 (Luxembourg) (World Bank 2018). In contrast, however, at just US$247, South Sudan has the world’s lowest GDP per capita, and many countries, predominantly in Africa, have a GDP per capita below US$1000 (UN 2017). The United States has the largest GDP in the world at $20.4 trillion (World Bank 2019) with China the second largest at $14.1 trillion (World Bank 2019). However, the US has a population of 327 million, while China’s population is the highest in the world which is 1.42 billion (despite the significant difference), the US also has the third-highest population in the world, behind India in second place with 1.35 billion. Japan, Germany and the UK make up the rest of the top five countries with the largest GDPs at $5.167,050, $4.211,640 and $2.936,290 trillion, respectively (World Bank 2019).

Due to lack of political stability, appropriate technology, deprivation and colonial legacy the global south experienced slow (with a few exceptions) GDP growth. The legacies of European rule have affected post-colonial economic development of the colonized. Today though is a reasonable moment to review the economic impact of legacies because it allows us to consider the issue in the context of different phases of post-colonial policy and performance (Acemoglu et al. 2001).

The assumption that most migration happens in the Global North makes policy makers ignore the fact that migration had taken place in the global South long before the emergence of European-like nation-states limiting migration (Awad and Natarajn 2018). The two distinct categories of migration between the Global North and Global South make it clear that some are forced (for whatever reason) and some choose to migrate. The contemporary migration discourse create such a world by privileging certain types of individual suffering in myriad ways such as persecution and discrimination while normalizing the widespread suffering caused by poverty, inequality, disease, famine, drought, and environmental degradation, from which one is neither expected nor is permitted to flee across borders (Awad and Nataraja 2018). Hence it is crucial for all of us to internalize the fact that how dominant migration discourses constrain our knowledge, governance, and practices, particularly with regard to implications for the Global South, which makes up most of the world, yet rarely receives most of our attention. Awad and Natarajan (2018) go on the say that much of the recent and renewed interest is due to displacements from Syria, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen to Europe.

South-South migration is predominantly intraregional. The share of migration to other developing regions is negligible except South Asia. The intraregional migration in South Asia, for example, is estimated to be three times higher than migration to countries in other developing regions (World Bank 2014b; Ullah et al. 2018). Many of the large migration corridors emerged due to the partitioning of countries. The largest of the remaining corridors are not mainly South-North; some are North-North, and others South-South. However, India, Russia, and South Africa are known as receiving countries in the South. There are many lesser-known receiving countries include Iran and Cote D’Ivoire (Shaw and Ratha 2007; Ullah 2019).
1.4 Remittance and Development Argument

There has been a remarkable interest in private and public discourse about the interplay between migration and development (Rahman and Ullah 2012; Ullah 2010b, 2012a, 2016a; Jones 1998). Of course, remittance inflows have variable impact depending on countries’ capacity, technical orientation, and level of skilled population and size of economically active population. The infusion of $2 billion migradollars in Mexican economy generates 10% of Mexico’s output and 3% of its GDP (Durand et al. 1996). Many scholars have very well documented the multiplier effect of remittance spending. They came up with different estimations i.e. each $1 in remittance spending generates $2 to $3 in local economic activity, meaning that non-migrants can benefit indirectly from migration, especially if remittances are spent on local productions (Kuptsch and Martin 2004). Fouron (2004) added that the impact of remittances on economic growth is probably close to double the actual amount sent. The fact that infusion of $1 of remittance generates $2 local economic activity has become a powerful argumentative point in the migration-development debate. However, the re-discovery of the migration-development nexus tends to neglect the insights of research and policy experience that emerged a decade back. The trend to study the cause and impacts of migration separately was one of the reasons why migration and development did not come to the fore. This implies that separate strands of migration literature have been generated which excluded development issues. More generally, the scholarly debate on migration has tended to separate the developmental causes (determinants) and effects (impacts) of migration artificially from more general processes of social (including economic) change (Taylor 1999).

After decades of concerns about some ‘damaging effects’ of migration, governments of sending countries have had renewed hopes that we can make migration work for development. Of course, remittances are proven as effective instruments for income redistribution, poverty reduction and economic growth (Ullah 2010a; Kapur 2003; Ratha 2003). Remittances, however, could not be the only yardstick to measure development.

Migration is an age-old response to variations in economic and opportunity differentials, and security, social and political factors (Ullah and Huque 2019; Ullah et al. 2019). So far, overwhelming majority of the body of literature generated on migrants’ remittances and factors driving migration demonstrated that economic factor is the most powerful one for developing migration volition. Of course, economic aspiration is expressed in myriad of ways. Remittance was an issue insignificantly discussed just about five decades back and today it has reached to about US$686 billion making migration is one of the most debated topics at the global stage (World Bank 2019).

The remittances flow to developing countries reached to $414 billion in 2013. The World Bank expected a growth to reach to $540 billion in developing countries by 2016 (World Bank 2019). Among the countries, the top remittance recipients were India with $79 billion, followed by China ($67 billion), Mexico ($36 billion), the Philippines ($34 billion), and Egypt ($29 billion) (World Bank 2019; Pew Research...
In 2019, remittance flows to low—and middle-income countries are expected to reach to $550 billion, to become the largest source of external financing. Amongst Asia and the Pacific, more than 40% of workers’ remittances flow into South Asian region, followed by East Asia (30%) and Southeast Asia (22%) (Tables 1.4 and 1.5) (Jongwanich 2007; Pew Research Centre 2019).

The South receives higher amount than the North. However, the truth is that between 30 and 45% of total remittances to developing countries originate in other developing countries. There is an impression that the South receives the entire amount of remittance from the North. It is worth noting that if the outflows from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCCs) countries to labour-sending countries are considered

### Table 1.4 Regional Trend in remittances flows, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Estimated remittances ($Billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source* The World Bank (2019)

### Table 1.5 Projections of remittance flows to low—and middle-income regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018e</th>
<th>2019f</th>
<th>2020f</th>
<th>($ billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low and middle income</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>573</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-East and North Africa</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>747</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries (FY 2016)</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>561</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source* World Bank. See appendix A in World Bank (2017) for data and forecast methods

*Note* e = estimate; f = forecast

*This group excludes Equatorial Guinea, the Russian Federation, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, and Argentina, which were classified as high-income countries earlier. These countries are included in the group of low- and middle-income countries in the table
1.5 Conceptual Debates and the Determinants of Remittance

The migrant workers, in general, grouped in terms of the levels of skills: skilled, highly skilled and semi-skilled, low skilled and unskilled. With the Temporary Labour Migration Programs (TLMP) tending to control the admittance by rotating them in and out of the country, dominant economic theories suggest that after a certain period of times these workers gain some skills, which enable them to secure opportunities to move elsewhere with better job prospects rather than being stuck in the low paid occupation lines. We see this as a counter argument of the notion of brain drain or brain waste. However, most migrants cannot make use of the skill gained.

Skill categories and length of experience determine the level of earnings of the migrants. There are other factors as well in work to determine the level of income. For example, President of the Philippines Mr. Rodrigo Duterte visited Brunei in 2017. During his visit he negotiated with the government to determine the minimum wage for the domestic maids working in Brunei. Filipino migrant workers in Brunei are now guaranteed a monthly minimum wage of BND520. This helps decline exploitation. The argument we wanted to make is that sometimes government policy initiatives often determine the salary level. The more skilled migrants will be sent, the higher amount of remittances will be earned. Therefore, skill drain, skill gain, skill promotion are central to remittance debate. Conceptualization of terminologies in the domain enables readers to better grasp the position of migrants in the skill market. Brain circulation refers to the transfer of knowledge through expatriate nationals when they return home to establish and maintain social, professional and business relationships with the destination countries (Saxenian 2005). Brain exchange is about the benefit from the specialized experience of expatriate professionals enjoyed by both sending and receiving countries (UNESCO 2007) while brain gain is the accumulation of specialized human capital for highly skilled migrants in the destination ends (Ciumasu 2010). Brain networking is a long-term commitment of expatriates to distant collaboration, which can facilitate decisions among the undecided to return home as they fall in and out of the network and brain outflow is the exodus of underutilized skilled workers in the countries of origin. It is the result of weakness in the demand for skilled labour in the home country. Brain circulation and ‘brain networking’ are used interchangeably by some scholars (e.g., Saxenian 2005). The re-skilling of the labours have experienced obsolesce of skill due to change in labour market needs. Resulting in a circular or even a circuit flow of skills that do not move
in a linear pattern where people obtain and then dies with it—there is a room for re-skilling, which countries may initiate (Ullah et al. 2019).

Brain train refers to the mobility specifically for educational or training purposes, and brain drain is the phenomenon of the emigration of highly qualified and talented professionals from one country to another (Adekola 2017). Brain waste comes from Bauder’s study (2003) in Vancouver on immigrants from South Asia and the former Yugoslavia, who were forced to work in unregulated jobs or had to switch careers. De-skilling results in a loss to both the countries of origin and destination (Reitz 2001). Brain overflow is a process in which emigration occurs because of the over-supply or over-education of labour in any given country (William and Balaz 2005; Pellegrino 2001). Brain strain occurs when there is clear evidence that migration flows have adversely affected the sending economy. Migration flows are regulated to avoid the loss of highly skilled workers when migration governance is at work in certain countries (Lowell 2004). Brain desertification refers to the highly skilled migrants who do not return and do not sustain any ties with their countries of origin (Adekola 2017).

The migration has created dependency among migrant origin countries for their GDP and foreign currency reserve, as well as, the countries of destination for dependency on foreign labour. Dependency on migration in order to keep the economy going in both the origin and destination countries is a fact in the demand-supply dynamics. There is a long-standing debate about the fact whether the origin country loses or gains brain through migration process. Empirics suggest a fresh paradigm in this book by dispelling the century long held notion about loss and gain theories. Migration is based on the idea of origin-destination reciprocity. We explain the contradicting views about the nexus between migration and development (Table 1.6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.6 The basis for contradicting views</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration optimists</td>
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<td>Functionalist</td>
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<td>Neo-classical</td>
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<td>Modernization</td>
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<td>Net North-South transfer Net North-North transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brain gain</td>
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<td>More equality</td>
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<td>Remittance investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumption is a contribution to human resources</td>
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<td>Creates hopes</td>
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Source Modified and adopted from de Haas (2010)
Remittances directly reach out to millions of households—approximately 10% of the world’s population (Rahman 2010, 2013; Ballard 2003; Ullah 2017). This means that apparently there is a direct link of migration with stakeholders in whatever ways we may imagine of. At the most basic macroeconomic level, the balance of the migration—stakeholder relation depends on the relative strength of three effects: the impact of labour mobility on domestic labour supply and, in particular, the supply of specific types of labour; the impact of migration on productivity in the domestic economy; and the impact of remittance inflows (Rahman 2012; IOM 2009). In the macro-economic term, remittance provides the stable flow of funds for a major source of foreign exchange for some countries (IFAD 2015; Ullah 2017).

1.6 The Regional Context

Migration does not impact equally across the world. Depending on the political system, economic performances, demographic conditions, health status of the population, migration behaves differently. We briefly look into the differences in impact and its consequences.

In macro economy, remittances worked as savior for many low income and recently independent countries. For example, remittances covered almost 80% of the account deficit in Botswana and almost 70% of total commodity exports earnings in Sudan, and more than half of the foreign exchange earnings in Lesotho during the 1980s (Sander and Mlambo 2003). As share of GDP, remittances were substantial in Eritrea (19%), Cape Verde (12%), the Comoros (6%), and even Egypt (4%) and Morocco (5%) (Fig. 1.2) (World Bank 2019). Since the most countries in Africa got

![Fig. 1.2](image_url)  
*Fig. 1.2* Per cent of GDP contributed by remittances, 2018. *Source* World Bank (2019)
the independence between 1960s and 1980s, they needed massive rebuilding undertaking. Instead of engaging themselves in the rebuilding the nation, many tried to escape post-independent uncertainties. Some argues that, Chinese investment poured businessmen have taken over in the infrastructural development and mine management in many African countries due to lack of capital and necessary skills. Investment is at the heart of Africa’s needs, being the fastest growing population, but receiving less foreign direct investment (FDI) than any other emerging region, except for Central-Asian transition economies (Herrero 2019). China invested in sub-Saharan Africa about $299 billion from 2005 to 2018, and further in 2018, Chinese president vowed to invest $60 billion into African nations (Brooks 2019).

Asia is categorized into three economic hierarchies: highly developed; developing and underdeveloped. In terms of geography, Asia is divided into four geographical categories: South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia and Central Asia. Some argues that since the remittances became important contributor to the development, no underdeveloped countries turned developed with the help of remittance. Some argues that remittances are meant to ease temporary financial deficit and unemployment problems. A significant rise in the contribution by remittances to the GDP of Nepal from 11.5% in 2000–2001 to 16.8% in 2005–2006 and 22% in 2014 is a clear testament that remittances is growing but it has not turned Nepal into a developed country (World Bank 2015; Ullah 2015a). It does not mean that remittance is less vital in sustaining the development in Nepal. It has now positioned itself as the top contributor to foreign exchange earnings for the last five years. The share of remittances in total foreign exchange earnings increased from 36.6% in 2003–2004 to 46.7% in 2005–2006, whereas the corresponding share of exports dropped to 29.4% in 2005–2006 from 34.5% in 2003–2004 (Fig. 1.3) (World Bank 2010). Does this mean that Nepal is suffering from Dutch Disease?

**Fig. 1.3** Top remittance recipients in the East Asia and Pacific region, 2018. Note GDP = gross domestic product. Sources IMF; world development indicators; World Bank (2019)
In absolute terms, India, Mexico, the Philippines, Egypt and Turkey have been the five leading recipients of remittances in the developing world during the last two decades (Ghosh 2006; Ullah 2015a) with periodical fluctuations. The top five receiving countries by volume in 2001 were India, Mexico, Philippines, Morocco, and Egypt (Pant 2008). Banks and other transfer agencies may have earned some US$12 billion as transfer fees in 2001 (Maldonado and Robeldo 2002). Western Union alone moves about US$35 billion across 15,000 currency corridors, yielding US$4 billion in annual revenues (World Bank 2005a; Ghosh 2006).

Island states: The Island states’ economy seems to be largely dependent on remittances. For small Island States, remittances are important for some reasons. Due to their extreme exposure to climate change sustainable development is in jeopardy. They have narrow range of resources which forces undue specialization, excessive dependence on international trade (Prakash and Maiti 2015). The World Bank (2006) emphasizes that for Samoa and Tonga, and to a lesser extent for Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu, remittances are crucial for the sustaining the economy. Remittance inflows during 2000 and 2001, and again in 2005 and 2006, despite slowdowns in economic growth in Australia and New Zealand helped get their economy going (Asian Development Bank 2009).

Remittances helped alleviate credit constraints and act as a substitute for financial stability. Their contribution to growth is, however, dependent upon the scale and intensity of financial sector development (Asian Development Bank 2006). The Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) have made it easier for migrants than before (when they had to resort to formal banks) but the cost still remains high. Out of 34 developing countries that received remittances in excess of US$1.0 billion in 2004, 26 countries registered over 30 growth during 2001–2004: Algeria and Guatemala reported more than a tripling of remittance inflows; Brazil, China, Honduras, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Serbia and Montenegro reported growth in the range of 101–170% (Ghosh 2006; Sander and Mlambo 2003).

Finally, while dependency on remittances has declined by percentage point over the past years due to diversification of incomes, remittances still remain the most important sources for the GDP growth of many small economies. Many countries from the developing regions have seen migration as a survival strategy (Gray 2009; Ullah 2010b, 2012a, 2013a). However, our argument throughout the volume revolves around the fact that over highlighting the positive impacts of remittances may eclipse the long-term negative. Where a ratio of remittances to GDP is concerned, small Island countries like Tonga and Samoa experience the highest ratio, followed by the Philippines, Nepal and Mongolia. The ratio in these five countries ranged from 10 to 30% of GDP in the last two decades (Asian Development Bank 2009).

In order to support the argument we are making, the chapters of the volume analyze a number of interconnected issues: migration and development; Dutch disease and long term impact on development; exposure to remittances and gender; costs of migration and remittances; and remittances and dependence. Significant attention has been placed on the fees migrants pay to send their monies from their places of work to...
their homes. For this reason many migrants use the hawala system—essentially using family, village, or tribal connections to send money back home (Rahman 2012). The hawala system is cheap and does not require various forms of identification, which migrants are often unable or unwilling to provide. These methods have the obvious potential for abuse, though, and can be used by criminal elements, a recent concern, particularly around money laundering. The use of technology and competition among sending institutions have lowered the costs of sending remittances. On the Gulf–Asia corridor a number of large players (e.g., UAE Exchange, one of the biggest money transfer companies in the world) have used technology to significantly lower the costs to migrants of sending remittances back to their home countries. Although still a major issue in many corridors, the high cost of money transfers is becoming less so in some other corridors.

1.7 Chapter Organization

Chapter 2 grapples with methodological and theoretical issues. Chapter 3 argues whether migration could be a long-term strategy for development in developing countries. We explored the hypothesis about a country’s diminishing capacity to use remittances for promoting long-run economic growth. In some cases, we found that in general remittances have a positive impact on long-run economic growth, however the impact differs based on the country’s economic development level, governance, size of economy, and the abundance of remittances in the economy.

The Chapter 4 explores the fact that migrants in some countries are considered as heroes (i.e. the Philippines) because of their contribution to the economy. Migrants in general risking their lives, take an adventurous journey to get to their destinations. We analyze how aspiring migrants justify taking certain risks to migrate by negotiating risk information in relation to their life circumstances and considering the symbolic value of specific forms of migration.

The chapter engages in analysis on gender sensitivity of remittances. The on-going debate has been oscillated between accounts that portray remittances as empowering devices for receiving women and accounts highlighting their burdening effects. Some scholars have produced gendered perspectives on remittances that focus on the relationship between the senders and the receivers. This chapter, however, focus on the fact that Women constitute around half of the total international migration flow in today’s world; however, the amount of the remittance that they are exposed to is considerably lower than that of males.

Chapter 5 advances with an approach to researching and analysing migration processes that combines a livelihood approach to exploring migration dynamics with a relational political economy perspective that deepens understanding of the broader social, economic and political processes and interests. Basic economic theory provides many predictions with regard to the costs and benefits of migrants to home and host countries. Migration affects production, employment and wages, assimilation

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and attitudes towards migration, economic behaviour of the local population and migrants, international trade, etc. in both the host and home countries.

Chapter 6 deals with an important phenomenon arising from misconception about migration. This phenomenon is xenophobia. This has been prevalence strongly in South Africa during 70s. This is again reported in Europe during the influx of Middle Eastern migrant into Europe. The last chapter synthesizes all the chapters of the volume. The chapter touches upon contemporary debates about negative and positive impact of migration. Migration has created myriad of consequences socially, economically, environmentally, politically and demographically. Since migration studies became a significant academic area of research, most researches highlighted only positive impacts on both the origin and destination countries.
Chapter 2
Underlying Methodological and Theoretical Aspects

The remarkable renaissance in the interest in migration and development in both sending and receiving societies by policy makers and scholars (Kapur 2003; Ratha 2003) has coincided with a radical shift from pessimistic to optimistic views on the issue.

This chapter is divided into two parts: the first one describes methodological reflections on research methods, highlighting important questions about the way in which the personal and the academic combine to produce “what we know” about contemporary global migration. We address more practically some of the qualitative methods used to investigate migration. The second part is about the theoretical issues related to migration. The aim here is to offer thoughts on how to improve and advance our understanding of qualitative research tools.

In this chapter, we highlight major theoretical underpinnings of international migration and methodological aspects. The interplay between theory and research remains crucial for the best blend of an analysis of a phenomenon like international migration. This provides a framework, direction and rationale for the research (Bryman 2008). The main purpose of a research is the enrichment of theoretical knowledge; either by building upon current knowledge of an existing topic or by extending the understanding of an unexplored area (Sim and Wright 2000). Theory is a framework for observation and understanding, which shapes both what we see and how we see it (Yeh 2007). It is about a generalised statement that asserts a connection between two or more phenomena—any generalised explanatory principle (Berger and Luckmann 1996). The analogy of theory is that ‘facts’ of different shapes and sizes have no meaning if they are not put together in a theoretical framework to offer a better direction of the analysis (Charles 2018).

This book is an outcome of a research conducted from 2014 to 2018 in a number of countries (Bangladesh; Brazil [on Dekassegui], India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Netherlands [on Surinamese]). The rationale for including the countries in the research is that these countries represent well of the sending and receiving ones. Migration has not equally impacted across all the regions in the world. This book, therefore, grasps how differently has migration had impact on development.
Therefore, a representative number of case studies (from South Asia and South East Asia, Middle East, Africa, South America, Central Asia, East Asia, Europe and North America) on migration and development nexus have been fundamental in producing the empirical basis of the argument we are making.

For this research, empirical data have been collected through interviews from migrants, their families remained behind, stakeholders, policymakers purposively selected based on logistical convenience. Policymakers, migrant population and remittance recipients and users have been included in the interviewee list. We selected our study countries for the prominence they gained in population migration.

Migration research is newer than the phenomenon itself owing to the fact that the phenomenon per se received delayed attention from researchers, academia, policy makers and international communities. This resulted in severe deficiencies in unified-but-suitable migration research methods for different geopolitical locales. Quantitative oriented researchers tended to erect a boundary from those who are qualitatively oriented. However, of late, a consensus has been established that the blend of both qualitative and quantitative methods yields a better outcome. Quantitatively garnered information is painlessly analyzable statistically and fairly reliable, but go with criticism for not providing an in-depth description. Qualitative methods, however, provide a more in depth and rich description of the phenomena but it limits large population to research on. We argue that no way is researching in normal condition similar to myriad of precarious conditions migrants go through (Ullah et al. 2019).

Migration specific methodologies for research has not yet emerged in a unified form, therefore, a void in knowledge persists resulting in the growing dilemmas in conducting research in conditions wherein, through and from migrants move over. This chapter therefore, addresses the vacuum that persisted in the scholarship and how differently migration research should be designed depending on demographic and geopolitical settings. Quantitative approaches—numerical measurements—which are the preferred methodologies of empirical, hypothetico-deductive and experimental migration research with the objectives to test hypotheses, and identifies numerical differences between groups under study. Qualitative approaches by contrast associate with a broader theoretical critique of quantitative models. Thus, qualitative methods aim to explore meaning, and might well be chosen for the investigation of issues, which, for ethical, practical or epistemological reasons, are difficult to ‘measure.’ This book brings in knowledge garnered experientially from a number of studies conducted on migration in selected countries from around the world.

Without research the world would not have seen so many advances and changes in societies. Research has contributed to changes and modifications in policies and plans made for human improvement. Therefore, the basis of research needs to be grounded by a sound and ethically endorsed methodology (Resnik 2016). Just a decade ago, in the ‘researcher—researched power hierarchy’, researchers were considered as more powerful than the researched. This means researchers were superior while the researched were inferior. Hence researched were placed in a position that they felt obliged to provide information for the particular research. In any research, this must not be the case. Today, however, the picture has changed dramatically, i.e. issues of
harm and vulnerabilities respondents/researched are prone to be taken into account (Sales and Folkman 2000; Ullah and Huque 2014; Nation and Angell 2006). Walton (2013) emphasizes that there has been a real change in the last decade in people talking more openly about ethical dilemmas in research.

The situation, as if, has been like whatever questions the questionnaire possesses could be asked of the respondents. Privacy, likelihood of harm, vulnerability and related consequences of the migrants were not taken into consideration. The practice has been in most cases like, respondents are forced to provide data and they are not allowed to withdraw from the interview. Researched invests time, and energy, and provides information without any direct benefit. Yet, they have been considered as someone subjected to provide information no matter how harmful or risky is this for the migrant population.

A tailored methodology (for example, researching in a war zone) for migration research has not yet been developed. The growing attention given to the research involving migrants and refugees has not yet been passably translated into corresponding research on the methodological challenges researchers handle oftentimes. The relative scarcity of such scholarship reflects the dilemma of the multidisciplinary nature of the study of migration studies. The category ‘migration and refugee’ has long been sidelined in favour of some other terms such as asylum seeker, irregular migrant or undocumented migrant, or is subsumed under emerging academic taxonomies such as the asylum–migration nexus (Eftihia and Giorgia 2007). We argue that no way is researching in normal condition similar to that of a condition refugee population experience or lives in Experiences of migrants and refugees in South East Asia (for example, Bhutanese in Nepal; Myanmarese in Thailand and Bangladesh) are different from those are in Egypt coming from Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. Therefore, specific techniques or methods are needed to grasp a range of geographical situations. A void in knowledge persists resulting in the growing challenges in conducting research in precarious conditions wherein migrants of all kinds and refugees abode, owing to displacement of refugees caused by myriad of factors that we have to take into consideration.

This section offers the crucial stages of a research process concerning migrants, presents significant dimensions of the multiple methods used (semi-structured interviews with informational questionnaires, in-depth interviews and participant observation) to obtain information and data, mainly on the varied difficult situations. Methodologies for conducting research in migration are never static as opposed to subject to modification with pattern of migration takes place depending on the geo-political landscape. Research methods applied included quantitative studies on migration, qualitative methods such as discourse analyses, long-term fieldwork, participant observation as well as multi-strategy research. Addressed those researches were the cross-disciplinary and trans-national aspects of research that place extra demands on research methods in data collection, sampling, comparative policy framework analysis, usage of terminologies, comparisons of discourses and ideological representations in a sometimes contested field of inquiry (Gale 2015).
What makes migration a subject of investigation are processes like Europeanization, globalization, and economic polarization often problematizing the free movement of people (Penninx 2010). Academic researchers have responded to the challenges associated with this issue by drawing upon a range of disciplines, gathering evidence from a variety of countries, employing an array of methodological tools to examine the emergent evolving processes and patterns of migration. An examination of the quantitative and qualitative paradigms helps identify their strengths and weaknesses and how the divergent approaches can complement each other. In most cases, researchers fall into one of the two camps—either relying exclusively upon objective survey questionnaires and statistical analyses or using only qualitative methodologies, rejecting the quantitative approach as decontextualizing human behavior. Experiences, however, bear out that each approach has affirmative attributes, and combining them answers the best of both research worlds.

Quantitative researches that are designed to ensure objectivity, generalizability and reliability cover the subjects that are selected randomly from the study population in an unbiased manner. The respondents answer to the questions set out in a standardized questionnaire, and the statistical methods are used to test predetermined hypotheses regarding the relationships between specific variables. This paradigm produces quantifiable and reliable data that are usually generalizable to a larger population. Qualitative methodologies for migration research provide researcher with the perspective of the subjects through immersion in a situation and direct interaction with the subjects under study. Qualitative methods used so far in migration include inter alia observations, in-depth interviews and focus groups. Hypotheses are generated during data collection and analysis, and measurement tends to be subjective. In the qualitative paradigm, the researcher becomes the instrument of data collection, and results may vary greatly depending upon who conducts the research (Ritchie et al. 2003).

Not at all fresh is the discourse about the application of quantitative and qualitative techniques. In most cases, sample frames were not available either from the government, IOM or from the UNHCR. Therefore, sample drawing remains a crucial issue to conduct a quantitative research. Qualitative in-depth research has been the most significant technique to depict the reality of the migration picture for appropriate interventions. Doing a long-term participatory research and ethnography with migrant communities has changed our views on methodology on migration research.

It has not been many years when migration has emerged as an academic discipline. In addition, refugees are becoming an endangered species’, with fewer individuals being officially recognized under the 1951 Refugee Convention. While intervention techniques were developed, an absence of research techniques for refugees is felt and recognized as well. The precarious situation they live in is often not conducive to bringing under research initiative. Most research whether or not academic these days is conducted without going through appropriate internal review board providing a condition for the participants to be humiliated. Therefore, researches on refugee warrant going through such steps to ensure their rights are protected. This is not about the discourse entering qualitative or quantitative rather we trust that adopting either or both depends on the purpose of the particular research.
Conceptual clarification is a prerequisite for any methodological approach to be adopted for a research study. Earlier research focusing on document and discourse analysis, expert interviews and narrative interviews with smuggled migrants indicated that there is a pressing need for a deepened debate on methodology when research subjects are trafficked in human, refugees and migrants in difficult conditions. Clearly that methods and techniques should be developed in a way so that they can be tailored according to the geographical locations and the political system of the host country.

Remittances earned, amount spent, and the impact are extremely difficult for the migrant population to measure and remember in accurate terms. Researching these issues become even more complex when the catchment countries for a research project are many in number. Language issues, cultural barriers, accessibility [to the respondents] problems, and access to data appear more complex than other logistical issues.

The designs of empirical approaches are the compelling consequences of ideas about the object of investigation. In migration research current concepts like “eth- nicity,” “integration,” or “migration background” are still the subjects of on-going controversies (Karin et al. 2007). Debates about the methods employed in migration research cannot avoid the underlying perspectives on immigrant societies and populations. Controversies concerning methodological issues also depend on diverse ways of defining the status and living conditions of migrant populations in contemporary societies.

Professional interpreters, bilingual students, bilingual overseas-trained researchers were recruited to conduct field research. The researchers who required training on data collection were shortlisted and were asked to attend a short training session in the respective area of the country by trained people. As researchers, due to time and resource constraints, we used skype heavily to monitor the quality of the data. Migrant population, returned migrants, remained behind family members; and stakeholders were interviewed. Most interviews were held in informal setting depending on the logistical convenience. Interviews and focus group discussions were held.

The criteria for the field researchers to select respondents were based on a few aspects such as migrants who migrated and stayed out of the country for at least five years; migrant families that had both good and bad experiences and those who were willing to be interviewed. There were a number of challenges that the field researchers had to tackle. Due to diverse political conditions, there is no common definition of migrants in survey research that is generally accepted or even comparable between countries. Migrant populations differ regarding their cultural backgrounds as well as their immigration history and their migration status. Another major challenge was related to employing adequate sampling procedures.

Qualitative approaches to migration have acquired a special importance in recent years. Such approaches have always been used by social scientists for investigating phenomenon like migrants life. Qualitative research is the systematic inquiry into social phenomena in natural settings. These phenomena can include, but are not limited to, how people experience aspects of their lives, how individuals and/or groups behave, how organizations function, and how interactions shape relationships
Underlying Methodological and Theoretical Aspects

Underlying Methodological and Theoretical Aspects (Bogdan and Biklen 2006; Denzin and Lincoln 2011). Their work led to the development of a range of fieldwork methods to investigate particular social issues, many of which related directly to the everyday lives of migrants and the issues they faced (Blaumeiser 2001; Bohnsack 1997; Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Kleining 1999).

Since the 1960s, feminist scholars have criticised the limited perspective of quantitative-positivistic accounts of migration, especially in terms of their gender-blind approach (Borkert et al. 2006). They proposed qualitative methodologies to address this issue, and to more broadly bring out the complexities of migrant lives (particularly those of migrant women) (Becker-Schmidt 2001; Brah 1996; Kofman et al. 2000)

Evidently, conventional techniques that have so far been used in social sciences including migration research were not concerned much about ethical issues. Power relations often (majority/minority) create insider/outsider dilemmas for the researcher, problems of representation and cross-cultural translation, how ‘race’ of interviewer/researcher affects trust in field studies and other ethical considerations. A very recent is the introduction of the approval from the International Review Board—IRB (in organizations/institutions, if any) to protect the rights of the participants and obstruct the researchers from playing dominance over the respondents. The questions regarding accessibility to and reliability of relevant data ranging from use of statistics as well as access to research fields, how to handle confidential research material, how to develop intersectional analyses, and specific questions related to multi-strategy research design are crucial in researching migration.

2.1 Underlying Theoretical Perspectives

The migration perspective has generated a lot of research and prompted wide-ranging theoretical debate. We highlight the diversity of approaches applied to understanding migration: countries of origin or destination; micro, meso and macro levels; individual behaviours, networks, migration policies. We show how these theories have evolved to take account of changing local and international migration dynamics.

New research topics appeared in the political and scientific agendas from the early 1970s. Migrants were no longer considered to be just workers, but as people actually inhabiting cities, with families, often with young school-aged children, and using public services such as hospitals and counselling centres. Questions around welfare provision, housing allocation, and neighbourhood integration began to be taken into account by social scientists. Most notably, there was a concern with issues of social equality, economic integration, and cultural assimilation. As it still merits knowing how many migrants there were, the immigrant question shifted the research agenda to a fresh terrain (Borkert et al. 2006).

Migration theory remains fragmentary and it is difficult to project the likely trends of aggregate migration flows (Zolberg 1989). Many of the events that drive migration, notably the economic trends, climate change, fresh rise of far right wing politics, and global political change, are volatile. Political processes at home and abroad can be
important in shaping migration. However, increasingly sophisticated approaches are being made to improve understanding (Howe and McWilliam 2006). Economic and demographic disparities between the global North and South continue and in some cases have widened (Tienda and Booth 1991). Economic models succeed best when migration is primarily for labor. According to Sjaastad (1962), migration pressure to the Global North from the South is likely to remain high.

According to classical sociological approaches, migrants go to countries where compatriots live so that a chain spans (i.e. chain migration) and they can rely on support during the initial difficult time of settling in. Postmodern theories, however, explain without socio-economic explanations of social problems, but instead try to interpret the world in “turns” such as the linguistic turn, the cultural turn, the anthropological turn or even the iconic turn, etc. (Kruh 2012). Many leftists and many concerned with the human-rights situation have gotten themselves into trouble with their ministries of the interior with issues of migration. Kruh (2012) brought in an example of one blatant case of human-rights violations when in 2010 two 8-year-old twin girls from Kosovo were to be deported in the early morning hours, and 100,000 dedicated and committed citizens signed a petition against this deportation. The pressure was mounting and, eventually the government had to allow the re-entry of the Kosovan Komani family (Kruh 2012).

Large-scale immigration raises questions such as ‘who are we?’ and ‘who belongs to us?’ Nation-states try to manage those questions by setting up criteria for inclusion and exclusion applied through their citizenship regimes (Bauboeck 1996: 7). Identity politics is only adopted when identities are allegedly endangered. Those who do not know exactly who they are, have to reassure themselves of their identities (Munz 2007).

Heated debates on migration emanate from economic migration. Some people argue that people should be able to take jobs anywhere, regardless of their origin (i.e. ‘free movement of labour’). Other people think that’s a bad idea, either for the place the migrants are going or the place they are leaving. There are debates in some countries about how easy it should be for citizens to come and go. On one hand people worry that their best and brightest people leave the country in droves for higher salaries abroad, often after receiving years of publicly funded education. The question of whether economic migration is good or bad touches on a lot more than just economics because there are social, cultural, and moral arguments used to argue for and against migration, as well as security concerns raised by letting people move back and forth.

The loss of human capital is a key challenge as many countries already face serious human resource shortage due to skill migration to developed states. However, work migration has been a contentious issue across the world. The recent elections in England, Australia and the United States (US), the immigration issues became the central campaign debate (NGO Pulse 2010; Gaitan 2017). We witness that work migration cuts across class and skill boundaries, as well as geographical and demographic contexts (NGO Pulse 2010).

Nyberg-Sorensen et al. (2002: 9) aptly capture the ‘bad’ side of work migration, stating that current alarmist commentary on migration includes “apocalyptic visions
Underlying Methodological and Theoretical Aspects

Of a western world beset by massive migration pressure from ‘barbarous’, ‘degenerating’ regions of the developing world, coupled with overwrought anxieties about growing ‘imbalances’ between the native population and other racial categories”. Developed countries are increasingly becoming suspicious of work migrants who are perceived to be stealing jobs, increasing crime and diluting the national culture. The ugly side of migration is that the outright xenophobia is increasingly becoming hot topic in many countries. Migrant workers are highly vulnerable to racism, xenophobia and discrimination and this is even more apparent in the current climate of economic downturn and growing unemployment levels in migrant-receiving countries. Unfortunately, xenophobia, racism and discrimination have become commonplace as current international disputes about national identity have shown. The recent international debate over the banning of the Islamic headscarf in many Western countries is a case in point. While this has elicited mixed views, it has also catalysed harsh anti-Islamic sentiment in many developed countries and has revealed the intensely negative views of developed countries towards Islamic migrants. This is but one example of outright discrimination and xenophobia in host countries. This is becoming more common globally.

Migration is closely linked to security concerns at the individual, national and global levels and this is especially true when one considers that migration often occurs as a result of conflict and violence. As a result, increasingly harsh policies are formulated resulting in promotion of human smugglers and employers who hire illegal immigrants to avoid complying with government employment regulations. As more and more humans cross more and more borders in search of jobs, security and a better future, they need to confront, assimilate or expel strangers strains political systems and collective identities that were shaped in less fluid times (Harari 2018).

The European Union was built on the promise to transcend the cultural differences (European Commission 2005) between French, Germans, Spanish and Greeks. There are claims that it, however, might collapse due to its inability to contain the cultural differences between Europeans and migrants from Africa and the Middle East. The debate is that the host country can allow the immigrants in but the immigrants must embrace at least the core norms and values of the host country (assimilation, integration etc.), even if that means giving up some of their traditional norms and values in order to become ‘us’.

Pro-immigrationists think that countries have a moral duty to accept not just refugees, but also people from poverty—stricken lands who seek jobs and a better future. On the contrary, anti-immigrationists think that use of sufficient force; immigration could be and should be stopped. Countries should not be obliged to open the door. However, in the case of refugees fleeing brutal persecution in a neighbouring country could be excepted. They justify their argument that one of the most basic rights of every human is to defend itself against invasion, whether in the form of armies or migrants.

Assimilation into the local culture, to us, is a kind of punishment. Assimilation carries a meaning that it asserts a force on immigrants. Anti-immigrationists tend to place the bar high, whereas pro-immigrationists place it much lower. If, for example, immigrants move from a patriarchal society to a liberal society, must they become
feminist? If they come from a deeply religious society, need they adopt a secular worldview? Should they abandon their traditional dress codes and food taboos (Harari 2018)? In a global world, as we think about freedom, how does it fit in reality?

Most people concede the existence of at least some significant differences between human cultures, in some issues ranging from sexual mores to political habits. Cultural relativists argue that difference doesn’t imply hierarchy, and we should never prefer one culture to another. Human beings behave in various ways, but we should celebrate this diversity, and give equal value to all beliefs and practices. This, however, does not stand the test of reality.

Yet, we have to accept the fact that not all cultures are characterised by exactly the same level of acceptance. For example, German culture in the early twenty-first century is more tolerant of strangers and more welcoming of immigrants than Saudi culture. It is far easier for a Muslim to immigrate to Germany than it is for a Christian to immigrate to Saudi Arabia (Harari 2018).

Skin colour matters a lot. Harari (2018) explains in an example nicely how does colour matter. Walking down a New York Street with lots of melanin pigment in your skin means that wherever you are heading, the police might view you with extra suspicion. But the likes of both President Trump and President Obama may explain the significance of skin colour in cultural and historical terms. The police view your skin colour with suspicion not due to any biological reason, but rather due to history. Presumably, the Obama camp explains that police prejudice is an unfortunate legacy of historical crimes such as slavery, while the Trump camp explains that black criminality is an unfortunate legacy of historical errors committed by white liberals and black communities (Harari 2018). Even someone is actually a tourist from Delhi who knows nothing about American history; h/se will have to deal with the consequences of that history.

Regarding migration in the South East Asia (SEA), the cross-border mobility in SEA has risen with super rapidity. The East and South East Asia consist of 16 countries with about two billion populations (Ullah 2018; Hirschman and Bonaparte 2012). Historically, the region is known for its ancient trade routes, strong economic and cultural ties between the countries (Ullah and Kumpoh 2018). It is a home to 12 million international migrants who have contributed greatly to the economic prosperity in myriad of ways. Simultaneously, international migration has played an extremely important role in the recent formation of the demographic context in Central Asia (UNESCO 2015). The continuous mobility of human resources presents a considerable loss in terms of human capital, sustainable development and the quality of life of people in the region of origin. Migration of Central Asians, and the exodus of Russians have probably the results of economic downturn (based on actual and anticipated declines in real incomes), but some political and social issues have also played a role (questions of nationality, status of ethnic minorities, linguistic problems, etc.) (Peyrouse 2008). For example, in recent years, due to the economic and political instability, waves of Kyrgyz have immigrated into neighboring states like Tajikistan. Kyrgyz immigrants bring with them a different language, different custom, and a distinct identity, which many Kyrgyz seek to preserve (Ryazantsev and Horie 2011).
Table 2.1 Migrations to Latin America, 1992–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Africa to Brazil</td>
<td>3,527,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Africa to Spanish America</td>
<td>1,235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Spain to Colonial Sp. Ame</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Portugal to Colonial Brazil</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcolonial Asian immigration</td>
<td>855,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcolonial European immigration</td>
<td>16,820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,037,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Africa, environmental degradation, overpopulation, droughts, famines, debt crisis, political and social instability, economic marginalization, ethnic clash, and religious fanaticism have become powerful elements for ceaseless unrest (Ullah 2012a; Otunnu 1992; Akokpari 1999). This circumstance breeds potential migrants and refugees. Although sub-Saharan Africa constitutes only about 10% of the world’s population, it accounts for nearly twenty-five per cent of the world’s refugees (Lodchie 1975: 89; Ullah 2014a). A substantial percentage of these were the environmental refugees (Ullah 2013b). Others have fled civil wars and human rights violations (Ullah 2015a). There are millions more internally displaced people who are not legally recognized under international law as refugees.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has identified major migration patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN 2019). Historically, immigration into Latin America from overseas between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries was imposed with a strong European component.

Migration is universal. Human being spread globally from one corner to the other of the world through migration. Transcontinental migration has played important role in the Americas. This continent was formed entirely by immigrants from every other continent (Table 2.1). Over two-thirds of Latin America’s population descends from people who arrived after 1492 (Berenguer 1979; Silva-Zolezz 2009). In Africa, Asia, and Europe, over 94% of the population trace their origins to people who had been there for thousands of years.

Migration to Europe, for example, cannot be entirely understood if the relevance of colonialism and post-colonialism, and the different national and academic treatment of the issues not comprehended. The largest migrations to Latin America during the first half of the nineteenth century were only partially postcolonial (Solimano 2005). About 70,000 Europeans entered Cuba during that period. Interestingly, some of them were Spanish and French refugees fleeing from the collapse of colonial regimes (Berenguer 1979). About 430,000 Spanish soldiers sent to Cuba to put down anti-colonial revolts. About one-third of the soldiers either managed to stay in Cuba, which means that the Spanish army became the mechanism of immigration (Fraginals and Maso 1999).
The South-North migration flows began to be apparent during 1970–1990 (Organization of American States 2011). Although migration has resulted in the loss of qualified workers in Latin America and the Caribbean and the emergence of immigrant communities, the development of an economic potential associated with the remittances sent by migrants to their countries of origin seems to be rewarding. Latin America received close to US$23 billion in revenue from migrant workers in 2001 and it grew to US$80 billion in 2014 (Cavallo and Powell 2019).

