Chapter 10

Filipinos as Malay: Historicizing an Identity

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“Googling” the key words “Filipinos as Malay” produces thousands of at least minimally relevant results. Among other possibilities, it suggests the idea’s widespread currency. In a site called Yahoo! Answers, for instance, someone posted a question, “Filipinos, do you know that you look like Malays?”¹ It elicited a lengthy thread of comments. A quick reply from someone codenamed Mercie, had this to say: “They are of Malay origins, that’s why … And yes[,] Filipinos have always known that …”² The casualness of this response, coming as it did from a Filipino, might prove striking if not utterly confusing to those who grew up in, or are familiar with the situations in Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore where Islam and Malay language are the recognized markers of being Malay.

Other participants in the group had different views. “Just some Filipinos look like Malays,”³ one identified as Monicha opined. This comment set off a series of remarks that sought to clarify the allegedly “mixed” character of Filipinos. A rather sharp turn ensued when someone, identified as natrinur, interjected and claimed: “No. Malays look like Filipinos. Our origin, the austronesians [sic], came first before the Malays.” This reversing of the logic of the relationship put the Filipinos in a more favorable position. Confidently, she added that “the ita-indones-malay concept [sic] as the origin of Filipinos is obsolete and wrong.”⁴ While this line of thought is not uncommon in other e-forums and blogs,⁵ other participants politely ignored it and reiterated the purported Malay origin of Filipinos.

Exchanges such as these in popular media reflect the dimension of the discourses on Malayness in/on the Philippines that scholarship on Malay
identity has largely eluded. In the book edited by Timothy Barnard, *Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries* (2004), for instance, the case of the Philippines is visibly absent notwithstanding the volume’s aspiration to explore Malayness “across boundaries.” A glance at the index reveals that there is no entry for “Filipino,” and that while the term “Philippines” is mentioned in 11 pages, only in two or three of them can one find a hint on the affinity of the Philippines to the Malay world. As if to underscore the point, the accompanying map labeled “The Malay World” excludes the Philippines beyond the Sulu Sea, Mindanao and southern tip of Palawan.

More recently, in the book, *Leaves of the Same Tree* (2008), Leonard Andaya locates the Philippines outside the area he calls the “Sea of Malayu,” despite noting that the tenth century AD Laguna copper plate found in Laguna/Bulacan in the northern Philippines constitutes what he claims as the “most distant evidence of Sriwijayan influence thus far found.” In his view, the “Sea of Malayu” covers the network of economic and cultural interaction spanning from “southern India and Sri Lanka to the Bay of Bengal, Sumatra, the Straits of Melaka, the Malay Peninsula, the Gulf of Siam, the South China Sea, the Lower Mekong, and central Vietnam.” Not even Sulu Sea and the southern tip of Palawan, as the case of the edited book by Barnard cited earlier, figures in Andaya’s map of the Sea of Malayu.

The exclusion of the Philippines appears even more deliberate in Anthony Milner’s *The Malays* where the author confronts yet cursorily dismisses the justifications other scholars have offered for a more geographically expansive notion of Malayness. He disapproves implicitly, for instance, of the alleged tendency to equate the “Malay world” to the much wider areas covered by Austronesian languages by noting that, citing Bellwood, Malay is just one among a thousand of languages under this linguistic family tree. More tellingly, he declares that the claim of Malayness in the Philippines is problematic because “people sometimes change their minds.” He claims that the idea had had currency in the Philippines in the 1960s coinciding with the birth of Maphilindo, but with the establishment of the ASEAN, which he notes to have no explicit “Malay” basis, the idea has run its course. Apparently for Milner, being associated with a patently political project makes the idea of Filipino Malayness rather contrived and superficial. He opts to limit the scope of the “Malay World” using what he upholds to be the “consensus” definition among contemporary scholars, that which was coined by Geoffrey Benjamin: “Isthmian Thailand, Peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, Central Eastern coast parts of Sumatra, and much of coastal northern, western and southern Borneo, Brunei, parts of Malaysian Sarawak, and parts of Indonesian Kalimantan.”
It is in Anthony Reid’s recent book on nationalism, *Imperial Alchemy* (2010), that we can find more than a token treatment, at over two pages, of Filipino Malayness by a well-known scholar. It is notable that Reid devotes this much space, but in the end just like scholars mentioned above, he brushes it off as no more than skin deep, even accidental. Ignoring its possibly deeper roots as well as the complexity of Propagandists’ scholarship, the book reduces Filipino Malayness to no more than a product of Blumentritt’s convincing of Rizal that he was a “Tagalog Malay.” The book also claims that with the idea “[s]anctified by Rizal, and spelled out further by Apolinario Mabini,” it seeps through the succeeding generations.\(^\text{17}\) In other words, without Blumentritt and Rizal, the idea would not have been developed, a suggestion that, as will be shown below, is highly questionable.

Seen against this backdrop, Joel Kahn’s book, *Other Malays* (2006), is remarkable. While it does not explicitly discuss Malayness in the Philippines, it is significant for including the Philippines (the southern part in particular) in his category “other Malays” and for providing a framework based on the notion of “cosmopolitan Malay-ness”\(^\text{18}\) that sets the enabling environment for accommodating Filipino and other forms of Malaynesses within the broader project of Malayness studies. He even goes so far as to argue that the analysis of “other Malays,” including those in the Philippines, is necessary to enable the recuperation of the long suppressed alternative narratives of Malayness, which probably can serve as key to addressing the race issues in Malaysia.\(^\text{19}\)

Given the early development of the discourses on Filipino Malayness, the elision of the case of the Philippines in academic discussions on Malayness is rather curious, even anomalous. Early Spanish chroniclers, for instance, such as Antonio de Morga, Colin, Pedro Chirino, Gaspar de San Agustin and Joaquin M. de Zuniga, among many others, had long noted the “racial” affinity of the indios to their neighbors in the South and had called them *Malayos*.\(^\text{20}\) Rizal and other propagandists had regarded themselves as Malay at least as early as the 1880s.\(^\text{21}\) In 1897, Blumentritt, an Austrian scholar, wrote that “[n]ot only is Rizal the most prominent man of his own people but the greatest man the *Malayan race* has produced” (emphasis added). It was a declaration that, a hundred years later, would be explicitly concurred with by Malaysians such as Anwar Ibrahim who initiated an international conference held in Kuala Lumpur in 1995. In this conference, participants recognized Rizal as a *pahlawan Melayu*.\(^\text{22}\) Interestingly, in the opening address Anwar Ibrahim delivered in the said conference, he called Rizal not just the first Filipino but also the “first Malayan.”\(^\text{23}\) Moreover, since the early 1900s, Filipinos read in their history textbooks that they descended from a series of “waves of migrants” the latest being Malays who were regarded as bringers of advanced civilization.
Despite being doubted by a few earlier on and being actively disputed since the 1960s, this claim persists in at least some history textbooks to this day. It is no wonder that being Malay is an almost taken-for-granted identity marker among many Filipinos as clearly manifest, say, in e-forum entries cited earlier. It may be the case, thus, that as a collectivity, the Filipinos had come to regard themselves as Malay even before the Malays in the Peninsular Malaysia and Borneo had crystallized Malayness in their national imagination. As Ismail Hussein, a Malaysian scholar, had noted, the Philippines constituted a nation that first became aware of their Malayness — a nation in rantau that experienced colonization earlier on.

I agree with Milner when he suggests that “[a]ny analysis of the spread of ‘Melayu’ must take account of the agency of the ‘Malay’ people” and this requires “de-linking Malay civilisation from the Melaka/Johore monarchy.” Unfortunately, the expanded scope of investigation that he and others propose remains limited geographically to the “Malay World proper” that is centered on Melaka-Johore-Riau and Jambi-Palembang areas. By excluding the Philippines, among other possible areas, the mainstream scholarship, with the notable exception of Kahn (2006), has in effect restricted rather prematurely and by conceptual fiat the range of contexts and possibilities by which Malayness has taken shape, conceived, and may be analyzed. Consequently, as I will argue, it has inadvertently reinforced or privileged, rather than undermined, the hegemonic conception of Malayness that has long been complicit in a politically dubious and racialist project in Malaysia.