The relevance of migration studies with contemporary globalization and rapid changes in economic and political landscape are proven facts (Castles et al. 2005). Different paradigms of migration studies have emerged over the past decades, there still lacks clear and dominant approaches to explaining the phenomenon. The advancement of globalisation in both the cultural and economic spheres has added further complexity to international migration, and further compounded by the different disciplinary approaches used to investigating the different national-academic research traditions (Borkert et al. 2006).

The reception of migrants, the attitudes, the culture, the images and representations towards them are determined by global, national and local factors. Thus, despite processes of Europeanization and or globalisation and attempts towards harmonization of immigration policies within the EU, national traditions remain strong (Borkert et al. 2006).

Colonial legacy shapes today’s migration. As we look at the migration volume to European countries, we notice that their origins are regions where, for a long time, they ruled or had colonies. Immigration has initially been seen as something temporary but it has become permanent, eventually. Therefore, today’s claims about the migrants are that they have marked the societies politically, socially and culturally, though they are the minority: out of 380 million west Europeans, only about 20 million i.e. just about 5% foreigners (Leclercq 1998). In terms of migration to Europe, the economic crisis in early 70s marked a political and academic watershed. In political terms, European borders were officially closed to new migrant workers because of the economic downturn that followed the oil-price rise (Coleman 1994). For academics, this shift marked the beginning of critical engagement with migration as a political problem.

Since the great political changes of 1989–1991, international migration to Europe has evolved significantly, and has once again stimulated interest amongst both the public and policy-makers. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the war in the former Yugoslavia, and the progressive strengthening of the European internal market has diversified migration movements (Martin 1999). Similarly, the advancement of globalisation in both the cultural and economic spheres has added further complexity to international migration. Today, it is more difficult to compartmentalise migration into one or two streams such as the labour, refugee and family reunification movement of the past (Salt 1992; Ullah 2014a, b; Bommes and Morawaska 2005; Bretell and Hollifield 2000). This has meant that different research approaches are now increasingly being considered alongside each other. There is, in short, a growing recognition that ostensibly similar issues can be looked at and talked about in different ways, but that
is because migration has become so fragmented, there is a simultaneous need for scholars to draw their different disciplinary and national perspectives closer.

We suggest, in line with Simmons (1987), three major dimensions of characterizing migration: a change in residence, a shift in employment and a shift in social relations (Simmons 1987). According to Simmons, the field remains highly fragmented because theories treat specific types of migration grounded in particular social and historical contexts, which affect the levels of analysis, be it micro, macro or meso. Individual decision-making for migration is one of the important explanatory factors in international migration. Individuals calculate the costs and benefits of taking migration initiative. The work of Alan Simmons (1995, 2002) is an exception, establishing an explicit link between the historical development of migration patterns, their social and economic significance, and the various phases in the development of capitalism and globalization.

Sjaastad (1962) contributed to migration studies hugely particularly to the introduction of the notion of human capital into migration theory to get around the problem of estimating returns. The basic postulate of his approach is explicit, namely that the analysis of private costs and returns is valid only in the case of voluntary migration, which, in a competitive economy, satisfies the requirement of “optimum” allocation of resources. He therefore, poses two questions: “first, and the one which has received the major attention, concerns the direction and magnitude of the response of migrants to labor earnings differentials over space. The second question pertains to the connection between migration and those earnings, that is, how effective is migration in equalizing inter-regional earnings of comparable labor? The latter question has received much less attention than the former. It is also the more difficult of the two (Sjaastad 1962: 80–81).”

The theories that have evolved over the centuries have generally evolved in isolation (de Haas 2008). Hence, theoretical incoherence has been a common problem. This incoherence is the result of the fact that migration has never been the exclusive domain of one of the social sciences, but has been studied by most of them. De Haas goes on to say that the differences in disciplines have led to widespread controversy on the nature, causes, and consequences of migration. Therefore, there have been numerous attempts to develop a comprehensive migration theory (Lee 1966; Massey et al. 1998; Zelinsky 1971). Lee (1966) begins by postulating that migration is the result of an individual calculation based on positive factors at destination and negative factors at origin. Lee’s model introduces the original concept of intervening opportunities between the places of origin and destination. He points out that it is not so much the actual factors at origin and destination as the perception of these factors result in migration.

Portes (1981) affirms that migration increases with time, and that growing economic disparities between developed and developing countries drive this increase, by education and training, and by technological progress, notably in communications and transportation. These are precursors of the research questions that were set to dominate the scientific literature on international migration in the context of globalization. Wilbur Zelinski (1971) was among the first to outline a theory of mobility based on the notion of transition. He seeks to include migration in the theory of
2.1 Underlying Theoretical Perspectives

demographic transition, which traditionally focuses solely on changes in fertility and mortality.

2.2 Macro-structural Approaches

“Human character, of course, is mirrored in the face. The eyes reveal sincerity, lying, curiosity, love and hate. But one’s choice of shoes speaks to personal geography: wealth or poverty, age, type of work, education, gender, and urban versus rural. Among the world’s legions of migrants, a certain pedal taxonomy holds. Economic migrants—the destitute millions with time to plan ahead—seem to favour the shoe of the twenty-first century’s poor: the cheap, unisex, multipurpose Chinese sneaker. War refugees escaping violence, by contrast, must trudge their wretched roads in rubber flip-flops, dress loafers, dusty sandals, high-heeled pumps, booties improvised from rags, etc. (Salorek 2019: 60).”

Salorek’s seven years of work has been featured in the National Geographic’s 236th volume. We see how a journalist shares common impulse with an academic like Murrugarra et al. (2011) and Massey (2013) who theorized some features of international migration: the structural forces in sending nations that create a mobile population prone to migration. This could be explained by world system theory and institutional theory (Portes and Walton 1981; North 1990); the structural forces in receiving nations that generate a persistent demand for migrant workers; and the social structures and organizations that arise in the course of globalization to perpetuate flows of people over time and across space.

The analytical framework of Akin Mabogunje (1970) sought to identify all the elements liable to influence migration, ranging from the economic environment to technology, the social environment and political factors. Mabogunje’s approach sees migration not as a linear, one-way movement, but as a circular phenomenon embedded in a system of interdependent variables. His approach gives rise to a conception of international migration that ties in with globalization, even suggesting the idea of a world labour market in a globalized economy (Petras 1981; Simmons 2002). This global perspective generated abundant literature on transnational networks (Schiller et al. 1992; Faist 2000; Vertovec 2009).

According to Piche (2013), to challenge the postulate of the rational actor (Ullah 2010a) maximizing interests under market forces Burawoy (1976) introduced political and structural factors. This is based on the principle of geographical separation of the processes of labour force renewal (reproduction) from those of maintenance (Piche 2013). An economic basis and political and legal institutions are both interdependent in forming migration connection (Burawoy 1976). He calls this a ‘twin dependency’ on two modes of production. This does not reproduce itself without recourse to noneconomic institutions. This assertion of course needs to be validated. For example, in West Africa, even after the disappearance of coercive structures (i.e. the abolition of forced labour), the system of temporary migrant labour continues to exist (Cordel et al. 1996).
The circular migration concept suggests “preindustrial society, characterized by a domestic mode of production, is not destroyed, since it continues to ensure the subsistence of those who stay behind, and the ‘social’ security of those who have emigrated” (Gregory and Piché 1983). Burawoy’s model (1976) remains pertinent today for various reasons, one of which is the temporary work programmes now re-emerging in industrialized countries also involves a twin economic and institutional dependency. Burawoy’s approach introduces macro-structural factors into the circular migration process. But in a more general perspective, certain authors see migration as a response to demand for labour (e.g. Sassen 1988).

Research on international migration has developed a wide spectrum of theoretical approaches in order to explain the origins, patterns and different flows of migration (Velazquez 2000). Classical theory of push-pull has been one of the most influential ones. With the changing pattern of migration over the years worldwide, different theories such as rational choice model, came into place to explain micro level decision making of migration which encompasses a range of factors: social, economic, geographic, political etc. Before seventeenth century migration has been a kind of nomadic and business and trade related phenomena. Nomadic Gypsy started their worldwide movement on various reasons from India to Egypt to Palestine and Europe. After the nomadic form of movement declined, if not disappeared, following their seeking to be settled, migration took demand and supply based form while forced and slave labour were widespread too during that period of time. For centuries it was believed that the Gypsies originated from Egypt which accounts for the similarities in their associated given names in various countries throughout Europe such as Gitans in France, Gitanos in Spain, and Egiftos in Greece (Frère 1973: 23). This assumption held sway from their first appearance in Europe until the 1783 publication of the first modern scientific work on the Gypsies entitled Die Zigeuner by German scholar H.M.G. Grellmann. Based on earlier studies in linguistics by Hungarian theologian Istavan Wali, Grellmann was able to demonstrate unequivocally that the spoken language of the Gypsies, Romani, was in fact related to Sanskrit, and was then able to situate the origins of the enigmatic nomads in India (Stewart 1997: 27). This claim has since been substantiated by more recent research in modern genetics, which has provided “unambiguous proof that all Roma are descended from

1The cultural group that would later become the Gypsies led a semi-nomadic life in India, and has been tentatively identified as the Dom, which has been recorded as far back as the sixth century. The Dom performed various specialized jobs such as basket-making, scavenging, metal-working and entertainment, traveling a circuit through several small villages each year. This is not a unique phenomenon; the Irish Travellers, although completely unrelated genetically to the Gypsies, fulfill the same functions. Indian caste beliefs of the time may have been the original model for the strict purity and pollution ideology of the present Gypsies, modified over time through contact with other cultures. This semi-nomadic life allowed the Dom the opportunity to easily flee when battles threatened the area in which they lived, and apparently did so three times during the Middle Ages. The European Gypsies are perhaps the original refugees from Mahmud of Ghanzi’s wars, for all sixty Romani dialects contain Armenian words, suggesting that they passed through Armenia in the early eleventh century on the way into the Byzantine Empire. The impetus to continue on and enter Byzantine Anatolia was most likely provided by the Seljuk Turks attacked Armenia during the eleventh century and spurred the Gypsies onward (Folse 1995).
2.2 Macro-structural Approaches

A single founding population, originating from the Indian subcontinent around 40 generations ago (Kalaydjieva et al. 2005: 1084). With Romani clearly established as an Indo-European language, it has been possible through the use of linguistics to "reconstruct in broad lines the itineraries followed by the Gypsies" migrating Westward from India, with the understanding that the migration into Europe "took place between the ninth and fourteenth centuries in a number of waves" (Achim 1998: 7–8).

The reasons for the Gypsies’ migration out of India are speculative and largely unknown given the absence of written evidence in reference to these nomadic people prior to the fourteenth Century. Some historians have suggested that they were taken as slaves by Mahmud of Ghazni around the tenth century during the expansion of the Ghaznavid Empire into India, and as a result, the Gypsies eventually found their way into Afghanistan, Persia, and Byzantium and finally in Europe (Shastri 2007). As the Gypsies migrated Westward, it is believed that there were two broad strands of migration: one over land heading through Byzantium and eventually passing through Thrace, with another travelling along the shoreline of the Middle East and entering Egypt via the Sinai (Strom 1993: 10). According to historian Nicolae Iorga, the Mongol invasions into Eastern and Central Europe led by Gengis Khan and later Tamerlane are responsible for the arrival of the Gypsies into this region, and as slaves of the Mongol military they were later abandoned once the defeated armies retreated (Crowe 1994: 107). This theory has been contested by studies conducted by Franz Miklosich who underlined the differences between the Tartar (Mongol) slaves and those of Gypsy origin, arguing that because the former were kept in fixed dwellings and had Turkic names in comparison to the latter which had Romany names and lived in tents, their arrival into Europe necessarily occurred at different times (Achim 1998: 16). What is clear, however, is that by the late fourteenth Century ample references can be found regarding the Gypsies in Romania who lived as slaves and were considered the property of the church, the state, or wealth landowners and businessmen.

Ernst George Ravenstein, a German geographer published a paper in 1885 entitled “The Laws of Migration” in the Journal of the Statistical Society (1885: 167). Some specific laws: (i) “… even in the case of ‘counties of dispersion’, which have a population to spare for other counties, there takes place an inflow of migrants across that border which lies furthest away from the great centers of absorption” (1885: 191); (ii) “The more distance from the fountainhead which feeds them, the less swiftly do these currents flow” (1885: 191); (iii) “In forming an estimate of displacements we must take into account the number of natives of each county which furnishes the migrants, as also the population of the … districts which absorb them” (1885: 198); (iv) “The process of dispersion is the inverse of that of absorption, and exhibits similar features” (v) “Each main current of migration produces a compensating counter current” (1885: 199); (vi) “Migratory currents flow along certain well defined geographical channels” (1885: 284). The nineteenth century laws until today by far are known to be the first systematic laws that explain migration dynamics. His work was based on five propositions; the first one was the existing relationship between migration and distance. He differentiates between the short and long distance migrants,
with male predominance in long distance migration and female predominance in short distance migration. He secondly identifies the stages of migration i.e. migrants primarily move from village to village then toward the centre of attraction or urban setting. Thirdly, urban populations display lesser propensity to move than the rural population. Fourthly, development in technology and modes of transport leads to an increased volume of migration. Lastly, Ravenstein argues that migration decision is based on the calculation of costs and benefits of migration (Velazquez 2000).

Ravenstein’s gravity theory of migration—known as ‘laws of migration’—in the nineteenth century explained the dynamics of migration (Ravenstein 1885). Many other explanations that came into place like saying: once migration starts it does not stop overnight if even the push and pull conditions diminish or disappear. With the changing relations after the globalization came into play, in the economic diplomacy, growing internal and external conflict, political persecution, involvement of mafia syndicates in ‘illegal migration’ and high demand of sex tourism have produced huge amount of forced migrants, refugees, and trafficked in human. One of the laws (migrants travel in general short distances) may seem to appear as obsolete in the time of advanced technology.

Some push forces of migration has somewhat been explained by a theory of relative deprivation\(^2\) which creates desperate desire of the potential migrants to set off for new destinations often without knowing how and what they are going to end up. ‘Desperate desire’ theory has been supported by a number of incidences that occurred in the past years such as ‘Dover tragedy’\(^3\) as a result of 58 migrants who were carried in an airtight tomato container suffocated to death, and a few such more incidents of the same nature that took place in subsequent time. The trend of tragic end of the many potential migrants will slump for the second generation of migration. However, chain of incidences that has been taking place in the past years disapproves of this claim.

\(^2\)Relative deprivation construct has been extensively used in social psychology, sociology, and other social sciences for more than half century. Relative deprivation refers to the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to those of other similarly situated and find out that they have less than their peers. Relative deprivation is the experience of being deprived of something to which one thinks he is entitled to (Walker and Smith 2001).

\(^3\)The tragic deaths of 58 Chinese people, found in the back of a lorry, highlight the desperate situation facing asylum-seekers and refugees. The bodies of fifty-four men and four women were discovered in an airtight 18 metre-long container at the port of Dover. The driver of the Dutch-registered lorry had just made the crossing from Zeebrugge, Belgium, when his vehicle was pulled over for inspection by a customs official. Two men lay by the doors, gasping for breath. Behind them were 58 bodies lying sprawled between crates of tomatoes. It is likely that the 58 died of asphyxiation, although there is a possibility of carbon monoxide poisoning. It is believed that the 60 people had been trapped inside the container for more than 18 h. Electricity to the refrigeration unit had been turned off throughout the journey, during summer temperatures of up to 32\(^\circ\)C (90\(^\circ\)F) (WSWS 2000). More than 60 illegal immigrants, tried to enter South Korea by hiding themselves in an airtight fish cabin. During the voyage 26 of them were suffocated to death and their bodies were thrown into sea by South Korean human smugglers in an attempt to eliminate evidence of their crime. The rest 34 were under detention by police as soon as they landed on an island near the Yosu city. Now the case is under investigation (People’s Daily 2001).
In September 2007, national and international media made headlines that one of the desperate persons who was later rescued unconscious by the US coast guard, jumped to the ice-cold water of the sea around New York from a ship to sneak into the USA (International Herald Tribune 2007). When we attempt to explain desperate desire as a result of relative deprivation cannot be supported by this kind of empirics. Further research bears out that the person, originated from Bangladesh, was not ‘relatively deprived’, but came from a well-off family as compared to the economy of the country of origin.

Neo-classical economic theory asserts that real wage differences between countries give rise to two flows whereby a new international equilibrium is created in which real wages are of the same level in all countries. The first flow is straightforward to understand that low-skilled labour from low-wage countries to high-wage countries, and the second is a capital flow from high-wage countries to low-wage countries. This capital flow comprises mainly labour-intensive industrial capital and will be accompanied by high-skilled labour migration. Recent trend of undocumented migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal of India, Maldives and Malaysia weakens the applicability of this theory, however (Ullah 2010b).

Piore (1979) explains in three possible ways for the growing demands for foreign workers in modern industrial societies: general labour shortages, the need to fill the lower rung position in the job hierarchy, and labour shortages in the secondary segment of a dual labour market. There may be specific shortages at the bottom of the hierarchy arising from motivational problems and demographic and social changes in modern industrial societies. Motivational problems come about because jobs at the bottom of the hierarchy are often associated with low social status with poor opportunities for upward mobility. These locals are reluctant to accept those jobs, which lead employers to influence the existing policy to change so that recruitment of foreign workers becomes a possible option.

Researchers and theorists (such as Faist 2000; Rahman 2004; Skeldon 1997, 2000) support the past theories that emphasize on disinformation and misinformation, which has played a big part in the growing form of clandestine movement. Therefore,

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4New York police searched for a Bangladeshi man believed to have jumped from a cargo ship traveling between France and the port of Newark, New Jersey. Another man who jumped with him was found and taken to a hospital. The men were part of the crew on the ship, called Manhattan Bridge that originated in France. Fishermen spotted one of the men on an island off the coast of Staten Island, which is New York’s City’s most southern borough, and the police harbor unit picked him up. “The other individual is still missing (International Herald Tribune 2007).

5One of the central propositions in the economic models of migration is that wage and income differentials between sending and receiving countries account for labour mobility and these differentials often determine the direction of international migration (Velazquez 2000).

6It is one of the patterns of social mobility. Vertical mobility, in contrast to horizontal mobility, involves moving from one social level to another. In migration perspective, moving from a lower wage or income country to a higher wage or income country is upward mobility.
better information and informal networks\textsuperscript{7} might scale down, if not discontinues, this pattern of migration.

While there is no strong push, argument could be made that strong pull essentially makes the potential migrants desperate or vice versa. There are some cases where forces of both push and pull were generally weaker than required for making a migrant desperate. Because some cases evidently demonstrate that most victims of the tragedies were highly educated, capital city based young and employed. Some cases also show that they set off for Europe from south Asian and African countries by a small boat that lose direction in a few hours and they die of starvation. This kind of incidents repeated a few times in 2005.

Several schools of thought explain why people migrate. Varying from the macro level of analysis, such as those provided by ‘push pull’ theories, to the micro level of analysis, i.e., ‘rational choice’ theory,\textsuperscript{8} the migration literature spans many different fields which employ differing assumptions and hypotheses for why people move (Spittel 1998). Although neo-classical economic theory is used to explain migration flows between countries, it is particularly appropriate with regard to internal migration. In contrast to international migration, internal migration is often less curbed by policies.

According to Keynesian theory,\textsuperscript{9} labour supply also depends on the nominal wage, not only on the real wage (Blinder 1986). This distinction stems from the different views on the role of money in the economy. In the neo-classical point of view money is solely a medium of exchange. The Keynesian (1936) point of view is different, because here money is not only a medium of exchange but also a medium of saving. Therefore, potential migrants are also attracted to high nominal wage regions. In addition, intentions to re-migrate or to send remittances further augment the significance of the nominal wage level compared to the real wage level (Mankiw 1993). In this theory, international migration removes unemployment differences rather than real wage differences.

\textsuperscript{7}Informal networks were far from unique, however. Sociologists have come to understand informal networks as an important social resource because they direct the flow of information, power, and status in work organizations (Campbell et al. 1986). For instance, informal networks help workers to obtain jobs, to advance up the corporate ladder, to gain skills, and to acquire legitimacy (Bridges and Villesmez 1986; Podolny and Baron 1997). These benefits are not distributed equally, however.

\textsuperscript{8}It has assumed that people are motivated by money and by the possibility of making a profit, and this has allowed it to construct formal, and often predictive, models of human behaviour. Sociologists and political scientists have tried to build theories around the idea that all action is fundamentally ‘rational’ in character and that people calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do.

\textsuperscript{9}This theory combines two economic school thoughts: Keynesian and neo-classic economics. While Keynesian looks at macroeconomic phenomena (e.g., unemployment), neo-classic economics looks at micro-phenomena (consumers and producers behavior). The bottom line of this theory is to explain how unemployment occurs as a result of rational choices made by the firm and household.
The dual labour market approach divides the labour market into a primary and a secondary segment.\textsuperscript{10} The primary segment is characterized by a capital-intensive method of production; the secondary segment is characterized by a labour-intensive method of production. GDP per capita differences and unemployment differences have appeared to be the most important economic determinants of international migration types, which are insensitive to immigration policies. On the other hand, migration types may be largely affected by immigration policies. The dual labour market is modelled in a standard efficiency-wage framework. Work conditions in the primary and the secondary sectors are not identical. The primary sector offers jobs with good working conditions, stable employment relationships and good chances for internal promotion. By assumption, workers in this sector cannot be perfectly monitored (Reich et al. 1973). Thus, firms in the primary sector prefer to pay wages above market-clearing levels in order to induce workers to supply effort. As a consequence, jobs are rationed in the primary sector and workers are queuing up for them. However, they can always find jobs in the secondary sector. These jobs are much less attractive and consist in repetitive tasks that can be monitored without cost. In this sector, the wage rate is set competitively. Thus, there is no unemployment (Muller 1997).

International migration between some certain sending countries and certain receiving countries may increase even if the difference in economic prosperity between these countries decreases, as, in spite of this decreasing difference, unemployment in the receiving country may lessen. Mostly the economic differences between receiving and sending countries and receiving countries in the case of international migration, which is sensitive to immigration policies, are very large. Therefore, the number of potential migrants is only modestly affected by slight economic improvement in sending countries in these cases. The dual labour market further states that international migration is determined by pull factors in receiving countries. According to some opinions, pull factors still dominate the volume and direction of international migration flows from poorer to richer areas of the world. However, in addition to low-skilled labour migration, this may also apply to other migration types, which are sensitive to immigration policies. We, however, argue that push-pull idea undermines people’s agency. Therefore, this model could be considered as a classical one.

Researchers, however, came to a consensus that supply-push and demand-pull are the basic drivers, along with many newly added factors, work directly for the propensity of population migration. Some forms of migration that came into the scene nowadays could hardly be fit in the existing theoretical framework though.

\textsuperscript{10}The concept of labour market denotes the interaction between the supply (number of persons available for work) and the demand (number of jobs available) and the wage rate. The need to consider the short-term supply and demand for labour as well is complicated in labour market analysis; however their allocation among regions, occupations and industries is more complicated. There are institutions that influence and regulate the distribution of workers leading to the development of a number of different analyses of the labour market, among them the neoclassical analysis, the radical analysis and the institutional analysis, the latter two forming what has become known as the “segmented labour market” model (Statistics Canada 2008).
Studies have sought to reveal the characteristics of those who move out—whether they are poorer or better off, if they participated in or were indifferent to community organizations, if social mobility was having an adverse effect or just impeding the satisfaction of their social expectations. What springboard catapults them abroad? What siren lures them away or what invisible hand or rude kick pushes them to leave family, friends, language and habits to face emotional scarring as they travel thousands of miles in extremely risky conditions only to reduce their social status and face racial and residential segregation? Many theories, approaches and disciplines have attempted to provide an answer, some of them from a supposedly aseptic scientific position and others based on openly confessed political options. The vigorous nature of this human mobility and the many recent changes in its form add to the importance and potential controversy of any answers today. If we take a look on the propositions of the neoclassical macroeconomic theory and the migration trend the paper demonstrates, it is hardly possible to fit this trend in this theoretical framework. This theory focused on explaining that the external and internal migrations are caused by geographical differences between the supply and demand of labour. The cases no way explain that these desperate migrants were responding to the demand of their ‘would-be’ destination nations. The wage differences activate the migratory flow with workers traveling from countries with low wages to those with high ones, with a resulting fall in the labour supply in the country with low wages, which causes them to begin to rise. The persisting wage differences merely reflect the pecuniary and even psychic costs of the migratory movement.

The centrality of economic motivation was established in the first systematic study of migration. Ravenstein (1885) presented his findings as a set of ‘laws’ of migration as already discussed. Not surprisingly, these rules are specific to time and place and reflect the process of industrialization pulling rural people into urban work centers. Thus Ravenstein observed mainly short distance migration. Interestingly, he found females to be more migratory than males for short distances. However, these laws either shed too little light on the phenomena discussed in this paper to sufficiently picture.

The neoclassical micro economic theory asserts that people move due to the cost and benefit calculation. Therefore, spending on migration is an investment. To obtain better wages, migrants invest in the material costs of the journey and then risk their lives. They also assume the costs of their own maintenance until they find work, and perhaps even those of the family they left behind, plus the costs of depriving their family of their presence and monetary and emotional support; and of racial discrimination in the country of destination. This model has even generated equations to work out the expected net returns of migration. It is calculated just before departure as a function of the probability of avoiding deportation, finding work and the income resulting from that job in the new country from which must be deducted the probability of finding work and the wages they can earn in the community of origin, as well as the total costs, psychological ones included, involved in migrating. Lucas expressed a view, that migration is comparable to a flow of water or electricity—an adjustment flow responding to pressure differentials at opposite ends of a pipeline, suggesting that it is neither the absolute level of push nor pull factors which matters,
but the existing difference in relative attraction elements (Lucas 1981). This differential attractivity model of migration is common in the economic literature, but not much favoured by sociologists and political scientists.

Migration as the result of an individual strategy to maximize income as micro variant of neoclassical economic theory holds, and this however, poses added problems in theorizing the phenomena, because the most complex job is human psychology to explain.

The gender approach: The feminist approach to migration has never fully penetrated the dominant spheres of migration research. Recent literature reviews pay scant attention to female migration (Oishi 2002; Massey et al. 1998; Zlotnik 2003). The theoretical construct stresses the gender division of labour, which forces women to assume the majority of household tasks and places them in a subordinate position, restricting their geographical mobility in places of origin, or confining them to insecure jobs in places of destination (Tienda and Booth 1991).

Migration networks: Oded Stark (1991) and Stark and Bloom (1985) depart from micro-economic theories by introducing the notion of family strategy which highlights the mutual interdependence between migrants and their families, and places emphasis on risk handling and risk pooling. Migration is analysed as a network and kinship capital (social capital). This approach was later developed widely in research on migration in developing countries, particularly with regard to survival strategies and migrants’ capacity to become actors of change (de Haas 2010). The existence of networks leads to the creation of a social capital, a notion that explains why and how belonging to a network increases the probability of migrating: thanks to network resources, the costs and risks of migration diminish while the benefits increase (Palloni et al. 2001).

Migration and development: The field of migration remains fragmented, with some theories explaining the reasons for migration and others explaining its effects. Research on the effects of migration is in turn fragmented between macro and micro approaches, and between the contexts of developed and developing countries. Immigration has become a structural necessity in response to the needs of western capitalism (Castles and Kosack 1972). In developing countries, debate on the economic effects of migration has taken a radically different turn. Researchers no longer focus on the situation in immigration regions, but rather on the links between emigration and development in the emigration regions. This has not always been the case (Oberai and Mannmohan 1980). The precise effects of these cash transfers on the economy are difficult to determine ex-ante. They may contribute to productive investments aiming to develop and diversify agriculture or non-farming activities in rural areas; they may be spent on housing or education or, quite simply, serve to alleviate the poverty of those left behind in the villages. Remittances may thus be used unproductively, and making them more productive is a leitmotif of future research.

Migration is no longer seen in terms of permanent rupture, and attention focuses rather on the links that are maintained between the home society and the host society, since migrants’ lives cut across national boundaries and brings two societies into a single social field (Faist 2008). Transnationalism often conveys a positive image of migration, and this image has been embraced and disseminated by international
organizations including the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the various instances of the United Nations. However, many critics have sought to temper this enthusiasm for the developmentalist capacities of remittances and transnationalism. The vast body of literature confirms that cash transfers alone are not sufficient to boost the economic development if there are no opportunities for investment (Skeldon 2008; de Haas 2010).

The growing diversity of societies is a major consequence of migration and raises key challenges for managing social, racial and ethnic differences (Castles 1993). Castles (1993), in fact, advanced hypotheses on the situation of minorities in Western Europe, notably with respect to migration policies and the issues of citizenship, racism and identity. Castles addresses the question of racism and the danger based upon the perceived threat of being swamped by ‘desperate masses’ from the south.” Castles view, “the constitution of new minorities with distinct cultures, identities and institutions, is an irreversible process. The long-term consequence of immigration will be “the emergence of multicultural societies, leading in turn to new concepts of citizenship and the nation state.” There is heated social and political debate between the advocates of pluralism and those who believe that immigration threatens national values. The discourse of the extreme far-right political parties emerging in many parts of the world is based, among other things, upon an anti-immigration stance, sometimes linked to Islamophobia (Akbaba 2018).

Japan, for example, has been reluctant in taking in immigrants, as it wanted to maintain the mono-ethnic and monoculture. Due to fertility decline, Japan was planning to depend on robots in order to get their economy going. It has, however, recently changed their policy to accept immigrants. The gaps left by an aging population in Europe are being filled-in by migrant workers. Therefore, by replenishing a declining work force and injecting younger workers into the economy, work migration increases dynamism and innovation in the work force. However, this fact has never been recognized.

2.3 The Micro-economic Effects

Here we ask two questions. One is how differently, female and male experience the result of migration, and the other is what is the impact of migration on non-migrant populations and on the native-born inhabitants of destination countries. There are two opposing views about the affects of [im]migration on the native labour market: one bloc claims that immigrants take the natives’ jobs, while others argue the opposite (Borjas 1990). Borjas, however, favours the second view and assert that there is no single shred of evidence to prove that immigrants have a substantial and adverse impact on the earnings and labour market opportunities of the natives because native workers and immigrants are not interchangeable in the production process.

Wilson and Portes (1980) contend that migrants may be incorporated into the labour market in several ways. Based on labour market segmentation theory (Piore 1979), Wilson and Portes describe three modes of incorporation. The first two concern
the primary and secondary labour markets. The primary labour market corresponds to professionals and skilled workers, often unionized and with real opportunities for advancement, and the secondary sector is characterized by low wages, menial and insecure jobs, and low levels of unionization. And the Third mode of incorporation is the “ethnic enclave” which comprises groups of immigrants concentrated in a specific geographical area who set up businesses to serve their own ethnic market and/or the general population (Portes 1981).

The political effects of immigration are addressed from two angles. First, political factors have been studied mainly in cases of refugee movements; second, the effect of migration on diversity, in terms of the relations between minorities and majorities, is a key political issue at the heart of the identity debate.

Zolberg et al. (1986) make an important distinction between internal and external effects. While the determinants of persecution, based on the Geneva Convention’s definition of refugees, are internal to the country in question, external effects may also exist in the form of factors that aggravate economic and social conditions, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflicts that generate refugee movements. Indeed, the policies implemented by potential host countries represent the most problematic type of external effects. The decision to grant formal refugee status to citizens of a particular country is generally seen as an implicit condemnation of the government of that country for persecuting its citizens or failing to protect them. The refugee question is studied rather with regard to the application of the Geneva Convention. Some recent studies have shown, for example, that European countries are seeking to restrict or even abolish practical access to political asylum in Europe (Legoux 2006).

Migration theories do not serve solely to understand and explain, but also to justify migration policy choices. All twentieth-century migration policies were shaped on the principle of national sovereignty and the economic needs of the countries concerned, and hence focus mainly on the labour market. Without going as far as to advocate free movement, which he judges impracticable, Ghosh (2000) was among the first to develop a systematic global approach to the migration question. He points up the absence of appropriate policies to address the new challenges of migration, notably the build-up of emigration pressure due to mounting inequalities. Rather than addressing the root causes that generate pressures for disorderly migration in sending countries or that attract migrants to the receiving ones through irregular channels, governments have responded by adopting repressive and restrictive measures. Ghosh’s (2000) main thesis is that migration is getting out of control, and that the magnitude of irregular migration across the world reflects the inadequacies of the present migration system.

Ghosh’s approach has given rise to a new paradigm, that of “migration management”, to achieve more orderly, predictable and humane objectives through global governance of the migration regime. It is the fear of huge waves of illegal immigration that shapes some areas of current political discourse and that serves to justify restrictive measures. Migration management calls for coordination between governments. For Tapinos (2000) this must be multilateral management; it would be anachronistic to address immigration control exclusively in terms of sovereignty.
We have presented the various theoretical approaches by examining the paths along which new ideas unfold. Rather than competing, each approach brings specific new insights that must be taken into account when attempting to explain migration.

The most recent founding text presented here dates back to the year 2000. Does this signal a recent absence of major theoretical developments in migration studies? Based on the literature reviews published since 2000, one might be tempted to say yes. Looking, for example, at the book edited by Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind in 2007, or that of Corrado Bonifazi, Marek Okolski, Jeannette Schoorl and Patrick Simon in 2008, we see that the topics covered are not fundamentally different from those discussed in the founding texts.

Two dimensions of migration deserve to be more theorized in the future. The first concerns the emergence of the new paradigm discussed above, namely the globalization of migration flows, which is transforming the role of international migration in today’s societies (Kabbanji 2011). Although a few studies have addressed this question, the major challenge of explaining current trends has yet to be taken up. Two questions, in particular, must be studied in greater depth: what are the new manpower needs in the developed economies, and how will they evolve? How will national and supranational states respond to these new needs? For now, governments are tending to restrict permanent migration in favour of circular and temporary migration, resulting in the emergence of new categories of non-citizens. This new paradigm involves “replacing the concept of migration with that of mobility,” the latter being the most advantageous situation for optimizing profit (Pellerin 2011). Is there a fundamental contradiction here between neo-liberalism, which promotes free circulation of capital, goods and services, and the new protectionist model of migration management based on flexibility and circularity? And above all, for how long will these contradictions persist?

The second dimension to be more integrated in migration theory concerns migrants’ rights. This is a paradigm that extends beyond the purely utilitarian outlook, by proposing that questions of migrants’ rights be included among the political parameters of migration. Research on this question remains overly ideological, and does not focus adequately on practical analysis of the living conditions of migrants and their families. What matters here, is to introduce the question of rights as an integral component of migration policy (Piché 2013).
This chapter grapples with a number of potential debates about whether migration could be considered as a long-term alternative for development. In order to examine this, we look at it from sending country and receiving country perspectives. This chapter is not meant to take a position in the debate whether migration is something to count on for economic development or not. This chapter analyzes both possible cynical and beneficial bearing on development. The argument we make is that whether migration could be a long-term strategy for any economy to rely on for the development. To that end, we attempt to demonstrate potential risks overdependence on migration may pose in the long run. Systematic research is difficult to find that warns about the long-term impact of migration on development. What has so far been done was predominantly to glorify migration and its impact. As a result, rarely are literature and research studies that have delved into the phenomenon critically.

Macro-economically speaking, migrants’ remittances add enormously to GDP of many developing economies, which has been documented, acknowledged and researched. For example, more than 20% of the GDP is constituted by remittances of about 25 countries in the world. Apparently, this figure is remarkably significant in shaping macro economy of those countries. The fundamental question hence we ask is: is this dependence a sustainable option for development in the long run?

From the beginning of the 2000s, however, there has been a significant perspective shift, which focuses on remittances as tools for development (de Haas 2007). A number of empirical research studies point to the fact that, besides consumption, remittances are largely spent in productive long-term activities, such as education, housing, businesses and health care (Adams 2006). These activities have the aptitude to improve the overall quality of life of the migrant’s household and also have a multiplying effect for the community’s development. This renewed perspective has shed light on the positive potentials of remittances (de Haas 2007). These are real. We do not tend to disagree with this. We highlight some issues that are in general missed out as we calculate benefits of migration. It is difficult to certainly assert that most of the global remittances is used for good causes. We are not sure that the portion (whatever it is) is used for good causes was spent efficiently enough to make an impact.
Evidently, most scholars and policy makers tend to overlook a long term bearing of remittances. This is primarily because of the fact that the families send migrants are in need of shortcut or immediate solution to financial crisis. Therefore, it became an established fact that migration brings only positive outcome. Objectives of research studies somewhat are redesigned accordingly. This means that long-term impact might be really different from the short-term impact. Thus, long-term impacts are generally left unheeded. For example, ‘excessive’ flows of foreign currency in small economies may result in the appreciation of domestic currency, which in turn discourages exports and encourages imports. This phenomenon is tantamount to the notion of ‘Dutch Disease’ (DD). Although the DD is generally associated with the natural resource discovery, it can also occur from any development activities that generate a large inflow of foreign currency. In this circumstance, import becomes very important to meet consumer need, which results in deindustrialization in the long run (Ebrahim-zadeh 2003). Also, remittances lead to the overshooting of a country’s exchange rate and hurt its competitiveness. The over-valued exchange rate gives rise to the country’s exports to become relatively expensive while cheapening the imports prices. The exchange-rate appreciating effect of remittances is stronger among smaller developing countries. The shift in earning financial resources from industry and tradable sector (i.e. agriculture) to a non-tradable sector (i.e. services) generates less competition in the country’s tradable sector. With the increase of capital inflow, local currency value rises while decreasing the effectiveness of the tradable sector or export industries, thus triggering off inflation (Goelton 2008). As known, inflation has both positive as well as negative effects on the economy causing investment to be highly affected by it. Non-economists know very little about the long-term damaging impact of excessive inflows of foreign currency on small economies. In our search for deeper research on Dutch disease in small economy turns out that very negligible amount of work has highlighted this issue as it comes to remittances.

Studying impacts of remittance on the economy has attracted a lot of attention as it is useful for both academics and policy makers to formulate appropriate policies, not only to attract remittances but also to manage the remittances for positive economic implications (Taguchi and Shammi 2017). Global remittances reached $689 billion in 2018, up from $633 billion in 2017, and the amount of remittances in 2018 was estimated at about 5.7% of GDP in the low-income world (World Bank 2019). Infusion of the large amount of money in the economy may have multi-dimensional impact. There is no doubt that remittances helped millions of families in myriad ways such as reducing absolute poverty, improve human capital indicators and reduce inequality (Acosta et al. 2008).

The amount of remittance inflows to many developing countries exceeds that of foreign private capital and official development assistance. Rise in remittances has also made the governments of many developing countries less reliant on other financial inflows for their foreign exchange requirements (Makhloof and Mughal 2013). The microeconomic impact of remittances has been documented by numerous researches. However, remittances inflows may bring havoc to macro economy of a country (State Bank of Pakistan 2007).
Remittances may lead to the overshooting of exchange rate of a country and hurt its competitiveness. This phenomenon is known as the Dutch disease (Makhlouf and Mughal 2013). This situation makes the exports relatively expensive, imports cheaper. Due to the remittances inflow, the demand becomes higher which enhances prices in the non-tradable sector while the prices cannot move much in the tradable sector in a small open economy. This shifts resources from industry and agriculture (tradelable sectors) to services (non-tradable sector), making the country’s tradable sector less competitive (Makhlouf and Mughal 2013). Empirically, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) found from a research conducted on 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries that a 100% raise of remittances cause the real exchange rate to appreciate by 22%. Bourdet and Falck (2006) found almost similar result in the analysis of the Cape Verdean economy that there are adverse effects of remittances on the competitiveness. Research further demonstrates that remittances have to do with declining competitiveness through a decrease in the labour supply in the remittance-receiving country (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Bussolo and Medvedev 2007; Görlisch et al. 2007).

Understandable that for low-income economies remittance is important for the fiscal budgets and easing unemployment burden. However, the remittance flows have raised critical questions with respect to the undesirable effects on the recipient economies as well as origin economies. The concern is about the fact that remittances could cause Dutch disease (Acosta et al. 2009). In terms of microeconomic implications of rising remittances flows, at household level, the impacts of remittance include increase in income, standard of living and reduction in incidence of poverty and decreasing dropouts of school students (Adams and Page 2005; Acosta et al. 2008; Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez 2013; Taguchi and Shammi 2017).

Macroeconomic implications on the recipient country include improvement external stability, capital accumulation and growth. However, remittances would lead to a decline in the production of tradable sectors relative to non-tradable ones through a real exchange rate appreciation (Taguchi and Shammi 2017). The theoretical framework of analyzing the Dutch Disease effect of “capital inflows” in small open economies has been generally represented by the Salter-Swan-Corden-Dornbusch model, which was initially demonstrated by Corden and Neary (1982). This model has also been applied to examine the economic impacts of emigrant’s remittances, since they constitute a major component of capital inflows. There have been, however, relatively few empirical studies of remittance impacts by using the Dutch Disease model.

Acosta et al. (2009) examined the remittance effects in El Salvador by applying a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a Bayesian technique, based on the Dutch Disease concept (Taguchi and Shammi 2017). This is, however, based on a very mathematical equation, which we are not familiar with. As we look at the empirical results of some notable studies we see that there is existence of the Dutch Disease effects of remittances (Bourdet and Falck 2007). Bourdet and Falck (2006) considered the role of capital accumulation, which may offset or mitigate the economic damages caused by original Dutch Disease effect. The appreciation of exchange rate makes imports cheaper and exports relatively more expensive which in
turn affects the trade balance of the country. The increase in household income raises the prices in the non-tradable sector of the economy (Acosta et al. 2009). The increase in the prices of the non-tradable sector and the resource shifting from tradable to non-tradable sector appreciates the exchange rate which encourages labour to move from tradable to the non-tradable sector (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006), increasing the wages in the trade sector.

Not to undermine the migration phenomenon, we argue that the high time to consider diversification of economy instead of depending on remittances to that extent so that it becomes heavier to carry for long term. We argue that origin governments should consider migration as a temporary solution to unemployment and foreign currency deficit.

Since the nomadic stage of human mobility, capital flow has featured a prominent disposition in the global economy. Today, though anecdotally, around one billion migrants (international and transnational) have contributed around US$700 billions to the global economy (IOM 2014; Ullah 2010, 2017). Since the early period when migration became an important area of academic and policy investigation, debates sparkle among the scholars and policymakers have always revolved around the brain drain and brain-gain dynamics. Scholars claim that the objectives of this debate have been to divert the attention from the pressing issues of migration.

Scholars spend a great deal of time discussing brain drain & brain gain dichotomy. In fact, as we discuss these issues, we knowingly or unknowingly preclude the unskilled labour migration. Literature tends to leave the unskilled migrants out of the broader brain drain discourse. Brock and Blake (2015) attracted a lot of attention after they published the book ‘Debating Brain Drain: May Governments Restrict Emigration’ from the Oxford University Press in 2015. We tend to forget putting the unskilled in the brain drain picture owing to the fact that we assume unskilled migrants do not have ‘brain’. Hence they are left out of the picture. There are in fact so many criticisms about their stance. We agree with Toit’s (2017) position about Bock and Blake’s stance. Toit argues that the way in which they framed the question has important ideological consequences, because they did not adequately account for the larger context, in particular, by leaving out the moral obligations of the host countries that are the main beneficiaries of the brain drain.

The nexus between migration and development constitutes a relatively recent topic in academic research. The growing academic interest has been the result of the widespread migration flows. The shape and scope of migration have transformed accordingly with the improvement of technologies in communication and transportation as well as recent economic interconnectedness between different parts of the world. As the possibilities for migration have multiplied, scholars and policymakers also grew more concerned with its effects to both the sending and receiving countries, in a range of issue-areas (IOM 2018). Clearly, no conclusion up until today could be drawn whether migration brings in brain or it incurs losses that have potential to lead to bankruptcy. We think, the more important debate should be on ‘who benefits more and who loses more’. The conundrum of the debate revolves around the claims from sending and receiving ends, in which the labour sending countries
may claim to have significantly contributed to economic augmentation in the receiving countries by supplying labour while the labour receiving countries claim to have eased unemployment and capital crises in the origin countries (Alburo et al. 2001; Barham and Boucher 1998; Bagasao 2002; Amuendo et al. 2004).

The primary grounds for the growing attention of remittances in the scholarship of migration are the dramatic escalation in its trend (Ballard 2003; Ullah 2009, 2017; Athukorala 1993). There has been an on-going debate about the distribution of billions of migro-dollars between the Global South and the Global North.

Given the magnitude and the diversity of the population movements, researchers had a wide array of subjects to analyze, which include: the volume, direction and composition of flows; demotivation to study; the motivations to move; the formation of social networks; and the strategies of incorporation in the country of destination. In regards to the link between migration and development, a debate started to take shape around the role of [im]migrants in changing cultural fabrics of the host societies. For instance, the arrival of the immigrants, and with them their varied cultural backgrounds, was essential in moulding host country’s public identity. And it fed into host country’s self-history, enshrining the country as a refuge for all those suffering persecution for political or personal beliefs; a shelter that accepts a wide variety of faiths and ideologies (Higgins 2015). This sounds good apparently. However, we know very little about the ideological struggle they go through to assimilate themselves. Ideological struggles turn psychological pain. Host society somehow forces them to forget about their roots, language, culture, religion etc.

Owing to the growth of remittances in both absolute numbers and relative to other sources of external investment and aid, there has been extensively discussed the perception about its potential as a “bottom-up” source for financing development in sending countries (de Haas 2005). Even with the possibility that it is viable to point the positive and negative effects of remittances on development. During the 1970s and 1980s, a rather pessimistic view on the impact of remittances dominated most of the researches, influenced by historical-structuralism (de Haas 2007). The central claim was that remittances reinforced the inequalities between developed and developing countries, and increased the level of dependency of the latter, since the “higher living standards are achieved through the inflow of money from abroad rather than from the expansion of economic activity at home” (Taylor et al. 1996b: 397). Being largely spent on consumption, remittances would be unproductive for the economy as a whole; rather it would create an artificial environment that could cause negative impacts on the local communities, by accentuating income disparities or causing inflation (Taylor et al. 1996a; Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002).

It is important to note that remittances represent an extremely complex phenomenon, since there are a number of variables that affect both the volumes of capital that are sent back and its social-economic impacts towards the receiving ends (Tamura 2009). In order to understand the potential of remittances as tools for development, it is necessary to account for a series of factors which extends from macro-economic variables (i.e. exchange rates and inflation) to the individual expectations and investment plans of the migrants themselves (as remittances are mostly private funds). The role of Diasporas and migrant associations is also a significant
factor because these groups can help to foster and maintain a link, or a sense of commitment, with the origin community, while also engaging in investment projects. In other words, when analyzing the impact of remittances, there are two important dimensions to consider: first, the individual dimension, which refers to the immigrant and to private aspirations; and second, the conjectural dimension, which refers to the influence of broader social, political and economic contexts on the potential impacts of the funds sent back by the immigrant (Tamura 2009).

These conjectural dimensions emphasize that remittances can be an important element for development, yet it has to be managed as one along with structures and national policies that helps create a welcoming environment for productive investments (Martin et al. 2007; Skeldon 2005). As de Haas (2005) puts it, although remittances enable people to invest, the extent to which they do so in practice crucially depends on the general development conditions in the sending countries (de Haas 2005: 278–1279).

3.1 Migro-Dollar and Dependency

Some of the central arguments we make are: migration has not been shown to lead to sustainable development in sending & developing countries, but has simply increased their dependency on the rich industrialised economies of the developed world; remittances are very unevenly spread between developing countries, and tend not to flow to the poorest; the social and psychological costs of migration on sending families and communities must also be offset against remittance benefits; and although remittances can selectively relieve the poverty of recipients and enable household (and sometimes wider community) consumption and saving, they do not automatically generate development, and should not be regarded as a substitute for policies that do so (Haider et al. 2016; Ullah 2010).

Of course, the lasting impact of remittances (interchangeably used with migro-dollar) that migrant workers send to their home countries is difficult to analyze. Many countries in the world are increasingly becoming heavily dependent for their fiscal budget on remittances. Until today, these remittance dependent countries (such as Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic) deeply believe that remittances work as savior for them (Mahapatra 2014). For example, remittances made up to 42% of Tajikistan’s GDP, 32% of the Kyrgyz Republic’s GDP and 29% of Nepal’s GDP in 2013 (World Bank 2014). The following Table (3.1) shows the countries with the contribution of remittances to GDP (Table 3.1).

Heavy reliance on the infusion of remittance for country’s development may turn to serious repercussion in economy at a point of time. This relates to the issues of Dutch disease under which circumstance the domestic currency gets stronger, which may discourage export and encourage import. In the Netherlands in the 1960s, due to the discovery of oil and natural gas, the country relied highly on their oil and natural gas exportations for revenues, while declining their activities in the manufacturing sector. Owing to the fact that natural resources like oil and gas are non-renewable and
Table 3.1 Remittances as a share of GDP, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Development status</th>
<th>Remittances as a share of GDP, 2009 (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>ECIS</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>A&amp;P</td>
<td>Middle-income DC</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Low-income DC</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>ECIS</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>A&amp;P</td>
<td>Low-income DC</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>Middle-income DC</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>A&amp;P</td>
<td>Middle-income DC</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Middle-income DC</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Low-income DC</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Middle-income DC</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>Middle-income DC</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>ECIS</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Low-income DC</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Middle-income DC</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>ECIS</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>ECIS</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>A&amp;P</td>
<td>Low-income DC</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>A&amp;P</td>
<td>Low-income DC</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>ECIS</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Low-income DC</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from World Bank data, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011

that they may run out, it is best to diversify economic activities—not just concentrating solely on what is being seen as favorable at the given time. Likewise, remittances inflows are unpredictable given the fast changing political and economic landscape.

The policymakers, stakeholders and migration regimes predict that the effect of a sudden slowdown of remittances may create havoc to economy of many countries. The slowdown in the growth of remittances affected most developing regions, in Central Asia, in particular, where flows declined by 12.7% in 2016. In line with the expected global economic recovery in 2016, the global flows of remittances accelerated by 4.1%, to reach an estimated USD610 billion and then rising to USD636 billion in 2017, and the remittances flows to developing countries in particular are expected to recover in 2016 to reach USD459 billion and then rising to USD479 billion in 2017 (World Bank 2018). As the remittances flow is huge, small fluctuations in the flow will have huge effect on the economy of the countries that are dependent on this flow. This signals the fact that over dependence on remittances may bring havoc to small economies.
Dependency on remittances is mostly measured as contribution of remittances to gross domestic product (GDP). In order to demonstrate the dependency on remittances for the source of fund, fiscal budget, and selected countries from Asia, Central Asia, Latin America and Africa are presented according to the percentage of their GDP as contributed by remittances. In 2013, the top recipients of remittances were Tajikistan (42%), Kyrgyz Republic (32%), Nepal (29%), Moldova (25%), Lesotho and Samoa (24% each), Armenia and Haiti (both 21%), the Gambia (20%) and Liberia (18%) (Table 3.2) (World Bank 2017).

The arguments are that migration provokes consumerist, non-productive and remittance-dependent attitudes in the origin communities. The exposure to remittances and the goods and ideas migrants bring with them, contributes to changing rural tastes lowering the demand for locally produced goods, increasing the demands for imported urban or foreign-products, and thereby increasing the general costs of living in sending communities (Lipton 1980: 12). Research suggests that migration leads to the disruption of traditional kinship systems and care structures (King and Vullnetari 2006), the loss of community solidarity (Ullah 2013a; de Haas 1998). In such an environment rural youth becomes reluctant to live in the rural way of life, and get discouraged to work in traditional sectors and volition to move out develops (Massey 1993; Ullah 2013c) and as a result rural traditional farmlands suffer insufficient labour. Evidences suggest that agricultural product back home has been substantially decreased in many countries due to lack of labour and interest in traditional work. In the long run in many countries in North America (Mexico, in particular), Africa, Latin America and Asia crop lands are going to the hands of powerful (politically, monetarily) people who buy lands from those people who fail to cultivate their lands.

In terms of the remittances transactions between the global South and the global North, we tend to conclude that entire amount the global South receives remittances

---

### Table 3.2 Countries most dependent on remittances, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittances flow (In Billion US$)</th>
<th>GDP (in Billion US$)</th>
<th>% of GDP contributed by remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz Republic</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>10.43</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source* World Bank (2017)
comes from the global North. We argue that the big chunk of remittance volume being channeled out to the Global South is not entirely from the Global North. Carling Jorgen (2005) notes that about one-third of global remittances are estimated to flow between Asian countries with the world’s third largest flow of remittances going from Malaysia to Indonesia (Rahman 2012; Carling 2005; Kingma 2006; Newland 2003; OECD 2005). Similar trend was predicted in African continent where they received more remittances from elsewhere within Africa than they did from other continents. This means intra-continental flow was higher than intercontinental flows. In Latin America and Caribbean, the estimated US$32 billion in total remittances in 2002, US$1.5 billion were actually interregional (Fagen and Bump 2006; Patricia and Bump 2005; Maybud 2006; Mahler 2002; World Bank 2004, 2005; Sinn 2004) and the flows between Costa Rica and Nicaragua suggest that about one-third of remittances received in Nicaragua are sent from Costa Rica (Monge-González et al. 2009). Remittances corridor is understood by the level of outflow of funds/remittances from one country to another. Corridors are one-way street, which means that remittances flow in one direction (for example, US to Mexico, Malaysia to Indonesia) (Fig. 3.1).

In 2014, remittance-flows to developing countries increased by 7.8% [over 2013] with the volume of US$404 billion (Fig. 3.2) (World Bank 2014). The projection is that global remittances, including those to high-income countries, would be US$681 billion in 2016 (World Bank 2014). This growth rate has outpaced that of private capital flows and official development assistance over the last decade in many countries, making remittances the second largest source of external funding for developing countries after foreign direct investment (Ullah 2014c, 2017; World Bank 2005; Bangladesh Bank 2009; BMET 2009). Some explains this increase as a win with the Global North that their demands have shifted to high skilled labourers. This should actually be explained by the fact that Global South is sending their high skilled labourer at a time when they needed them most. For example, the Philippines, losing

**Fig. 3.1** Major remittance corridors (Values in billion US$). *Source* World Bank (2016)
medical doctors because they seek out jobs elsewhere although they cannot afford losing medical doctors as the demand for them grows higher and higher (Ullah 2018). In Vietnam, for instance, the migration of students and professionals are encouraged but the result is that the country suffers the loss of the local human resources (Dang et al. 2010). Respondents (from Bangladesh) about migration of skilled workers grudgingly were saying that migration in fact ‘leaves us with weeds’. In probing, they added that migration makes us ‘skill-empty’ country. As a result, doors got opened for Indians in Bangladesh labour market. Only in one year in 2014, Taka 29,000 crore (about US$4 billion) was remitted from Bangladesh to India (Prothom Alo 20 February 2018). This amount is almost half of Bangladesh fiscal budget in 2010 (Ullah 2018). Remittances do fluctuate depending on the global economic performances.

A significant amount of remittances is transferred through informal channels (Ullah and Panday 2007; Ramamurthy 2003). Hence they remain unrecorded. The unrecorded and informal flows of remittances could be as high as US$200 billion (Collier 2000; IFAD 2008; Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 2002; Sander and Mainbo 2003).

Remittances as a share of GDP are larger in small economies, particularly in Central Asian countries and Pacific islands – e.g. about 49% of GDP in Tajikistan and a quarter of GDP in Tonga (Fig. 3.3). This high dependency on remittances increases these countries’ vulnerability to shocks from remittance-sending countries (World Bank 2015) (Table 3.3).

The complex relation between migration and development has earned its title as a “Nexus due to the inter-relations that exist between those two phenomena (Louis 2013: 1).” The nexus is puzzling, not only because of the intricacy (in economic, social and political terms) of these two concepts but also due to the mosaic of different repercussions (some of them largely understudied) produced by the phenomenon. Yet, there are some measures that are generally viewed as a means of boosting the economic and social growth of a state, especially the sending one (Taylor 1999).
Thus, the efficient use of remittances is traditionally referred to as a potentially significant contributor to development. Some states, such as France, emphasize co-development as a way to improve the situation in origin countries. Codevelopment is a fresh trend of thought and a development strategy in development studies, which considers migrant population to be a developing factor for their countries of origin. Although it is widely accepted that it was a French scholar (Sami Nair) who first coined the word codevelopment, it is believed this phenomenon has existed alongside migrations (Hennings 2013; Ethel 2012).

### 3.2 Remittances and GDP

There are abundances of evidences that the capital i.e. remittances is a vital source of funding for developing countries for their economic advancement. However, continued reliance on remittances can produce a dangerous dependency that may inhibit long-term productive economic growth and inculcate a culture of reliance on income transfers (Solimano 2003). Some of the poorest communities in developing countries rely on remittances for up to 50% of their income. Their total value can make up a sizeable portion of a low-income country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Efficiency of remittances depends on who uses the money. This is particularly important because of the fact that the lion’s share of the remittances is used unsupervised i.e. spent in the absence of the senders. This implies that the money is sent to parents, siblings or relatives. Just a decade ago, an overwhelming majority of the unskilled and semi-skilled migrants (from Asia, Africa, Latin America) did not have bank account at home. This means they had to (willingly or unwillingly) send the entire amount of money they earned to their siblings. How the money is going to
Table 3.3 Projections for remittance flows to developing countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014f</th>
<th>2015f</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>−6.3</td>
<td>−12.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
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<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income countries</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>−1.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>−1.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>($ billions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>403</td>
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<tr>
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<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
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<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income countries</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-income</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>130.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source World Bank (2015)

be used or spent depends on the receivers’ intention; capacity, efficiency and orientation. This situation is improving day by day as number of unbanked migrants is declining because banked population is growing. Those who got access to banks can curve out the money according to their plans of investments schemes (savings on their own account, for education of the kids/siblings, consumption, house renovation etc.). Studies bear out that the unsupervised money is spent for purposes that was not meant to in absence of the remitters. Many recipients of remittances do not invest productively, and instead spend on the extra financing for consumption, including leisure, which reduce the incentive to find work. Some times, recipients saved more, worked less and spent less on education. Of course, many recipients do not have the
means to use remittances to start a new business, or to invest more or to add to their savings, but these activities are the engines of economic development.

Remittances foster dependency. It’s proven that remittance dependent countries are susceptible to the economic crises and political machinations of host countries (NEF 2006). For example, the expulsion of Indonesian workers during the East Asian crisis in 1997 from Malaysia and Thailand greatly exacerbated Indonesia’s economy. The decision of Israel to revoke the permits of workers from the West Bank and Gaza resulted in devastating unemployment, poverty and hardship (NEF 2006). We strongly agree with the concern the New Economics Foundation (2006) expressed on the over reliance on remittances. NEF warns that reliance on remittances may create an illusion of sustainable prosperity that provides a disincentive for governments to address issues of poverty and inequality that originally led—and in all probability continue to lead—to the forced emigration of their remittance-sending citizens. NEF (2006) goes onto argue that a remittance-dependent culture is vulnerable to the fluctuations of industrialised country demand for labour and to contagion from economic crises (such as the East Asian crisis) in the richer developing countries. This exposes remittance-receiving countries to unexpected economic disruptions, which can have serious consequences for poverty (NEF 2006).

Countries that are dependent on remittances as a source of GDP have become subsistent on the external capital. This risks the country damaging the competitiveness in the global economy if remittances come to be relied on as an alternative source of development funding, rather than forcing an impoverished country to undergo the reforms and developments necessary to increase competitiveness. Remittances, however, should not be used as a replacement for normal economic development reforms (Peprah et al. 2019). But governments in the developing world are often wracked with their own difficulties that hamper growth. Therefore, remittances, even with potential downsides are considered a vital engine of economic development. Such is the scale of the problems facing governments in developing countries that there is no alternative to the vital role that remittance plays in economic development (Kuross 2015). If remittances are viewed as an uninterrupted source of income, then recipients may be less likely to spend productively or preserve their extra funding rather than use it strictly on consumption (Ullah 2010). Thus remittances are treated by recipients as a form of “social insurance” rather than a positive investment in human capital.

Remittances wax and wane with the global economy, though often they can be less volatile than local wages (Kuross 2015). Dependency on remittances inhibits normal development and can actually mask deep structural deficiencies in local economies like underemployment. Remittances can also undermine policy decisions as their inflow can shift the existing money supply within an economy, making it more difficult for a local government to efficiently allocate capital (Grabel 2009).

Does the remittance’s contribution to GDP have anything to do with improvement in development index or equality index? Some scholars argue that this has little to do with HDI. The changes in the HDI between 2010 and 2018 of remittance receiver countries are not impressive. For example, the changes are for Tajikistan (0.650 and 0.634), Kyrgyz Republic (0.672 and 0.636), Nepal (0.574 and 0.529), Moldova

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Remittances received by Nepal account for about 25% of the GDP (World Bank 2018). Remittance pattern and trend show that Nepal’s economy is increasingly becoming dependent on remittances, which is leading to a remittance-financed consumption. However, in order to uphold the ongoing development (health and education etc.) and implement the development plans Nepal suffers severe lack of skilled engineers, doctors and nurses has challenged the outmigration drive.

Much about remittances in Central Asia remains poorly understood. It has been proved that remittances encourage consumption but we do not understand whether consumption reduces poverty and promotes development. Some economists, in fact, believe they may actually hurt development by contributing to a massive outflow of workers. Uzbekistan is the highest migrant-sending country in central Asia with about 20% of working-age population permanently working abroad and 85% of them in Russia (Levina 2019). Due to the depreciation of the Russian currency (Ruble) against the dollar, Russia as a destination is no longer very attractive to the Uzbekis. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are known to be the most remittance-dependent countries in Central Asia. As a result, they have contributed to property bubbles in both the countries. Some argue that this has helped boom construction sector, however, some others say this has distorted the market.

These countries faced sudden fluctuation in remittances transfer over the last decade pushing them into a difficult situation to formulate fiscal budget. The remittances flow depends on the Russian economy functions. This underscores the fact that how exceptionally vulnerable Central Asia is to developments in Russia.

Politically speaking, Central Asia’s economic dependency—in part because of mass labour migration—gives Moscow significant leverage when negotiating all sorts of deals. When there is any resistance from the sending countries in the negotiations, Russian uses the power to threaten to send the millions of young men home back (Trilling 2015). Considering the political context surrounding remittances, it is not surprising that officials in recipient countries are concerned about the numbers. There is no doubt that notable fluctuations in remittance volumes can have a major impact on political and social developments in Central Asia.

Central Asian countries felt the negative impact harder because of the heavy reliance on remittances sourced in Russia, as remittances in several countries are vital for the families and for the macro economies. New Russian regulations include the barring of migrants who overstay their visa for a period of one year from re-entering the country for the next ten years. These regulations became effective since the early 2015, could encourage many migrants to return earlier than they had planned (World Bank 2015).

Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have been experiencing growing remittances with periodic fluctuations. The flow of remittances depends on the economic situation in the United States and Spain. Spain hosts one-tenth of all the migrants from the LAC region. The economic recovery in the United States improved employment prospects for migrants, particularly as migrant employment...
3.2 Remittances and GDP

in the United States is more responsive to economic activity than native employment does. Migrant employment rose during the second half of 2014, but remained flat in February 2015. The sectorial composition of the United State’s recovery has important implications for migrant employment, and therefore for remittances to the LAC region (World Bank 2015).

Remittance flows to the East Asia and Pacific Region (EAP) weighed down by a sluggish growth prospects in the Euro zone and weak values of the Euro, the Japanese Yen and other currencies in source countries against the US currency (World Bank 2015). In 2014, remittances flowing into the region grew by an estimated 7.6% to US$122 billion. During the year, two of the EAP countries; China and the Philippines are the world’s second and third largest remittance recipients and they have taken in estimated USD64 billion and USD28 billion, respectively (World Bank 2018; Economic Times 2018). However, smaller Pacific Island countries are amongst the most dependent on remittances, with Tonga and Samoa among the world’s top 10 recipients whose remittances contributed to huge share of GDP.

El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico saw robust growth, and they were the world’s 4th largest remittance recipients in 2015 (IOM 2016). The remittance growth was sluggish in Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay, Brazil and Peru as well, partly owing to weak economic activity in Japan and Spain. However, the outlook for the region is positive, as remittances is expected to benefit from the expansion of GDP and employment in the United States, although this will be offset by high unemployment in Spain. This in fact means to explain that economy of some countries depend on another countries’ economy. This implies that sending countries’ economic volatility is dependent on the performances in destination countries. Scholars argue that when sending countries have no power on maneuvering demand and supply functions, sending countries should not solely depend on the remittances for the development.

To answer to the question—what impact does that have on the socioeconomic fabric—researchers have dual answers. Some strongly favours the migration led development and some are not because they think that migration led development has high human cost. Mass migration has left countless poorly cared for children, elderly parents and grass widows (Muszel 2013). The net effect on local economies is questionable, as this has to do with the bureaucracy and corruption. Officials would like to see transfers shovelled into small businesses, but red tape and greedy civil servants make that prospect appealing only to the well connected.

According to the conventional wisdom, most Latin American migrants who come to the United States look for a better life, inspired by the “American Dream” (Planas 2015). There is a lot of truth in that, nonetheless, there is another side to the story—people migrated from Latin America because it is difficult to make a living in that region. Issues such as poverty, political instability and recurring financial crises often conspire to make Latin American’s life to be more challenging than in the U.S i.e. a wealthy country with lots of job opportunities. Living on the northern side of the U.S.-Mexico border, it will be obvious to view the Latin America region as a total different world that is isolated from the United States. Even so, the truth is that the U.S. government has historically made life in Latin America harder by overthrowing
democratically elected governments, financing atrocities and pushing trade policies that undermine Latin American industries, dealing blows to local economies (Planas 2014).

Irrespective of the continents and countries, most respondents, as it comes to dependency, felt demoralized because of the fact that they know that the relationship between sending countries and receiving ones are asymmetric. Most migrants think sending countries are demonized and looked down upon by receiving countries. As the citizens of the receiving countries eventually get to know that sending countries are dependent on their economy, migrants begin to face xenophobic treatment.

Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as well suffer fluctuations in inflows. In 2014, the growth was about 7.7% while it was just 1.1% in 2015 (World Bank 2015). The steady growth is contributed by the fact that a strong 10% growth of inflows to Egypt and a 13% increase in Lebanon. If the oil prices continue to be undervalued, remittances from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in a medium-to-long term may decline. In the short term, however, significant foreign exchange reserves and strong fiscal positions could support current spending, thus delaying the negative impact of low oil revenues on migrant employment.

Conflicts in the region are resulting in international displacement and forced migration across borders, and remain a major risk factor to the outlook for remittances in the region. About half of the estimated 59.5 million displacees (UNHCR, 2016) around the world are children, and millions of those children have been separated from their families (Touzines 2007; UNHCR, 2013, 2014; Ullah 2018). In the past decade, more than two million children have been killed in conflict, with a further six million wounded and one million orphaned (Fazel and Stein 2002; Ullah, 2008; 2011, 2018; UNICEF 2012). Only a decade ago, the number of forced displacees was 37 million. Since early 2011, the main reason for the acceleration has been the war in Syria—the world’s single-largest driver of displacement (UNHCR 2015). Syrian devastating conflict—one of the protracted ones the region has witnessed in recent times—a continuation of the so-called Arab Spring which started in 2010 in Tunisia to put an end to authoritarian rule and corruption and to demand liberty, dignity and social justice (Ullah 2015a, 2018).

The South Asian countries are projected to receive USD120 billion of remittances in 2015, although the growth rate is slower with only 3.7%, compared to 4.5% in the previous year (World Bank 2016). Large-scale construction activities and fiscal expansion in the GCC countries, which account for 60% of remittances to South Asia, and improving economic prospects in the United States continues to support inflows to the region. Meanwhile, India, the world’s largest remittance recipient also is experiencing a shrinking growth whereby the rate has decreased to 0.6%. The reason behind this is partly due to the appreciation of the Rupee. In contrast, remittances soared to Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh with the growth rates by 16.6, 9.6 and 8%, respectively (World Bank 2016).

In a FGD with Indian migrants in Malaysia we asked about how do they feel that India receives the highest amount of remittances. This means that India tops as a recipient in the global remittances with US$71 billion in 2017. While some were
excited to know that and a few also murmured that ‘money cannot buy peace’. Why you are saying so? Most responses were about how some families became helpless. They got a feeling of insecurity due to the truancy of the family members. The meaning of the feeling of the remained behind family members is very deep in the sense that the psychological cost these people pay is never compensable with mere remittances. To them, mental peace is more important than being financially solvent. This implies that development to them would be different from what is conventionally understood.

The level of dependence on remittance varies across regions and countries. In the Sub-Saharan Africa region, Nigeria alone accounts approximately for two-thirds of the total remittances inflow to the region, although the remittances are estimated to have remained flat in 2014. The regional growth in remittances in 2014 largely reflected the strong growth in Kenya (10.7%), South Africa (7.1%) and Uganda (6.8%). Remittances in the Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia and Comoros made up to about 20% of their GDP in 2013 (United Nations 2017). In Somalia, there are rising concerns on the impact on remittances due to the closing of bank accounts of money transfer operators by correspondent banks fearing risks of money laundering and financial crime.

The opportunity for the people of the Republic of Moldova to leave the country has only existed since the gaining of the country’s independence in 1991. The economic, social and political factors have been the driving forces behind the migration flow from Moldova (Stemmer 2011; GFMD 2011). This migration came along with huge cost that includes a reduction in production activities, an increased in social pressures, the separation of individuals from families, drastic demographic changes as well as the amendments to the whole political structure (Stemmer 2011). A mass mobility began in 1990s and reached its peak in 2005 with approximately 400,000 people leaving the country. However, according to the Moldovan border police, the number of emigrants was close to 750,000 while the IOM estimates that the accurate number of people who left would be around 600, 000 and the majority (about 60%) of them has moved to the Russian Federation (IOM 2015). The migration of the country’s elite has brought both economic and political problems for the Republic of Moldova. The country is losing its most valuable scientists, engineers and business people. The brain drain could also become a problem for Russia and the EU. Both sides have a vested interest in the educational elite of their neighboring countries staying where they are, as this is the only way to create stability in the region.

A “welcoming environment” however, is not reflected by the policies enforced in the sending countries themselves, but also it comprises the attitude of receiving states towards the migrants. Besides, restrictive policies also interfere with remittances, in terms of the availability of official or non-official channels of money transfer or of the possibilities for circular and return migration. Since remittances are subjected to the fluctuations of the macro economy of sending countries, thus its inflow between different countries may not always be stable and secure. In spite of that, management and planning of remittances would be useful to make better use of it. Besides, remittances are mostly private funds and it would be contingent on the migrants’ personal desires of expenditure and investment.

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3.3 The Cost of Remitting

Sending money back home also has its own cost of transaction. Recently, the average cost of remitting has fairly decreased, due to the availability of options for various channels through which remittances could be sent in legal way. Yet, remitters generally do not take this cost into account when they calculate net profit. We tend to disregard the cost of remitting in our migration—development calculations. This is because perhaps the cost at an individual level looks like a fraction of the money remitted. However, the aggregate cost of a person pay throughout his/her migrancy could be astounding. One migrant worker from the Philippines said she was living in Hong Kong for the last 18 years. On average, she remitted 7 times a year and she paid on average 10 dollars per transaction. This means she paid (18 * 7 * 10). The aggregate cost of sending remittances globally in 2017 was about $30 billion (World Bank 2018). Despite its potential to lower the cost, the use of mobile technology in cross-border transactions remains limited (Rahman 2012). This is due to the fact that there are regulatory processes of transactions to be followed in order to combat money laundering and financing terrorist activities. In addition to sending money to their families, international migrants hold significant savings in their destination countries (World Bank 2014). Over and above that, it is true that remittances and those diaspora savings can be very profitable and beneficial towards the countries’ economy (Ullah 2012). Israel and India are good examples of how remittances can be made helpful in times of crises such as the macro liquidity. These countries managed to resolve their financial crisis by tapping into the wealth of diaspora communities (Ullah 2014a).

Migrants also resort to informal channels to remit. It was rampant as formal systems (especially Banks, Western Union and MoneyGram became widely known) took longer time when their families back home needed money urgently. Formal systems such as banks were expensive to remit. Of course, some of them were with questionable legal status (i.e. irregular) that got no access to formal channels (Ullah and Panday 2007). There are many evidences that money was not delivered on time and many lost their money without any trace.

The Remittance Prices Worldwide (RPW) database monitors the cost of sending remittances in major international corridors. RPW includes 227 country corridors; incorporate 32 remittance-sending countries to 89 remittance-receiving countries. How snaky is the travel path of the money often depends on the cost of remittances. The United Arab Emirates and Singapore were among the cheapest remittance corridors. Despite a substantial global reduction since 2014, Sub-Saharan Africa remained as the high-priced corridor with 11.5% of total charge. In which, the costs of sending money from South Africa to Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and Mozambique are the most expensive in the region (World Bank 2015). Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) increased by 2.2% (to US$32.9 billion) in 2014, after a slow growth (0.9%) in 2013. Nigeria alone accounts for around two-thirds of total remittance inflows to the region. It is notable that the level of remittance dependency varies across countries. Remittances in Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia and Comoros equal about 20% of
GDP (World Bank 2015). Globally, India remains the largest recipient of officially recorded remittances in the world with about US$70 billion in 2016 followed by China (US$60 billion), the Philippines (US$25 billion), Mexico (US$22 billion), Nigeria (US$21 billion), and Egypt (US$17 billion) (World Bank, 2017).

One of the largest customer bases of the Western Union are migrants who regularly visit their local Western Union office to wire money to family members back in their home country. One of every $5 that a person sends using a money transfer service is handled by Western Union (Kuross 2015). Western Union has half a million agents locations worldwide. Western Union serves more than 150 million consumer-to-consumer and business-to-business customers whether they are sending or receiving money using web, apps, accounts, mobile wallets or retail, every year, to more than 200 countries and territories. In 2018, Western Union moved over $300 billion in principal in nearly 130 currencies and processed 34 transactions every second across all of the WU’s services (Kuross 2015).

3.4 Channels and Corridors

Carling (2008) argues that the remittance pattern is dependent on the characteristics and behaviors of the remittance senders and receivers. Apart from the fact that the cost of sending remittance to different countries varies, the cost is also subjected to the types of channels used by the sender. The size of total remittance flows and the frequency of transfer are determined by various factors, such as the number of migrant workers, wage rates, the professional skill, length of stint, and economic activity in the host country/region and in the sending country/region; exchange rates; political risk; facilities for transferring funds; marital status; level of education of the migrant. Other factors include whether or not migrants were accompanied by dependents; household income level; relative interest rate between labor-sending and receiving countries or regions (Doorn 2000).

The cost of sending remittances is negatively correlated with the number of migrants and service-providers in a country, which means that the more is the competition the lower is the cost. Figure 3.3 shows the cost of sending from one country to another—listing from the most expensive cost to the lowest. In Brazil, for example, it is most costly for the residents of Bolivians to send money home, costing almost three times as much as it does for Peruvians. In France, the most expensive remittance destination is Vietnam, followed closely by China.

On average, the transaction cost from and to G20 countries has fallen to 7.58% (World Bank 2016). South Africa continues to stand as the most expensive G20 country to send money from. While, Russia is the cheapest of all and Saudi Arabia comes as the second cheapest country to send money from with a rate of 4.06% charge (World Bank 2016). On the other hand, the average cost to send money to G20 countries has increased to 8.08% (World Bank 2016). The top two most expensive countries to send money to are China and Brazil, with the rates of transaction at 10.38 and 9.38%, respectively. On the contrary, the cheapest receiving countries are

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Mexico and Indonesia at rates of transaction 5.30 and 6.69% respectively (World Bank 2015).

The most expensive region to send money to is the Sub-Saharan Africa. As compared to South Asia, the cost of sending money to the region remains the cheapest with a rate at 5.74%. East Asia and the Pacific remain at a steady rate of 8.11%, while Middle East and North Africa got a reduction cost to 8.21%. Concurrently, the cost to send money to East Europe and Central Asia has also reduced—as calculated inclusively with Russia; the cost is reduced to 6.02% but as calculated with exclusion of Russia, the rate of cost is at 7.18% (World Bank 2015). This clearly points to the fact that poor nations pay higher costs to remit. Not surprisingly, the US–Mexico corridor registered the largest remittance flow. Other large flows originate in Saudi Arabia and go to Asian and Arab countries and from the United States to China, the Philippines, India, and Vietnam (Agunias 2006).

There are two broad policy trends: (i) an increasing interest in strengthening the infrastructure supporting remittances such as transaction costs and “last mile”— also known as the distribution stage, in which the funds are paid to the beneficiaries; (ii) cross-selling products linked to remittances in order to encourage a more beneficial remittance usage, and securitizing remittance flows (Agunias and Newland 2012). There should be a shared responsibility between sending and receiving countries, as receiving countries create mechanisms to compare transfer fees, both sides cooperate to increase security, and sending states create cooperation mechanisms with postal offices for receiving of remittances or offering consular identity cards to emigrants without necessary documents despite their status of residence. To foster more productive remittance use, some sending state governments support remittance-backed housing and business loans, as well as mortgages. Such programs exist in Colombia, Burkina Faso, Mexico and the Philippines (Philippines link it with long term investment in pension funds) (Agunias and Newland 2012; Newland and Patrick 2004).

Remittance and corruption: There is no doubt that corruption has plagued humanity (Berdiev et al. 2013; Tyburski 2014). Though there are some people who do not view corruption as a problem but most scholarship finds that it remains a substantial barrier to economic growth (Ahmed 2013; Majeed 2016). In a big economy small-scale corruption may not bring instant damage but in a small economy large-scale corruption can dismantle the growth. There are arguments that corruption can “grease the wheels” in developing economies and promote growth by removing red tape (Neff 1964; Huntington 1968; Darden 2008). Most studies confirm that corruption hampers growth and increases income inequality (Mauro 1995; Meon and Laurent 2010).

Migrant remittances (new development mantra) (Ratha 2005) present an interesting political puzzle. Scholars, however, found an interesting but unexpected dark side of remittances. We discussed already that remittances hinder economic growth by simultaneously increasing the price of domestic goods and reducing the competitiveness of exports. Remittances might cause a moral hazard for governments, allowing them to increase political corruption in a manner similar to the natural resource curse (Abdih et al. 2012). Government income from resource wealth correlates with
increased levels of corruption. Migrants are not a resource like oil or gas that governments can export. Migrants, their friends, and families are people and potential political actors with a unique resource at their disposal i.e. remittances. Migrants may adjust to corruption at some point of time because they remit purposively to improve living standards back home (Conway and Jeffrey 1998).

The prevailing wisdom in political science research mimics the resource curse argument. Ahmed (2013) argues that remittances allow governments to reduce their spending on public goods that all citizens can access and provide more private goods to political supporters, and governments may react by substituting remittance wealth for their own spending on social programs. This expenditure switching effect increases corruption by creating incentives for bribery and government rent seeking as people compete for access to increasingly scarce public goods (Ahmed 2013; Conway and Jeffrey 1998).

Corruption thwarts their remittance-supported economic pursuits by creating economic uncertainty while increasing transaction and opportunity costs (Singer 2010). Tyburski (2014) argues that the tendency for authoritarian governments to provide private goods is reinforced by migrants’ weak incentive to try and influence corruption using their remittances. About US$84 billions were syphoned off from Bangladesh (that receives US$15 billion as remittances per year) in the last 8 years (from 2010–2018) (Ullah and Huque 2019). Respondents believe that it was possible because the Central Bank has the sufficient US$ reserve from remittances to meet import payments. One individual claims to be the richest person in Bangladesh who amassed huge amount of money through brokering labour supply to foreign countries throughout his life. In one of his interviews, he claims he never paid any tax to the government.

Barajas et al. (2008) argues that availability of remittance inflows decreases motivation of individuals to monitor and evaluate the governments’ policy performance. This means migrants tend to compromise with domestic governance. Abidih et al. (2012) examined the relationship between remittance and the quality of institutions and found that remittance exerts negative influence on quality of institutions. Individuals with high remittance do not take account of the quality of domestic institutions and prefer to solve their economic issues by using bribes to ‘grease the wheels’. Families with migrants, especially those also receiving monetary remittances, are more prone to bribe solicitations by public officials. Corruption in Public health does not bother the remittance receivers as they can buy services in private clinics or go abroad for treatment (Majeed 2016). Remittance makes people less reliant on government services, which in turn reduces pressure on the government from people. This implies that government becomes less accountable. Therefore, less accountable governments always are prone to more corruption.
3.5 Receiving Country Perspective

A case of Dekasseguis’ remittances: In the light of the academic debate this book is dealing with, this section aims to address the role of remittances in local contexts, taking the example of the dekasseguis—the name given to the Brazilian Japanese descendants that migrated to Japan, more intensively from the 1980s, to work in temporary, low-skilled jobs. The term dekassegui is composed by two Japanese ideograms: deru, which defines “to leave” and kassegu, which means to “work to make a living.” Therefore, it applies to individuals that leave their homeland to work in another region (Hirano 2008). Considering the dimensions of Brazil, both in terms of its population and of its economy, remittances do not represent a large share of the GDP thus it brings only a limited impact for development at the national level. Nonetheless, the potential impact of remittances on households and for community development, at the local level, should not be disregarded.

Dekasseguis migrated mostly from small and medium sized cities and they are concentrated in the states of São Paulo, Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul and Pará, where the Japanese community had established upon arrival to Brazil. Nevertheless, they are responsible for the second largest share of remittances to Brazil; and this constitutes an interesting and peculiar case of study. This section identifies and characterizes the remittances that are sent to Brazil, in the light of the migratory trajectories of dekasseguis.

The first generation of Japanese immigrants in Brazil tended to perceive their movement as a temporary settlement. The ultimate goal was to save enough money to return to Japan. These plans, however, were largely transformed by a series of circumstances, which included the financial difficulties that many immigrants faced in Brazil and the infrastructure and economic collapse of Japan after the Second World War. As a result, the immigrants and their descendants began to establish more permanent roots in Brazil, leading to the formation of one of the most expressive Japanese communities outside of Japan until today.

Over the years, in the 1980s, Japan saw a positive anticipation as the country was going through a period of intensive economic growth. Several enterprises were in need of labor imports to keep the production levels high. This had attracted the attentions of Brazilian dekasseguis and during the period, the influx of these communities moving back to Japan was large. At that time, the movement was largely influenced by the economic situations of both countries—as only now that the roles were reversed, in which Japan’s economic condition was favorable as compared to Brazil’s (Sasaki 2000; Hirano 2008). Unfortunately during this period, Brazil was considered to be the “lost decade”, due to the climate of political instability and economic recession, both of which contributed to the deterioration of the quality of life. However, back in Japan, the jobs offered in the industrial and production sector did not entice the Japanese workers themselves because they perceived those occupations as kitanai (dirty), kiken (dangerous), kitsui (painful), kibishii (demanding) and kirai (unwanted) (Sasaki 2000; Beltrão and Sugahara 2006).
3.5 Receiving Country Perspective

With such effort, starting in 1989, there was a rapid increase in the number of dekasseguis looking for employment in Japan. In the following year, with the reform of the Japanese Immigration Law, these flows gained a new impetus. The revised 1990’s Immigration Law not only predicted strict sanctions for employers that hired illegal migrants, but also established conditions that institutionalized and greatly stimulated the immigration of Brazilian Japanese descendants. In the new version of the Law, nisseis and sanseis (third generation migrants), as well as their spouses, could apply for a residence permit of between six months and three years. They were also granted with the right of multiple re-entries, an important institutional mechanism that secured the migrants and allowed them to establish a circular routine between Brazil and Japan. Therefore, the Japanese ancestry facilitated the access of dekasseguis to the Japanese labor market as it provided a solution to the labor shortage of the companies while, at the same time, regularizing the entry of foreigners in the country (Sasaki 2000).

Under these favorable circumstances, in 1990, the number of Brazilian dekasseguis in Japan saw a raise of 288%, compared to the numbers of the previous year (Sasaki 2008). In the beginning, most of the dekasseguis arranged their trip through recruitment agencies that took charge with the procedures—from the visa application to the job placement in Japan. However, with the consolidation of the flows, the social networks became a lot more relevant and migrants started to rely mostly on their connections with friends and relatives already established in Japan to plan their own departure. Furthermore, migrant associations were created, such as the Center for Information and Support of Migrant Workers (CIATE) and the Brazilian Association of Dekasseguis (ABD).

Brazilian dekasseguis is mostly concentrated in the central area of Japan, especially in the provinces of Shizouka and Aichi—which were two of the main industrial zones of the country. In regards to their origin, the largest number of dekasseguis came from the states of São Paulo and Paraná, which are regions that had been colonized by the Japanese immigrants in Brazil in the beginning of the twentieth century. Most of them came from households with middle/middle-low incomes and their educational background was less educated than the average Japanese descendants in Brazil (Beltrão and Sugahara 2006).

Most of the dekasseguis (66.6%)—men and 58.3% of women—make regular transfers to Brazil (Beltrão and Sugahara 2006). The average value of the monthly remittances was of USD820 for men and USD630 for women. These findings are also endorsed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which points to the fact that the individual values of dekassegui remittances tend to be higher than those sent by Brazilian immigrants in other countries (Tamura 2009). While the average value of remittances sent from the United States and Europe varied between USD100 and

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1It is interesting to note that another research conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) shows that there is a very clear regional concentration of remittances, most of them being sent to households in the South and Southeast areas of Brazil (Schweizer 2008). Even though this data refers to the remittances of all Brazilian emigrants, and not only to dekasseguis, it is possible to assume that the remittances sent by this specific group largely influence the verified pattern, since most of the cities with a high concentration of Japanese descendants are located in those areas.
USD500, for example, dekasseguis remitted an average of USD600, in each monthly transfer (Tamura 2009).

A number of factors contribute to the volume and regularity of dekassegui remittances, such as the possibility to work overtime and the fact that the jobs are relatively well paid—at least comparing to the wages of similar positions in Brazil. However, an even more influential factor is the legal character of the flows. The regularization of dekassegui workers offers better conditions for inclusion in the Japanese labor market—with the guarantees of the specific labor legislation—and facilitates the use of banks and other formal channels of money transfer (which, in turn, also facilitates the accounting of remittances and the development of appropriate policies to increase the profitability of these resources).