There may be a number of reasons for the absence of the Philippine case in the academic discussion on Malayness. First, being Christian and “too Westernized,” the Philippines does not fit into the widely held definition of what or who are Malays, notwithstanding the extent of fluidity we have so far allowed the concept to move about in. With this notion hanging over us, doubts meet any claim to Filipino Malayness by, or on behalf of, Filipinos. It is easily dismissed as a product of misconception or false consciousness. Second, the scholars who are actively engaged in the discourse are specialists of either Malaysia or Indonesia, and this has restricted the parameters of the debates on the notions and manifestations of Malayness that are observable in these countries. Consequently, Malayness of different forms and under different contexts finds it hard to register as Malayness. This suggests once again the need to combat parochialism that has long been entrenched in area studies. Third, the debates on Malayness as they stand are already complex and multidimensional, and taking on board the case of the Philippines which operates on altogether a different platform will make analysis even messier. Alternatively, and this is the fourth possibility, there seems to be a latent fear
that inclusion of Malayness in the Philippines (as well as that in other areas) will stretch the notion of Malayness too far or too thin that it loses its conceptual distinctiveness and efficacy. Finally, the Filipino scholars or foreign scholars of the Philippines who could have participated in the discussion might have been too preoccupied, just like the Indonesianists and Malaysianists, with their own country specialization to care or notice, or they found the question either a non-issue or an issue that has already seen its day.

In this chapter, I wish to explore two main questions: (1) in what ways, since when, under what contexts and why did the Filipinos conceive Malayness as a constituting element of Filipino national identity; and (2) what difference does the recognition of Filipino Malayness make on the analytics of Malayness? Answering these, this chapter seeks to highlight Filipino contributions to construction of Malayness. It also aims to help shift the boundaries of academic discourse on Malayness toward a more inclusive perspective.

**Early Beginnings**

Spanish and other European chroniclers had earlier on regarded the natives and the things they did as “Malay,” “Malayo” or “Malayan.” Writing in 1521, the Italian chronicler who joined Magellan’s voyage, Antonio Pigafetta, described for instance the ceremony establishing friendship between Ferdinand Magellan and the king of Limasau as “Malay rite.” Incidentally, Pigafetta also provided a list of 426 “Malay” words corresponding to items that they encountered in their voyages to Philippines and later Maluku. This list, Adrian Vickers notes, constitutes the first European evidence of the spread of Malay language as a lingua franca in the region.

Plasencia, writing in 1589, referred to “Tagalo” as being classed among the “Malay nations.” Morga, who was writing in the 1590s and early 1600s, described the inhabitants of Manila and surrounding communities as “Malayan.” Ignacio Alcina, writing in 1668, claimed that “… there is no doubt that these Bisayans are the descendants of the Malayans because their language points to it …” All these of course reflect the European knowledge pertaining to racial and linguistic classifications. There are indications, however, that within the region itself, in particular among the riverine and coastal communities, there were elements or activities — cultural, linguistic and commercial — that were shared or engaged with by people who may be categorized, owing to some similarities, under labels such as “Malay,” “Malayo” or “Malayan.”

Before the inroads of European colonization, extant evidences indicate that the archipelago later to be called the Philippines had long been within
the trading network involving Chinese and Malay-speaking people, among others. As there is a sizable corpus of published work on this, there is no need for an extended discussion here. What is of great significance to note here, though, is the finding in 1989 of the Laguna Copper-Plate Inscription (LCI) that effectively pushed back the time of this interaction to as early as 900 AD. Written in a mix of Old Malay, Old Javanese and Old Tagalog, this inscription appears to be a legal document that absolves a particular individual and his descendants of the financial obligation to another. With striking resemblance to copper inscriptions found in Java and Sumatra, experts had initially thought that it was brought in from the outside. Upon closer examination, however, scholars now believe it was likely to have been locally produced, raising of course many important questions and implications that call for a re-evaluation of the Philippine pre-hispanic history and its place within the broader context of the region. Insofar as those who seek to establish the claims for the Philippines’ “Malayan connection,” such as Zeus Salazar, the LCI could only be heaven-sent. Even Andaya, who as earlier mentioned hesitated to include the Philippines in the discussion on the Malay World, has noted that the LCI constitutes an evidence of the farthest reach of Srivijaya’s sphere of influence.

According to Salazar, with the deepening and widening impact of Hispanization, the people of the Philippine archipelago with the exception of those in Muslim Mindanao, Palawan and a few other areas began in the 1660s to be “cut off” from the Malay World. The trend would not be reversed, he further claims, until the 1880s when propagandists such as Jose Rizal, Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, and Isabelo de los Reyes deliberately appropriated what was then a fairly common claim of Malayan ancestry for what amounted to as politico-scholarly project of counter-hegemonic identity-formation. Nonetheless, Spanish scholars such as de Zuniga observed in the early 1800s that “Malay” persisted to be used among coastal communities that engaged with traders from the other parts of the Malay World.