The dekassegui remittances are not only significant in terms of volume and regularity, but also support objectives such as investment in human capital, real estate and businesses. These support objectives are mostly having the potential to improving household living conditions and promote development in Brazil. However, even though the potential might exist, these resources need to be considered in the light of two very important factors. The positive impact of remittances is connected to two dimensions: an individual and a conjectural one. Therefore, having the intention to invest does not mean much on its own. Investment depends on the preparedness of the migrant and on fertile social, political and economic conditions offered by the country of origin.

They intend to open a business in Brazil, most of the dekasseguis did not have previous experience and only a small number actively searched for information on the specific business area they wanted to invest or on the broader economic atmosphere in the country. They do, however, recognize the necessity of getting some kind of support upon return to Brazil, especially capacitation courses to improve management and entrepreneurial skills and re-adaptation to the country (Beltrão and Sugahara 2006). This means that their remittances despite their entrepreneurial intention, goes to unproductive schemes.

Some interviews with dekasseguis reveal that their income largely depends on the economic situation in Japan. There has been a concentration of the Brazilian population in Aichi area, which is largely due to the presence of Toyota Motor Corporation, one of the world’s top car producers (Sasaki 2013). In late 2008, in a bid to counter the general loss of auto sales in the global financial crisis, Toyota Motor entered a long period of production adjustment. However, between October 2007 and September 2009, Toyota’s semestral domestic production plunged by almost 38%, while its net sales dropped by 28% from 26.29 trillion yen (US$262.40 billion) in financial year (FY) 2008 to 18.95 trillion yen (US$ 203.7 billion) in FY2010. The general drop in industrial production resulted in the reduction of working hours, salary cuts and joblessness in the region. While Toyota Motor factories did not hire Brazilian residents in Japan, the decreased production in the suppliers led to a large-scale joblessness across the sub-contractors, which drastically affected the lives of the Brazilians (Sasaki 2013).

With the abundant amount of remittances inflow, there was a sudden realization on the importance of utilizing the earnings. The potential dekassegui remittances...
for development in local areas of Brazil had initiated the Dekassegui Entrepreneur Project, which is an institutional answer to the gap between the investment plans of dekasseguis and their concomitant lack of knowledge and experience in the field highlighting the importance of information and qualification as a differential for those that want to open a business (Table 3.4) (Tamura 2009).

The numeric magnitude of the dekassegui flows also has a financial counterpart; in one hand it is manifested through the contributions made by the via tax payments, daily expenses and living costs in the country of destination, while on the other hand it is declared through the remittances that are sent back to the country of origin. The volume of remittances sent to Brazil from the dekassegui migrants in Japan surpassed US$2 billion—the second largest amount remitted by Brazilians living abroad, only behind the ones residing in the United States (Schweizer 2008; The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 2005).

An indicator of these transformations is the increase in the volume of migrant transfers has prompted the capital that is sent back to the origin country by returning migrants.\(^2\) The differentiation between the types of money transfers executed by migrants is an extremely relevant tool, since “each of these flows has different implications at the public policy level” (Maldonado et al. 2012: 11). For instance, if the tendency verified for Brazil in 2011 is maintained in the following years, it would mean that more and more Brazilian migrants will be returning to the country and, as a consequence, that the volume of remittances and migrant transfers might also reduce.

The potential of remittances, as a form of investment capital, the benefits of return migration for local development also depend on the “aptitude and preparation of the return migrant, and whether or not the country of origin provides a propitious social, economic and institutional environment for the migrant to use their economic and human capital productively” (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002: 27). Cassarino (2004)

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\(^2\) An accurate measurement of remittances requires a precise definition of the other types of money transfers to countries of origin. There are three main different categories of money transfers associated with migration: workers’ remittances, compensation of employees and migrant transfers. “Workers’ remittances are defined as money transfers conducted by individuals who change their residence, in other words, who move another country, usually for more than a year, and send money home from there. The compensation of employees refers to transfers conducted by individuals who do not change their place of residence, but only live and work temporarily in another country. Finally, the migrant transfers account for capital flows that migrants send from abroad to their own accounts back home, usually due to a return to their home countries” (Maldonado et al. 2012: 10).
identifies two relevant aspects of return, which are the resource mobilization and preparedness. The first aspect refers to the tangible and intangible resources accumulated by the migrant. While, the second aspect refers to the willingness and readiness to return. However, the level of preparedness “is not only dependent on the migrant’s experience abroad, but also on the perception that significant institutional, economic and political changes have occurred at home. These circumstances have a bearing on how resources are mobilized and used after return (Cassarino 2004: 18).

Not all of dekasseguis and not all of return migrants aspire to become business owners, and it is equally necessary to provide the sufficient institutional, social and economic conditions for their re-integration in the labor market and in the society, as a whole. Remittances are perceived and invested as private, individual resources. There was no evidence of community projects such as the building of hospitals, schools or other infrastructure—that had been financed by migrant associations. The focus centered predominantly in economic development, and, more specifically, in fostering economic dynamism at the local level, through migrant entrepreneurship and business initiatives. These investments can, of course, have multiplying effects for the community, promoting a broader social development, but, nonetheless, it is important to understand the primary uses that are given to these resources.

Even though returning is not a necessary pre-condition for migrants to contribute with development in their places of origin, especially given the numerous possibilities for diaspora engagement (Ullah 2015b). Migrants are the human resources that have long been one of the integral elements of development. Naturally, migrants and development will have the own influences to one another. The human resources are also capable to exacerbate financial—other than providing the accustomed physical potencies (i.e. skills and knowledge) for a country’s development. Remittances are perceived as the optional tools for development, whereas some developing countries rely on it largely as their GDP contributor. However, not overlooking the other factuality whereby sending remittances to one country has its charges too which means that remittances are not flowing freely between any two countries. Nevertheless, this chapter has disputed that remittances can in fact bring affirmative impacts towards a county’s development. Although scarcely it can be seen as effective towards the entire development of a country, remittances have huge rewards to offer to certain local communities and mostly in the local households. Utilizing the remittances by implementing institutional inventiveness such as entrepreneur or business projects provide opportunities for the local communities to present the locality with its own economic development, which in return may bring about social improvements.

We contend that migration and remittance are often used as prestige economy. In many rural societies, migrant families enjoy higher status than the non-migrants families. There are however, problems the determinants of the status meaning that status is determined depending on the development status of the destination country. For example, if a migrant works in the Middle East, in general, enjoy medium level of status, if they work in the Western world, they enjoy highest level of status and if they work in low-income countries, they enjoy lowest level of status. This status hierarchy creates divisions in the society. In the migrant families shame economy works strongly too. Neighbors, friends, and relative tend to borrow money from the
migrant families. Though they are not in a position to lend, because of shame economy, many respondents said they borrowed money from elsewhere to lend money to someone.
Chapter 4
Extraordinary Agents and Expensive Adventure

How strong is the push to leave? To abandon what you love? To walk into the unknown with all your possessions stuffed into a pocket? It is more powerful than fear of death. (Salopek 2019: 48)

Since the turn of the millennium, the relationship between migration and development has returned to the fore in the development discourse as a major development-policy issue. Although the debate has swung between optimism and pessimism since the 1950s, optimistic views began to dominate in the 1990s and 2000s. However, since the last decade, pessimistic impressions have been mounting as well (de Haas 2007) and should continue to mount.

Migrants in the Philippines are considered as heroes because of their extraordinary contribution to the economy. In many cases, migrants risk their lives; take an adventurous journey to get to the destinations. We analyze how aspiring migrants justify the risks they run to migrate by negotiating risk information in relation to their life circumstances and considering the symbolic value of specific forms of migration.

While it has been argued that migrants are following perilous migration routes do so out of misinformation or disinformation about the risks they are potentially going to face, often due to the desperate desire to better their families’ economic status. We argue that these migrants are really exceptional people. These people, however, suffer discrimination, low pays, and xenophobia. They pay exorbitant amount of money to finance their migration and high cost for remitting. They pay opportunity costs and psychological costs (Nikolova and Carol 2014). Decisions to migrate through high-risk channels are mediated by a range of factors such as aspiring migrants’ options for socio-economic advancement, the social and moral acceptability of certain migration forms and the risks they involve, the religious significance of death, and migrants’ perceptions of their relative preparedness to, and ability to control, the risks they may face (Baláž et al. 2016).

Migration is a very complex decision. The risk they run has a high cost. Since 2014, more than 4000 fatalities have been recorded annually on migratory routes worldwide. The number of deaths recorded, however, represents only a minimum estimate because the majority of deaths around the world go unrecorded (Ullah et al. 2019).
2014). Since 2000, more than 60,000 migrant deaths have been recorded globally (Migration Data Portal 2019). The IOM recorded 32,000 deaths and disappearances worldwide since 2014 (IOM 2019). Since 2014, only in the Gulf, about 34,000 Indian migrant workers died (The Times of India, 2019). This speaks of the lack of migrants’ protection. These data not only highlight the issue of migrant fatalities and the consequences for families left behind, but can also be used to assess the risks of irregular migration and to design policies and programs to make migration safer. How much underestimated is the number could be imagined we look at the number of dead bodies of migrants arrive in Bangladesh everyday (8 dead bodies everyday) (Ullah et al. 2014).

In a ceremony organized on the occasion of World Refugee Day to “give back their dignity” to the migrants by the United for Intercultural Action to call out the names, region of origin, date, and cause of death of each of the 36,570 persons who lost their lives “trying to reach fortress Europe” (United for Intercultural Action 2019). The idea is to make the invisible, visible, to give existence to the men, women, and children whose existence the European Union denies to the extent of not keeping any statistics on them, whereas it loves statistics of all types on its own citizens. Since 1995 and the creation of the Schengen space, legal means of access to the European territory have become increasingly restricted, leaving migrants no choice other than the most dangerous routes.

The tragic deaths of 58 Chinese people, found in the back of a lorry on 19 June 2000, highlight the desperate situation facing undocumented immigrants from China. When British customs agents waved a 50-foot, Dutch-registered freight truck into the inspection dock of this port city, they thought they might find contraband alcohol or drugs, not 58 corpses slumped behind crates of tomatoes in what was the country’s worst smuggling disaster (Miller 2000). Four British dailies carry comments on the disaster at Dover. The Times says that the tragedy should prompt what it calls “fresh thinking on immigration” both in Britain and elsewhere (Blocker 2000).

Migrants are the people who have the courage to fight for a better life in a new, unknown, and possibly in inhospitable environment. This means they are resourceful and determined, and strong in conviction. They dream big. They are not afraid of death, and they take risky routes to materialize their dreams. They know that the chance of success is from 0 to 50%. They do not turn back. They know the chance for survival could be zero, they still sail the boat on the rough waters with the hope of the mere chance to get to the shore. Are these people not exceptional?

On 9 September 2019, security personnel at the Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi stopped a man riding in a wheelchair, made it all the way to the Terminal 3 before being intercepted before boarding a flight to New York City. Using a fake passport under a different name (than an original name) 32-year-old successfully cleared both an initial security screening and the immigration counter. India’s Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) said there were some signals, whose passport said he was 81, wasn’t who he claimed to be. [We were] suspicious about him as his voice didn’t match his age. “Despite [his] gray hair, his skin seemed to be quite young, as there were hardly any wrinkles on his face.” He changed the look with thick glasses and a white turban. The guy reportedly confessed his scheme, telling
authorities he was going to the USA for a job but had trouble acquiring a visa. A man told him that he could get him to the States for around $42,000, to be paid when he reached New York (Jensen, 9 September 2019).

Extraordinary courage, determination and risk taking adventure make them exceptional. An interview of a diverse and multinational family in Egypt demonstrates how a convergence in the family happened after about 30 years of a journey of a migratory life. “I come from a Bosnian family. I worked and ‘kind of’ settled in Lebanon. I married an Egyptian woman. My son met a met and married a Filipina woman. My wife is the granddaughter of [im]migrants from Iraq. If you look at my family, my life, wife’s life, and the lives of our children in this country, would not have happened if we were not brave.”

A Bangladeshi migrant’s [in Kelantan, Malaysia] a splash of memories of how he got there. “It took me 37 days to get to Malaysia from Bangladesh. I traversed a few countries, a few jungles, a few mountains, jungles on the hills and oceans at dead of night. Who is more courageous than me?”

Through a few FGDs, one common message transpired. They said, they might be unskilled, uneducated but they have worked hard, they have made many people educated and skilled, they have made the community better, richer, and stronger, for many, many years. This in fact reflects that they are proud of what they have contributed to the society.

“I am a migrant myself. Upon graduation in Argentina, I left for Australia. I did not have idea about the process of being permanent in other country. I eventually became permanent. I do not really consider myself to be among the bravest people in the world, as I had financial support from my family, a fairly solid academic background prior to my move, and importantly, I realize now, that a white complexion and my name were in my favour (sorry for making a racial comment). It does not necessarily mean that I have not faced hurdles along the way, but they were pretty minor compared to those encountered by most migrants. But I am a typical migrant in the sense that I fought hard to make a good life for myself in my adopted country, thereby also making a small contribution to the country as a whole.” There are millions of them contributing to the wealth and vitality of their adopted countries all around the world, but those 5000 in 2018 who died at sea (and many more before them) will never get the chance to do so leaving a message that we died only because I wanted to migrate. Migration is a human right. It has, however, become clear that a lack of human rights-based migration governance is leading to the routine violation of migrants’ rights in transit, at international borders, and in the countries they migrate to (OHCHR 2019).

In a summer of 2005, we (a group of migrants) got on a small cargo boat, and sail across the Gulf of Guinea to Calamar, Nigeria. When we discovered that no ferry existed that we were informed of by GPS, we had no enough time to exit the country overland before our visa to the country we entered expired at midnight. At the dock, a vessel with a single outboard motor, a cargo of nails in wooden boxes, a crew of two young toughs, and a pilot was leaving that night for Calamar. For a price that seemed extortionate, we would be allowed on board. We were unaware of the time the trip might take. It was the height of the rainy season and the ocean was cruel. We went on with our heroism. There was a passenger on board who looked miserable and pale. He was reluctant in taking part in any conversation. After the first hours of drenching waves and seasickness, we learned that he was living in Algeria illegally.
and had gotten into troubles. He was being repatriated. He was away from his own land for about 29 years.

The incredible decision to uproot oneself—to say goodbye to home, family and friends, travel hundreds or thousands of miles into a place unknown socially, politically, religiously. There is no idea whether they would be accepted. They do not rule out the likelihood that they may die en route and they may not see their family back again in their lifetime. Still they move on based on a belief that is that life would be better elsewhere.

... ... I witnessed the consequences [of various nature and extent] of migration. Anxiety, expectation, dream, desire, aspiration, failure, disappointment and frustration—all have signs on the face of the person living and working alone in a city. The family (siblings) they left behind in the village keeps waiting for a letter or a call from the migrant member. The left behind family deals with the routine reminders of the lenders (from whom they borrowed money to finance the migration). Expanded responsibility, taking over roles of a husband to take care of the wellbeing of the entire siblings often push them into depression. In most cases, their (left behind families) contribution is not recognized. Any failure brings scorns, hate and often culminate in separation or divorce.

The toll of migration on so many people seemed immense—the hardships, the uncertainty, the longing. The aloofness, the way they conceal the pain of dislocation behind poses and jokes, they way they digest the pain of gross exploitation perpetrated upon by employers, brokers and the receiving country citizens often go beyond explanation by any language. But still migration goes on. There was something heroic about the effort they make getting their work done, making the employers satisfied, and keeping their status in the receiving country legal and in order.

As they return from the factories or work place to their coffin size sleeping room with exhaustion from long shift hours (often 14 h including over time), they receive calls from back home; their lassitude is never reflected in the conversation. They are migrant workers. They saw themselves, their origins, and the world with more openness and more clarity than those who lived with what was given. Whether consciously or not, they had chosen to rediscover themselves anew.

It is difficult to turn back on the past. It is something you have to arm yourself for, or grief will ambush and destroy you. More migrants from Sub-Saharan Africans are making to Europe than before. Since 2010 at least one million Sub-Saharan African move to Europe (Pew Research Centre 2018). The immigration policies of countries like France, Britain, and Spain were more liberal then than today. Every now and then we use to hear about someone who had made it to Paris or London, and they were regarded with awe, like the explorers of centuries ago, and also with envy, and even a little pity, because they would be truly alone and gone for good. But the world was still too big for the imagination of most African villagers to conceive of Europe (Packer 2015).

Today, the primary destination for African migrants is Europe. Whether or not life is harder in Africa or Asia than it was thirty years ago, globalization has shrunk the distance and expanded the horizon of aspiration. When we read about the boat
tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea (Ullah 2008), the thousands of Africans—and Middle Easterners and Asians—drowned on the lethal voyage to the shores of Europe, we think of desperate souls struggling to escape the hell of their lives.

Evlyn (43) [disclosing the name with her consent] spent 24 years overseas (4 years in the KSA; 11 years in Hong Kong; 3 years in Macao, 5 years in Singapore and 2 years in Brunei). She is a Filipina. She is unmarried. She says she forgot to marry (meaning she was busy and never thought of getting married). She has so many responsibilities. She financed two of her brothers for their university education and three other cousins; financed one sister to become engineer. Evlyn thinks she is now free but she is tired now. Evlyn is broke. Evlyn’s story makes us deeply think about a few things: how long is the list of her sacrifices; is it something that may make her regret? What is her future plan? It is clear that during the migratory life journey, she never thought of herself; her marriage, having kids, having a family in a sweet home. When she goes back home finally, how would her life be like?

Yes, she helped improve and establish many people’s life. But what is about her? How is then development and migration negotiated? Her sweet and sour migratory journey is ending soon but today that made her tired. How would we then see development through the lens of Evlyn’s life? Whose development is at whose cost and what cost?

The previous chapter in large part debated over an issue, which is who earns remittances and who are exposed to remittances uses and how does this impact on development. Exposure to remittance, or the benefits of remittances, is relatively a new concept introduced to the scholarship of migration studies, and within this broad concept there are also important gender dimensions (Ullah 2013d). Women constitute around half of the total international migration flow in today’s world; however, the amount of the remittance that they are exposed to is considerably lower than that of their counterpart. The magnitude of the effects of remittances is increasingly being investigated, however it is yet to be completely understood. Since most of the origin countries are from developing world, studies conducted on impact of remittances on development have particular importance.

While making a case about migrants’ contribution to development, research tends to overlook some important facts related to the costs migration requires such as money required financing migration, the opportunity costs migrants forego, the fees to remit and the other costs. Globally, in most cases, potential migrants obtain finances from multiple sources such as their relatives and friends, banks, traditional moneylenders [often on high interest rates], NGOs, as well as from selling properties/assets. Nevertheless, this may lead migration to a worthless venture because in some cases we observed that migrants required years to pay the loan back. This becomes one of the reasons why migrants tend to stay longer than they initially thought of. As a result, many of them become illegal/irregular. In addition, the psychological costs the migrants and their family members back home pay is impossible to be measured quantitatively. Had these migrants been in their home country, they would have earned ‘something’—i.e. opportunity costs or would have supported the family in different ways (Ullah 2010). Though in general, this factor is not considered in calculating the net benefit of migration.
During the twenty-first century, capital, goods and information circulate at low cost and at a rapid speed. Evidently, as population mobility continues, debates on international migration will constantly be challenged. There are claims that migration is still governed by outmoded notions about human mobility and is hampered by inadequate policy and legal frameworks, and the overriding security concerns tend to stifle it. While globalized labor markets seek migrants, it has severely compromised the human rights of migrants where there are too many of whom must travel, live and work outside the protection of laws.

A growing number of parents in sending countries in Southeast, Central and East Asia and Africa are moving to wealthier countries. An increasing proportion of these migrant parents are mothers who leave their families and children behind to take up employment in domestic and care service sectors. This is how a family becomes transnational, and in this case children are geographically separated from one or both parents over an extended period of time. Millions of children are currently growing up in the absence of their mother or father, or both. This social cost of migration goes very high, particularly due to the lack of parental care.

To a large extent, the impacts of family separation on the well-being of children who are left behind demands a deeper understanding. The negative effects can be exacerbated because a long-term absence of one of the parents may lead to permanent disruption of family unity. Migrants may start having dual or multiple relationships: one in the country of origin and one in the country of destination resulting in reduced amount of remittances sent home. This describes that the negative impacts of migration on child may outweigh the positive effect of remittances. Migrants who take up domestic work are mostly females. A research conducted on female domestic workers in Hong Kong in 2013 (Ullah 2013a) shows that almost all of them migrated unaccompanied. At one point of time during the stint, some of them decide to return; some fail to renew contracts; some of them get tired of staying away from homeland. Regardless of the reasons for return, subconsciously they calculate the costs and benefits of the migration. This cost-benefit analysis is not only in relation to monetary factors but also social cost-benefit analysis. The study shows that the mean stint of the migrants abroad was 11.14 years. The average age when they moved was twenty-one-years-old, which means they moved in their prime period of life. Of the total respondents in the study 78% were singles. Many of them returned home when they reached fifty years of age (Ullah 2013e). In another follow up research in 2016 (Ullah 2016a) found that about 97% of them had premarital sex in Hong Kong and of them 36% experienced pregnancies (Ullah 2016b). As they give birth in the destination countries, most of them are repatriated. With new babies (born mostly beyond wedlock), they return home facing another phase of social and financial ordeals (Ullah and Alkaff 2018).

Migration plays a critical role in the transmission of diseases including HIV infections. Research confirms that increased HIV rates have been associated with migration (Hirsch et al. 2002). Migration-related factors, such as being away from home, poverty, poor living conditions, isolation, mobility, limited access to health care and HIV prevention resources, more liberal norms regarding sex behaviours and drug use are correlated with an increase in risk for HIV/AIDS (Apostolopoulos 2006;
HIV/AIDS is generally considered a development threat. There have been widespread claims that unaccompanied migrants are at a high risk of being contacted with sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS (Ullah and Huque 2014).

Migration brings significant impact towards family structure and family development. Migrants leave behind their siblings (son, daughter, wife, sister, parents, son-in-law or daughter-in-law) (MDHS 2005). When large numbers of migrants are separated from each spouse, it results in shrinking of birth rate and increasing an aging population, and this phenomenon has been growing and becoming more apparent (UNICEF 2007).

Owing to the fact that there is no official system for gathering data on the number of children and adolescent left behind globally (IOM 2006; Gracia et al 2018). However, the figure could be in the hundreds of millions. More than a third of all children residing in rural China (61 million) are left behind by one or both migrant parents (Yuan and Wang 2016). About 27% of children in the Philippines (Reyes 2008), 36% in Ecuador, and more than 40% in rural South Africa are estimated to be left-behind (Gracia et al. 2018). Gracia et al. (2018) in their review research found conflicting findings. Remittance helps improve material benefits and income security, which has impact on health through gaining access to health care and education. On the one hand, some studies suggest poorer health outcomes among left-behind children (mobility orphan). Studies have shown that poorer nutritional, developmental and mental health outcomes in left-behind children in China (Gracia et al. 2018).

In Moldova alone, an estimation of 177,000 children under 18 were left behind by parents working abroad (IOM 2006). Approximately, 37.1% of these children are between 10 and 15 years old. Moldova falls into the category of countries with the highest proportion of children left behind in the CIS region (IOM 2006).

There are at least 5 million children in Bangladesh; 11 million in India, 2 million in Nepal and 4.5 million children in Pakistan are left behind (Table 4.1). This is just

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1</th>
<th>Perception of left-behind children about estrangements (n = 132) multiple response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children think that they have better clothing</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most positive outcome is the financial support</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better housing</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their relationships with their parents were good</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thought they were the same as before</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration did not have much of an effect on their relationships with their parents</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with their peers improved or stayed the same</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children thought their academic performance had suffered</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Field data, 2014–2016
an estimate. We attempt to identify the impacts on children associated with migration as a result of being left behind.

“…my children have stopped listening to me after his father left for overseas. They have become reckless. They answer back if I ask anything about their studies”. The children lack physical or emotional nurturing from their caregivers and they often experience a sense of abandonment. Left-behind children from across different countries felt that their parents have left them too early, for which they should have waited until at least they had grown up. The majority of children under this study were worried about their future and highlighted that they might encounter problems such as difficult relationships with their parents, relatives and peers and difficulties in ensuring both personal and family welfare. These fears seem to appear in association with the parents’ long absence. Some children thought that they enjoy more freedom than before. Many children tend to experience difficulties with their caregivers. Many of them felt that grandparents are not the best caregivers especially if they have aged. Due to such deficiency, children are prone to stress, losing their self-esteem and they are exposed to abuse or violence. The cases of abuse are common whereby their guardians and close relatives assaulted the youngsters. In some cases, remittances received from abroad are misused for the caregivers’ own needs. What is more telling is that the parcels of personal belongings sent for the children were probed and the guardians took what they wanted, leaving only unneeded things for the children.

Most parents have high expectation in their children’s academic performance and achievements in education. In general, when migrants return home, they pay visits to their children’s school for consultation sessions with the teachers. Notably that the educational performances of the children of migrants are significantly lower than those of children living with their parents. Elsewhere (in Chapter 3) we argued that when money goes unsupervised, it goes to schemes that are not meant to by the remitters themselves (Ullah 2010). The majority of teachers think that left-behind children who receive money from abroad show less interest in their studies, have no preparations for classes and are more likely to be cheeky and untidy.

Children of migrants are perceived to be more arrogant, aggressive and rude compared to other children. Separation may cause psychological distress that is manifested through deviant behaviour, acting out, or withdrawn and depressive behaviours (Abraham and O’Dea 2000). Due to the distress, children are more prone to bullies and offences. In the opinion of school staff, these children have lower academic performance compared to other children. In the Philippines, it is common to see that the children are being inclined to skip school and get involved in alcoholism and drugs. Teachers at school mentioned that emotional degradation is frequently subjected to the absence of the parents, regardless of the age and nature of the left-behind children. The money received is frequently spent on improper activities, though remittances should have been used to improve the children’s access to information technology if parents’ work abroad but their role in improving school performance has not been demonstrated. Instead, they misuse the opportunities to access the Internet to surf adult sites (Brooks-Gunn and Warren 1989). However some children are positively affected by parental migration, i.e. female children living in urban settings whose father is a migrant. The effect of maternal migration on left-behind children is an
increase in school absenteeism in urban areas, while children left behind by their mothers in rural areas do not report an effect as such at all. Nevertheless, these results should be treated with caution, since they may be caused by several other factors.

Evidences suggest that migration can affect the health of those left behind both positively and negatively (Ullah 2010; Ullah and Huque 2014). With remittances, the left-behind family members can afford to buy drugs and can bear the costs of health services, as well as they can sustain themselves with sufficient food supply (Table 4.2). However, the children may not be given the precise care, not taking accurate drugs at the right time and consuming on bad quality food. With less proper control and guardianship, children’s physical and psychological health can be affected negatively, even though they have the source of funding to live healthily.

Indeed, according to many policy makers and stakeholder, there are lots of works to do to ensure that the problems surrounding the left-behind children are adequately addressed. Yet, it is important to deepen the diagnosis of both the social policy system on the one hand, and to improve regulations and social requirements and provisions of assistance on the other. Priority should be given to investigating the relationships between migration, remittances and family structure, and in particular to assessing the impact of the departure of mothers. There is also a need to explore the link between girls who are left behind by migrant parents and human trafficking, illegal migration through marriages with foreigners and teenage pregnancy. Though these issues are under another big debate on the impact of migration towards girls.

The government, in the context of its bilateral relations with host countries, may seek agreements to facilitate the reunification of children with their migrant parents. It is necessary for the government to ensure consistency in the status of the migrant population and improve their working conditions through international or bilateral negotiations to promote the rights of the left-behind children, as these children’s rights cannot be ensured when the rights of parents to choices of employment are restricted (Garza 2010).

Social issues, such as social barriers could reduce the vulnerability of the people who are most at its risk. Despite all the economical benefits it brings, migration is detrimental to the psychological climate of the family and its subsequent effects on overall child development (Torres and Wallace 2013; Ullah 2016a). A parents’ departure is coincided with a series of upheavals for the children. The children have to

Table 4.2  Impact of migration on children (n = 132)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eating habits changed</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children tend to hide certain health problems</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postpone visits to the doctor</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not comfortable to disclose health issues to other people than parents</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source  Field data, 2014–2016

a mahsanullah gmail.com
Extraordinary Agents and Expensive Adventure

leave their friends, school and familiar places. In a way these children have to adapt to new adjustment including a new lifestyle and this rearrangement would bring additional stress to the children. The negative changes are sometimes reduced by the protective systems that parents establish to minimize the disruption to their children prior to their departure. Long absence tends to create pressure within the households and can result in family breakdown and divorce is a direct and frequent consequence of one parent’s truancy (UNICEF 2007; Ullah et al. 2018; Ullah 2016a). Though there are evidences that most affected families tend to rapidly develop their own coping mechanisms to reduce stress. Two explanations may be given: firstly, as migration is widespread globally, people got so familiar to the issues and promptly adapt the situation, and secondly, households with migrant members who have achieved better living standards tend to help the newly affected families to manage the emotional trauma caused by family members’ absence.

The nature and level of the changes that take place in the children mental health depend on several factors (such as who is leaving among the two parents, family relationships with the caregivers, the presence of other children in the neighbourhood and the attitudes of direct and indirect caregivers) (Frumkin 2002). Children got to turn to other people for help if needed, depending on their age and their problems. The truancy of parents has significant impact on the family life, when the absentee is the mother and the absence is very long. When mothers are away from homes for a long time, the major consequence is “that [it] can no longer be considered as a normal family” in the homes (Senechal and LeFevre 2002). For the left-behind children, the absence of parental care may represent a major deprivation, due to lack of supervision, support and encouragement (IOM 2014).

The children often encounter myriad of difficulties based on their gender. The correlation between the sex of the migrant parents and the impact of their absence on the children’s overall wellbeing requires a deep understanding because the childcare roles of parents vary according to their gender and the children’s age. Left-behind girls living with their fathers come across bigger difficulties than boys when dealing with inconvenient issues related to the girls’ physical maturation (Abraham and O’Dea 2000). In traditional societies girls are not expected to discuss the issues related to puberty or maturation. The only way to handle the problems is over the phone with their mothers seeking support from other females, living in the same community, usually friends and close relatives.

Brain-drain-loss conundrum: Scholars have divided opinion along the line of benefits and loss from brain drain. One bloc argues that brain is rather gained through migration while the other argues that no country can afford to lose any more brain (Rahman 2013). The primary argument of the first bloc that brain drained could be offset by the remittances they earn. We have misgivings in supporting this argument primarily because this argument has indicated that brain is a cheap commodity that is interchangeable with money. We however, argue that there is no way to justify brain loss with remittances inflow (Ullah et al. 2018). Skill migration to other countries remains a highly contentious issue these days. Skill drain does not take place based on skill surplus—deficient equation. Skilled migrants can make their choice to migrate on their own with minimal support from the government. This sub-section—is based
on a research conducted on skill migration from the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—argues that sending countries may lose skill that cannot be justified by the remittances inflow.

In order to answer, brain drain question we interviewed 12 engineers (6 from the Philippines; 4 from Singapore and 2 from Thailand); 9 medical doctors (5 from the Philippines; 3 from Singapore and 1 from Thailand); 8 nurses (6 from the Philippines and 2 from Thailand) and 14 academics (6 from the Philippines; 8 from Singapore) that were working abroad. Skill migration continues to grow because of the growing demand, wage differentials, glorifications of the contribution of remittances to development and failure of the origin countries to retain them. The question remains whether the respective sending country is producing more of them so that they can send after their own demand is met. This section investigates whether the sending end can afford exporting such skills.

The Philippines and Thailand send workers of almost all categories (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) and Singapore sends mostly skilled ones. Filipino nurses represent the largest category of health workers migrating from South East Asia, followed by midwives and doctors. These health workers prefer countries like Brunei, Ireland, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates as their destination, yet Saudi Arabia has consistently been the top destination for many nurses in the last decade. Engineers from both Singapore and the Philippines prefer to move to North America and Europe, while the academics from Singapore chose to move to the Pacific and North America.

A nation invests hugely to educate and train its citizens. A one-year increase in the average education of a nation’s workforce increases the output per worker by between 5 and 15% (Lowell and Lindsay 2001). Therefore, the loss of skilled workers would retard national growth, which suggests that skill migration has adverse impact on services provision in the origin country. The empirical literature is underpinned by a robust theoretical framework, which suggests that skill migration eventually leaves the country skill-empty that play a long-term impact on development. Most skilled migrants tend to settle elsewhere at some point of their life, thus the country loses them forever. What is more compelling is that skill loss cannot in anyway be justified and compensated by glorification of migration and remittances.

Beneficial brain drain—The notion of brain drain could be seen as beneficial to the labour origin countries. Migrants are leaving their homes to pursue opportunities such as education and skill training. After a certain period, the migrants will come back with their individual achievements and they will be able to contribute back to their home country—provided that they have gained greater skills and knowledge (Kangasniemi et al. 2004).

Brain waste—Foreign skills often are not interchangeable with the need in the destinations. About 98% of medical doctors from Bangladesh, for example, who migrated to Canada are doing something that is not at all related to their academic degrees. A majority of them effectively is unemployed and trying to have another sort of degree in order to secure jobs in other sectors (Ullah 2013a). For temporary or contract migrant workers, as they go back home with entirely new and skills from what they had before turn unusable. This aspect is generally not addressed because
brain gain has become kind of synonymous to migration. Brain drain is often justified by the amount of remittance and therefore, brain waste notion is never talked about (Sumption 2013).

For the highly skilled workers, the cost of emigration needs to take into account not just the private return but also the social return forgone. This is because the highly skilled workers could help train other workers, impart new ideas and are often a source of innovation, and thus their social return is particularly important than their private return. However, it is often neglected the non-economic costs such as the social, psychological as well as the opportunity costs which are implicit in the separation of the individuals from their original home and hearth, including possibly the family, and the familiar socio-cultural surroundings. These costs are not easily measurable, but they are no lesser than real (Ghosh 2006).

The access of developing country emigrants to the labour markets of the industrial countries benefits one another. However, a better allocation of labour would generate gains to the worldwide economy from which in principle, all countries should benefit. The World Bank estimates that a rise in emigration from developing countries equal to 3% of the labor force of high income countries and this could lead to a global output gain of US$356 billion by 2025. This is about twice the global gain from full merchandise trade liberalization, using the same model and similar assumptions. Out of the total increase of US$356 billion in global real income, those in developing countries would gain US$143 billion and their migrants would gain US$162 billion (adjusted for differences in purchasing power between the high income and developing countries) (World Bank 2005).

Well recognized is that migrants from the developing world, especially those who are low skilled workers, generally earn lower than the domestic workers of comparable skills in the developed world. This is one of the primary reasons why developing countries tend to receive lower volume of remittances as compared to the volumes of migrant they send. In 2000, Lucas (2005) estimates that the average remittance per migrant in developing countries was US$160 as compared to US$926 in EU-15 countries; it was as high as US$3988 per migrant in Bahrain and US$3231 per migrant both in Belgium and Luxembourg. This reduces the accumulated remittances. Not surprisingly developing countries that are willing to increase the remittance inflows would be more interested in seeking access for its potential migrants to the labor markets of rich, rather than of low-wage countries. Whether or not they will actually have such access is, of course a moot, but a total different issue (Ghosh 2006).

Developing economy send doctors and nurses and that they cannot provide sufficient care to patients of their own country. How could this dilemma be compensated? How much remittances are required to compensate them (Leipziger 2008)?

Skill drain in the case of South East Asia: There has been a longstanding debate that whether skill migration is beneficial or not for countries of origin. Skilled citizens i.e. human capital is one of the most important assets for a country. In order to transform a citizen into human capital, nations invest an immense amount of resources. A one-year increase in the average education of a nation’s workforce results in increase of the output per worker by between 5 and 15%. Therefore, loss of skilled workers has the potential to retard overall growth of a nation. Empirical literature is underpinned
by a robust theoretical framework suggesting that skill migration eventually leaves the country skill-empty. This has a long-term impact on development. Most skilled migrants tend to settle elsewhere at some point of their life as opposed to the unskilled migrants. Thus, it is highly likely that the country would lose them forever. Skill loss cannot in anyway be justified and compensated by glorification of migration.

Even in the historical era of near-open borders, migration has never been free of cost. The costs involved were the costs of transporting the belongings, and the effort to find work, lodging, and sustenance at one’s new home (Ullah 2010; Rahman and Ullah 2012b; Rahman 2011). Legal restrictions on migration imposed new financial costs. Skilled workers tend to move out of their origin to a richer country with the hope to be able to fully exploit their skills (Ullah 2013b, 2015a, b; Dodani and LaPorte 2005). The trend is also apparent in the ASEAN region i.e. migration within the region or between the member countries. Rationally, the free movement of goods between any two countries tends to expand the free movement of workers at the same time. Over and above that, the integration of ASEAN through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) aims not only to administer the South-North migration but also to elevate the South-South migration (Susantono 2015). The AEC aims to have a free flow of goods, services, investment, capital, and skilled labour. Eight professions are covered under skilled labour, which are: engineers, architects, doctors, nurses, lawyers and accountants. Between 1990 and 2013, intra-Asean migration increased from 1.5 million to 6.5 million (Nadaraj 2016). As part of the AEC commitment, members of the region have decided to foster the mobility of skilled workers—who are in those professions. This commitment is signed under the Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs).

Research on the issue of brain drain remains divided. It is viewed that skilled migration does not seem to pose a problem when it comes to the number of movers (Zhao et al. 2000; Helliwell 2006). Most migration in Asia consists of low-skilled workers, although over the last thirty years, mobility of professionals, executives, technicians and other highly skilled personnel has increased. Countries such as India, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Singapore are trying to attract professionals on either temporary or permanent basis (Castles and Miller 2009).

Since the last three decades, the stock of intra-ASEAN migrants has risen substantially. The rise among ASEAN nationals living abroad is also significant: for whom the intra-ASEAN share raised from 20.3 to 34.6% over the same period. In the destination countries in ASEAN more than half of the migrant stock comes from other ASEAN Member States—for Singapore 52.9%; for Malaysia 61.2%; and for Thailand 96.2% (ILO and ADB 2014). Since 1990, intra-ASEAN migration from Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia has shot up in each case by around 40 percentage points in terms of their total nationals abroad (ILO and ADB 2014).

Starting in the 1980s, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand became major destinations for many sending countries. The growth in cross-border labour mobility within ASEAN has two patterns (Manning and Bhatnagar 2003): first, migration was centred around the Mekong river states with Thailand as the hub and the four countries of
Myanmar, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Viet Nam as labour suppliers (Pasadilla 2011) and the second is the Malay migration region, with Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia as the major destinations for workers from Indonesia and the Philippines. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, account for about 90% of the region’s total migrants and 97% of intra-ASEAN migrants (ILO and ADB 2014). Disparities between the six other Member States, namely Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (ASEAN-6) and the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam) are evident (ILO and ADB 2014). These differences partly explain patterns of regional labour migration. Disparities are marked when it comes to wages i.e. a worker in Malaysia earns, on average, more than three times the monthly salary of an Indonesian worker (ILO and ADB 2014).

Not all educated and skilled migrants casually leave their home country merely for seeking better pay or for a better living. Under certain circumstances such as war, political unrest, ethnic or religious persecution, migrants are forced to leave (Torres and Wittchen 2010; Ullah 2014). Simultaneously, Siar (2014) claimed, the frequent movement of people crossing the borders is commonly large due to the high rates of unemployment and poverty. These movements are seen as solutions to certain individuals who need to start a living. However, Castles and Miller (2009) argue that the emigration of skilled people does not damage the economy as they leave, rather educated or skilled individuals who are unemployed would opt to seek jobs outside their home country, so as to become productive by utilizing the skills and knowledge they possess.

ASEAN is home to 616 million people (Jones 2013) (as of 2011) of which about a little less than half (270 million) are in their working age (ASEAN Statistics). Using estimates based on bilateral migrant stock in 2011, it contributes 12.8 million or 6% of the total global migrants or 30% of which are migrants within ASEAN (Orbeta and Gonzales 2013). The AEC focuses on breaking down trade barriers, so that the region can foster economic output up to 7% by 2025 and generate approximately 14 million employments (Susantono 2015).

Skilled/educated individuals move out of their countries of origins where they believe they can bring their knowledge into effective actions, while building new life. The unevenness of the migration pattern due to rigid national [im]migration policies, inequalities of professional education and licensing regimes as well as the vast income gap between countries represents that with the ever increasingly interconnectedness, the risk of brain drain has become a serious matter of concern (Susantono 2015; Bernard 2015). Economic integration may be seen as favorable as a whole but free movement of skilled labors may stimulate a brain drain from poor countries to richer ones (Chaitrong 2012). Moreover, today’s world economy is perpetually in transition, some countries are in favor of skilled laborers and the demand can be achieved through an open labor market at certain corridors.

The notion of brain drain is a common nuanced phenomenon that usually is seen from two lenses: detrimental and beneficial (Ullah et al. 1999). What is a brain drain theory? According to Torres and Wittchen (2010), brain drain does not simply express the situation when the educated individuals in their home country emigrate...
to look for higher wages or better opportunities in another country—but also when
the individuals who earned knowledge and completed their education abroad do not
return to their home country. Dodani and LaPorte (2005) claimed that the countries
(mostly the countries of origin) that have invested in education and training to the
individuals would be at loss of significant resources when they migrate, while the
recipient countries accrue benefit as they did not spend out the cost of educating
those migrants in the first place.

We conceptualize the term affordability in this context and lay out the variables
why these countries are losing skills and why they are in fact not in a position to
lose them. This paper is based on a research conducted on skill migration from the
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Skill migration continues to grow
because of the growing demand, wage differentials, glorifications of the contribution
of remittances to development and failure of the origin countries to retain them. The
question remains whether the respective sending country is producing more of them
so that they can send after their domestic demand is met.

Because of the fact that this section deals with a concept ‘affordability’, we con-
ceptualize this term so as to make the direction of the paper clear. In what way
ASEAN country’s affordability is questioned in the paper? Before the time migra-
tion studies came under academic investigations, migration used to be considered as
natural human phenomenon. Since the last decade, security, political, social and eco-

demic factors have been predominantly occupying the space in public debate about
migration. Migration has been viewed by most scholars as one of the best options
for making positive impact on development (Ullah 2010, 2013a; Rahman and Ullah
2012a; Skeldon 2005). One of the reasons for this is the volume of remittances being
channeled into origin countries. There are many countries whose 20–40% of the
GDP is constituted by remittances. While this is a great indication of contribution
to development, it is important too to look into the potential negative impact migra-
tion may have in both origin and destination countries in the long run (Ullah 2015b;
Ullah and Hossain 2014, 2016). While in this section affordability is viewed from
two perspectives: origin and destination, primary attention has been paid to countries
of origin.

The need for international skills has grown in developing nations. The supply and
demand mismatch for labour is one of the main drivers for international migration
and this is particularly evident in some countries in Asia. This happens due to the
fact that they experienced remarkable economic growth in the past two decades
(ADB Institute 2014). For example, Thailand has been in shortage of skilled labour
in a number of sectors because Thai market is insufficient both in terms of quantity
and quality to meet the growing skill need (NESDB 2013). Increased dependency
on foreign technologies also led many countries like Thailand to import increasing
number of foreign skilled labour.

Some countries in ASEAN are facing fertility decline and the population size is
shrinking and they are becoming dependent on migrant population as a result. At the
same time some human resource-surplus countries are ready to send labor to other
countries. Apparently, the tradeoff looks great in the way that some countries are
deficient of people and some are surplus. This might imply that a demand and supply
theory works in making a balance of need of both ends. The question has always been left unanswered which is: can the countries with surplus human resources really afford losing their human resources and the human resources–deficient countries can afford importing migrant workers?

Scholars defended the early 1980s theory of brain drain and came up with brain gain theory. Lately, the theory of brain waste is replacing the earlier ones. This theory is getting prominence in scholarly debate due to the fact that the brain that goes out is unlikely to come back and those who really return cannot use the skill they gained overseas because they engaged in such jobs where their skills were redundant thus eventually get de-skilled. One of the most pressing issues is that skill that a country produces is drained but the gap remains as it is or gets bigger as the country is not producing more than they export [in order to reduce the gap]. For example, the Philippines is losing medical doctors and nurses but the supply is less than they need. The dire need of medical doctors in clinics in rural Philippines could not be met, as a result. Policy makers do not take this kind of loss seriously into account because remittances inflow is seen to be counterbalancing this loss.

Majority (65%) of the engineers (irrespective of countries of origin) confirmed that they left their own country for a better salary base; this means that wage differentials are primary reasons for their decision to leave. Most Filipinos (85%) pointed to the fact for the decision to leave the country that the country was becoming inhabitable in terms environment, political culture, corruption and price hike which may not match the majority’s income. Most Singaporeans (irrespective of their professions) pointed that that was their choice to move out of the country. Most of them however mentioned one thing that life in Singapore is very stressful. Their skill is marketable, sellable and got high demand elsewhere. Most Malaysian and Thais pointed to the wage differentials as their primary reasons for taking over jobs abroad.

Migrants in many countries including the Philippines are often called heroes. This title is given to recognize their contribution to the economy, and this eventually works as encouragement to leave the country. In addition, migration is seen as the tool for easing unemployment problem. It should however be noted that skilled people may not be the reasons for growing unemployment problem. In addition, migrants are often seen as alien in destination countries. In many countries, recently in Europe, though due to the mass influx from the Middle East, a strong opposition to the migration was heard from people at large under the belief that migrants steal their jobs. This allegation may lead people to potential xenophobic practices of which there are myriad of evidences (see Ullah 2010).

It is acknowledged that brain drain adversely affects the countries of origins. Firstly, the evident impact of brain drain is the phenomenon known as a ‘labor gap’ that reflects the growing gap between the rich and poor nations. As elaborated by Illagan et al. (2013), the poorer a country is, the more the (educated) people tend to leave for a richer country, and this process usually generates profit to the respective inbound countries. This trend exhibits that the country is in demand of highly educated workers and the requirement of work experience, which the youth in low-income countries may not possess (Battistella and Liao 2013). One of the respondents (who is a nurse from the Philippines working in Singapore) said that
she is better respected there than in the Philippine hospitals. Respect… … (?), she mumbles in reply… ‘I mean in terms of salary, benefits and status.’

This leads to the second impact, in such a way that the resource poor nations are usually made up of unskilled labors while rich nations are usually blessed by skilled and educated labors (Bernard 2015). With this ongoing trend, Susantono (2015) claims that by 2025, there could be more than half of all the high skilled job positions in the low-income countries like Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam would be taken up by low skilled workers. In other words, the low-income countries might always lag behind the high-income countries as they are lacking of the human capital or human resources needed to further advance the economy and other development. Many respondents irrespective of origin said, as long as they can contribute to their countries in whatever way they can should be fine.

“… we don’t have to be in our own country. We can contribute wherever we are…” One of the respondents (who is an academic from Singapore) thinks his decision to move out of the country is not tantamount to brain drain. Why and how? She replied … ‘though I live here, look at my profile, most of my research and publications deal with Singapore. This means I am contributing more to the country than I could have been if I were in my own country.’

When a country consistently loses its skilled citizens, its identity might get weakened at some point of time. In Singapore, every year, 4–5% of the country’s top 30% of its population gives up their citizenships to take up overseas jobs (Loh 2015). The Prime Minister of Singapore during his interview with TIME magazine expressed his concern by saying “If the successful ones mostly leave, we’re going to be depleted. And if it goes beyond the successful ones, we’ll be shrunken.” As Singapore continues to lose its citizens, the government opens its labor market to accept migrants from elsewhere. However, the true identity may be at stake due to the loss of its natives while being inhabited by large proportion of new residents (Lee 2015).

Competitiveness and growth of a country depend largely on its ability to acquire and fully utilize new knowledge and the skills of its workforce. However, draining out direly needed skills and knowledge may bring havoc to domestic economy. The problem with this is that many countries are not capable of producing the workforce they need, and many more see their highly skilled workers emigrate (Sugiyarto and Agunias 2014).

The level of impact of brain drain may closely be linked to the economic and political conditions of the countries of origin. Poorer nations are prone to the detrimental consequences as a result of migration that involved the major outflow of their most talented human resources (i.e. educated and skilled individuals). Then again, the economic integration such as the AEC implemented by the members of ASEAN may be regarded as a step to support the financial system of the region aiming at easing the economic conditions of the less developed countries. As positively seen, the integration and interlinks between the members might elevate the migration process but as negatively seen, uncontrollable migration might end up giving more pressure to the disadvantaged grounds.

Skill drain or skill waste in ASEAN: Over the last two decades, migration landscape has changed (in terms of volume, direction and skill composition etc.) across
ASEAN region. Most receiving countries got new policies aiming at being self-reliant in labour market and thus slimming the inflow of migrant workers. These efforts are not working very well due to two factors: fertility decline and skill mismatch. Hence the unemployment as well as the number of migrant workers are growing. This picture is seen from two opposite lenses: migrants steal the local’s jobs hence is the unemployment and that locals are reluctant to take over some certain job categories. Almost all categories (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) of workers originate from the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore however sends mostly skilled ones. Filipino nurses represent the largest category of health workers migrating, followed by midwives and doctors. They prefer moving to Brunei, Ireland, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates as their destinations. Saudi Arabia has consistently been the top destination for nurses in the last decade. Engineers from both Singapore and the Philippines prefer to move to North America and Europe. Academics from Singapore moved to the Pacific and North America.

The mobility of people is inevitable due to social, economic and political changes. Vietnam government has two agendas on migration: first, labor export as a strategy to participate in the global trade as well as to improve domestic economic condition; second, encouragement to self-initiated professional to migrate as a strategy to improve the quality of the local human capital (Nguyen 2014). The Vietnamese government has been actively exporting their people in their former communist countries such as USSR, Germany, Slovakia and Hungary. The labor export was seen as a technique in sustaining the multilateral relations and aimed to reduce macroeconomic instability. As early as 1978, the Vietnamese government had sent approximately 24,000 technical interns who were the skilled workers and students to the USSR (DOLAB 2012). Unfortunately, a large number of those interns did not return home (Chesnokov 2011). The continuous movement of the Vietnamese has become alarming because of the fact that the country is suffering from of human capital loss (Dang et al. 2010).

Singapore is one of the most prosperous nations in Asia. As of 2012, the unemployment rate is maintained at a low rate with the average of 2% in Singapore (Walter 2014). The mismatch between the need for skills for the fast expanding development undertakings and the domestically available skill has made the country dependent on the migrant workers (Ullah 2012, 2013a; Rahman 2012; Walter 2014). However, this dependency has not stopped the native Singaporeans to go out for better opportunities overseas. At the same time, the large inflow of foreigners into the country has slowly becoming a point of issue as the local Singaporeans are on the other hand, looking for jobs abroad. Some policy makers attempted to justify this by the fact that diversity and globalization have made the border open for all and the mobility of people around the world has become largely inevitable (Lee 2015). Diversity is necessary to create knowledge and migration is necessary for creating diversity.

Job announcements in Canada, for example, clearly spell out that Canadians and Canada permanent residents will be given priority. This in fact signifies that while diversity is not closed, national talent should be retained first. Some countries in ASEAN hire ‘western’ people. The citizens see this as an exclusionary policy. Many citizens find it difficult to land into jobs of respective areas of skill, and decide to
move on elsewhere as a result. For example, in March 2014, Seah Kian Peng, a Member of Parliament in Singapore, “expressed shock” at the overwhelming number of foreign faculty members in universities in Singapore. Singaporean faculty members made up the minority (28% of the 25 faculty members) in the National University of Singapore’s (NUS) political science department. However, this came as no surprise to many Singaporean academics and graduate students. In 2013, a Member of Parliament (NMP) and associate professor of Law at Singapore Management University raised the same issue in parliament. A Senior Minister of State for Education pointed out that Singaporeans made up one in four (25%) faculty members on the tenure-track in both NUS and Nanyang Technological University (NTU); Singapore Management University’s (SMU) figure is one in six (16.6%); and Singapore University of Technology and Design’s (SUTD) figure is one in three (33.3%). In other words, Singaporean faculty members are a minority in Singapore’s universities. Some 44% of Singapore PhD students revealed in a survey that they believe that Singaporean universities have a preference for hiring foreign faculty members (Lay 2014).

Among ASEAN worker in Malaysia, Indonesians are the largest group, accounting for about 51% of all foreign workers, followed by Myanmar 7%, Viet Nam 4%, and the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia, accounting for a combined 5% (Pasadilla 2011). Cambodian migrants move mainly within ASEAN, in particular to Thailand and Malaysia. In terms of outward migration, workers from Malaysia, Myanmar, and Indonesia are mostly destined to work within the region, while in the rest of ASEAN countries; out-migration to the rest of the world takes the larger share.

The contradicting factor is that while Malaysia’s one-third of labor force is constituted by migrants; a considerable number of Malaysians are living and working abroad. Most of them are educated with tertiary qualifications. In 2013, 308,834 high-skilled Malaysians were living in the OECD countries and Singapore (Rahman 2012; World Bank 2014a, b; Mustafa 2015). Most of them were working in the financial, technical and engineering sectors (Pillay 2015). With the opportunity to migrate, Malaysians who decided to leave their homeland were mostly due to wage differentials, the origin’s ‘unfavorable political issues and public security’. Hence, Malaysia is facing an exodus of talent due to the poor prospects and lack of high-skilled jobs offering (NEAC 2010: 60). This issue matters very much, as Malaysia is moving towards becoming a high-economic nation by 2020, with the aim of sustainable development and that all they need is a sufficient pool of talent and skillful human resources to achieve it (Ishak and Abdul-Aziz 2014). Whatever are the reasons for them to leave the country, the truth is that the county lost the skills, which placed the country into a position to import skills from other countries. The cost of importing human resources, especially social costs, could be very high. For example, to tackle the issues of security; illegality/irregularity Malaysia had to form RELA (Ullah 2013a) which costed Malaysia’s image as Malaysia has been known to human rights regime for its infamous and brutal treatment towards migrant and refugee population.

In order to get most talented people home back the 10th Malaysia Plan revealed in June 2010 announced a ‘Talent Corporation’ to headhunt Malaysians abroad.
Recognizing the fact that the skills Malaysia lost are instrumental in driving economic growth. This implies that Malaysia realized that they couldn’t afford losing the skills from the country. Though this program turned unsuccessful. In the last 15 years only about 1000 were attracted to come back (Malaysiakini 2010). Of the 23% of the resident Singaporeans and permanent residents (PRs) about half (45%) were from Malaysia (Malaysiakini 2010). According to Malaysia’s Human Resource Ministry, there are about 350,000 Malaysians working in Singapore, and that 386,000 PRs (excluding Malaysian-born Singapore citizens and non-resident Malaysians) were Malaysians.

In the Philippines brain drain has been a concern since the 1970s, which involved the departure of college-educated and professional workers, mostly the physicians, teachers, engineers, scientists and mechanical officer (Alburo and Abella 2002). Then in the 1980s, the growing outflow of medical professionals (especially doctors and nurses) had started to become apparent. Of the 2 million domestic helpers from the Philippines, it is believed, about 3% are nurses and university graduates. They compromised their skills to take up foreign jobs (Ullah 2015b, 2016a). Worldwide, 25% of all overseas medical professionals come from the Philippines (Morella 2008). The continuous outflow of medical professionals, which is labeled as “Medical Apocalypse” (Morella 2008) is a serious problem that is currently faced by the nation. The country is steadily losing its medical professionals that it has to suffer the lack of doctors and nurses to take care of the local patients—forcing 2500 hospitals to shut down, since 2002 (Purgill 2010). The biggest shortage in many Philippines’ hospitals is not the equipment but the medical experts who run the equipment and perform the medical procedures (Voice of America 2009). As a result, the social development has become extremely poor especially in the sector of health services of the Philippines. This shows that the mass migration of high-skilled individuals has adversely affected the nation.

Moldova: The Republic of Moldova is the second smallest member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), after Armenia with 4.3 million populations (Salah 2008). Since the year 2000, the country’s economic performance has been constantly eminent. Moldova launched its structural reforms with the purpose of stimulating growth, accompanied by an effective social protection system (World Bank 2003). The successful economic improvement (GDP growth is retained at 6% throughout the past six years) has brought about the reduction of the national poverty rate (from 73% to less than 26.5% in 1999 and 2004, respectively). However, in 2006, the poverty rate raised up to 29%, mainly due to the increase in poverty in rural areas and small towns.

Just in 2000 and before, migration in Moldova was inspired by political and ethnic impulse. Today, however, Moldovans are desperate to improve their livelihoods from regional financial crisis, unemployment, low-income occupations and poor living standards. To that end, for them, the best way is to migrate in search of opportunities. As a result about 252,000 Moldovans migrated and left more than 1.5 million behind (IOM 2006). About 17% of the Moldovan households had at least one family member working abroad (MDHS 2005). The percentage counts are similar in both urban and rural areas, i.e. 16% and 17%, respectively, and majority of the migrants are highly
educated; experienced teachers and medical personnel (doctors and nurses). The records show that 25% of the emigrants have left their spouses behind (IOM 2005).

The highest percentage (21%) of households with at least one migrant is located in the South of the country, and the lowest percentage (i.e. 13%) is located in Chisinau area (MDHS 2006). Nationwide, the distribution of households with at least one migrant tend to come from the middle and fourth economic quintiles, i.e. 23% and 21% respectively. Only few come from the richest and poorest household quintiles (United Nations 2017). By gender in general, there are more male migrants than the females. However, in the Southern part of Moldova and Chisinau, the gender-proportions are the other way round. Scholars believe that this accounts that migration has caused inevitable loss of labour and reproductive potential. Female migrants often move out to European countries while the male migrants are inclined to migrate to Russia. Although in large, half of Moldova’s migrants moved to Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries. Only one-third of the total migrants have shifted to Western Europe, primarily in Italy, followed by Portugal, Greece and Spain (IOM 2015).

Evidently, the Moldovan economy relies highly on the migrants’ remittances for its source of income. Remittances transfer has risen rapidly since the past few years (National Bank of Moldova 2006). In 2006, the remittances constituted up to 30% of the country’s GDP. More than 50% of households with children under 18 years old with a family member working abroad have accounted more than 50% of remittances into their family budget. It looks like that the children are one of the main factors that promotes remittances flows towards the family. The remittances are used to fund fundamental household consumption, consumer durables, housing purchases and for debt clearance (Banks et al. 1998). Only a small quantity (7% or lesser) is being used to finance business investment (World Bank 2005). The receiving households are commonly using the remittances on food and clothing, as well as other basic needs (Ghencea and Gudumac 2004). Both types of families (with and without children) have similar consumption patterns, and it is obvious to see that the monthly expenditures for food are twice as high the other necessities (Brewer et al. 2006). Households with children have higher debt accounts than those households without children.

Remittances would usually alter the existing social networks without producing immediate changes in communities. Social networks are often left out in most researches. In Moldova and beyond, migration tends to wear off the social values i.e. the traditional community structures such as close relationships, openness between neighbours and impacts on solidarity. Normally, migrant families that become affluent tend to form a new social group or that they start to mingle with particular social groups while cautiously loses their sense of belongingness in the neighbourhood (Peter 2010). This may create conflict between them and their roots resulting in the breakdown of the community networks. Left behind family members have to procure new behaviours, following what the migrants introduced, which often results in them adjusting the traditional community cohesion (Ullah 2010).

Lets turn to the case of Latvia because remittances are constituting about 51% of their GDP and about 10% of the total population is living out of the country (Kozlovs 2014). The migration-development nexus has taken a prominent place in
the academic debate, as well as policy discourse internationally, linking it with the
global refugee regime and implementation of millennium development goals.

Undoubtedly, one of the most powerful tools that can be used by the sending
country for its development is the realistic and favourable diaspora and migration
policy. We are talking about a policy that mobilizes those who emigrated for various
reasons, and attracts their capital, be it financial, human or social, for fostering
development of the country. During our research on the diaspora policy, Latvia, has
gained prominence in the context of recent developments of return migration policy,
we encountered other strategies besides fostering remittances to be just as or even
more important.

In recent years, the different spheres of diaspora involvement have been increas-
ingly acknowledged. Diasporas are in development debate due primarily to the fact
that many people think diaspora’s contribution to development is negligible because
they invest their money and talent overseas, while migrants do the reverse. We found a
few hundred of diaspora/migrants who contribute to their countries of origin out of the
feeling that they should contribute to the country that brought them up. Many of them
directly send money to their neighbours for education and health. We found many
who established community organization only for the good cause of the local people.
There are many schools and colleges established and run in the home countries by
the money directly send to by the migrants. Mr. Abdul Halim Miah a Bangladeshi
Canadian established a college in his village in Bangladesh in order to enlighten
the local people. The different ways of diaspora engagement in the scientific litera-
ture identify several policy approaches that include, but are not limited to creating a
favorable environment for investment, fostering business networks or encouraging
philanthropy, as well as developing diaspora tourism, among many others (Newland
and Patrick 2004). Recently, however, migrant groups that have maintained strong
collective identities abroad have been labelled as diaspora. Cohen (1997) talks about
several types of diaspora: classical notion (Jews), victim diasporas (Africans, Arme-
nians), labor and imperial diasporas (Indians and British), trade diasporas (Chinese
and Lebanese), cultural diasporas (the Caribbean case). These various types of dias-
pora have shown that the concept of diaspora has evolved significantly and now
includes more aspects that just tend to force exile (Koser 2007).

Recently, a more encompassing definition has been elaborated by Van Hear, Pieke
and Vertovec (as cited by Weinar 2010: 76)—diasporas are “populations of migrant
origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there are
multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between
the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries”. The devel-
opment of the concept of diaspora over time has led to inclusion of different aspects,
not only forced exile, to its understanding. As Faist (2010) labels them—the older
and newer usages of diaspora, and, hence, may explain the different tools used by
governments of sending states to foster development. But a challenge is often iden-
tified in the literature (e.g. Agunias and Newland 2012) including the issue on how
to engage the diaspora in development activities.
Diaspora engagement is a complex system with a multi-level process that incorporates four core steps. First, the identification of the goals of diaspora engagement—is it aimed at strengthening the ties, teach the language or foster political relations between the sending and receiving countries. Second, the mapping out of the main characteristics of diaspora—including their age composition, main places of residence and occupation, in order to develop strategies that would target these specific characteristics. Third, the building of trust between diaspora organizations and government institutions is crucial, which is a precondition to the forth step, namely, mobilizing the diaspora to act as partners in the development endeavors of their country of origin (Agunias and Newland 2012; Ullah 2012).

The governments of the sending countries can employ not only emotional links with the diaspora, but also implement legal and institutional mechanisms to foster successful diaspora engagement. On the one hand, the establishment of separate institutions or departments from the existing ones can promote an active and direct operation with diaspora issues. These can be ministries, but in the case of Armenia or Israel, they have specific agencies in charge such as the State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad, or they can be institutions on a local level that can be established in federal countries such as Mexico for instance (Agulias and Newland 2012).

Diaspora engagement allows for a successful partnership both with receiving and sending countries. Receiving countries can benefit, when mobilization of immigrant communities can contribute to integration processes. Furthermore, diaspora communities are often active advocates of human rights of migrants. Diasporas who are located in democratic countries often lobby the host governments to defend their human rights and promote citizenship rights (Werbner 2002; Crisp 1999).

There is a specific financial tool issued by the government known as diaspora bonds i.e. the income from which is used to finance infrastructure projects. Diaspora bonds basically mobilize remittances, turning them into substantial funds for development (Ozaki 2016). Diaspora bonds have been introduced in India, Israel and most recently in Greece; however, while they may be used as a trial towards the willingness of the diaspora to invest, the government needs to trade these bonds because relying on a secure and legal, emotional attachment is just not enough for investment (Wickramasekara 2016; Agunias and Newland 2012; Chander 2001).

The introduction of technologies and management systems as the new characteristics of business management allows one to lead a successful business from a distance. This in return has increased the prominence of diaspora entrepreneurship on the agendas of sending countries. Appealing to the entrepreneurial incentives to be implemented in the country of origin has been a popular motive for a longer time, though, as members of diaspora have a good understanding of the working environment in their homeland, and the existence of social networks can increase the success of a particular business incentive (Newland 2010; Boyle and Kitchin 2011).

Diaspora policies need to be understood in a certain economic and historical context, representing not only the reasons for emigration, but also for the motivation for strengthening ties with diaspora. In the case of Latvia, the 2011 national census shows that in the last 22 years, the country is experiencing depopulation due to the movement of 394,000 emigrants (Wong 2013). The event of emigration has then
becoming more apparent towards the society and policy makers. Concerning on the matter, the on-going discussions on employment policies has come to a point where it is predicted that the labor market development under the country’s Ministry of Economy will have 200,000 job positions to be filled in by 2030 (Ministry of Economics 2013).

According to some scholars and policy makers interviewed, the role of remittances is deemed as insignificant, as they serve only as a compensation mechanism to the lost human capital but do not foster economic growth. The Latvian diaspora is said to contribute to the economy when they invest their financial resources, and transfer knowledge and human capital back to the country. Therefore, the focus of the diaspora policy of Latvia has shifted. The Latvian diaspora policy has always been centering on strengthening links of the communities and their sense of belonging to the ethnic homeland via fostering language learning, knowledge dissemination on culture, art and traditions and encouraging the formation of diaspora organizations.

The advocacy and diplomacy activities of the Latvian diaspora were actually the most important during a time when Latvia was incorporated in the USSR. Through political campaigns, members of diaspora had taken the opportunity to inform their host societies about the situation in the Baltic States, and they managed to mobilize support for independence from such a powerful actor in the international arena. In some countries, the embassies of Latvia even continued to be politically active, and most of the diaspora organizations were established in the time from 1945 to 1980. The support from diaspora organizations was crucial in the process of all the Baltic countries achieving independence in the beginning of 1990s (Sumilo 2006). Diaspora organizations also played a significant role in Latvia’s accession to the EU and NATO, and in this case it was a targeted policy of the Latvian’s government to use diaspora channels as lobbies. Furthermore, several members of diaspora communities are now diplomats or politicians in Latvia.

Voices are being raised and heard that immigrants built many nations such as the USA, Canada, and Australia etc. Navarrette (2001) said it well that the USA was born on a leap of faith, the hope that crossing the Atlantic would mean that those brave enough to go could achieve a better life on the other side. The risk-takers then settled and began to contribute to the nation by launching businesses, building great universities, discovering vaccines, and exploring the space frontier (Navarrette 2001).

Chinese migration is not a recent phenomenon. However, Chinese migrants began to formally move out after 1979. Before 1979, thousands of Chinese used to migrate through dangerous routes. Chinese migration was documented as early as the Tang Dynasty (618–906 AD) during which the first wave of international Chinese migration took place with the establishment of seasonal agricultural movement between the mainland and Formosa (Taiwan), and Pescadores; then during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) Chinese explorers and traders ventured further to Africa and Madagascar, and the 1840s Chinese people left for plantations and mines in Spanish America, Indonesia, Malaysia, North America and Australia (Soon 2012).

This is not just about migration history. This is also about the history of bravery. A mail-order-bride (a woman who lists herself in catalogues to be selected by a man
for marriage) does not know anything about the person. She got no idea what awaits her. Still millions are putting on the catalogues. In most cases, the potential husbands ask them to go to them to meet. They run the risk for a marriage or for documents to be citizen of the country (Hodge 2019). In many cases, they set off despite strong objections from the siblings but they go ahead leaving behind angry fiancé.

Desperation makes people brave, which lead people to run risks. In 2017, a 19-year-old man from Gabon managed to squeeze himself inside the cramped bag and was arrested by the Spanish Civil Guard. Then, in the early hours of the New Year, more than 1000 men tried to jump a high double fence at the same location to get to Spain (Hodge 2019). In early 2018, four migrants found crammed inside car dashboards and engines trying to sneak into the EU (Pike 2019). The West African asylum seeker was found curled in the foetal position next to a car engine in a special compartment under the bonnet of a vehicle crossing into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta from Morocco (Sypes 2015).

We understand that a fraction of people has no choice but to move out. One can argue that these people will do whatever it takes to get to their destinations. For example, for the same reason, more than 5.6 million fled the war in Syria, and a million more were Rohingya (Ullah 2018; Ullah and Diotima 2018; Edwards 2019), chased from their villages in Myanmar, and hundreds of thousands fled their neighborhoods in Central America and villages in sub-Saharan Africa, driven by poverty and violence (Edwards 2019).

As migrants get to their desired destination (without documents), security people, or coast guard or immigration officers become busy inspecting their paper or asking questions. Most of them, however, tend to forget the fact that what ordeals they went through, what made them take life-threatening risks. Hossain’s—who escaped forced recruitment into military in DR Congo—in story tells us the level of bravery they possess and enforce for survival. He made a travel plan already to make it to Europe. He resorted to smugglers to traverse Rwanda, Sudan, and Egypt. He borrowed money from multiple sources (friends, relatives and parents) to pay to the smugglers. He spent about 11 days to get to Egypt. He was confined and threatened in a village in Sudan by unknown people (later, Hossain knew that these unknown people were just set by the smugglers to claim exorbitant amount of ransom. At a mid night, he escaped confinement and ran (as he assumed) about 20 kilometers. His dream to get to Europe was still up. He was preparing (arranging money, getting to know the best routes with least amount of time, contacting smugglers etc.) from Egypt to sail to Europe.

Almost a similar story was written in the Guardian on 9 February 2019. One Eritrean (Dawitt) chose the same destination through Egypt and at a point he decided to sell one of his kidney to get fast money that he has to pay to the smugglers. The Guardian (2019) says that Dawitt’s story is more common than statistics suggest. The Guardian (2019) reports that, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has collected data on 700 incidents of organ trafficking, primarily from North Africa and the Middle East (The Guardian 2019). The issue of the millions fleeing Syria has received serious attention though this is just a small fraction of a big picture. Refugees constitute only 10% of the total international migrations. They are the least
contentious group, because many countries have signed international commitments to admit them. The rest are moving to work, or for family reunification.

Global financial crises (in 1997 and 2008) made citizens worried about job security and the entry of economic migrants. Populist parties in many countries in Europe and elsewhere took the opportunity to deride the migrants leading to hardening polices related to migrants entry. The US government decided not to bail out firms that hired too many immigrants, and Spain government paid migrants to leave (Mackenzie 2016).

It is probably part of our evolved nature to think that more for you means less for me. This is how evolution made is xenophobes (Goldin 2013). Economy of course does not work that way these days. If it does, wages would go down as labour supply increased and natives might well lose jobs to immigrants. Migration brings an increase in profit, which business owners can invest in more production.

The argument made by Goldin and many other economists that the more people come in the more is the expansion of the economy, and ILOs example that for every 1% increase in a country’s population caused by immigration, its GDP grew between 1.25 and 1.5% (Mackenzie 2016). The World Bank estimated that if immigrants increased the workforces of wealthy countries by 3% that would boost world GDP by $356 billion by 2025. And removing all barriers to migration could have a massive effect. However, there was no change in wages and employment for natives overall if workforce grew by 4% (Peri 2012). A deeper look at the positivity about migration shows us another side of the coin meaning that all these arguments favour receiving countries only.

The very well known phrase about migrants that migrants do the 4Ds job (dirty, dangerous, demeaning and difficult) has a painful, negative and deep-rooted connotation. This is not a graceful title. This undermines migrants as human being. No legislations so far addressed the fact that this should not be used. This gives an impression that they are ready to take up any jobs given to them because the natives do not want to do these jobs. This notion creates a hierarchy between natives and migrants. This means we are separating them between migrants and the native by separating the work between 4Ds (crop picking, care work, cleaning and the like) and safe jobs.

However, when the developed world needs skilled migrants, they take them in happily depriving the countries of these skills. The example of the UK says it all that nearly a third of doctors and 13% of nurses are foreign-born (Mackenzie 2016). The presumption that migrants a strain on benefit systems in fact undermine their being because of the belief that economic migrants are poor people out to live off the tax money of the native and relatively rich people (Mackenzie 2016). Buruma (2015) counter argues, though, that many go not to countries offering generous benefits, but to where there are jobs i.e. the south-south. Those who do end up in wealthier countries are not the burden because its migrants on average pay as much in taxes as they take in benefits (Mackenzie 2016).

All hates illegal migrants. However, they make a surprising extra contribution because those who are formal work have taxes automatically deducted from their pay cheques, but rarely claim benefits for fear of discovery (Goldin et al. 2011).
Social security paid by employers on behalf of such migrants, but never claimed by them, netted the US$20 billion between 1990 and 1998 (Goldin and Cohen 2014).

Castles et al. (2009) rightly pointed that the dominant images of migrants that they take away jobs, push up housing prices and overload social services are empirically unjustified. They argue that an increase in migration is often the result rather than the cause of economic changes that harm natives—such as neoliberal economic policies. They further argued that economics is not the whole story. If perceptions about jobs and wages were the only problem, then anti-immigrant views would run high where jobs are scarce.

The blames that migrants are the threat to social cohesion are hurled on their shoulder. However, Bell and colleagues (2013) found no change in violent crime in Britain linked either to a wave of asylum seekers in the 1990s, or eastern EU migrants after 2004. The burden of blames the migrants carry is getting heavier day by day. Europe embraced multiculturalism in the 1970s, but now they call for cohesion and nationalism. The presence of foreigners appears to disrupt this. Many think that increased diversity may decrease social capital such as trust and altruism. Canadian Prime Minister (Justin Trudeau) though reiterated that “diversity is the engine of investment, it generates creativity that enriches the world.”

The issue of intercultural, international, inter ethnic, interreligious marriage, foreign brides in particular, has been getting a broad attention throughout the world since the 1990s. Migration related international marriage i.e. international marriage migration (IMM) has become a global phenomenon that has ignited a discourse on national identity and citizenship as well as transforming the culture in many societies. Every year, tens of thousands of women from less developed countries cross borders to marry men in more developed countries. Men in Western Europe and the US seek marriageable women from Russia and Eastern Europe (Levchenko and Solheim 2013), and men in East Asia and Australia find prospective wives in Southeast Asian countries (Lu and Yang 2010). Filipinos are the forth-largest ethnic group in Japan after Koreans, Chinese and Brazilians (most of which Brazilian Japanese). Of the 105,308 Filipinos in Japan in 1999, 89,645 of them were women and half of them were married to Japanese. At that time about 300–350 Filipinas entered Japan each month. Many initially worked as hostesses. Some were looking for a sugar daddy husband (Calunsod 2014; Statistics Japan 2009).

In 2008, Bangladeshi and international media covered the story of an Egyptian girl who flew to Bangladesh to meet a man living in a rural area whom she had been having an online relationship with. She travelled to Bangladesh in order to marry the man, leaving behind her angry and anxious parents. In Bangladesh, this story captured the interest of the public and raised a curious question: what explains her choice to marry an unknown person overseas? These days however, these types of stories are increasingly common. Our search on various websites turned out that around one million women globally post their profiles on websites ‘seeking husbands’. Possibly, even more women would have done so if they had access to the internet. Around a decade back, marrying a foreigner was acceptable only for females from a low social class in most countries in Asia. In the past few years this trend has shifted dramatically and as a result, foreign marriages have become a common practice in
today’s society (Ullah 2013a). Today, even among the upper middle classes, foreign marriage is seen as an exercise of free choice. The practice of marriage migration dates back centuries—merchants, pilgrims, colonizers and invaders either remained at their destinations or returned with wives or husbands of foreign countries and ethnicities. As the world has increasingly globalized, this practice has undergone a substantial burgeoning (Ullah 2013a).

Of the over 175,000 Filipinos engaged or married to foreigners between 1989 and 1999, over 91% were Filipino women i.e. brides are from the Philippines. The exposure of the Filipinas to the outside world is attributed to their colonial history. The geographic distribution of the foreign partners therefore is not surprising when considered the historical, colonial and post-colonial ties between the Philippines and the United States, Spain and Japan (Hashimoto 2007). Approximately 40% (over 70,000) of the foreign partners are from the United States; 30% (over 53,000) from Japan; 8.8% from Australia. In 1997, the number dropped to just over 7000 and in 1998 decreased again to just 6000, the drop most likely attributable to the Asian Financial Crisis (Freeman 2005). Other research has identified the number of registered Thai-Foreign marriages in Udon Thani in 2003 as being as high as 2228. This number likely underestimates the reality, as other research has found that 44% of Thai foreign marriages in the Isaan area are not registered (Srichan 2006; Ullah 2013a).

In the past two decades, South Korea has become one of the major receiving countries for marriage migrant women. With the economy of Korea surging, its birth rate dropped and life expectancy soared, Korean women achieved higher education, obtained employment and as a result they delayed marriage (Nho and Lee 2016). This led serious scarcity of brides for Korean potential grooms. Looking at IMM in Korea, the number of formally registered marriages between foreign females and Korean males was only 620 in 1990 however, it shot up to around 55,000 by 2005 which constituted around 13% of total number of registered marriages (Kim 2007). After 1992 when the diplomatic relationship between China and Korea opened up, marriages between Koreans and Ethnic Korean Chinese started to rise. As of April 2006, the total number of female marriage migrants in the Republic of Korea was 55,408 with 42.5% being Korean-Chinese, 20.7% Chinese and 20.3% from the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. The cumulated data of internationally married Korean men was 160,000, from 1990 to 2005 (Ullah 2013a; Lee 2007).

Between 1995 and September 2002, there were 58,279 visas issued to Taiwanese men married to Vietnamese wives from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO)1 in Ho Chi Minh City (Yamanaka and Nicola 2003) and in 2003 officers reported that the running total was in the vicinity of 72,411. The situation in Taiwan is even more dramatic, with international marriages accounting for 32% of all marriages in 2003. International marriage is overwhelmingly Taiwanese men marrying foreign brides—the group of immigrant spouses is 92% female. About two-thirds of these

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1 Statistics on the marriage of Vietnamese women to Taiwanese men are maintained by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO) in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
foreign brides are from China, and the rest from Southeast Asia. Among the latter group, Vietnamese constitute 69%, followed by Indonesians (15%), Thais (6.5%), Filipinas (4.8%) and Cambodians (3.5%). There are major differences in the patterns of marriage between Taiwanese men and women from China and Southeast Asia. The Chinese brides tend to be much older than the Southeast Asian brides. However, both the Chinese and Southeast Asian brides were typically marrying men 10 or more years older than themselves—55% in the case of the Chinese and 67% for the Southeast Asians (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Tsay 2004).

Over the last decades research has flourished on cross-border marriages between women from poor regions in Asia and men from wealthier countries (Statham 2019). After this life-changing decision is made, the women engage in a phase of intentional strategies and risk-taking to establish an enduring relationship with a foreign man. In some cases, this occurs literally overnight and she breaks with her existing life pattern and puts herself in a social situation to meet foreign men the day after experiencing the life course-triggering event. In others, women take several years vetting potential candidates by communication and mediated encounters. Meeting foreign men often requires brokering by friends or family acquaintances, which are already married to foreigners, or have relevant contacts. This mediation allows a modicum of security to the woman, who invests trust in her broker, and the bona fide intentions of a prospective man. Some women use internet-dating sites, messaging services and commercial agencies. Others move to work in tourist cities where male tourism and commercial prostitution is prominent or become ‘bar girls’ (Statham 2019).

Marriage migration has been explained as a success of women emancipation. This tells about the freedom that women can make this hard decision on their own. However, what has been neglected was that what extent is adjustment for both (bride and groom) they have to make. Marriage migrants who are women are at high risk of being subjected to specific forms of gender violence (psychological or physical domestic violence, forced marriage, domestic work exploitation, etc.), and may have limited access to protection and support services. Not surprisingly, many studies of Southeast Asian marriage migrant women living in Korea examine acculturation processes, particularly the stress associated with living in a new country. Except for a few (Lim et al. 2009; Park 2007), all of the reviewed studies used the standard measure of acculturative stress. Although only a few studies examined Korean men’s experiences in international marriages, the men reported a significant gap in expectations. The wives’ expectation of an “equal relationship in marriage” is a stark contrast to the husbands’ expectation of an “unequal or hierarchical relationship” (Kim 2007; Lee 2012; Park 2007). How long they can go ahead, how much sacrifice they keep making. There is no doubt that both of them must fight a cultural fight, religious fight, and language fight. As a result, events of domestic violence, separation, divorce etc. are growing.

Protecting the human rights of foreign-born wives of foreign men has emerged as a serious concern because these women face an elevated risk of domestic violence and intimidation but have limited legal protection. Only in 2018 in South Korea, a survey of 920 foreign wives in South Korea by the National Human Rights Commission found that 42% had suffered domestic violence, and 68% had experienced unwanted...
sexual advances (BBC 2019). Since the brides feel that their wives are not living in their own country and nobody is there to report to police, they can be abused. Brides are seen in many leaked videos saying that you are not in your country, so be a good wife otherwise wait for the consequences. BBC (2019) released a video being assaulted a Vietnamese wife by a South Korean husband saying ‘didn’t I tell you that you are not in Vietnam?’ Local media said the victim had managed to film the assault by hiding her mobile phone. She suffered broken ribs in the attack. A two-year-old boy, apparently their son, is seen in the video crying by the woman’s side. Although a high number of foreign wives experience domestic abuse, few report it to the authorities. And advocacy groups say there are clear reasons why. “In the worst-case scenario, South Korean husbands and their families deliberately refrain from helping their migrant wives obtain citizenship or visa status.”

So for a foreign wife to report abuse and upset her husband is tantamount to giving up her “Korea Dream.” It makes her already-vulnerable status even weaker. If she happens to have kids, the move could also mean never seeing them again. There is also a tendency in South Korea to treat domestic violence as a “family matter.” Of reported domestic violence cases for the past five years, only 13% saw arrests, 8.5% resulted in an indictment, and just 0.9% drew an actual prison sentence (BBC 2019). Last year, a series of women were murdered after suffering lengthy (and reported) abuse from their husbands, shocking South Korea. After one murder, the daughter of the victim posted an online petition, seeking capital punishment for the father who had stabbed her mother (BBC 2019). The problem is if they mutually want a divorce, it becomes very complicated- perhaps more so, than an international marriage. When spouses are from different countries, with assets in perhaps still another, the situation can get very complicated very quickly.
Chapter 5
Political Economy of Migration, and Social Force

In order to engage in the debates about impact of migration and remittances on development, the previous chapter dealt with a general overview of the role of migration at micro and macro levels and brought in an example of Dekassegui—Japanese who migrated to São Paulo, Brazil, for a new destination after the United States closed its doors to the Japanese during the first decade of the twentieth century.

In the wake of the rebirth of academic interest in political economy approaches in the 1990s, the argument was advanced for a ‘gendered political economy’. Since then, feminist scholars have stressed for the need for fostering a greater understanding of political economy models as inherently gendered, through critiquing economistic concepts such as ‘rational choice’ i.e. the privileging of the public over the private and the dichotomous treatment of agency. Women have been known, in migration stream, since long as dependent migrant on male counterparts. Just in two decades, a major qualitative change has taken place i.e. they migrate as independent migrant overseas.

The propagandists of populist politics are blazoning that [imi]gration is bad. The social and economic problems of our economic system are projected onto immigrants, and those still unaware “aliens” cannot easily defend themselves against what is happening (Kruh 2012). Leftists and NGOs argue that [im]migration is good by referring to human rights. European demographers know that the continent needs immigrants in order to maintain the population development necessary for prevailing in global competition.

Why do people ruthlessly attack immigrants in general? Why we differentiate between ‘we’ and ‘them’? The notion that we the good ones and they the bad ones, we in here and they, the enemies out there in front of the protecting wall (Kruh 2012) creating division. Anthropologists call this “othering” and their studies show that this phenomenon exists in many societies and cultures (Kruh 2012). The others present the “problem”, who is “unwilling to integrate” and living in the much criticised “parallel societies”, which they defend wearing head-scarves and visiting mosques, those who do not speak enough or only poor host country language and allegedly are not interested in “us”, the social majority. These are the migrants who sell their
cheap labour to make the economic boom of the twentieth century possible and they are stigmatised because of the work they do (4Ds) (Kruh 2012).

All around us, including the ‘Austrian Austrians’ (whatever that may be), there exist only ‘parallel societies,’ exclusively. So why should this be different with people coming from somewhere else? And why is this phenomenon turned into a reproach against them? The use of the term “parallel society” with its reproachful and pejorative connotations is particularly insidious. There are exceptions too when we look at ‘we’ and ‘them’. In explaining immigrant’s integration Kruh (2012) says that wealthy immigrants from a bourgeois background, quickly arranging themselves with the prevailing conditions and the economic system, are considered good, while those from poor social backgrounds, who have become workers, are identified as bad. Their culture is called backward and it is forgotten that for a long time no institution of the destination country paid any attention to them culturally (Féher and Heller 1994).

Since people no longer speak of class conflict in the public arena, the focus of the discourse has shifted to “ethnicising” and “culturalising” the social consequences of the economic imbalance. A century ago Europeans took it for granted that some races—most notably the white race—have been inherently superior to others. After 1945 such views increasingly became abhorrence. Racism was seen as not only morally abysmal, but also as scientifically bankrupt. Life scientists, and in particular geneticists, have produced very strong scientific evidence that the biological differences between Europeans, Africans, Chinese and Native Americans should be negligible (Harari 2018).

Female migration is seen as a victory of women empowerment. Feminization of migration has been theorized on the premise that migration has brought revolutionary impact on the lives of women. Migration has given the women mobility, empowerment and exposure. Yet, deeper analysis reveals that the actual facts are different from conventional wisdom. The phenomenon has emanated from the fact that outflows of female migrants in the labour market from Southeast and central Asia have been ever growing and in some cases, female migration outnumber male counterparts. Most of the female migrants are in their twenties, leave their own soil unaccompanied and often unmarried; usually on two years contract. Studies show that these young women regret at some point of time of their life course owing to the fact that they lose their marriage prospect, job prospect, roots and networks. In addition, female migrants are less exposed to their own income than the male migrants are. Therefore, on their return back home, female migrants are likely to face another struggle to begin their life afresh. These issues are important to take into consideration as we engage in migration—development discourse.