Displaying erudition, even competing or arguing among themselves, the propagandists such as Rizal, Paterno, de los Reyes and Tavera marshaled ideas and information from the works of well-known European scholars to formulate a viable counter-history, one that could neutralize the damaging views propounded by Spanish scholars. These scholars included Rudolf Virchow, A.B. Meyer, Hendrik Kern, Max Muller, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, James Pritchard, Joseph Montano, and Charles Darwin, among others. One area of intellectual battle was the “civilizational” origins of the Filipinos. As far as many Spaniards were concerned, there was no civilization in the Philippines before they came. In combating such a damaging view, the Filipinos’ purported affinity to the Malay “race” (raza) played an important part.
In the book, *Antigua Civilizacion Tagalog (Tagalog Ancient Civilization)* (1887), Pedro Paterno provided an evolutionary framework that located what he called “Tagalog Civilization” among the world’s greatest civilizations. Maligned by fellow scholars of his and our time for his fantastic, illusory and overblown claims, Paterno’s effort was nonetheless a notable early attempt to write the Philippines in world history. He emplotted the beginning of Tagalog civilization with the arrival of the Malays followed by other foreigners such as Chinese, Arabs and Spaniards.

Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera was a medical doctor but he also claimed the distinction for probably being the first “Filipino” to have formal training in Malay language. While in France, he studied Malay under the pioneering scholar Pierre Favre at the *Ecole Nasionale des Lengueas Orientales Vivantes*. He also studied Sanskrit and produced some works lauded by experts in the field such as Friedrich Muller.

Another noteworthy Propagandist was Isabelo de los Reyes. Unlike Paterno, Rizal and de Tavera, he did not study abroad. A homegrown scholar, he studied at the University of Santo Tomas, which was founded in 1611. Despite lack of exposure overseas, he exhibited an impressive level of familiarity with a vast range of European literature in anthropology, history, linguistics, religion, among other fields. Keenly insightful, he anticipated the view expressed much later by Filipino scholars such as Jocano (1965, 1975) as to the dubiousness of the category “indonesianos,” a popular ethnographic entity then. He also wondered about the possibility that rather than Filipinos originating from the Malays from Sumatra — another commonly accepted supposition — perhaps the reverse was more likely. To note, this view predated part of what is now probably the “standard” view about the peopling of the Austronesian world — Bellwood’s “out-of-Taiwan” dispersion that placed the Philippines as an intermediate staging point of southward and eastward movement of Austronesian-speaking people. However, de los Reyes upheld the view held by other scholars then about the diffusion of the Malay people from their “Sumatran ‘homeland.’” In his intimation, notwithstanding the differences among languages in the Philippines, they shared a common Malay base. That is to say that Malays who came to the Philippines initially spoke one language, but later on, this language was fragmented into different “dialects” as “indigenes are natural corruptors of languages and inventors of thousands upon thousands of new terms.” Echoing the view widely held during his time, de los Reyes asserted that “the Malay origin of Filipinos, excepting the Aetas, is INDUBITABLE (emphasis original).”

In one of Rizal’s most famous essays, he described the natives of the country as “Malayan Filipinos,” who like other “Malays,” were a sensitive yet
resilient people. “The Philippine races, like all the Malays,” he claimed, “do not succumb before the foreigner, like the (aboriginal) Australians, the Polynesians and the Indians of the New World.” That is, despite the new diseases that the European colonizers had brought, and the oppression and brutalization they inflicted on local people, the “Malayan Filipinos” like other “Malays” had not been exterminated. They rather continued to increase in number and emerged from the experience tougher than before.