Aiming to seek opportunities away from home, married women also bring themselves into the open labour market and it is conventional that they shall leave their children behind. An example suffices the argument we are trying to make in this chapter. In the Philippines, more than nine million children are growing up without their parents (either one or both) (Reyes 2008; Hugo 2005), in China more than 61 million children are left behind. These children are taken care of by a single parent or other relatives. At the same time, it is also important to take into account the
psychological burden these children have to carry. In addition, this lifestyle results in the changes in gender role and relations. This chapter delves into the long-term implications of such changes.

Migration is an economic, geographical, social and political process that affects those who move, those who stay behind, and the places where they go (Hugo 2005). With the advent of globalization, crossing borders for potential migrants in search of better job opportunities and to provide a better future for their families has become easier. Along with this development, the number of children being left behind is growing and is left to the care of extended family members or friends (Reyes 2008).

Researchers and policy makers often ignore the social costs of migration specifically to the children left behind. When men migrate, the left-behind wives indeed assumed more responsibilities with their multiple roles as a father or/and mother. But when women migrate, it appears that families go through more adjustments—this is not surprising because changes in women’s roles often have more implications for the family than changes in men’s roles (Scalabrini 2003).

Family decisions on remittance-use depend largely on who have migrated and who stayed to manage resource at home. The gender of the de facto head of household affects the outcome of remittances on children as decision on remittances allocation decisions may differ between mothers and fathers. At some point, growing up without a parent has become a normative fact for the left-behind children. Mothers at the other end fears all the time whether their children can still recognize them, whether they will ask questions why their mothers had to leave, and why they were deprived of their mother’s love. Some mothers think that children have the right to ask these questions.

Eventually, as a mothers’ nature, the feeling of guilt develops. This psychological state of the mothers has a few implications on them and their children. Some children can realize that their mothers suffer the guilt feeling and take advantage of it. For example, being away from home, it is necessary for the mothers to recompense their truancy. One of the common situations implies how the children are demanding for money for they might not need, yet it is predetermined for the mothers to give as a way to redeem their regrets. In other case, due to the natural feelings, the mothers always have to maintain their close bond with their children thus they stay in touch by talking as frequently as they can. At the same time, some mothers tend to struggle to return home before completing their contracts abroad. These two incidents are prone to cause liabilities whereby the mothers spend a lot of money on Internet usage just to be in contact with their children and for those who return home before their contract ends will lose their earnings.

Although a significant number of studies have been conducted on many aspects of migration and labour issues, there is a scarcity of research on the financial or psychological consequences of a youth spent abroad alone. The end results of such a long absence from the homeland are largely unknown. Although the idea of young people with agency is quite common in studies on young people in developing countries, and has been widely used to counter the idea of young people as simply passive (Whitehead et al. 2007), it is difficult to find research that deals with the loss of one’s youth while serving others abroad (Whitehead et al. 2007; du Toit 2003).
Some mothers keep sending money to their children back home though they know the money is being wasted. Why they keep sending? According to most mothers who do this, sending money may slash our guilt feeling. “We deprived them of our love, lets not deprive of money. We heard that our children left schools and they still claim tuition fees. We are hurt but what to do?”

Given the political ‘hype’ around migration and development, it comes as no surprise that there has been a heightened interest in this topic among researchers in the last decade (Geiger and Steinbrink 2012: 16). This topic is not discussed only recently. Since the nineteenth century, European researchers have studied migratory movements ‘overseas’, particularly in the colonial areas and later in those areas labelled as ‘underdeveloped’ (Geiger and Steinbrink 2012). However, development studies and migration research have become two separate fields of study: the latter being mainly inspired by migration to Europe, and mostly driven by concerns of the (European) migrant receiving countries, rather than the questions arising in the sending countries. It has been argued that despite the lack of exchange between development and migration research, they often coincided in their evaluation of migration as a problematic phenomenon. On the one hand, the ‘integration’ of immigrants into the receiving society was problematized, and on the other hand, the loss of human resources for the countries of origin was deplored (Baraulina et al. 2011).

There has been a one-sided debate on a pessimistic perspective with regard to migration and development. The prospect is embedded in the contention between two ‘grand’ theories, which are dependency and modernization. According to neo-Marxist dependency and world system theory, migrants are victims of the capitalist global order, who do not move out of free choice, but because they are forced to. Migratory movements then, are to be explained through (post) colonial structures and capitalist transformation processes (Hoogvelt 1997; de Haas 2007). Also, migration is predicted to have negative effects on development and it would aggravate social inequalities. The ‘migration optimists’, who interpret migration in line with neoclassical equilibrium models of modernization theory, sketch the exact opposite picture of migration and development. They describe migrants or migrant households as rational actors, who opt for migration after a careful cost-benefit analysis. From this point of view, migration balances social inequalities and to further development in both sending countries (e.g. through remittances) and receiving countries (through the provision of needed labour).

The volume and direction of migration sometimes depends on the political relationship between countries. For example, currently the Bangladesh government maintains intimate diplomatic relationship with India and as a result more than one million Indians got jobs in Bangladesh and thus Bangladesh became 4th largest source for remittances in India (about US$6 billion per year). Though, however, Bangladesh

1South-South migration has thus also been constructed as a phenomenon, which is supposedly different and to be treated separately from South-North migration (some interesting questions about the political construction of the ‘South’ and the ‘North’ are raised by Bakewell 2009).

2Prominent examples of ‘migration optimists’ are the Todaro-Model (see Todaro 1969) and the New Economics of Labour approach (see Stark and Bloom 1985). Compare discussion in Geiger and Steinbrink 2012).
government gave concession to the Indian government in lieu of the support to let the
government stay in power (Ullah and Huque 2019). During Arab spring, migrants
faced deportations, layoffs, and losses of jobs due to the fact that the sending coun-
tries did not support the government of the receiving countries or remained silent in
crisis (Ullah 2014).

Ideological divergence between the USA and [then] the USSR prompted a uni-
directional migration before the cold war (from the USSR to the USA) of those
who rejected communism. Later, combined with poverty and dissolve of the USSR
prompted many to move elsewhere. Around 3 million Russians form a strong
community today in the USA.

According to Chudinovskikh Olga and Mikhail Denisenko (2017), the history of
international migration in Russia did not begin with the breakup of the Soviet Union
rather it began in earlier times. Soviet migration policy focused mainly on internal
migration, for the purpose of redistributing the labour force. Ideological convergence
influences migration. Many students from other socialist states and from developing
countries attended Russian universities. In 1960, 13,500 foreign students were in
the Soviet Union, a number that rose to 180,000 by 1990 (of whom 70% studied in
Russia) (Chudinovskikh and Mikhail 2017).

The American immigration doors have been heavenly doors for those fleeing
communist Cuba. However, recently polices are being changed (Rivero 2019; Fandl
2017). Since 1959 (Fidel Castro’s revolution), the influx of Cubans into the United
States has been steady. There have been four waves of migration from Cuba to the
are about 2 million Cubans living in the USA (Krogstad 2017).

The consensus exists neither on the causes of migration, nor on its effects. Evalu-
ations on the nature of the relation between migration and development depend not
only on a changeable definition of development, but also on the underlying ideologi-
cal assumptions (Geiger and Steinbrink 2012: 18). Nevertheless, this insight has two
implications: first, the question of the relation between migration and development
is far too general; and second, there is no one ‘grand theory’ of migration (Massey
2012).

We point out the two methodological ‘traps’, which different approaches to migra-
tion and development have fallen into: the ‘ideological’ and the ‘territorial trap’
and the connected problem of ‘methodological nationalism’. In the past decade, the
international political debate has undergone a shift from declaring development as a
cause of migration to heralding migration as a mean for development (Faist 2015).
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo
still posited the lack of development as a root cause for emigration and emphasized the
need to speed up development in the developing countries, in order to make emi-
gration unnecessary (Martin et al. 2007: 8). However, the global approach to migration
and development seems to have shifted fundamentally since the ICPD. With the
establishment of the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development
in 2006, it has a fresh result from the Global Forum on Migration and Development
(GFMD) meetings. The new approach is to “make migration work for development”
(IOM 2009: 2).
The new ‘co-development’ approach aims to integrate migration and development in a way that turns migration into a benefit for both the country of origin and the country of destination. Utilizing migrants as ‘agents of development’, they are also determined to support development projects set up by migrant organizations, to facilitate remittances and then use the savings for ‘productive purposes’, as well as to encourage the return migration of students and high-skilled (Nair 1997). Notwithstanding, others have argued that “brain gain” or “brain circulation” instead of “brain drain” can be brought about, if only migration is ‘well managed’ (compare Martin et al. 2007: 14; Bailey 2010: 376). In a way, the establishment of a good management authority will be helpful in sorting out the possible pro-development agendas for the migrants.

The issue of ‘circulating brains’ or ‘brain exchange’ is rather appalling. What about the people whose brains are supposedly gained, drained, or circulated? As the Global Migration Group (GMG 2008: 106) underlines that development goes beyond economic growth to balance with human development, which focuses on the individual, his/her family and community, and seeks to expand individual capabilities and choices through welfare affairs such as health, education, standard of living and political freedom (Sen 2003). In a way, it is important for development not to only encompass the economical aspect but it also aims to incorporate the social aspect of the community. The new global approach to migration thus should ideally bring about a ‘triple win’ situation, benefitting both receiving and sending countries, as well as the migrants themselves (IOM 2012). However, despite all the positive rhetoric, the picture often looks much different on the ground.  

A growing body of research has begun to investigate political implications in international migration. Some research in this vein maintains that emigration depresses democratic functioning (Bravo 2008). The burgeoning interdisciplinary literature examining how international migration affects politics in home countries reveals important consequences for democratic functioning (Itzigsohn 2000; Ullah and Huque 2019). Migration diplomacy is another phenomenon emerged in Europe. In the early decades of the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s restrictive policies prevented the emigration of Jewish citizens (Adamson and Grastimos 2018; Peretz 2015). Concerted American migration diplomacy during the détente years facilitated the exodus of Soviet Jews (Beckerman 2010). In the case of Mexico-USA migration, the migration regulation has historically been a central issue in the two states’ bilateral relations (Délano 2011).

The quantitative growth in international migration has contributed to migration becoming an increasingly politicized and visible issue (Betts 2011). Meanwhile, the qualitative change in the nature of migration, with increasing south-south movements

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3 An evaluation of the IOM’s claim is clearly beyond the scope and the focus of this section. Here, it suffices to say that in practice states are still reluctant to cooperate on matters of migration; and even if it were possible to establish a global migration regime, it would probably not be to the benefit of all. The ‘migration management’, which is currently practiced by most migrant receiving states, often with the support of the IOM, can rather be described as being “for the benefit of some”, as its main objective is to enable the flow of wanted/beneficial migration, while curbing unwanted/unbeneficial migration (Düvell 2002).
and the internationalization of labour markets, has led states to seek cooperative ways to maximize the economic benefits of migration, while minimizing the costs associated with undesirable migration (Betts 2011).

Two fundamental sets of factors play significant roles in shaping migration. One set consists of poverty; political repression, human rights abuses, and conflict while the other include economic opportunities, political freedom, physical safety, and security (Martin 2001). These factors are getting stronger and stronger for various reasons such as globalization, trade war, and the geopolitics implying that the pace of international migration is unlikely to slow any time soon. Sometimes, migration does not follow rules. Sometimes, it does. The new economics theory of labour migration explains why migrants move between certain countries and not between others, segmented labor market theory and world systems analysis seem to account better for why demand for immigrant labour arises in host societies.

The economic theory provides many predictions about migration that the costs and benefits shape migration decisions. Migration affects production, employment and wages, assimilation and attitudes of host country population towards migration, economic behaviour of the local population, international trade, etc. in both the host and home countries. However, reality is not always what the theory predicts (Epstein 2012).

Politicians in sending countries from the Global South, in general compromise social welfare as they make migration policies. They rather tend to secure their own wellbeing. Politicians need recourses for campaign elections and to satisfy capital owners and voters. They want to be re-elected and the need for the campaign resources can affect the decision making of the politicians and their ruling. If a Prime Minister loses the elections and the opposition comes into power. Therefore, the head of the government may decide to increase the migration quota in order to increase the chances of winning. Singapore for example, despite terrible congestion, the government invites immigrants with the hope that these immigrants will become the vote banks for the sitting government. Similarly, allowing Rohingya in Bangladesh has to do with the politics. As the latest influx begun in 2017, Bangladesh government clearly said they were not going to let the Rohingya in. As the influx was irresistible and the government changed the tone and let them in in order to show the world that the government is standing beside them for the humanitarian cause. Eventually, if they cannot repatriate, they will be used as vote banks.

Just three years ago, Bangladesh government decided to send female migrants (as domestic helpers) in the Middle East. This decision came hastily because the number of people migrating out from Bangladesh is a signal of success of the relevant minister. Migration scholars and some human rights activists have been against the decision. The basis for disagreeing with the decision was that the targeted women were not ready to take up such jobs in the Middle East. Gross human rights violations against the employers on the Bangladeshi women have been reported and they began to return empty handed. Only for securing political mileage, a blunder like this the government made.

In countries that are based on centralized system, citizens usually make political demands on the state as they know that the decision of the elected representative
directly affects the daily life (Bardhan 2002; Treisman 2002). As such, it is important to systematically assess how transnational forces such as international migration affect citizens’ ability to make demands on the local state apparatus through formal and informal political participation. Political leaders’ positions on the issue of immigration can be an important determinant of their electoral success or failure. Huge influx of Indian migrants in Bangladesh is a recent phenomenon. This influx began after the metaphor pronounced by the Foreign Minister of current the government of ‘husband-wife’ relation between Bangladesh and India. This goes to the fact that India’s blind support to retain this government in office (Ullah and Huque 2019; Prothom Alo 20 January 2018).

There is abundance of precedence that migration is becoming important in politics. In order to secure popular vote in Canada (held in October 2019), some advertisements (say no to mass immigration) were launched in support of Maxime Bernier, leader of the small right-wing anti-immigration People’s Party of Canada, and called for a halt on mass immigration to Canada. They started appearing in several Canadian cities and were bought by True North Strong and Free Advertising Corp (TNSFAC). Bernier has focused on limiting immigration and protecting so-called Canadian values in contrast with more moderate Conservatives, prompting some pundits to refer to him as Canada’s Donald Trump (Warburton 2019).

The billboards, which feature pre-election advertising with Bernier’s face, the logo of his People’s Party of Canada and a slogan advocating against “mass immigration,” started appearing in different spots across the country. This sparked an outpouring of criticism. Nova Scotia’s Liberal Premier Stephen McNeil was one of the first politicians to criticize the billboards, tweeting: “I don’t welcome this negative, divisive tone. Our population is at an all-time high, unemployment is at a record low and our economy is growing, in large part thanks to immigration” (Smith 2019).

Immigration has become a highly salient political issue in many of the world’s affluent democracies. Yet, the electoral dynamics of anti-immigrant sentiment remain barely understood. Immigration took centre stage in politics in the US presidential elections in 2016 and its aftermath, as now-President Donald Trump took strong stands on ‘illegal’ immigration, the construction of a border wall, refugees from Syria, and sanctuary cities (Mayda et al. 2018). The Brexit vote, for example, in the UK and recent political elections in Germany (2017) and Italy (2018) have highlighted the controversial political role of immigration and the electoral success of strong anti-immigration stands. An increase in high-skilled immigrants as a share of the local population is associated with a strong and significant decrease in the vote share for the Republican Party (Hawley 2011; Mayda et al. 2018). To the contrary, an increase in the low-skilled immigrant share of the population is associated with a strong and significant increase in Republican votes Mayda et al. 2018). People’s motives for casting a right-wing populist vote, the anti-immigration argument gained centre stage in most countries in recent years (Mughan and Paxton 2006).

One of the most established theories explaining migration is that the economic trends influence migration patterns. Multinational companies exert pressure on governments to ease mobilities of executives, managers, and other key personnel from
one country to another (Martin 2001). While migration regulations are largely governed by national legislation, regional and international trade regimes include provisions for admitting foreign executives, managers, and professionals. For instances, under NAFTA, USA, Canadian, and Mexican (as of 2004) professionals in designated occupations may work in the other NAFTA countries without regard to numerical limits imposed on other foreign nationals (Martin 2001).

Ethnic conflicts and wars induce flows of refugees out of the affected areas. This has unfortunately become a common headline in current news. How important is the role of ethnic conflicts and wars as well as inter-state wars in explaining migration flows. However, not well understood given the rather limited theoretical and particularly empirical treatment to the topic. Further, a country’s political regime, whether authoritarian or democratic, is bound to impact net wellbeing of its citizens, as they believe that their government is more or less responsive to their needs and accountable of its own actions. Less democratic regimes come hand in hand with more restrictive civil and political rights for their citizens and, as a result, boost their willingness to migrate (Ullah and Huque 2019; Adserà et al. 2016).

In response to a few attacks by the so-called Muslim fundamentalists in Madrid and so on, hardly any public discussion ensued about the dangers of political Islam and its threats to Western democracy. Why is it that the same issues are sometimes heavily politically loaded and in other instances practically not? Which mechanisms can explain the differences in the extent to which, and the way in which, potential issues become politicized (Brug et al. 2011)? In the institutional arena of politics, the debate over how to effectively govern multi-ethnic societies remains contentious. While only a small handful of countries in the twenty-first-century world can be considered ethnically homogenous, governments struggle with how best to manage predominantly multi-ethnic societies (Ullah et al. 2019; Ullah and Kumpoh 2018). In democratic theory, political parties play a central role as representatives of the popular voice and institutional mediators providing the channels connecting the people with governmental decision-making. Therefore, it seems reasonable that political parties would be key actors in shaping most debates in democratic societies (William 2011). “The international politics of most areas of migration is characterized by a fundamental power asymmetry, generally between migrant sending and receiving states. In the absence of a binding, institutional framework, receiving states have discretion to open or close their borders and are thus implicit rule-makers, while sending states have to generally accept the decisions of receiving states and are thus implicit rule-takers (Betts 2011: 8).”

The fact that much of the discussion about migration and development is based more on a political-ideological dispute, and less on empirical-analytical considerations, it has been referred to as the ‘ideological trap’. The ideological trap is one of the two methodological traps, in which theoretical approaches to migration and development have been caught, and the other is the so-called ‘territorial trap’. According to John Agnew (1994), the ‘territorial trap’ refers to a set of assumptions about the relationship between state, territory, and society. The first assumption is that states are fixed units of sovereign space.
The ‘territorial trap’ is the problem of methodological nationalism; which is the presupposition that “the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002: 302). Across different disciplines and times, the social sciences have suffered from different variants of methodological nationalism, which Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002: 308) describe as “ignorance, naturalization and territorial limitation.” Given the ubiquity of the national doctrine and the container model of society, it becomes clearer why migration presents a problem to both policy-makers and researchers. Mainly, the problem arises as migrants challenge the supposed “isomorphism” between (1) “people, sovereign, and citizenry”, (2) “people and nation”, (3) “people and solidarity group” (social cohesion), and (4) “the rule of sedentariness” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002: 310).

Some observations have been made under the circumstances when linking the theoretical considerations to the political discussions and practices concerning migration and development (Kurekova 2011). The attempts to consider the concerns of the sending countries (and ideally the migrants themselves) on migration and development are still firmly rooted in the logic of the nationalist container model. Even though the notion of co-development presents a move away from an ethno-nationalist understanding, which interprets remittances and ties to the country of origin as a disloyalty to the receiving society and a problem of integration, it does not present a departure from a nationalist understanding, which links people to a certain territory. In fact, the idea of co-development is essentially (trans)nationalist, as it expects migrants to send remittances, build up businesses, and eventually return to their homeland. The (trans)nationalist assumptions are also reflected in the way development is often defined, that is it signifies national economic growth, instead of human development (de Haas 2009: 5). In the wake of the cultural turn, several new paradigmatic trends have emerged in migration studies, which King (2011) sums up as: the mobility paradigm, transnationalism, diaspora studies, and gendered approaches. Geiger and Steinbrink (2012) see new impulses to international migration and development studies that stretch from transnationalism to the migration systems approach, network theory, and vulnerability/livelihood research.

The idea of transnationalism⁴ can be seen as a shift from studying populations or population changes in demarcated (state) territories to appreciating ties between societies (Baubock 2010). However, as Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002: 324) point out, transnationalism still procreates the conventional image of a world divided into nations by prioritizing the social ties between the migrants’ ‘countries of origin’ and their ‘countries of settlement’. In this perception, migrants are still perceived as “the others, the foreign and alien to the nationally-bounded society” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002: 323–327).

⁴The concept of ‘transnationalism’ was developed by American anthropologists in the 1990s and has since emerged as a dominant paradigm in migration research. It refers to “processes by which migrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch et al. 1992).
In order to fully grasp the potential of migrants as agents of development, understanding the multiple connections that they form with other actors and different localities is important. de Haas (2009) proposes to use Amartya Sen’s capability approach to development, defining the latter as the “process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen 1999, cited in de Haas 2009: 20). This approach to development allows the anticipation about migrants as ‘agents of development’ not only in terms of the economic benefit they may or may not provide to countries of origin and settlement, but also in terms of the opportunities.

5.1 Marriage Economy and Migration

Feminization of migration has prominently been debated in migration scholarship. The vast body of migration literature evidently suggest that migration is gendered. This means that migration is male dominated phenomenon. To date, little attention has been accorded to the correlation between migration and divorce and separation though some socio-demographic studies conducted in the past decades have demonstrated direct links between international migration and divorce (Caarls and Mazzucato 2015; Andersson et al. 2015; Hill 2004). One of the apparent consequences of migrations is that, it drives families to be geographically apart. By that means, partners are living transnationally—although it may not be an issue for many, being separated may bring difficulties due to marital discontent (Ullah 2013). Also, most migrants move out from home at their young age, which means that they are living away from their spouses at times when their biological desires are supposed to be active (Ullah and Alkaff 2018).

Due to migration policy and the fact that most migrants cannot afford bringing their spouse along with them, which have led them to stay in separation for a long time. This means both partners are expected to experience long-term truancy (Ullah 2011a). Eventually, this leads to separation and divorce for many of the migrants. Boyle et al. (2008) argue that the stressful life being encountered by the migrants abroad has resulted in domestic unrest, straining relationship, and eventually divorce.

Literature dedicated to sociological studies on marital dissolution has indicated that stressful life events are strong predictors. Studies show that men gain more benefits than women in their careers through migration. As marital stress increases, so does the risk of divorce, because migration makes women suffer (Boyle et al. 2008). Typically, for couples to opt for a transnational living arrangement, with one of the spouses, the husband in most cases, migrating while the other remains in their home countries (Baizan et al. 2011).

However, some researchers argue that migration could be one of the causes of higher rates of divorce while others argue that migration may make the relationships more intense than how it used to be, thus a divorce is unlikely to occur mainly as a consequence of migration (Ullah 2010, 2011b; Glick 2010). Of course, this analysis seems to preclude the pattern of divorces due to migration (Table 5.1). In addition, we agree with Frank and Wildsmith (2005) and Hill (2004) that the results extracted
from a range of researches on this area could be biased because in most cases, the data for such comparisons typically focus on the destination countries. This means that the perspective of the origins remains unknown. Furthermore, the increasingly strict migration laws, declining salary base (for most semi and unskilled migrants) and the high living costs at destination countries make it difficult for couples to migrate together. As a result, the transnational life of the couple begins (Gallo 2006; Jolly and Reeves 2005). In traditional societies, gender role determines who would migrate and who should stay at home. Generally, women are left behind for taking care of the children and the elderlies, properties or business, if any. In some cases, women voluntarily stay back home. They think accompanying husband overseas would involve costs. Therefore, to them, an ideal decision is to stay home country rather than accompanying their husbands. Some argue that this idea is fundamentally emanated from an inferior status accorded to women. Some respondents irrespective of the destinations and origins said, wives were mistakenly suspected to engage in extra marital relationships while the husbands are rarely questioned about whether they had relationships abroad (Ullah 2010, 2013).

There are counter arguments that migration plays the role in modifying ideas about gender norms such as women who were left behind would eventually become financially, socially and politically empowered (Ullah 2010; Mahler 2001). There are of course correlations between women’s empowerment and divorce cases by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>Years of stay abroad on average</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>One committed suicide; 4 got remarried; 2 went for divorce and one died and the rest chose separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Three engaged in a new relationship; 2 got remarried; and 2 went for divorce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Two went for separation and one engaged into another relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>One was reported to have committed suicide and the rest for separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Two were separated, one got divorced and one declined to answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Four engaged in another relationship, 2 for separation, two got remarried and one declined to answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>One engaged into another relationship and one got remarried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Three engaged into another relationship, one separated and the rest declined to answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Field data, 2014–2016
the way that they enjoy more freedom than before from the constraining gender norms and as a result they can make decisions on their marital issues should there be any mistrust and misunderstanding among the couples. Hirsch (2003) found similar findings in the study conducted on Mexicans in the USA. Charsley (2005), Gallo (2006), and Manuh (1999) argue that men may not be comfortable with new gender roles [which means their being empowered] because they may feel that they have been marginalized, side-lined and that their masculinity is under threat. These factors may lead to spousal conflicts.

When Caarls and Mazzucato (2015) studied on the fact that migration may lead to divorce, they identified the scarcity of literature and research on it anywhere in the world. Tabutin and Schoumaker (2004) mention that 35% of women’s first marriages end in divorce after 30 years of marriage in Ghana. Furthermore, Takyi and Gyimah (2007) estimate that in 2003, around 25% of ever-married women aged 15–49 years had divorced (Takyi and Gyimah 2007).

Divorce and separation bring dramatic changes to the life of the children. The children witness disagreements, conflicts and often battering which result in the breakup, separation or divorce. For children, experiencing this is challenging and painful (Fagan and Churchill 2012). Divorce tends to intensify the child’s dependence and it tends to accelerate the adolescent’s independence; it often elicits a more regressive response in the child and a more aggressive response in the adolescent’ (Amato 2000: 1270). Our research confirms that most children of broken family performed worse in school and career than those were from integrated families.

Since the beginning of the time when migration has become an academic field, there was no literal attention given to the fact that migration may also bring negative consequences. The specific characteristics such as the length of separation, the region where the migrants are moving to, the age of the migrants as well as the number of counts i.e. whether it is the first time for the partners to be geographically apart are important to consider when researching migration and its consequences. The general perception is that the longer the partners stay separated, the higher is the risk of straining relationship and eventually divorce (Frank and Wildsmith 2005; Hill 2004; Charsley 2005; Gallo 2006; George 2000; Manuh 1999; Zontini 2010). Caarls and Mazzucato (2015) contend that women migrating to a Western context are more likely to make decisions on divorce than those who migrate to other African countries. However, this may not be the case for men. Knowing that gender role does play an important part in migration, moving into Western countries may generate tensions between spouses due to western orientation in gender roles. There were 132 samples from five countries that we asked what do they think are the most important reasons for their divorce (Table 5.2).

Let us turn our attention to the prestige economy i.e. migration—dowry interplay. Dowry in fact in many societies is considered as a prestige economy. This is a phenomenon commonly debated and discussed in South Asia. The dowry system refers to the durable goods, cash, and real or movable property that the bride’s family gives to the bridegroom, his parents, or his relatives as a condition of the marriage. Biao (2005) goes on to argue that dowry as an institution, particularly when it involves in a large amount of wealth, is closely connected with other institutional
Table 5.2  Reasons for divorce related to migration (five countries\(^a\) combined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long time separation</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In absence of each other they develop new relationship</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular money sent</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust as period of truancy lengthens</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard from others that husbands married overseas</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard from others that they are not returning</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard from others that they died</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source  
Field data, 2014–2016
\(^a\)Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Philippines

arrangements such as education, and bears far-reaching social consequences. Interestingly, migrants themselves also expect to receive dowry, because there is a belief that the ‘market value’ as a groom is higher due to the fact that they are migrants. There are two arguments regarding migration dowry. One argument is that migration helps many parents to marry off their daughters easily. Living someone overseas is an indicator of economic status. It is important to note that marrying daughters off ‘in time’ is a major social issue in many societies in most part of the world. There are many people who want to marry in a family that has someone living and working abroad. These families are preferred because of a number of reasons: there is a ‘chance’ that the potential groom will be extended help to migrate; they feel that this family has enhanced social status (evident from houses, life style, consumption style etc.). However, the underlying factors that come with this kind of expectation may be called dowry demand. Once married to these families, demand grows high. Dowry in general is expected in kind rather than in cash. In some cases, cash is also proffered under the pretext that the groom needs capital to begin a business or his business is running badly due to lack of capital. In rural areas, especially in India, Bangladesh and Nepal, a range of demands for goods from motorbikes, television sets to finger rings (made of gold) are expected. Demands go higher to migrant’s families than non-migrant families. Biao (2005) in one of the studies found that the association between IT professionals who migrated and high dowries seems to be obvious for the locals in India: IT men are rich and highly esteemed, and therefore popular in the marriage market.

It might be a surprising fact that IT professionals demand high dowries because people in general expect that highly educated professionals with a Western exposure would break this traditional practice. Ullah’s (2010, 2012, 2013) research in Bangladesh, India and Nepal bears out that migration has not played role in weakening dowry practice rather it has increased. Migrant families also found to voluntarily practice dowry because they think not giving dowry curtails the level of prestige. In some societies in South Asia, dowry is seen as a function of prestige economy. Biao as well ushers that migration tends to escalate rather than undermine the institution
of dowry. Migration enlarges the scope of search for a match and makes economic calculations more central to marriage negotiations (Biao 2005).

Globalization today penetrates deeper into the daily lives of the people in the underdeveloped and developing countries. Family separation becomes a norm as a result. Underlying divided families are the disturbing global hierarchy of motherhood. Just a decade ago, women used to migrate to reunite with family, but today they are increasingly migrating in search of wages to support their children. This trend is rooted in an increased supply of poor women in the South who cannot secure living wages. There is a high demand in most countries in the North for women to clean homes, hospitals, and hotels and to care for children and elderlies. Women who cannot afford to stay with their own children are migrating to care for the children of others (Ullah 2013). As global inequality grows, poor families in the Global South increasingly have to decide between sinking further into poverty together and sending one or more members to the North to find work (Schmalzbauer 2009). The result is a growing trend in families who have little choice but to divide their labour across borders. Despite the economic roots of most migration decisions and the problems that migration leaves in its wake, migrant mothers are often blamed for family breakdown and for the struggles the children go through who stay behind (Schmalzbauer 2009).

Texting and calling on phone or skype have been the means to stay in touch with the family remained behind. We call this communication transnational care. Separated by thousands of miles, they get connected virtually with their siblings, children, husbands, parents and other relatives. This communication has a major impact on their lives and their children as well (Schmalzbauer 2009). While these children’s life without their mothers is difficult, some children tend to feel that this makes them more independent, free thinkers than others. However, this depends on the fact that some children really realize their mothers’ sacrifice. Mothers send encouragements to them to work harder so their life does not turn the way their mothers did.

The economic remittances are rooted in commitment to mothering. Most migrant mothers invest time to maintain connections with their children. However, it does not always work the way they want. Physical absence cannot be compensated by anything (Schmalzbauer 2009). These children are taken care of by their relatives, grand parents often friends and neighbours when their biological mothers take care of children of others elsewhere. Sometimes, to children, this becomes a reason for their emotional burdens. Most female migrants from Africa, South Asia and Central Asia mention that it is their primary responsibility to un-reciprocally send money to their families.

One of the respondents from the Philippines was evaluating her migration the following way.

… … my migration has given me relief from financial crisis but has taken away everything. Two of my children have been sick severely. One was rushed to hospital. They wanted to see me. I could not do anything. I tried to call them on skype. I was not able to do so…….. it was heart breaking.
Another respondent from Moldova (working in Russia) lamented “… i feel like killing myself. I visited my home last year after just 6 years and my daughter did not recognize me. I thought there was no point to stay alive. I wanted to talk to her while in Russia but I was never allowed to talk. Employer thought having access to a phone or internet would curtail the quality of my work… …”.

Mothers living far away from their children are struggling everyday. As we were asking a few mothers what do they do when they miss their children. The expressions we saw in their eyes made us emotional. Irrespective of the countries of origins, all mothers fight an emotional battle all the time. Some mothers carry a guilt feeling because many of their children were asking them why their mothers had to leave them home. The homesickness and loneliness burden the migrant mothers. In order to get rid of loneliness, some mothers get into another relationship. This often makes their lives more complicated than before. Still many of them dream about reunification. This could happen in two ways: first, mothers can go home on short visit. This has, however, profound implications on political economy. On political economy side, mothers have to be a legal migrant and they have to have access to sufficient fund. Second, children can join them. However, same issues appear as their mothers. Fund and legality might become important barrier to reunification.

Another picture that transpired saddened most parents. Many children who kept receiving tuition fees from their parents but never attended schools. Parents were not able to check. Some parents were found to justify this by their guilt feeling. Some of them said, it was their fault, not the children. In all the countries under study, children from migrant’s families had higher drop out from school than non-migrant families. Left behind children who dropped out of schools and kept it secret from their parents yet receiving tuition fees to justify that they were left alone (Table 5.3). Interestingly, some parents continue sending money to their children though they know that their children dropped out. They said that they (parents) are responsible for this. Parents think that they deprived their children of much needed parental love and care.

According to ILO (2014), there were at least 53 million domestic workers worldwide, who are largely made up of female workforces with an estimation of 11.5 million are under the age of 18. Nonetheless, millions other remain undocumented.

| Table 5.3 Dropped out children from schools (Parents know about their children who left school) |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Country                          | f | % |
| Philippines                      | 31 | 23.5 |
| Bangladesh                       | 3  | 2.3 |
| Nepal                            | 19 | 14.4 |
| India                            | 18 | 13.6 |
| Myanmar                          | 37 | 28  |
| Moldova                          | 21 | 15.9 |
| Kazakhstan                       | 11 | 8.3 |
| Moldova                          | 13 | 9.8 |

Source Field data, 2014–2016
It simply means that globally, 7.5% or every one in 13 female wageworkers, is a domestic worker. The rate is high in Latin America and the Caribbean—one in four i.e. 26.6%—and highest in the Middle East—one in three or 31.8% of the workers are populated by female (Ullah 2015). As a whole, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, it is known that a large number of women and girls migrate between different countries; generating billions of dollars in remittance for families back home. Almost 30% of the world’s domestic workers are employed in countries where they are completely excluded from national labour laws (ILO 2015). In other words, these domestic workers are not entitled to personal protections like weekly rest days, minimum wage, overtime wage, and limits on hours of work.

Young migrants are making up about a quarter of all migrants globally. As the total number of international migrants increases, so does the number of children and youth affected by this global phenomenon (UN 2002). Within this group, there are domestic helpers who make the move overseas for a better income. Around one million domestic helpers in Hong Kong and about two millions in Saudi Arabia alone, an overwhelming majority (92%) of them migrated during their reproductive age, with most being in the age group of 18–25 years (Ullah 2010, 2013). They generally started with a two-year contract; but some managed to renew their contracts multiple times, thus extending their stay. One study (Ullah 2010) shows that around 35% of them have been in Hong Kong for about 12 years after renewal of contracts or change of jobs.

In order to recoup the money they had spent to finance their migration, and to meet the current expenses of the family back home, they tend to continue to extend their stay. However, at some point of their life overseas they experience a wake-up call and begin to feel that the most important time of their life is over. They start pondering on their past and present, the gain and the loss, and look at the future through a past-present lens. The fact that the migrant community of domestic helpers consists of females implies that this job market is gendered. Hence, their experience after return may turn out differently from that of males. Women are believed to be attracted to migration due to the high demand and preference for their services in gender stereotyped low-skilled work such as domestic work, care giving and in the entertainment industry (CARAM Asia 2002). It is only in the last decade that there has been an increase in the flow of skilled and semi-skilled female migrants (UN 2009). These populations usually leave young and return old. In between, a long period of time is spent living in an illusion of some sorts. However, at some point disillusionment sets in, and many migrants experience what can be described as a ‘wake-up’ call.

It is important to analyze the feelings of these migrants given the heated debate on whether the economic gains made by the migrants can compensate for the losses of varied kinds they incurred. There is no mechanism to measure the psychological baggage they carry the pain, the erosion of roots, the tears due to the loss of marriage

5The term ‘reproductive age group’ refers to the active reproductive years of women, starting with menarche around 12–14 years and ending with menopause around 45–49 years. For demographic purposes, the reproductive age group is usually defined as 15–49 years or 12–49 years.
prospects. Hence, this has crucial policy implications for both the sending and the receiving countries.

Childhood and youth are in the valuable stages of life, more than just necessary steps on the way to adulthood. There are four distinct but interconnected stages in the transition from a time of dependence (childhood) to independence (adulthood). Leaving home and setting up one’s own personal economy requires an independent source of income, and to reach this stage a young person generally has to acquire qualifications, besides demonstrating his or her skills in the labour market (Caldwell 2002). The youth facing uncertain employment prospects and financial insecurity are likely to avoid stable personal relationships and thus delay marriage, and postpone accepting the responsibility of children (Essays 2018).

When we talk about gendered migration, especially female migration, resilience is an important issue. As mentioned above, female migrants generally move unaccompanied and begin staying in an entirely new environment where they have to anticipate unwanted interventions in life. Little wonder then that resilience is considered a necessary shield for them. Resilience entails the ability to adjust successfully to major life changes, which appears highly relevant in the context of migration, considering the changes and hardships that female domestic workers face. Although the literature on resilience focuses mostly on individual characteristics such as personality, the significance of an individual’s connectedness to others and the role of social support have been acknowledged as well (Benard 2002).

Almost all of these young female migrants move unaccompanied, meaning that—with rare exceptions—their life abroad is spent without a partner. At one point, some may decide to return; some fail to renew contracts; and some get tired of staying away from homeland (Ullah and Alkaff 2018). Regardless of the reasons for their return, subconsciously they calculate the costs and benefits of their migration. This cost-benefit analysis is not only in relation to monetary factors, but is also an analysis of the social cost they have paid and its benefits. Youth is the prime time of any individual. This is the time to contribute to the nation, build the future, and strive for personal satisfaction. This precious time is spent taking care of children of others.

Contemporary scholarship on migration tends to overlook the fact that millions of young migrants who leave their country of origin unaccompanied suffer considerable psychological upheaval, in addition to other material losses. This is particularly important for migration research, as most migrant groups are made up of young people. Moreover, migration behaviour of the youth is different from that of other age groups. Their migration behaviours are also likely to be influenced by different reasons (Sandefur 1985) unlike the conventional ones (Johnson and Fuguitt 2000).

The migration experience of young people in the past decades suggests that their motivation to migrate is best understood in terms of economics (Domina 2006).

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6Leaving the parental home and establishing new living arrangements; completing full-time education; forming close, stable personal relationships outside of the family, often resulting in marriage and children; and testing the labour market, finding work and possibly settling into a career, and achieving a more or less sustainable livelihood.

7Prime time of life seems subjective and arbitrary. Plenty of people who would say their retirement was their prime time of life. However, here the youth is considered prime time of life.
Young people have more productive time in labor market than older ones to recoup the costs associated with migration, and they can contribute more to the economy. Hence, their migration behaviours tend to be more responsive to economic opportunities than those of older people. This fact is also asserted in the primary tenets of human capital theory (Borjas et al. 1990). Even though there are occupational and other economic considerations across an individual’s lifespan, preference for a particular residence might become a more important influence as a person goes through different life stages such as raising a family, rearing children, seeing them grow up and leave home, and retiring (Detang-Dessendre and Ian 1999; Domina 2006; Johnson and Fuguitt 2000; Sandefur 1985). We developed the following model to demonstrate the underlying factors that connect the entire migration trajectories of respondents.

In the past few years, increasing global unemployment has hit young people hard, and the impact has been gender disproportionate. The number of unemployed youth increased steadily between 1993 and 2003, and is now hovering at around 88 million (ILO 2004). Current estimates are that in 2015, 660 million young people were either working or looking for work. Young people are more inclined to move than any other groups and this tendency is a direct resonance of the gravity model of Ravenstein (see Ravenstein 1876, 1885, 1889). The pressure of unemployment at home, the inherent propensity to move, and ambition for upward economic and social mobility, operate as strong motivating factors for the youth to explore opportunities overseas (Fig. 5.1) (Asian Demographic 2004). “For most young people, finding decent work is a coming-of-age symbol that marks the transition from childhood to adulthood” (ILO 2004: 1).

The transition from youth to adulthood for migrants represents a challenge to the youth/adult dichotomy of migration. Early migration often speeds up the transition to adulthood, as females tend to marry younger and take on the responsibilities of

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**Fig. 5.1** Theoretical framework
Table 5.4 Age at departure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age when departed</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22–26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean year of stay</td>
<td>11.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source  Field data, 2014–2016

adulthood sooner. A research conducted in garment factories in Bangladesh, focusing specifically on adolescence as a time frame to look into the effects of migration\(^8\) found that young female garment workers, who enjoyed a degree of autonomy during their adolescence as a result of their work, had greater decision-making ability once they transitioned into the role of a traditional wife later in life. In this context, migration benefits young people by defining their traditional roles and increasing their economic value in the family. Employment in labour-intensive, low-skilled factory work offers women a chance to work outside the home and experience a modicum of independence.\(^9\) Women who migrate for employment are likely to marry later in life (Amin et al. 1998). However, when their stay becomes more prolonged than they expected, marriage often gets postponed forever, and existing relationships are likely to end.

The mean stint of the migrants (under this study) abroad was 11.14 years. The mean age when they moved was 21 years old (Table 5.4). Thirty-five per cent of the respondents were married and the rest were single. Nine of the married ones and three of those who were single had children before they departed. Many of them returned when they reached 50 years of age. As many as 67% stayed legally following the extension of their contracts, while five per cent stayed illegally after their contracts expired; the rest declined to answer. Of the returnees, 71% lived in Hong Kong, 25% in the Middle East, and the rest in different countries in East Asia.

Of the respondents from the Philippines, 35% were trained nurses who used to work in private clinics; 25% used to teach in schools; 15% worked in sales; 13% were unemployed; and 9% owned small businesses before they migrated. Of the Bangladeshi respondents, 76% were unemployed (i.e. helping parents in household chores); 12% worked in garment factories; five per cent used to go to school; and 6% used to work as household helpers. Of the Nepali respondents, 67% claimed

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\(^8\)Adolescence is usually defined as a time between the ages of 10 and 19 years when young people are making the transition from childhood to adulthood. The three main aspects of this stage of life are demographic and biological, psychological and emotional, and economic (Amin et al. 1998).

\(^9\)In a setting such as Bangladesh, where girls are considered eligible for marriage soon after puberty and work provides an alternative to early marriage, child labour legislation has important consequences for reproductive health. Importantly, the transition from childhood to adulthood brings young migrants to terms with their own sexuality, which in Bangladesh, is managed through early marriage and purdah.
to have been unemployed, 21% used to work as low-skilled factory workers; eight per cent claimed to have small businesses, and four per cent were attending school. Thirty-eight per cent of the Indian respondents used to work in garment factories; 25% were unemployed; 18% used to attend school; and seven per cent used to work as household helpers.