While very much cognizant of the Filipino affinity to the Malay “race,” Rizal expressed a critical attitude toward the nature of such affinity. He tried to buy or collect as many books as he could about the subject with the intent of settling some vexing issues. Several months before his execution in December 1896, he told Blumentritt that he wished to strengthen his knowledge of Malay to find out whether Tagalog indeed had its origin in Malay. He started studying language in earnest in 1895 but his fascination with the “Malayan culture” in general dated back years earlier. After reading Marsden’s *History of Sumatra*, he claimed to have “found many similarities between the customs of the Sumatrans and the Filipinos.” He was quick to point out, however, that “I cannot draw the conclusion that the Filipinos had come from Sumatra.” He elaborated, thus:

> The similarity between two individuals does not necessarily mean that one is the father of the other. Both can be the children of a deceased person, and for this reason I believe it is difficult to decide whether we originated here or there before having studied thoroughly our respective histories, languages, and religion …

More interestingly, Rizal seemed to have anticipated the ongoing debates on Malayness when he opined that “the Malayans should not be considered either the original or typical race. [They] have been exposed to many foreign and powerful factors that have influenced their customs as well as their nature.”

The “racial” or “ethnic” identification with the Malays professed by these propagandists was part of their effort to rediscover the pre-hispanic past from which they believed they could draw weapons for their polemics against Spanish critics. These critics tended in the late 19th century to be particularly virulent in denigrating the Filipinos, insisting the supposed absence of civilization in the Philippines before the Spaniards came. The fields of contestation focused not just on the demands for political reforms in civil and ecclesiastical domains, but also on social transformation and cultural advancement. It was in the domain of the “cultural war” that the propagandist found a handy ally in the longstanding belief among the Spaniards about the cultural affinity of Filipinos with the Malays.
It appears however that Rizal and other propagandists might have thought of the affinity to the Malays beyond the cultural sphere. Austin Coates, one of Rizal's biographers, has noted that within the Filipino organization which Rizal founded in 1889, the *Indios Bravos* [Brave Natives], there was a secret inner circle that “pledged to the liberation of the Malay people from colonial rule … first in the Philippines, later … in Borneo, Indonesia and Malaya.” Unfortunately, perhaps owing to the secrecy surrounding the inner circle, further details about it are lacking. If this were true, the implications are far-reaching not only on the Philippines’ “Malayan connection” but also on the extent of revolutionary ideas among the Propagandists by 1889, often thought to be “merely” reformists during that time.

This revolutionary idea also found expression in the thoughts of Apolinario Mabini, the “Brain of the Revolution.” One of the few revolutionary leaders who refused to cooperate, let alone pledge allegiance to the Americans, Mabini conceived of cooperation, if not union, with other Malay peoples in the future as a bulwark against colonialism. When asked in the early 1900s by Americans if the Philippines was indeed ready to govern itself, he proudly said that not only was it ready for self-governance but that the “Malay peoples” were ready to form a confederation of Asian states.

**Popularizing the Idea**

The longstanding currency of the idea that Filipinos are Malay in origin owed much to the textbook knowledge propagated since the early years of American colonization in the 1900s. In 1905, David Barrows published a reference textbook, *History of the Philippines*, which seemed to have set the pattern followed in the course of the century by succeeding textbook writers such as Leandro Fernandez, Conrado Benitez, Gregorio Zaide, Teodoro Agoncillo, among others. Echoing and synthesizing the views of early scholars such as Montano, Blumentritt, Virchow, Blumenbach and Meyer, Barrows claimed that the contemporary Filipinos descended from the earlier migrant settlers, the Negritos, and the two groups of Malays he classified as “Wild Malayan tribes” and “Civilized Malayan people.” The title of Saleeby’s paper, *Origin of Malayan Filipinos*, published in 1912 reflected to an extent the currency of the idea.

The American anthropologist H. Otley Beyer, however, was the one who probably contributed the most in cementing in the popular and scholarly imagination the notion that Filipinos descended from the Malays. Considered the “father” or “dean” of Philippine archaeology, Beyer was credited for having “made it known to the whole world that Filipinos had a culture of our own
centuries before the Caucasian from Europe and the West ventured into our shores.”

The peopling of the Philippines and the accompanying progressive cultural evolution, in his view, were accomplished through a series of wave migrations by the following: (1) Java-men like human type; (2) Australoid-Sakai type; (3) Indonesian “A”; (4) Indonesian “B”; (5) advanced group from Central Asia; and, (6) the “civilized” Malays. This formulation was originally no more than a preliminary hypothesis about the peopling of the Philippines. In due time, however, it assumed the status of almost “biblical truth” to the point that school textbooks published as late as 2000 still carry its variant despite trenchant critiques since the 1960s.