Another interesting dynamic is that earning remittances and sending low skilled migrants (such as domestic helpers) has a downside of it. Those countries get known as infamous for sending domestic helpers. For example, people from receiving countries taunt the sending countries (such as the Philippines) that this country cannot produce skilled workers or lack talented people. The perception develops this way, which is demeaning for a country’s good will.

Some countries are notoriously known for their sex migration or sex tourism. The prostitution industry in Thailand earns over $6.4 Billion (200 Billion Thai Baht) a year in revenue (Hansen 2007; Havocscape 2012; Thai Examiner 2018). A political party leader in Thailand and former massage parlour owner stated that as we look at the amount of money, it looks so promising. However, many Thais we talked said that the price Thailand pays for this money is very huge. i.e. the damaging image. One respondent said, if we go abroad and are asked where are we from. As we say, from Thailand, we notice they have fictitious smile and trying to say something. This is disgraceful. Sex tourism, which exists throughout the world, is particularly prevalent in South East Asia, where the connected problems of human trafficking, AIDS, and poverty, continue to flourish and claim lives at unprecedented rates. Sex migrants tend not to differentiate between buying groceries, and going to the brothel to buy sex—both provide someone with economic sustenance.

5.2 Life Plan on Return

…it time flies fast, I never thought I would spend so many years of my life out of my country. When I returned, I found everything had changed. Though in between I visited my country twice, but it seems I failed to comprehend the change that took place during my absence.

This statement sums up that the disillusionment happened to most returnees. They are shocked at the changes that have taken place in their absence, and wondered if they would ever be able to fit into the new environment. Some families are excited when migrants return home, while others are disappointed as the return of a migrant means an end to remittances. To many, they appear as a superfluous ‘element’ in the family for whom space has to be carved out.

Many of the family members thought they would never come back. This means left behind family members had a dream in their mind that the properties will be just divided among those remained home. This means that all returns were not seen positively and accepted happily. Conflicts begin as a result. There are stories we have heard that these conflicts led to permanent separation from other family member and often killing happened.
Some member got frustrated due to the fact they would not receive any money from overseas anymore. This situation had impact on the relationship between them. Due to long absence of a family member, the remained behind had developed a different life style. Returns of the migrants are seen as a disruption. They did not like it. Of course, to many, their return was so much expected.

Most respondents only appeared to have experienced emotions of regret that the migration did not essentially weigh financial gains. Arranged in order of significance, they regretted the loss of marriage prospects; the loss of a chance to be a mother; the erosion of family ties; erosion of skills and job opportunities; psychological scarring; and difficulty in reintegrating into the society they had left in their youth. Male return migrants would not necessarily hold the same views as in most South Asian countries. Marriage of girls is seen as an essential rite, any delay in which is considered shameful for the family (Ullah and Azizuddin 2018). Similarly, motherhood is said to ‘complete’ womanhood in most South Asian societies.

Regardless of the origin, an overwhelming majority of the respondents rued that they had lost their marriage prospects (Table 5.5). It was one loss that weighed the heaviest for most of the respondents. In conservative societies, no marriage means there is no motherhood. They pointed out that in order to be a real woman, one had to be a mother. In charting the transition from youth to adulthood, a spatial and relational disruption is evident in the family structure of migrants, which is relevant to the patterns and effects of migration (Table 5.6) (Arulampalam et al. 2001). This dislocation can be both a cause and effect of migration. Local norms about parent-child relationships have context-specific effects on how the dislocation is managed, while governmental discourse on the subject of youth migration has been adverse, often times labelling it as trafficking even though it is far from it.

Throughout Asian history, men have dominated household economy. Evidence suggests that husbands tend to disallow wives to obtain a gainful job from the fear of losing their dominant position in the household (Kabeer 1996). Under this circumstance, policy makers of some countries, primarily in Asia, decided to send females as domestic workers in the Middle East in 2016.

It is often easy to get carried away by the presence of women in a few top positions in the countries like Bangladesh, Germany, New Zealand, Argentina, Finland, Lithuania, Moldova, and Mozambique. Women have assumed the post of president or the head of the government or Sates. India boasts a woman president in the recent past—but this picture does not represent the ground reality. In terms of marriage and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Lost marriage prospects (%)</th>
<th>Lost the chance to be a mother (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source* Field data, 2014–2016
Table 5.6 Different countries, different norms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Social norms/women’s employment</th>
<th>Marriage and family relationship</th>
<th>Perception about female migration</th>
<th>Roles in the familya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Greater equality between genders than many countries in Asia. Women’s employment is seen positively</td>
<td>Legally bound and strong family ties</td>
<td>Well accepted by society, family. Government encourages migration</td>
<td>Shared role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Inequality is pervasive. However, working-women are seen in a positive light</td>
<td>Socially and religiously bound strong family ties. A mix of progressive and the older medieval family relations where customs and tradition come first</td>
<td>Mostly well accepted by families and societies</td>
<td>Most of the household chores are performed by women, though in many cases are now being shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Inequality is pervasive. Women’s jobs (in most cases) are not accepted. The perception is that only poor families send their women to look for employment (with a few exceptions)</td>
<td>Socially and religiously bound strong family ties</td>
<td>Neither families nor the government policies encourage female migration</td>
<td>Mainly household chores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Country of contrasts: inequality and equality exist side by side</td>
<td>Socially and religiously bound strong family ties</td>
<td>Some obstruction from society (and traditional families). Government encourages migration</td>
<td>Mostly household chores but in many cases these are shared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aThere is a difference between rural and urban society

family relations, marriage is seen as more of a legal bond in the Philippines where divorce is illegal (although legal separation is possible), unlike other countries under study where marriage and family ties are seen more as a religious and social bond (Ullah and Alkaff 2018). The threat of divorce is a deterrent to women asserting themselves. In North India, for instance, a deeply entrenched belief is that a woman
leaves her father’s home in a wedding palanquin, and only returns in a coffin. Today, however, women have begun to engage in income generation in the wake of growing economic pressure, although their jobs in no way diminish their domestic roles. In some traditional societies in India, Bangladesh and Nepal, women still require a permission of a father, brother or husband to step out of their homes (Hashemi et al. 1996). Social and cultural norms are shaped by a society’s history, popular culture, literature, media, customs and laws, as well as everyday practices. In the Bangladeshi society, for instance, good wives keep themselves within the confines of their homes (Schuler et al. 1998).

Regardless of the country, feminization of poverty has pushed women into employment drive, and many of them have ended up in the informal sector, such as that of readymade garment factories (Beneria 1989). This was the first step out of their homes for women, and eventually emboldened them to set out for opportunities overseas. However, female migration is still not accepted well by society and religious norms in Bangladesh and many other countries, so much so that some governments so far have imposed a ban on it. Inevitably, gender plays a major role in the expectations of young people and their ability or desire to migrate. Girls, in African and Asian contexts are not seen as permanent members of the household, since they eventually leave home after marriage.

Researchers have found that families are more likely to let a woman work elsewhere, since her economic value is lower, and her future ties to the family are uncertain (CPRC 2004). Women also have slimmer chances of pursuing education, and thus they are more likely to move in search of economic opportunities (Ullah and Routray 2003). This is problematic and troubling, since young girl migrants are at risk of sexual abuse or exploitation by employers (Socorro and Xenos 2004). Nearly 28% of the population of the Philippines can be bracketed as ‘youth’, and of these 21 million young people, nearly 12% are migrants.

Children are dependent, passive, and obedient (Whitehead et al. 2007). At times, large families may take advantage of local approval toward child migration when socioeconomic factors prevent them from adequately caring for all the children. Evidently, in most countries in the global south, especially in rural Africa, the trend of youth migration closely linked to poverty and urbanization (CPRC 2004). The family is one of the most important socioeconomic institutions in society, but the nature of the links between family members varies across nationalities. In some cultures, family ties are weak and members feel obligated to continue their relationship with other members of the family only to a point. In other cultures, family ties are strong and enduring (Alesina and Guilian0 2007; Elder and Schmidt 2004). The highest percentage of respondents who thought their absence weakened the family ties were the Nepalese (67%), followed by Indians, Filipinas and Bangladeshis. The traditional family bonds or the belief in joint families may explain the variation across the countries. Most of those who felt their place of origin seemed ‘new’ on their return were Indians (72%), followed by Nepalese, Bangladeshis and Filipinas (Table 5.7).

Professional compromise is quite common among the migrants. Our first encounter with a former college teacher in Indonesia, who accepted the job of a domestic helper in Hong Kong, answered her long-held questions about professional
compromise. Later, she encountered countless cases of trained and experienced nurses from the Philippines working as domestic helpers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and Singapore (Whitehead et al. 2007).

Professional compromise, however, does not end with one job; it carries more implications over the years. As their existing skills erode over time, migrants often lack in confidence to reclaim the skills they had gained before they set out for overseas (Table 5.8). A common motivation for young people to migrate is the early loss of one or both parents, which heavily spurs them to move abroad. Impoverishment at home has been a leading cause of migration in Africa, and it continues to be so elsewhere as well. Filipinos, for instance, are also motivated to migrate because of the prospects of better income abroad (Whitehead et al. 2007). Any study of the migration of youth undoubtedly throws up many other reasons, which together offer a complete explanation of the process. However, there are perceptible variations in the preference of work attributes by gender and age group. Young women value the match between work and skills more, while men attach importance to management of work (Ryan 1999).

Integration issues within the family and the society of their own are big problems as well. Long absence of migrants makes their roots weak. Some returnees were not easily accepted in the family. This means, reintegration within the family and society appear for them as a challenge. Most of them said that the reintegration has been a serious issue for them to arrange a job. Most of the respondents complained about losing contact with their friends and possible employers. They were to start afresh as if they were in a ‘foreign country’. Even those who managed a job had to compromised their positions, skills and professions.

The returnees talked about many difficulties upon return, and the nature of difficulties, the dynamics of the problems in their reintegration process. The highest number of returnees who faced difficulties was from Bangladesh followed by the Philippines,
India and Nepal. Major difficulties mentioned included non-cooperation from family members and neighbours; inability to find jobs, friendlessness (previous friends had either left the place or got married) and the inhospitable attitudes of relatives and other people. We talked to hundreds of returnees in many countries. Irrespective of the origins, we found majority of them remained unemployed. Some of them of course did not want to work anymore.

Despite much negativity, many respondents had an eventual feeling of empowerment that accompanied their migration and employment. Although migration of young girls is often frowned upon and seen as purely exploitative, evidence shows that it helps these women to adjust their life into adulthood by bringing them in contact with ideas they may not have experienced at the origins (Amin et al. 1998). Yet, this feeling of emancipation is tempered by biases at home. In a conservative society like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan girls who work are feared to have lost the chastity and face bleak marriage prospects. There are some women who work and save money to pay for their own dowries. For women, in the transition to adulthood, societal pressures always militate against migration and employment opportunities. This implies that integration is something migrants face in the destination and as well as in the origin as they return. The correlation between social integration and economic opportunities is high (Jekielek and Brett 2005).

Many migrants openly admitted that they were living in a kind of isolation. This means that as they were left behind, relatives stopped visiting them. However, the picture reversed as their parents returned. Many relatives visited them after the return of their parents with the hope of getting or borrowing money from them or at least to get some gifts (Table 5.9).

Globally, the number of female migrants has been on the rise, both in terms of the sheer number of women who migrate, and their distribution in the world’s migrant population. Migrants decide whether to stay in a host country or return while simultaneously making other choices. Decisions are made by comparing discounted flow of utility ‘between staying for an additional year’ and ‘returning permanently to their home countries’ (Massey 1993; Ullah 2010). The majority of the returnees often turn into unproductive members of their societies. This may largely depend on how well the governments and civil societies invest in social, economic, and political institutions that meet their current needs. The even more obvious gain in making the most of the productive potential of youth and ensuring the availability of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Field data, 2014–2016
decent employment opportunities for them is the personal gain to the young people themselves.

One important issue we highlighted throughout this section begs further focus is that the importance of a reintegration policy. Integration and assimilation are generally seen as issues of the destinations, but reintegration in the countries of origin. Although a few countries have adopted reintegration policies, this issue remains largely ignored by most of the sending countries. Due to the lack of such policies, return migrants become unemployed burden of the society. It is important because migrants who have remained away from the country for more than 10 years may lose their roots, skills that they had before they left (due to professional compromise), their friends, and obviously their previous jobs. Therefore, policy-assisted reintegration is necessary for them.

Our research revealed that the returnees who failed to start a business or land a job became unemployed. As a result, most of the unemployed ones became psychologically devastated. Unemployment breeds marital conflict, problems of drug abuses, health loss and rues for return. They were found reluctant to take on household works, or any paid work that is lower in status than the work they used to do overseas. They suffer from a kind of pride. As we asked what were the fundamental reasons why they remain unemployed. Most pronounced answers were that they lost the skills they gained, got older (lost zeal), change of an environment, they witnessed changes in peoples behaviour, frustration in changing political atmosphere in the country, the feeling that they are new comers etc. Long-term unemployment is a destructive and persistent social issue, which has effect on individuals, families, and society (Korner 1984).

Contemporary research generally looks into successful cases of return migrants and their enterprising initiatives. Little to no attention is paid to the perception of those returnees who regret spending a major part of their life abroad without any success. Hence, more research is needed in this area to delve more deeply into the dynamics of their perceived ‘losses’. Negative perceptions of youth, the failure to help them develop and exploit their full potential, the inability to recognize that investing in youth benefits national development, and the consequent unwillingness and incapacity of society to fully involve young people in a meaningful way have effectively deprived the world of a resource of inestimable value (World Youth Report 2007). There is no doubt that without remittances from migrants, the economy of many countries would suffer. These assumptions, however, have been made without testing how economy does without remittances and with full exploitation of the human resources. We argue that these countries could make further strides with the active and full participation of the human resources (this means there would be no opportunity costs) and return migrant workers.

This section suggests that more in-depth research is required to find out how some migrants have succeeded in re-integrating themselves into the economy and community upon their return, while others have failed to do so. The process of reabsorption or reintegration of returning migrants into the society is more significant for women migrants than their male counterparts. This is because many societies in Asia do not grant social sanction to female migration, and women migrants often
run the risk of social isolation when they return. Emotionally too, they are more vulnerable when they return to a society whose expectations they are unable to meet, having spent their youth working for strangers abroad to fend for their families back home. Without a reintegration policy, it is not possible to expect all returnees to participate in development activities. Hence, reintegration into the home community remains one of the most critical issues of migration.

5.3 Xenophobia: A By-Product of Migration

The citizens of receiving countries are frequently suspicious of incomers, and historically we have been faced by what can loosely be termed the ‘nationalist’ attitude towards the issue of migration. This view embodies the political/populist conviction that immigrants reduce wages and increase unemployment among resident citizens; are destructive of the native community and its culture; push up the crime rate; and exploit the social services provided by the host community. (NEF 2006: 16)

There are multiple ways international migration and human rights intersect with the countries of origin, transit and destination (Grant 2005). The migratory process is often complex and dangerous. Migrants are a vulnerable social group and because of this, there is a lack of statistical data, which make analysis difficult. The reasons for fleeing are often related to the denial of human rights and after they leave they can be subjected to trafficking or exploitation in the transit phase. There is also little data on the transitory phase of the process and as such it is difficult to conceptualize ways of protecting migrants’ human rights while they are in transit. “The dissociation between nationality and physical presence has many consequences”. As strangers to a society, migrants may be unfamiliar with the national language, laws, and practices, and so less able than others to know and assert their rights and thus they may face discrimination (Grant 2005: 2).

Most under-researched area in migration studies is the consequent xenophobic practice perpetrated upon migrants. Most often xenophobia remains invisible and difficult to quantify. In todays time, the economic benefits of [im]migration is one of the -most -settled facts in economics. In 2016 US election campaign one of the most cited statements is ‘we should take in far more immigrants than we currently do’ (Davidson 2015). However, the blame that ‘they steal jobs’ is not getting weaker than before. This is an extremely dehumanizing complaint against migrant population. This claim somehow has been established keeping aside the fact that migration primarily happens due to the demand and supply function. The notion of stealing job triggers xenophobia especially during economic downturn in Western world. Xenophobia is not drawn simply on international or racial lines, but includes internally displaced migrants as well as rural to urban migrants. There are multiple reasons for xenophobia that include uneven development, cultural practices, history, politics and a fear of the ‘Other’ to name a few.

In the 90s, xenophobic outbursts were followed by an increase in acts of racist violence in a number of countries in the world. Expression of xenophobia may occur
against people of identical physical characteristics when such people arrive, return or migrate to areas where occupants consider them outsiders (UNHCR 2001). In the receiving countries, social groups in unfavourable position considered newcomers as competitors for jobs and public services, which cultivate a social and political climate that generate xenophobia and racism. Increased competition between states leads states to reduce their services in areas of social welfare, education and healthcare which influence a segment of the population living on the margins are often in direct competition with migrants for welfare service and are the main breeding ground for xenophobic and racist ideologies. Largely unknown is the magnitude of xenophobia in many countries and the impact on psychological wellbeing on the migrants (Ullah and Huque 2014). Xenophobia, racism and discrimination are global phenomena that negatively affect migrants. As globalization continues to expand in its rapid pace, migration continues at dramatic levels. The vulnerable position of migrants increases discrimination and exploitation, and the irregular status of migrants gives little or no opportunity for redress.

Turkey, due to its geopolitical position, has both emigrants and immigrants as well as internally displaced people. Generally speaking, research and scholarly work on migration in Turkey are remarkably less visible than it deserves. This section intends to fill in the knowledge gap in the scholarship of xenophobia.

Xenophobia is the “attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity” (UNESCO 2008: 10). Generally, xenophobia is directed towards foreigners as defined by the nation state. However, it can be directed towards people who speak the same language and even people with the same nationality, which means rural migrants to urban areas may experience xenophobia (Fig. 5.2).

Far less literature has been generated than it deserves in this contemporary age (Crush and Ramachandran 2009). Racism refers to any hostility based upon beliefs about inherited biological differences, while xenophobia refers to hostility that is based upon beliefs around cultural differences or hostility towards foreigners (Ullah

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Fig. 5.2 Migration governance and Xenophobia

- **Migration governance**
  - **Poor governance**
  - **Good governance**
    - Absence of human rights instrument
      - Discrimination
        - Xenophobia
and Huque 2014). The issue of xenophobia got prominence due partly to the fact that it is often translated into hostility towards immigrants in many countries (Jureidini 2003). The policies, designed to protect refugees and migrants often fail or are inadequate and many migrants are left without rights and without knowledge of how to acquire them. Stephanie Grant (2005) highlights the gap in the legal framework and the actual enjoyment of human rights by migrants.

Human rights violations are often the direct result of xenophobia or racism and therefore receive unequal treatment. This is compounded by the lack of rights because the migrants are not citizens and the potential difficulty of navigating the legal system. Immigrants and refugees are often pressured to assimilate and integrate and often have the duties of citizens (for example, paying taxes) without the rights of citizens. Migrants are often treated as a security threat, have irregular statuses are subjected to exploitative or forced labour (Ullah et al. 2019). All of these human rights violations are difficult to combat due to the invisibility of the migrants in the eyes of domestic labour laws. It is taken for granted that migrants fall into the general human rights core texts, which denies the unique, often irregular, situations of migrants (OHCHR 2019).

Migrants, due to their often illegal, or non-citizen status are vulnerable, which not only makes them an easy target for xenophobic and racist hostility, but also makes it difficult for them to seek protection or access to the justice system. They are more likely to be exploited in their jobs and less likely to be able to send their children to school or have access to health care. The denial of these basic human rights is often in large part a result of xenophobic policies (UNHCR 2001).

Xenophobia is not caused by migrants, but instead affects them. Xenophobia appears to be the worst in areas with few foreigners, who are often perceived to be associated with criminality, stealing of jobs, and using up of social services. These assumptions give way for xenophobic policies aimed to protect nationals from [im]migrants, and in turn, encourages hostility, violence and exploitation (Misago et al. 2015; Rzepnikowsva 2018). Exploitation is at the crux of the issue because migrant workers are willing to work for much lower wages than the national counterparts. The employers hire migrants and their illegal status makes it cheaper for the employer to recruit them.

The 1990 UN Convention of Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families have been an important convention that outlines the legal framework for protecting migrants and their families (OHCHR 2019). The Protocol against Trafficking in persons- especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land and Sea details actions for states, for example anti-discrimination legislation, national strategy plans for addressing migration and discrimination, and policies and programs that respect multiculturalism and diversity. The causes of xenophobia are complex and multifaceted and are interrelated with all the potential theories, but regardless of the causes, xenophobia has negative effects on migrants and their families. Many governmental policies, instead of restoring human rights to migrants, instead exacerbate their problems, by enhancing their vulnerability and playing into the xenophobic misperceptions of the populations. Some scholars argue that xenophobia is a biological and natural response to strangers, however this may
be used to justify xenophobic actions (Ullah and Huque 2014). Migrants are often made to be scapegoats for social problems. “When migrants are made scapegoats for social ills, negative and biased stereotypes are produced, re-produced and accepted as common sense” (Crush and Ramachandran 2009: 44). Greater understanding of citizen attitudes to migrants, refugees and migration policy through research uncovers the root causes of xenophobia (Crush and Ramachandran 2009: 71–72).

South Africa is affected by unemployment and poverty and many South Africans blame immigrants that migrants worsen the economic situation. South Africa is a major receiving country in Africa and hosts over five million migrants (visitors) each year with a foreign born population of 3–5%. The lack of policies to support refugees and migrants reflects and perpetuates xenophobia by exacerbating the situation in their host countries (McConnell 2008). McConnell addresses the regional and circular patterns of migration in and out of South Africa and the strains on both the sending and receiving countries. The treatment of the large number of non-nationals in South African is expounded by media portrayal and public perceptions (Economist 2019). This belief is largely a reflection of the xenophobic fear of an “invasion” by foreigners and many South Africans believe that migrants are taking their jobs. South African policies, though that have become more migrant friendly in the last two decades, are not entirely devoted to ensuring the human rights of migrants and refugees. The policies “have failed to grasp the bigger picture, focusing only on specific issues and overlooking important linkages between such related areas as the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon, increasing inequality among citizens, unemployment and HIV/AIDS” (McConnell 2008: 35).

A group of youths (24–34 years) were asked of question that ‘what would be your opinion about the claim that migrants take your jobs’. Chapter 3 offered some important and critical reflections on the perceptions host country job seekers have about the migrant population. For example, some Singaporeans objected the fact that migrants take away the jobs in some sectors and that locals are becoming minority. Some of them said importing migrant worker should not be an open-ended policy. This should stop somewhere. Many Singaporeans are leaving the country due to lack of job opportunities (Ullah 2018). Perceptions about this in Turkey are also almost the same as those of the Singaporeans. For some Malaysians, it was fine to bring in migrant people however, some of them think that relatively less construction works are underway hence the government can get to reduce the number of migrant workers.

Turkey, due to its geopolitical location to both Europe and the Middle East and Africa, has made it an important transit spot in the post World War II era (Öniş 1995). The political turmoil and lower economic development levels in countries bordering Turkey to the East have pushed migrants and asylum seekers to Europe. However, as Europe continues to enact policies that restrict migration in, more people are getting caught in Turkey. Additionally, Turkey is relatively economically developed for the region and as such attracts economic migrants. However, due to different Turkish policies and various international trends and world events, there have been four distinct eras in Turkish migration (Içduygu and Deniz 2012). The first, the fertilization period, which ranges from 1979 to 1987 is characterized by a large number of Iranian refugees following the 1979 regime change. From 1988 to 1993,
the maturation period, there was an increase in irregular migration: refugees from Iraq and Bulgaria as well as economic migrants from former Soviet republics arrived. 1994 to 2000/2001 is marked by the ‘saturation period’ in which Turkey’s position as a transit country increased rapidly. The fourth period from 2001 on is termed a ‘period of degeneration of irregular migration in Turkey; the issues of irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling, and their impact on the labour market, have become hot issues both domestically and internationally’ (Içduygu 2004: 91). In addition to the international immigration, there has also been an increase in rural to urban migration following the drive for modernization beginning in the 1920s. Içduygu suggests that Turkey, due to inadequate policies to deal with migration need to “(1) develop a set of measures to manage migration in an orderly manner, (2) provide an appropriate capability for protection and for dealing with disorderly movements, (3) provide an environment conducive to integration, and (4) engage in dialogue and cooperation with all involved parties and countries” (Içduygu 2004: 99).

Immigration to Turkey was characterized as mostly from Balkan countries that spoke Turkish. In the 1960s, Western Europe began a guest worker program and many Turks began migrating to Germany. Most of the migration that time was unaccompanied as they intended to save money in order to start businesses back in Turkey. Today, the growing number of Turks abroad is due to family reunification. The Turkish government is concerned with the integration of Turks abroad into the education system and the job market. They want Turks to be able to have full access to their political, social and judicial rights (Acma 2006).

During the cold war, Turkey was a buffer state, which made it an important migration point between the East, the West and the third world. However, during this time it was not a major receiving country. Today, Turkey is a major destination and transit country, especially for migrants from the Middle East. Framing immigrants and Refugees as security threats does not prevent them from migrating; it merely dictates their access to human rights and social services (Içduygu and Keyman 2004).

By examining the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Mainlander immigrants to Cypriot, Hatay (2008) gives a description of how xenophobia takes root in an area and how the ‘other’ can be defined. With a complex relationship between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish migrant workers, at the root of the xenophobia is orientalism arising from Kemal’s vision of modernization (Hatay 2008). The Turkish immigrants in Cypriot represent not only other but a representation of the ‘backward’ self of the Turks. Viewing the immigrants as backward and undeveloped is a form of orientalism and is linked to rural to urban migration, where urbanites are considered more modern than the rural migrant workers. The relationship between the Turkish immigrants and the Turkish Cypriots was further complicated by neoliberalism and the growth of a consumer culture among the Cypriots. Displays of wealth became increasingly important and the mainlander Turks, who were poor, traditional, and religious, did not fit into the neoliberal vision of progress (Hatay 2008).
“Xenophobic reactions to the migrants resemble those in other parts of the world where migration has proceeded quickly and where the immigrant population is perceived as ‘different’ from the ‘local’ population” (Hatay 2008: 164). This explains why internally displaced people, as well as international migrants experience racism. The perception of ‘other’ is not necessarily drawn on racial or nationalistic lines, but is instead based on a perceived “difference.” This difference can be based on the more obvious reflections of difference: skin colour, nationality or language, but it can also be difference in cultural habits, religion, or even diet. Migration continues, and if left unchecked, so too will xenophobia, racism and discrimination. The elimination of xenophobia and the protection of the human rights of migrants will have to come from many directions.
Chapter 6
Inevitability of Migration: Conclusions and Policy Options

This chapter synthesizes main findings and provides analysis of the arguments we make. The most important question we are asking whether development is negotiable with remittances received and the cost of shortages of professionals that are in high demand in origin countries. Is a policy to halt migration a solution to this situation? In attempting to answer to these questions, the Philippines example is worth revisiting. The trend of medical doctors taking nursing training to take up jobs in Europe, the Middle East and North America is on the rise. As a result, the Philippines itself has fallen into the problem of shortages of medical professionals. This has two pronged effects: professional compromise discourages potential talents to go for specific training, and the shortages of medical professionals undermine the state capacity to provide sufficient health services.

Population mobility continues at varying volumes. Debates on international migration have not gone unchallenged. Claims are there that migration is still governed by outmoded notions about human mobility and is hampered by inadequate policy and legal frameworks, and overriding security concerns stifles it. While the globalized labour markets, productions and consumptions are thriving for the existence of migrants, human rights issues have severely been compromised.

A huge share of existing literature tends to overlook some important facts such as money spent on financing migration; sources of this money (loans and borrowing on notorious conditions), long-term effect of the money borrowed. Globally, potential migrants obtain finances from multiple sources (relatives, friends, banks, traditional money lenders [often on high interest rates], NGOs, and by selling properties) for migration. This may lead the migration to a worthless venture. We observed that migrants required years to pay the loan back. This leads many migrants to prolong their stint (often illegally). The psychological costs migrants pay (migrants and their family members back home) are not possible to measure quantitatively. Had these migrants been in their country, they would have earned ‘something’—i.e. they pay opportunity costs (Pumar 2002). In calculating the remittances, these need to be factored in. Choosing a course of action (out of a set of actions/choices) that is most in line with our preferences is difficult. If we choose one, we forgo another. Our subconscious minds make a cost–benefit analysis to come up with a better choice.
Of course, there is pain involved in making choices. We accept that pain to make a choice. We choose to migrate to become wage earners overseas or in the urban centres at the cost of the activities we might otherwise have pursued within our locality or country (Plange 1979).

Growing number of parents (of whom high proportions are mothers) leave the families and children behind to take up “temporary” employment providing domestic and care services. A transnational family is thus formed where children are geographically separated from one or both parents over an extended period. Millions of children are currently growing up in the absence of their mother or father, or both. This implies that the social cost of migration is very high, particularly due to the lack of parental care.

The impacts of family separation on the well-being of the left-behind children demands deep understanding. Negative effects can be exacerbated if long-term migration of one of the parents leads to permanent disruption of family unity. Evidences are rife that migrants start having dual or multiple relationships in destinations countries as they migrate unaccompanied: one in the country of origin and one or more in the country of destination resulting in reduced amount of remittances sent home. This ends up having biological remittances (for more, see Ullah and Alkaff 2018).

Migration and its effects on development depend on the social structure of the society as well as on cultural values, tradition, and the amount and sustainability of the remittances they receive. Migration stakeholders have devised ideas about how public and private sectors and civil society can build partnerships around migration policies that eliminate discrimination against migrants and protect their rights (IOM 2008); lower the human, social and economic costs of migration (Ullah 2014); and expand opportunities for migrants to more productively invest their earnings and share their knowledge.

The previous chapter, in part, analyzes whether exodus of skills and knowledge is good or bad for sending ends. This analysis primarily was performed with examples of countries from South East Asia. As we discuss development and migration, issues about brain drain or brain gain or brain waste are important to touch upon. The question was whether countries are in a position to send the human resource to other countries. Sriskandarajah (2015) argues that African countries lose 20,000 skilled personnel to the developed world every year and the developed world make efforts to increase aid to these countries may not make sense if the local personnel required to implement development programs are absent. Developed countries take advantage of difficult conditions in some parts of the world by luring away people who could otherwise be of immense use in their home countries. If the number of skilled people leaving is higher than that of people entering (or being produced), brain drain can become a challenge for the sending countries (Ullah 2016).

Is dependency good? On an average, how many members of a family are dependent on a single migrant worker? It, of course, varies from country to country. Excluding the economically dependent member of the families (minors and elderlies), our study suggests that remained-behind family members tend to be reluctant to work at a point of time as they become used to receiving remittances from overseas. As time passes,
they tend to believe that money will continue to come from abroad anyway. This reflects the situation in the country of origin but how about country of destinations?

More than 50% of workforce in various countries worldwide is composed of foreigners and most of these countries are in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), GCC and South East and East Asia (World Bank 2016; Ullah 2017). Each international migrant leaves several family members behind and supports them from abroad by consistently or inconsistently sending remittances (in kind or cash). Therefore, a global stock of many millions of migrants implies that many more millions of people are directly affected by remittance flows. Remittances are generally spent on consumption necessities—food, clothing, medicine, housing and house renovation. Overall, the migrant population helps to lift people out of poverty by supporting a better consumption than would otherwise be possible. However, beyond the fact that remittances could alleviate poverty, their macroeconomic impacts are not systematically understood. Given the effects on consumption, effects on short-term outcome from fluctuations in remittance flows are expected too. A more pressing question is asked that whether remittances have any long-term effects on economic performance, and in particular, whether remittances can hasten a country’s economic development. This possibility is suggested by the fact that remittances are essentially unrestricted, private financial flows that could finance investment as well as consumption. Investment and un/employment are intricately linked.

Given the fact that the bottom poor do at best migrate domestically due to lack of information and necessary capital, the multiplier effect of remittances seems to be negligible. It is highly likely that remittances would increase social and economic discrepancy. There is a widespread debate about consumption that it contributes to human resources. As a consequence, there are evidences that many active remained behind family members have slacked at some point of time as they continued receiving remittances from abroad. Numerous studies (Ullah 2010, 2012; Rahman 2012) confirm that remittances sent back home go usually unsupervised.

Most migration scholars are complacent with the fact that many countries especially developing ones receive higher amount of remittances than that of merchandise exports. Economists are loud about the positive correlation of development and remittances perhaps because of the fact that it is more stable over time than private capital flows and exports (Lueth and Marta 2006). Lueth and Marta (2006) offer a gravity model that explains trade and, recently, FDI flows, to workers’ remittances. There is abundance of studies conducted on the motives of remitting. To date, a wide range of motivations have been identified, and altruism is one of the most important one.

Geographers offer the explanations of migration and remittance that it is all about redistribution of population from one country to another, sociologists and anthropologist go further deep into the analysis of the underlying reasons for the move they make and the long term consequences and impacts on various social issues. However, Lueth and Marta (2006) offer interesting yet contradicting findings on altruism that it is less of a factor for sending remittances than commonly believed. They also found a positive association between remittance receipts and the dependency ratio back home. This suggests that helping those at home is an important motive. However, remittances do not appear to increase in the wake of natural disasters but it appears to
be positively aligned with the business cycle in the home country, as evidence shows that remittances are favouring the investment motive (Ahmed 2015). However, during financial crisis, the remittances flows remained unhurt. Though, it may be ironic but the truth may be that when something is resistant to financial shock then either it is highly protected or it is less connected to the mainstream economy. The effects of remittances could be analyzed based on three dimensions. Firstly, the unapparent fiscal penalty on the access of foreign monies into a developing country is open to the flows of capital that depends on the exchange rate level of the home currency and on the domestic levy; secondly, how the monies are spent; whether the remittances are used within the family members or the earner invests them, and lastly, the negative consequences of remittances when the family falls short of it (Demurger 2015). From a macroeconomic point of view, these impacts seemed to be unfavourable.

There are evidences on the impacts of remittances on the local income distribution, whereby inequality has been becoming apparent (Richard 1989). The inequality is between the families with migrant workers and the families without migrant members. In many developing countries, remittances enhance the ability to own land and housing property but this kind of expenditure is perceived as unproductive. While more moneis are spent on this type of market, the prices are susceptible to rise; thus remittance flows may also lead to price inflation (Bayangos 2012). The negative outcome of the remittances flows is on the rise depending on both the local currency’s exchange rate and on the domestic levy. By way of explanation, the exchange rate being defined as the price of the local currency, depending on the value of the foreign currencies of the countries where the migrant people reside. For each increment of foreign currencies, there will be a rise on the average central bank reserves; therefore, the increase then obliges the bank to issue new local money entailing mechanically inflation. It is considered that this increase of the real exchange rate produces a Dutch disease effect (Bourdet and Falck 2006).

Psychologically speaking, the family members who are ‘left’ behind tend to be content as they receive remittances from abroad. To most of them, the remittances are like the “manna falling from heaven” without requiring them to work or cash withdrawal from the local labour market. The recipients are often seen to take the privilege from it, as consuming on luxurious goods has become affordable. The claims that left behind members turned sluggish or reluctant to work are real. Eventually, they become dependent on remittances. In order to seek answer to those questions, we asked the sample from a few countries if they really turned so. Table 6.1 represents only the difference in days they reduced work before and after migration happened in the family. These days are calculated for all the members who were able-bodied and used to work. To confess, the difference may have occurred due to other reasons as well. Hence, some of the respondents mentioned that they could afford now not to work.

Another fresh phenomenon is growing rapidly in some countries including India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Mexico, countries in Africa, and Latin America, where youngsters loiter around and create public nuisance in many ways to pedestrians, especially to young girls. We found that these youngsters who obstruct and disturb pedestrians...
Table 6.1  Difference in days worked between pre and post-migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source  Field data, 2014–2016

are largely the siblings or children of the migrants. This could be explained by a number of facts: firstly, the inflow of remittances may have given them an impression that their financial condition is better off than the others. This makes them feel superior amongst the rest. Secondly, the absence of their breadwinner means that they are no longer being observed directly and this makes them feel like they are free from control. Thirdly, the inflow of migro-dollars instilled disinterest and thus become reluctant to look for jobs or to do jobs. Fourthly, a large number of these youngsters are school dropouts meaning that education has gone to the bottom of their priority list, although the total spending on education from remittances is increasing in general. According to some scholars, it is difficult to identify any evidence that claims migration is detrimental to development. This is because most scholars from a pre-conception conducted research studies that migration has been a highly successful anti-poverty tool in many developing nations. The common perceptions about migration have changed, from the “brain-drain”—a negative connotation—to brain gain.

Migration does help to spur the labour markets but there are also facts on how the labour markets can be affected by the remittances. Remittances provide capital for consumption and entrepreneurial ventures, while remittances can discourage workers who substitute labour for leisure (Acosta 2006). Acosta (2006) rehashed the effects of international migration and remittances on labour force participation in El Salvador and suggested that labour force participation declines and women are more affected than men. For instance, urban females in remittance-receiving households are 42.2% more likely to quit the labour market, while urban males in remittance-receiving households are only 9% more likely to quit (Acosta 2006).

In any growing economy, it is important to use remittances more on investment than consumption and leisure. Yet, a careful thought can also convey that leisure is also an economic good, in which more consumption of it can also be a good thing (Ullah 2010). Is it arguable that remittances are harming some societies because they reduce labour supply in formal (or even informal) markets? Probably not, because when people substitute work for leisure, their preference reflect that they are choosing something that is better. However, the bottom line is that the migrant or the remittance senders of course do not want their money to be abused or misused. Those remittances are conventionally extremely hard-earned money. Additionally, some people become dependent on remittances, and staying off labour market for a long time can handicap them, and in that case they might lose the skills to compete if (when) remittances stop coming or are reduced.
The prevalence of the misconceptions that migrants steal local jobs is, in general, fuelled by distorted views about migration. When the claim is made that they take away jobs they have to consider the fact that most 3D jobs are taken up by migrants due to the fact that locals are reluctant to accept those jobs. The misconception and the distorted views about migration generate xenophobia.

6.1 Return Migration

The return migration is not completely a new perspective in academic research; it has been in fact discussed since the 1970–1980s era (de Haas and Fokkema 2011). Nevertheless, it is only in the recent years that a revival of interest in this topic has been appearing (Bailey 2010).

The increased attention for return migration is reflected in the abundance of investigations conducted on the factors affecting the decision to return. The vast body of research revealed the factors influencing migrants’ intention to come back, ranging from the conditions in the receiving and sending countries to the migrants’ individual characteristics (Ullah 2010). Among these determinants are the family left behind (Constant and Massey 2002), level of integration in the receiving country (de Haas and Fokkema 2011) and the border policies of the hosting state (Carrion-Flores 2006). A number of studies have been dedicated to the effects of return on various states. For instance, Zhao (2001) reflected on the consequences of return migration to China, on the basis of investment intentions and employment of the Chinese returnees. Following the same line, Black et al. (2003) explored the possible effects of self-employment by the returned Ghanaians on poverty alleviation in the country. Rother (2009) examined the eventual repercussions of return on democratization, through the study of attitudes of returned Philippine migrant workers towards the existent political system.

Gent and Black (2004) highlighted a number of problems associated with return and reintegration (a difficult relation between returnees and the local communities; stigma and the feelings of being a failed migrant; frustration with the political climate, corruption; high expectations of family and friends; feeling alienated upon return; suffering identity conflicts; and nostalgia for the host country). In order for the returnees to overcome the problems, a gender-sensitive counselling upon return and a gendered approach to return and reintegration programs need to be in place (Conway and Potter 2006).

We talked about the professional compromise in previous chapters. Professional compromise offers instant benefit but undermines the talent and human capital that the individual achieved throughout his/her life. This makes them unfit for the future job competitions when they return home. The discontinuity of the skill-use makes them unskilled or skill-sensitive. As a result, most of the returnees were found unemployed. Though some governments are making effort on re-integration policies but no visible success has so far been achieved.
Migrants as the human capitals are able to contribute to development of the both origin and destination countries. As they return from destination countries finally they are inclined to invest the money they earned abroad (Collier et al. 2011). Despite huge potential that return migrants represent their places of origin, the promotion of return at the policy level appears to be challenging. One cannot exactly predict what determinants could make the migrants come back, since the push factors are often deeply grounded in a complex blend of economic, political and social structure of the state. Moreover, it is extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible, to measure return migration.

Some governments promote (out) migration while some governments promote return migration. For example, the Moldovan government has adopted a comprehensive plan on stimulating the return of Moldovan migrant workers. There are number of projects implemented with an objective to facilitate the return and reintegration of Moldovans who are currently residing abroad (Mosneaga 2013). Taking into account that the return of migrants in the context of development has not been addressed sufficiently by the major migrant sending countries, the analysis of Moldovan experience could make an essential contribution to the debates on the issue.

The return of migrants is ‘the returns of skills’ may not hold true because the skills they gained overseas may not be useful in the origin country. In the academic literature as well as in the policy documents, the return migration is frequently discussed within the domain of brain drain. The ‘return of skills’ is described in positive terms as a beneficial aspect for economic and social development of the origin country (IOM 2005). Return migration is seen as a way for brain gain, assuming that for some sending regions, the return rate of the highly skilled reaches about 20–30% (Mayr and Peri 2008). Empirical studies, however, do not always support this optimistic position. The phenomenon of ‘brain waste’, or deskilling of migrants, significantly decreases the development potential of the return flows (Eurofound 2012). Similarly, Wiesbrock (2008) suggests that the origin countries do not always benefit from return migration, especially if the migrants return temporarily. This view is supported by Ley and Kobayashi (2005) assuming that the return is challenged by the modern transnational practices and therefore should be viewed only as a point in the continuous circle of movement.

The temporality of migration and return is also connected to the debates on circular migration. Nevertheless, scholars make an important distinction between return and circular migration (Vodean and Piracha 2009). However, as argued by de Haas (2005), the belief in circular migration as temporary movement is somewhat misleading, since a significant share of migrants chooses to stay in the destination country (de Haas 2005: 14).

Moldova, for example, is hugely affected by emigration, the outflow of population lasting already for more than 20 years. The first wave of emigration began in 1990s, almost immediately after the country gained its independence. The building of the new state has been accompanied by serious economic challenges resulting in the substantial decrease of financial and social well-being of its citizens. The main push factors behind the extensive migration process were poverty, lack of decent jobs and low salaries (CBS-AXA Consultancy 2005).
The main destinations for Moldovan migrants are Russia and Italy, symbolizing the two main directions of outmigration from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and European Union, respectively. The two migration flows differ significantly: those moving to CIS are mainly men, from rural areas, low- and medium-skilled. Migrants choosing the EU are predominantly women; most of them are highly qualified. Such a discrepancy is determined by the specifics of migrants’ employment sectors: constructions in CIS and domestic/care services in the European Union. Moreover, the two flows differ also by the length of stay abroad: longer stay in EU destinations can be explained by the difficulties in obtaining visas and geographical distance, while the proximity of CIS countries to Moldova as well as non-visa regime permit shorter stays and even circulation (Vodean and Piracha 2009; IOM 2009).

There is no doubt that the social and economic effects of migration for Moldova are immense. The annual amounts of migrant transfers make Moldova one of the largest remittance-receivers worldwide (Luecke et al. 2009). Moreover, Moldova is ranked among the top remittances-receiving countries as a percentage of GDP as it is asserted that about 20–30% of its GDP is constituted by remittances.

Demographic losses due to migration are considerable. The emigrant population groups are generally young, in which 38% of migrants are 20–29 years old, followed by those aged between 30 and 39 years. Besides, 22% of Moldovan migrants have higher level of education (Matei et al. 2009), their outflow leading to brain- and skill drain. Moreover, migration produced dramatic consequences for Moldovan families, since the number of children with at least one parent abroad exceeded 70,000 (UNICEF 2006).

The roots of return migration management can be traced back to 2005, when the National Employment Agency (NEA) of Moldova, jointly with the IOM (International Organization for Migration) Mission launched the projects focusing on the return and reintegration of voluntary returnees. The projects are eventually considered as a way to prevent further emigration. The voluntary assistance projects were mainly designed for Moldovans applicants who were denied asylum status in European Union as well as Moldovan irregular migrants from European Union, overlooking the bulk of migrant workers potentially wishing to return (Morgades 2010). In 2008, a real impetus to the promotion of return migration has been given through the adoption of the plan on fostering the return of Moldovan migrant workers from abroad. The aims of the plan include the provision of information about the (reintegration) opportunities in Moldova, development of entrepreneurial culture with the aim of remittance investment and consolidating links with diaspora.

Although the plan has not clearly stipulated whether the permanent or temporary return of Moldovan migrants is expected, we can deduce their intentions from a careful examination of actions proposed. Thus, the character of envisaged activities, lack of any temporary schemes, as well as the focus on labour market reintegration make us assume that the main goal of Moldovan policy-makers is to target the long-term, if not permanent, return of migrants.

The development of the Moldovan’s return migration policy has coincided with the start of a large cooperation program with the European Union (EU). In June 2008, Moldovan government initiated the so-called Mobility Partnership with the EU with
its main objectives to promote legal migration, to fight irregular migration and to maximize the benefits of migration.\footnote{For more details on the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership, see the ‘Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership Between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova’.} This multilateral framework comprises 15 EU member states, including main destination countries for Moldovan migrants, such as Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus (European Commission 2009).

Initially, the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership (EU-MMP) has been limited to government agencies. After two years of its establishment, it became open for NGOs and international organizations. The extension of the format permitted an active involvement of the latter, especially IOM, in the development-oriented activities promoted under the umbrella of the Mobility Partnership. In relation to return migration, the IOM-implemented project ‘Supporting the Implementation of the Migration and Development Component of the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership’ provided the opportunity to realize small pilot initiatives directly targeting potential returnees. In particular, some measures envisaged assistance for the employment in Moldova, targeting overseas Moldovan graduates who wished to return, while others focused on the temporary returnee of expatriate Moldovan scientists (IOM 2009).

The return migration policy in Moldova has been promoted so far by the few mainstream actors, predominantly governmental institutions and international organizations, and almost neglected by alternative stakeholders. Information is scarce on non-governmental implication in return migration, for instance, a Moldovan-German project addressing Moldovan medical community in Germany. This project benefits both the Moldovan and the German’s health institutions, in which those medical Diasporas tend to gain knowledge (JMDI 2011). By large, Moldovan diasporas do not appear to be pro-active in return, rather they take the positions as beneficiary and intermediary between the two national’s health institutions (Lupu 2010). The return policy implementation may be significantly challenged by weak participation of small and middle actors.

The bottom line is that the effects of emigration have been devastating for Moldova, especially in terms of demographic and the labour market imbalances. Correspondingly, the policies discussed in the previous chapter reveal a clear emphasis on permanent or long-term return and labour market reintegration, either through entrepreneurship or vocational training. For sending countries with a high demographic potential and without labour force deficit, such a model would hardly be relevant. Rather, they would opt for a temporary return without active labour participation but involving instead skills transfer.

A very important factor in implementing return migration policies is the cooperation between the origin countries with destination countries. In Moldova, the authorities have benefitted from large assistance by the European Union, particularly in the framework of the Mobility Partnership. This was possible for the dynamic development of the political relations between the two parties. Obviously, such cooperation cannot be taken for granted and constitutes rather as an exception in the relations between origin and destination countries.
Moldovan practice of return migration policies provides a very specific model, which can barely be applied to other contexts. However, each element taken separately can eventually serve as good examples for origin countries striving to get their migrants back. Thus, for instance, Moldovan experience highlighted the need to keep up close cooperation between the origin and destination countries, in order to ease migrants’ return. Similarly, an active involvement of international organizations could bring visible benefits to the authorities that lacks financial or human resources.

Researching the migration policies implemented by different countries, in particular in some emerging fields of interest, brings advantages both in terms of disseminating knowledge and improving the practices of migration management. However, scholars as well as policy-makers should be aware of the limits of such policies. The example of return migration policy promoted by Moldovan authorities brings to light the reduced applicability of some measures, their success being determined by the specific context of the country.

The continuous flows of remittances into a household have culminated the outcome whereby the left-behind family members becoming highly dependent on it. Remittances do have impact to both the household and the national economy both in negative and positive terms, depending on how they are used and spent. The relentless cycle of emigration and remittances also convey to the issue of “brain drain,” thus it is crucial to pinpoint solutions that could administer balance human capital flows, in and out of the origin countries. One of the possible resolutions is through the return-migration policy that is hoped to ensure an accommodating and a manageable sequence of “brain drain-brain gain.”

6.2 Policy Implications

This section synthesizes the main analyses of migration policies that are in place. The chapters in the book argued that development might suffer due to migration and remittances in certain circumstances. Empirical evidences were presented from many countries in support of this argument. As evidenced throughout the study, one of the worthy outcomes of migration is the remittance that migrants generate continuously and is sent back to their countries of origins. Remittances are the sources of funding for most households in many countries in South Asia, South East Asia, central Asia, Africa and Latin America. This book demonstrates possible and potential circumstances under which remittances may result in negative development. This is, however, not to challenge the notion of migration itself rather this is to send a message to stakeholders and migration regimes about the potential impacts in the long run. The nations that are very much dependent on remittances for their financial budget need to come up with good migration governance so that dependency on migration does not bring havoc to the economy in the event migration slows down.

The evidences as well as previous researches present that remittances tend to induce the left-behind family members becoming reluctant to work as they eventually become dependent on remittances. This poses a serious problem to migrant
families primarily because dependency is something that damages the inner-self of an individual and the potential of a family. Some migration scholars (such as Rahman 2010, 2012; Skeldon 2002) argue that this has nothing to do with migration because those who become sluggish are inherently so. Apart from the issues of remittances, today, it is apparent that most sending countries suffer from the lack of professionals. One of the best exemplars is the Philippines, where there is a mounting trend of medical doctors and nurses taking up jobs internationally, mostly in Europe, Middle East and North America. As a result, the Philippines has fallen into the problem of shortages of medical professionals. Therefore, the most important questions to ask will be whether development is negotiable between remittances received at the cost of shortages of professionals, and are there policies to find a solution to this situation? This as well attempts to bridge the existing gaps that persist between the macro and micro economic levels, theory and practice, and academic and applied areas. Therefore, the reciprocity of remittances and development should not just be viewed from one single angle.

Portraying negative views about migration is not something that came out of the blue. Therefore, concerns are growing among scholars about the unfavourable impact of dependency on migrants’ remittance. Remittances constitute about 35% of Moldova’s GDP and this implies that Moldova’s financial system is heavily dependent on it. About 20% of the GDP of Nepal is constituted by migrants’ remittances. This dependency on remittances alerts that if migration volume declines for any reason the economy may collapse. In small economy, of course, a Dutch disease has profound implications. This means that when one nation is heavily relying on it, the economy might be affected badly. Research on migration and development nexus has been portraying one-sided positive image that shaped the minds of many scholars in a way that migration can never produce negative impact. Therefore, migration scholars do not tend talk loudly about the possible long-term negative impact. As reflecting again to the Philippines, there are about 9 million children growing up without their parents. This fact came to light from the research conducted by development scholars. This shows that when we talk about migration and development, in no way we can overlook the fact about these children.

Some of the Middle East countries have been highly dependent on foreign workers. South Asia and South East Asian countries were the main sources of supplies of those workers. Thus many countries were complacent about the near guaranteed remittances coming from the Middle East. However, some countries in the Middle East started to suffer unemployment. Oil price fluctuations and declining growth have given an impetus among those governments to develop their own human resources so as to reduce the dependency on foreign workers. This resulted in low demand, though slowly, for workers from those source countries that were not ready for this situation.

Political economy in the context of migration and development does not necessarily impel us to include state or state actors. Our understanding about political economy has been inspired by Andre (2014: 5) who argues that political economy is an interdisciplinary field of enquiry within the social sciences that is concerned
with the study of the past, present and future dynamics of the global political economy. It would be good if a political economy approach could be addressed and be accountable to the question of how migration differs from trade in the (potentially) contributing countries to the (under) development of receiving countries. We would argue the point of trade and its contribution were touched upon occasionally (as context permitted) throughout the book. The book of course does not mean to say that migration contributes to underdevelopment, rather the position the book takes is that the idea we have been holding about migration and development nexus need to be revisited and reconsidered, and give a signal that in the long run migration may bring a disaster to any economy in case economy becomes too dependent on it.

As we mentioned earlier that both macro and micro economic impacts have been touched upon in the analysis. In doing so, we collected data that responded to the micro-economic impact i.e. small business, family savings, asset building; backward and forward linkage issues; potential engagement in business; and the use of remittances in productive scheme. On an average, about half of the total global remittances goes to consumption. Some scholars argue that consumption should be considered productive as this goes to human resources development (Fig. 6.1).

South-South migration is not as large as South-North migration in three of the six developing regions. South-South migration is estimated to account for half of all outward migration from South Asia, 64% from Europe and Central Asia (although a portion of these people never crossed international borders but became “migrants” after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the formation of new countries), and 69% from Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, it is estimated that 74 million, or nearly half of the migrants from developing countries reside in other developing countries. However, this estimation is likely to be low, as the official data tend to undercount

**Fig. 6.1** Cost of remittances
irregular migrants. Irregular migration is probably even more common in South-South than South-North migration because of tight restrictions on immigration in many developing countries, coupled with limited enforcement, the high cost of travel documents, and unclear immigration rules in the South. In 2005, the South-South remittances ranged from 9 to 30% of developing countries’ remittance receipts, or between US$18 billion and US$55 billion that depended on the allocation rule chosen to estimate bilateral flows (OECD 2011). The amounts would be higher if the flows take place through informal channels were taken into account. The costs of South-South remittances (where such remittances are permitted) are even higher than those of North-South remittances, because of lack of competition in the remittance market, a lack of financial development in general, and high foreign-exchange commissions at both ends of the transaction.

It has long been recognized that in some Asian countries, such as India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, perhaps as much as 30% of total remittances did not get recorded in official accounts. An extreme case in African countries, particularly in Sudan where in 1983, about 90% of the transfers did not come through official channels (Choucri 1985). Based on the available surveys, the World Bank estimated that unrecorded flows might add 50% or more to total recorded remittances (World Bank 2005, 2014a, b).

In the receiving societies, migration and development policies generally constitute separate domains, which have hampered the elaboration of effective policies that establish a more positive connection between migration and development. As a result, migration policies pursued by most Western states often tend to decrease the potential contribution of migration to enhancing welfare and well-being in both the sending and the receiving societies (de Haas 2005; Hamilton 2006).

Cuban case is an interesting one. Cuban population in the United States (about 2 million in 2012) has been contributing to the country since long (World Bank 2015a, b, c) by sending remittances, which reached the record figure of US$2.605 billion in 2012. This does not include remittances in kind (The Havana Consulting Group (THCG) 2014). However, remittances to Cuba are likely to be affected by the movement towards normalization of relations with the United States (Sullivan 2015). Some scholars find it awkward in the sense that when the economic and diplomatic hostility has been obvious between these two countries; remittances flow kept mounting year by year (Joshua and Martinez 2014; Michael 2014). As Cuba increased trade with the Soviet Union, nationalized US-owned properties, and hiked taxes on American imports, the United States responded with escalating economic retaliation. For the last 60 years since the 1960s, successive U.S. administrations have maintained a policy of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation with Cuba (Sullivan 2014). Due to the new development in terms of diplomatic relationship with the United States, general donative remittances to Cuban nationals and donative remittances for humanitarian projects will no longer require a specific license. This is of course a new development in the political economy of migration.

The Philippines is one of the highest recipients of remittances in the world. Migration has become ‘inevitable’ option for the people with a relatively less choice of
opportunity in the country. To some people it is becoming an economic fashion. However, the Philippines are one of the countries with most socially fragmented people, whereby the families have fallen apart. This is resulting in a decline in social cohesion and an increase in social exclusion. We argue that over emphasis and dependency on remittance for macro economy may overshadow many potential problems at micro levels. It does not mean to say that macro economy is less important than micro economy.

Saggar et al. (2012) argue that immigration can affect a country (specially receiving ones) negatively in many ways. People are different in significant ways from one another and these differences create both opportunities and challenges. A vivid imbalance in skills’ need and supply is prevalent, while the gender role has changed dramatically. The migrants have been caught in a ‘vicious cycle of migration’ by the fact that most migrants borrow money from multiple sources to finance their migration in the first place (Fig. 6.2). In order for them to recoup the money they spent on migration, they tend to stay back in whatever way they can.

Dependency on remittances is high in several ECA countries, particularly in Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova. Remittances to the region are expected to remain unchanged in the coming years (World Bank 2015a, b, c). However, the weakening of economic growth in Russia, the Ruble depreciation, and sanctions imposed on Russia by western countries may have impact on the growth of remittances to the Europe and Central Asian (ECA) region (World Bank 2015a, b, c). However, it is still difficult to predict what would be the behaviour of the remittances flows. Russia is the largest source of remittances to countries in the region, and Ukraine is ECA’s largest remittance-recipient country. At the same time, Russia is experiencing very high unemployment rate (the average 7.86% from 1993 until 2016, reaching an all time high of 14.10% in February of 1999 and a record low of 4.80% in August of 2014) (Muravyev and Oshc 2013). This means a threat is expected for the sending countries that Russia may plan to decrease the number of foreign workers.

Remittances flows to the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region are likely to bounce back in 2015. Economic recovery in the United States benefits Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, which together account for more than half
of the remittances flows to the region. In contrast, high unemployment in Spain is negatively impacting remittances to Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru. In 2014, the officially recorded remittances in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region were rising by 2.9% that reached US$51 billion (World Bank 2015a, b, c). Nevertheless, the remittances flows remain volatile, especially in the three largest recipient countries—Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco. In 2014, the attractive investment opportunities in the planned expansion of the Suez Canal was expected to stabilize the remittances flows to Egypt. Yet, at the same time the on-going economic crisis and high unemployment rates in Europe may have impact on remittance flows in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (World Bank 2014a, b).

Social polarization is another consequence that remittances have offered. A divide between migrant families and non-migrant families are transpiring vividly. Interviews with migrant families irrespective of origins revealed that family members consider themselves different from others. Non-migrant family members as well consider themselves different from others in terms of social status, skill, future prospects, income and life style. Some scholars find this situation tantamount to social polarization. Social cohesion and bonds have been instrumental for a better social fabric and harmony. Many polarization theorists contend that while the native residents of a city fill the growing numbers of high-skill, high-wage service sector jobs, unskilled immigrants to the city fill in the concomitantly increasing number of low-wage service jobs (Baum 1997; Chiu and Lui 2004: 199; Sassen 1994). This has profound implications in the society. This may generate long term devastating disharmony in the society.

In the South Asian region, remittances inflows increased more robustly in 2015 than last year. Although flows to India only grew modestly by 1.5% in 2014, the partial year data point very strong growth of inflows to Pakistan (16.6%), Sri Lanka (12.1%) and Nepal (12.2%) (IOM 2015). The expansion is being led by flows from the GCC countries, where skilled and unskilled workers are finding renewed job opportunities. As a result, the growth rate of remittances to the region is expected to hike more than double to 5.5% (from 2.7% in 2013), boosting volumes to US$17 billion in 2014 and would rise further to US$123 billion in 2015 (World Bank 2016). Concurrently, the growth in remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa is picking up modestly as well. As widely known, the importance of remittances varies greatly across the region. Remittances as a share of GDP are most significant to Lesotho, the Gambia, Liberia, Senegal and Cabo Verde. Flows as a share of foreign exchange reserves are highest in Sudan, Senegal, Togo, Mali and Cabo Verde. In 2014, remittances to the region were expected to reach US$33 billion and it will slightly grow up to US$34 billion in 2015 (World Bank 2015a, b, c).

The migration of skilled and educated women, like men, represents a loss in terms of investments in their education and training at home as well as their potential contribution to the wellbeing of their communities of origin—which is called a brain drain phenomenon. When significant numbers of the most educated citizens leave the country, that country stands to lose its critical human capital that, in the long term, reduces the GDP growth. Female migration flows to domestic service conceals the reality that a significant number of women are in fact professionals who have chosen
to devalue their qualifications as a temporary measure to gain an entry to the labour force with the hope that they can someday utilize their credentials for appropriate jobs. However, as they relocate themselves to overseas, women often lose continuity of employment, and opportunities for career development. This kind of migration deeply affects not only the development of communities of origin but also, and more significantly, migrant women themselves. Due to the lack of opportunities in their countries, many of them who used to work as professors, engineers and managers are compelled to take up jobs like cleaning hotel rooms, garages, etc. This phenomenon has been described no more as brain drain but as brain waste.

Migration has changed gender roles (in varying scales) in many countries. Some scholars find it as an empowerment and some find it as a breakdown of cultural norm and some find as a burden for the left behind. There are evidences that expectations of care giving are shifting away from daughters to the child (Curran 1994; Pramualrathana 1991). This warrants a redefinition of gender roles, where sons take on more care-giving roles (given their limited urban labour market opportunities). The remittances sent by women differ from those sent by men in their relevant volume, frequency and sustainability over time. Although the amounts sent by men and women are basically similar, women would send a larger part of their salary than men do, given the wage discrimination in the receiving country (Ullah and Panday 2007). Women’s remittance strategy is sustained by keeping a tight control over expenses (while men reserve greater amounts of money for personal spending) and often requires perseverance in their jobs as live-in domestic workers, in order to save as much of their salaries as possible. This often makes it impossible for them to project some advancement in their careers as professionals, investments in education (for example, to take language courses) or capacity building which would allow them to access other labour sectors outside of domestic service. This also affects their own construction of social capital, which would help improve their integration into the society of their destination country (INSTRAW 2008). Women play a key role as recipients and managers of remittances. Data reveals that women use remittances primarily for food and education. This supports the hypothesis, already sustained in other areas such as food security, that the greater women’s control over the household’s monetary resources, the greater the tendency they are to invest in the overall well being of the household. This applies to whether they are the remitters who maintain strict supervision over the use of it, or as administrators of remittances received.

The female face of migration: The movements of people for myriad of reasons are as old as humankind and continues until now and will keep continue. The mobility has remained remarkably stable at around 3% over the past 50 years (Ullah 2010). However, the rate varies across the world, for example, in Europe it was 8.8%, and in North America 13.5% (UNDP 2009). Since the early 1980s, there has been an inclination in the number of women—both single and married, moving on their own to take up jobs in other countries (Ullah 2015c). Indeed, approximately half of all international migrants today are women (UNDP 2009).

Migration is not a gender-neutral issue, as women have always remained invisible in its studies. Except a few country examples, until today, migration is largely
seen as a male phenomenon. This means that contributions made by female migrants remained invisible as well. It is crucial to understand migration from both men and women’s perspectives because both gender show differences in their migratory behaviours, avail different opportunities and have to face and handle different risks and challenges (include vulnerability to human rights abuses, exploitation, discrimination and specific health risks). The relatively equal share between both genders in migration flows may hide significant differences in the experiences of migration and the opportunities available. It caused the significant change in the level of awareness on the part of migration experts and other stakeholders about the significant roles they play (such as the growing amount of remittance; capacity to manage different odd working conditions).

Castles and Miller (1998) recall that some experts regard the current era as ‘The Age of Migration’ because of five phenomena that characterized it: its globalization (there are a greater number of countries affected by migratory movements); its acceleration (reflected in an increased volume of migrants); its differentiation (migrants moving to a single country belong to a variety of ethnicities and groups); its politicization (domestic policies, bilateral and regional relations and national security policies of states are being increasingly affected by concerns about risks of international migration and vice versa); and its feminization (the growing number of female migrants) (Caritas International 2012), which we view as a qualitative change in migration.

North America is an exception—since 1930, female immigrants have been outnumbering male immigrants, and in 2005, the female has accounted for as much as 50.4% of the total migrant population. Europe and Oceania have been experiencing growing immigrants, which have surpassed the number of males since 2000 and account for as much as 53.4% and 51.3% of total migration, respectively (Caritas International 2012). Amongst migrants to Australia, women have outnumbered men in the last three decades. Since then migration flows have seen an increase in the number of women—married and unmarried—who migrate alone or in the company of other women. In 2005, female migrants constituted 44.7% of total migration in Asia, but the number of women migrating from some countries has surpassed that of men. For example, in the Philippines, 65% of those who left the country to work or live abroad were women. In 2002, twice as many women as men migrated from Sri Lanka to other countries. Between 2000 and 2003, 79% of the people who migrated from Indonesia to work were women (Phillips and Potter 2005; Ullah 2015a, d; Caritas International 2012; Rahman 2012). In the Philippines, female migrants have two streams: one stream is dominated by those who got children at their origin but still young separated from husband or boyfriend, and the other stream is dominated by those with ambition, single and young. These women opt to move to western and developed countries.

Latin American and Caribbean women are also highly mobile. By 1990, immigrant women from Latin America were the first in the developing world to reach parity with male migrants and that they constituted 50.3% of total migrations from this region in 2005 (UN 2005). They migrate mainly to Europe, North America and anywhere in South America. The feminization of migratory process is evident among migrants.
moving from Central and South America to Spain, where in 2001, 70% of all migrants were women from Brazil and Dominican Republic. The migration flows of women from LAC region to Italy are also apparent and in 2000, 70% of the arrivals from 13 out of 30 Latin American countries were women (IOM 2004a, b). Caribbean migrant women have also outnumbered the men to North America since 1950s and were well represented in skilled categories (Phillips and Potter 2005).

In Africa, the widespread poverty, disease, land degradation and high male unemployment have pushed women to take on the responsibility of providing income for the family and as a result female migration grew faster than the global average (UN 2010; Ullah 2012). By 2005, 47.4% of the 17 million immigrants in Africa were women, whereby the proportion was only at 42.3% in 1960. Most African women migrate within the region, but they are also moving to North America and Europe. For example, “the migration flows from Cape Verde to Italy is highly constituted by female migrants that accounts to 85 per cent” (Caritas International 2012: 3). However, in the Arab world, the socio-cultural norms continue to limit female mobility (with some slight changes in recent times). Scholars are loud about the fact that feminization of migration is a positive outcome of migration. However, evidences suggest that feminization of migration gives rise to specific forms of problems such as commoditization of women and girls, often resulting in the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation.

Migration volume is often contingent on the level of poverty and gender inequality of a particular setting. Females are the primary victims of inequality (because of the feminization of poverty) and as a result, they are subject to misinformation and disinformation about migration prospects. Migration of women is most likely to occur at the intermediate stages of economic development (Caritas International 2012; de Haas 2007). Extreme impoverishment makes international migration unlikely, simply because people have few resources for migration, and transportation as well as communication structures are poor, while higher educational levels stimulate aspirations for suitable employment, increase knowledge about the world and capacity for action.

Of course, women and men socialize and migrate differently in the global economy (ILO 2007). As a result, whilst men overwhelmingly constitute the majority of skilled professionals in the IT sectors, women tended to cluster around the welfare and care professions. These professions are initially opened in only a few countries like the US and the UK, and to some extent some Middle Eastern countries.

Many women tend to concentrate in a more limited number of occupations and they end up in unrelated career trajectory and skill acquisition, we call it professional compromise. Domestic work is one of the largest sectors driving international female labour migration (Ullah 2015a, e), mostly in the developed countries where women have rapidly entered the labour market (Ullah 2015b). When women enter a country of destination on the basis of labour market skills, the occupational categories open to them are often limited to service occupations (WAGI 2008). The nature of their work isolates them from the rest of the world, which prohibits them from building networks (Sabban 2002). Except for the nursing profession, the migration of highly skilled women is relatively invisible. For example, in the case of Japan, the regular
occupation available to female temporary migrant workers is entertainer. In Canada, the best way for women migrants to enter is to work as a caregiver, mostly through the Live-in Caregivers Program, regardless of their higher professional qualifications.

Women who leave their families are subjected to a huge psychological and emotional burden. They provide love and affection to their employer’s children or relatives in order to improve the quality of the lives of their own children, whom they sometimes never see for many years. Moreover, the fact that women neither can afford nor have the legal right to bring their own families to the advantage of employers, as they are less distracted at work (Caritas 2009). Such untimely separation of family members creates a new generation of children—so-called mobility orphans—who grow up without the tangible presence and influence of their parents or adults in their lives. The fundamental definition of a parent is being altered, from the primary caretaker, physically, mentally and emotionally, to a mere provider of material goods (Yeoh and Lam 2007).

There is no doubt that parents leave the country with the best intentions to secure the future of the family. Even though, this departure significantly affects the family members left behind especially if they are very young. They suffer deficit care, which means that children are unable to go through formative care during the period when they need it most in terms of their developmental psychosocial growth (McAdams 2001). This situations pose profound threat to the psychosocial development of the personality of the child with long-term effects on individuals and societies (WAGI 2009). Migration of mothers gives rise to the so-called—grand mothering phenomenon in which children remain in less restrictive measures that are often attractive to children because their natural impulses are given more freedom of expression. This may lead the children to being spoiled by grandmothers rather than being guided to mature growth (WAGI 2009).

The children of absent mothers are doubly discriminated against: first, they are deprived of their mothers’ caring, and secondly, they are despised at school as children of absent mothers. Borne out by studies that children with absent mothers tend to have more difficulties academically, and performed poorly. A study on the children of left behind mothers in Sri Lanka, showed that they had negative behaviours, including loss of appetite, weight loss for children under five years of age, and temper tantrums among those of all ages, especially adolescents (Waters 2002; Yeoh et al. 2005). The same resonates in Latin America and in Africa.

Mobility orphans have more emotional needs and are unable to communicate with their caretakers who are generally older people. The situation becomes worse for children with mental and physical disabilities as their marginalized position in society can degenerate further in the absence of a parent. This resonates in the case of Filipino children that with absent mothers they showed poorer social adjustment and suffered from impeded social and psychological development. Also, the absence of a parent becomes a cause for being bullied at schools and elsewhere. Parent’s contribution to the improvement of the material standard of living comes at the cost of the child’s mental well-being and stability. Emotional deprivation inevitably leads to increased vulnerability and their marginalization within society at large (Caritas 2009). Previous chapters showed that migration of male or female affects marital
relationships. Under the strain of geographical distance and difficult circumstances, many of them choose to seek divorce and marry a new partner in their receiving countries. The Romanian case is the best exemplar in this regard. The divorce rate is 37% among those women who live overseas (Caritas International 2012).

Migrants’ human rights are at stake in countries of origin, transit and destination. Existing UN and ILO Conventions provide extensive protection for women migrants, but they function in a fragmented manner. Moreover, it is sometimes not obvious that they could be fruitfully applied to women migrants when the focus is on the single variable of migration status. What remains an enormous problem is the one common to human rights in general, which is the gap between theory and practice, i.e. the actual implementation by states. The most important root causes of non-ratification or non-implementation is the lack of political will. Analyses that identify the myriad of protections that the states have already agreed upon extend to migrant women will serve as a tool for advocates. This is necessary for providing protection from gender-based discrimination, persecution and violence (such as rape, forced circumcision or sterilization as well as cultural burdens placed on women) (UNFPA-IOM 2006).

Who migrate? The most adventurous ones? The most active ones? Skilled and educated ones? Migration filters least active, least adventurous ones. The implication is that the country is left with those who might not be much ‘needed’ in the country. Migration therefore works like a filter. Skilled human resources leave the country means that unskilled ones are left-behind. Many countries in the world today suffer seriously the lack of skilled workers due to migration of skilled ones.

Is remittance a security threat? After 9/11, debate around remittance has taken another direction. Somalia has come under fire after some suspicious transactions were detected. A large number of Somalis live in diaspora (UNDP 2009). Somali diaspora is known to be engaged in their country’s political and economic developments. They transact an amount ranging from $750 million to $1.6 billion annually. Remittance transactions are conducted by money service businesses (MSBs) that have come under increased global scrutiny in recent years and been identified as an area of vulnerability for criminal use, including terrorist financing (Cotter and Durner 2015). In 2001 the U.S. government shut down the operations of al-Barakaat—which, before the attacks of September 11, was the largest MSB serving Somalis—because of suspicions that it had been used as a channel to funnel money to terrorist organizations (Cotter and Durner 2015). The 9/11 Commission did not find any direct link of Al-Barakat with any such activities though (9/11 Commission 2004).

In the recent years, money laundering has been linked to remittances in many African and Asian countries. Recent development in foreign exchange deposits in Swiss Banks has spurred a serious debate as Bangladeshi citizens’ deposits with various Swiss banks rose by 36.02% year-on-year in 2014. The amount deposited went up to Tk 4283 crore (one crore is equal to 10 million) (506 million Swiss franc) which is one-fifteenth of the total national budget in just 10 years ago (Byron and Rahman 2015). Political unrest and poor investment climate are the reasons why Bangladeshis prefer to deposit elsewhere (Ullah and Huque 2019). The booming Banking Sector in Bangladesh is unprecedented. Why money could not be deposited...
in Bangladeshi Banks? The lead economist at the World Bank’s Dhaka office pinpointed that it is because of political uncertainty that comes with a sense of insecurity about the money earned through such dubious means, and thus the money owners tend to seek safety elsewhere (Byron and Rahman 2015). The reasons that prompt people to engage in money laundering are not different from those that prompt many people to leave the country. The premise is the same i.e. the safety issue. As these people do not feel safe depositing their money in their own country they themselves as well do not feel to stay in the country.

Migrants are the essential input to an innovative economy (Industry Canada and Policy Research Directorate 2008). Skilled migrants do better, in general, economically, although unskilled and low skilled migrants contribute more to the origin country because they got less chance to obtain root in destinations (National Academy of Press 2015). High demand for skills in industrialized countries has led to intense international competition for skills because they provide destination countries with needed skills; but if overall attractiveness to these workers is insufficient, they will go elsewhere. Policymakers have to structure policy responses to benefit from skilled workers, taking into consideration the variety of ways they affect the domestic labour market and the economy.

Skill migration has always been seen as a great way of amassing remittances. Only recently, skill migration is seen as a talent loss. The question hence has been posed whether sending ends can afford this loss. The ASEAN region is home to a workforce of about 260 million. Among the anticipated outcomes of ASEAN Integration is intra-regional mobility among professionals. ASEAN professionals may soon be able to practice anywhere within the region. What does the current discourse say on who would stand to gain or lose from this eventuality? The fact is that the loss of skilled workers may retard national growth. Ullah and colleagues (2018) suggest that skill migration has adverse impact on services provision in the origin country, eventually leaving the country skill-empty. Most skilled migrants tend to settle elsewhere at some point of their life. Thus the country loses them permanently. Skill loss cannot in anyway be justified by glorification of migration.

Many Singaporeans expressed their deep resentment to protest against the White Paper’s prediction that Singapore’s population could rise to 6.9 million in the coming 15 years, with immigrants making up nearly half that figure. Rising property prices and living costs are the results of growing immigrants. Within Asia, the most important initiative in the area of skills mobility has been undertaken by the ASEAN i.e. to achieve a regional ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. The “free flow of skilled labour” is enshrined in the fifth of five pillar of the AEC. This is a bold step toward creating the institutions and mechanisms for governing mobility in the region (ADB Institute 2014). The Philippines and Thailand send almost all categories (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) of workers, and Singapore sends mostly skilled ones (Yong et al. 2014a, b). Engineers from both Singapore and the Philippines prefer to move to North America and Europe. Academics from Singapore moved to the Pacific and North America. This study suggests that skill migration has adverse impact in myriad of ways on services provision in the origin country. Keeping
this fact into account, many countries have now formulated policies for encouraging return migration. Long-term stay out of the country leads to losing roots and often de-skilling. A certain percentage of migrants leave their family back home for the sake of the continuity of their educations. The bottom line is we must not be complacent with that. The ‘Brain Drain’, as the flow of skilled professionals out of developing countries has become known, thus marks a potentially serious barrier to economic growth, development and poverty reduction. The continuous movement of skilled labourers seriously causes the depletion of human resources in the countries of origins. The sad truth about migration is that, it may be seen as a strategy to ease unemployment in the countries of origin as well as to open up better employment chances for the people, yet it should not be done in a way that it leaves the home countries brain-empty.

Migration stakeholders have devised ideas about how the public and private sectors and civil society can build partnerships around migration policies that eliminate discrimination against migrants and protect their rights. For instance, lowering the human, social and economic costs of migration and expanding the opportunities for migrants to productively invest their earnings and share their knowledge are the basics entitlement needed by migrants.

Migration and its effects on development depend on the social structure of the society as well as on cultural values, tradition, and the amount and sustainability of the remittances they receive (Ahlin and Dahlberg 2010). We would always be inclined to demonstrate positive image of migration but this is a ripe time to ponder over the potential negative impact it may have on countries and the people in the long run. Only remittances (in whatever forms—cash or kind—political, social, psychological, biological) are the end product of migration, hence remittances always come to the fore as we conduct research on migration. Central Bank of Bangladesh boasts the foreign currency reserve, which is contributed by remittances. Devaluation of foreign currency against Bangladeshi local currency has been continuing since long. As a result, money-laundering issues remained a trivial one. The illicit outflows of funds from Bangladesh equal up to 38.5% of the combined official development assistance and foreign investment the country received between 2008 and 2012 (Daily Star 2015).

From time immemorial, migration has been a feature of human existence. Wide range of factors worked behind human mobility: seeking freedom from war and conflict, escaping hunger and poverty, finding economic opportunities and employment, fleeing from religious intolerance or political repression, or even to trade and to travel to other places (Cohen 1997). Today, however, the political, social, and economic crisis challenges the world to think about the multifarious relations between migration, inequalities, identities, and politics. Migration phenomenon is viewed differently from different disciplinary areas. To demographers, migration is nothing but redistribution of population from a place where the respective government is not in a position to manage. Economists view migration as a response to demand and supply. They tried to put a dollar figure on how much the world economy would grow if we just remove all immigration restrictions overnight. Whatever way migration is defined or viewed, it has become a global phenomenon.
Migration has important impacts on our societies, and these can be controversial. This is real. Hence, better governance needs to be devised. The economic impact of migration is no exception. Benefit or burden—what is the reality? Experts of the World Bank believe that the economic effects of free movement of people across borders can amount to 39 trillion dollars within the next 25 years (Sputniknews 2011). But, the inherent risks of migration should not be overlooked.

The new migration crisis that began in 2010 (since beginning of the Arab turmoil) in Europe and the Middle East is seen as an outcome of global power politics. Europe, in large part, is carrying the burden of the crisis. Some activists tend to argue that Europe should accept those fleeing war in the Middle East. Europeans populated the world during 18th century and currently the world is populating Europe. In the last three decades, two major shifts in migration scope have taken place. First, the scalar focus has changed from nation-state policies to supranational migration agreements and transnational migrant experiences and then the theoretical focus has moved from geopolitics to biopolitics (Kuusisto-Arponen and Gilman 2015). However, The Guardian (2019) reports that the stretch of sea between Libya and Italy is one of the most popular routes for migrants and refugees to enter Europe. Roldán took 20 days leave from his work as a freighter and helped desperate migrants trying to enter Europe. Roldan says, “I saw a lot of pain, suffering and death. It was horrific. We tried to do everything legally and came up against a lot of bureaucracy, and that actually cost a lot of migrants their lives. At times they were left to drown because we hadn’t been given permission by the Italian government to rescue them.” Despite trying to navigate Italy’s legal territory, Roldán and his six other crewmembers are now facing up to 20 years’ imprisonment after being accused by authorities of aiding illegal immigration (The Guardian 2019). On another event one ship’s captain facing jail after defying Italian law to bring 42 migrants into port. The captain said she would do it all over again and hit out at Italy’s far-right deputy prime minister. People’s lives matter more than any political game (The Guardian 2019).

In a globalized world, migration is a fact of life that should be governed accordingly. To that end, establishing what we call “Migration Order 3.0,” a new framework that would make migration work for everyone is crucial. Until World War II, transnational human mobility was subject to Migration Order 1.0: immigration controls were established solely at the national level by governments. After the war, international institutions such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), under a different title, were created to manage refugee and migrant flows, primarily from and within Europe. During this era of Migration Order 2.0, the movement of people across national borders was governed by mutually agreed norms, standards, and practices.

Large-scale cross-border movements of people, however, have exposed fault lines in that post-war framework. We now know that Migration Order 2.0 is too inadequate for the task at hand. According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, most migrants tend to move within their own continents, and not necessarily toward the destinations that one would assume.

Moreover, interconnected global forces are ushering in a new phase of migration, defined by different dynamics than in the past. A global shift in the balance of power
has created new geopolitical tensions, and governance failures have led to armed conflicts and civil wars, violent extremist movements, and the rise of ultra-nationalism and populism in many countries. The world is experiencing a violent backlash against globalization, rising inequality, and sudden labor-market disruptions.

Social inequities, humanitarian crises, demographic changes, and identity politics all pose a challenge to a development paradigm that was supposed to leave no one behind. At the same time, climate change and biodiversity loss are threatening to displace entire populations from vulnerable locations around the world.

In the past, the movement of people tended to follow four broad patterns: migration for work, education, and family; irregular migration, mostly due to human trafficking; cross-border displacements triggered by conflicts and natural disasters; and refugees fleeing persecution. But these four categories have increasingly begun to overlap, which places strains on a system that was designed to manage each type separately.

Today’s mixed migratory patterns demand a more cohesive yet differentiated approach. The costs of maintaining the status quo in response to disorderly migration cannot be ignored. Growing anxieties among host populations are causing an unwarranted backlash, with far-reaching negative implications for economic and political systems. There is also a moral dimension to consider: migrants in all categories are increasingly vulnerable to abuse, owing to lack of access to resources and power.

Fortunately, there are realistic options for improving migration governance. With objective information about migration and its consequences, we can dispel popular misperceptions and reduce social tensions. We can also design and implement policies that will secure the many benefits of migration. Investment in empowering migrants is a win-win proposition for everyone. The vicious cycle of migration, economic hardship, and social backlash can be turned into a virtuous cycle of integration and economic growth.

Of course, all of this is easier said than done. National sovereignty and universal human rights can be difficult to reconcile. Governments struggle to strike a balance between realizing the economic gains of migration, protecting native-born citizens’ interests, and ensuring national security. And it doesn’t help that the capacity and resources for governing migration effectively are often in short supply.

Nonetheless, the international community is making progress toward overcoming these challenges. The UN Sustainable Development Agenda includes a specific target (Goal 10.7) for optimizing migration governance. And the new Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) provides a non-binding framework to guide countries and other stakeholders toward a more comprehensive approach (Haque 2019).

The GCM’s implementation is being overseen by the IOM. Astute observers will note that the GCM’s provisions are perfectly aligned with the principles and objectives that governments have already embraced under the Sustainable Development Agenda and the IOM’s Migration Governance Framework (Haque 2019). It does not offer a silver bullet; but it will serve as the blueprint for building a workable Migration Order 3.0.
The final text of the GCM was agreed only in 2018. As always, mustering a constructive multilateral effort will take political will. But the GCM promises to make migration work for everyone. The only question is how long it will take governments and other stakeholders to recognize it as a powerful tool for addressing the geopolitical dimensions of migration and unite around realizing its potential.

Migration creates losers as well as winners. We end here by quoting Goldin, Geoffrey and Meera (2012: 24) “when a Bangladeshi man goes to work on a construction site in the Middle East, his wife typically moves in with her husband’s family. Not all wives enjoy this. They sweat in a strange kitchen, take care of a bossy mother-in-law and see their husbands only for a few weeks each year. And although their husbands send money, they often send it to their parents, not their wives.” Of course, many wives may not see their husbands at all in their lifetime again. In Bangladesh alone, eight dead bodies of migrants arrive per day.

The claims that migrants steal jobs and erode country’s social fabric in the process; and in spite of minor short-term dislocations, international migration is a boon generating innovation and dynamism while fuelling long-term economic growth (Goldin 2013). Goldin goes on to argue further that where protectionist instincts tend to overwhelm the longer-term need for more open societies, the core role that migrants play in economic development is often overwhelmed by defensive measures to keep migrants out.

Throughout history, migration has always been one of the most important drivers of human progress. Evidences suggest that both in the developed and developing world migration have contributed tremendously to the economic development (Goldin 2013). However, most studies demonstrated a one-sided positive picture. As a result, its negativity remained largely abstruse.

We conclude by touching upon the concept of migration hump (coined by Martin and Taylor in 1996), which refers to the short term influx in migration driven by trade and economic policies as compared to the expected migration trend without such initiatives. Since 1991, there has a growing recognition of the fact that the poorest countries are not the sending nations because migration needs resources to be financed, thus, initially developmental policies such as free trade and foreign direct investment enable people to migrate (Arshi 2014). Hein de Haas (2010) highlights the fact that migration hump has come to be widely accepted in the migration research circles, however some other scholars argued that there is no empirical evidence for this claim.

European development and a mass outflow of people during the industrialisation phase between 1850 and 1925 have a correlation. Newly industrialized countries (in Europe, Asia and Latin America) have witnessed outflow and inflow of migrants during alternative phases of economic reforms. South Korea witnessed a rapid pace of development and still in 1980s it saw a 25% increase in migration as compared to 1970s (Martin and Taylor 1996: 46; de Haas 2007: 835; Massey et al. 1993: 431). This is justified by the fact that higher per capita income enables people to avail better education and training, hence they are better prepared to migrate.

It seems it is established that socio-economic development promotes migration rather than reducing it (Lanati and Thiele 2017). However, this should not be the
basis for judging all categories of migrants. We think Naude’s (2010) point is right that certain categories move at a certain economic condition and hence migration rates fall after a specific level of socio-economic development has been reached (Naude 2019). Lanati and Theile (2017) pointed out that development aid should not be stopped assuming that helping the underdeveloped develop will grow migration. However, we found that the bottom poor are also migrating. They obtain money from various sources to finance their migration. Please migrate to better their future. So, if they are already better (in terms of income) why should they move? However, according to the conventional wisdom, the factor that drives most of the migrants is not development rather it is underdevelopment. Migration is supposed to contribute to development. Development, in turn, is supposed to influence reverse migration.
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