Perhaps one reason for the popularity and resilience of this “theory” lies in its efficacy in satisfying a need among the Filipinos for an identity apart from the legacies of the West. Having been colonized the earliest and the longest, not just by one but two colonizers, and having no ancient cities or monuments such as Angkor, Pagan, Majapahit, Sri Vijaya, or Borobudur, to which they could look back with pride, membership or affinity to an entity called the Malays whom they regarded as “civilized” helps fill in a vacuum in their identity formation.

Contrary to the common perception of Malays as backward and lazy, Philippine history textbooks generally portray Malays in favorable, even glowing terms. Textbooks describe them, for instance, as “the first navigators, discoverers, colonizers and conquerors of the Pacific world,” in addition to being civilized and technologically advanced. The supposedly good traits among Filipinos such as bravery is claimed to have been “inherited from their Malay ancestors.” In cases where negative traits of the Malays are mentioned, sharp distinction is made, as what Barrows had done, between the “Wild Malayan Tribes” who supposedly came to the Philippines earlier, and the “Civilized Malayan People” who allegedly came later and became the ancestors of the present-day Filipinos.

On similar vein, we may understand the title that Nasser Marohomsalic, a Bangsamoro scholar, decided to give his book, Aristocrats of the Malay Race. This volume is the author’s rendition of the history of the Bangsa Moro struggle wherein the first chapter of the book is called “Malay Aristocrat,” alluding to the supposed venerable ancestry of the Moros of Mindanao. He claims, for instance, that “[t]he Moro, by physical character and culture, belongs in general to the Malay race and Malay culture …”

Even more notable is Ahmed Ibn Parfhahn’s Malayan Grandeur and Our Intellectual Revolution (1957 and 1967). Described by Salazar as “improbable” for its fantastic, mind-blowing claims, it is nevertheless significant for exemplifying not only an extreme form of Pan-Malayanism but also the kind
of counter-consciousness that Eurocentric universal history can generate. Published in two installments in 1957 and 1967, an excessive form of “Malays-are-great” trope pervades the narrative in the book. Not only did the Malays precede the “White Man on the road to culture,” they also built the ancient civilizations in Egypt, Sumer, Mesopotamia, Indus and Yangtze valleys. They also encompassed all the people on the equatorial belt from the Middle East, India, Central America through the Mediterranean basin. In Parfahn’s formulation, practically every important historical figure — Alexander the Great, Buddha, Jesus, Constantine, the Pharaohs, among many others — and civilizations (Etruscans, Aztecs, Incas, Druids, Minoans, Egyptians) were Malay in origin. As for the Philippines, he regarded it as “center of a great seafaring activity between Africa on the Indian Ocean … and Peru on the west coast of America …” It is no wonder that Salazar has observed that the “off tangents remarks … tend to cast some doubt on [Parfahn’s] absolute possession of normal mental powers.”

Politicians’ Malayness

The understanding among ordinary Filipinos that they are of Malay origin runs parallel with high-profile pronouncements and political projects Filipino politicians and intellectuals have undertaken in the course of over a hundred years. It is probably because these projects loom large in the consciousness of scholars of Malayness that drive the latter to dismiss the claim of Filipino Malayness.

Long before Macapagal’s Maphilindo, in 1931–1932 a well-known and brilliant student leader at the University of the Philippines (UP), Wenceslao Vinzons, spearheaded the establishment of *Perhempoenan Orang Malayoe*, an organization whose membership was drawn from interested Filipinos and foreign students in Manila who came from southern Siam, the Malay Peninsula, Netherland East Indies and Polynesia. Available accounts indicate that Malay served as ceremonial language and this was held secret. In addition, the organization’s avowed objectives included the study of history and culture of Malay civilizations and the promotion of solidarity among “brown people.” While the idea was predated, as indicated earlier, by the inner circle in the *Indios Bravos*, this organization exemplified a concrete and early effort by Filipinos to build solidarity with fellow Malays for explicit political ends. In a famous oratorical piece Vinzons delivered in February 1932 at the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law, he argued that a political outlook that was confined to national boundaries circumscribed the struggle against colonial yoke. He warned that so long as the various islands stretching from
Madagascar to Easter Islands (the geographic scope of his Malaysia) were not unified, they would always be at the mercy of powerful predators, not just from the West but also from Japan. He recalled the glorious past of what he called “Malaya Vikings” who were “not only rulers of the sea and of emerald isles” but also “renowned for political genius.” He called for a “renewed racial vitality” which “may give birth to a new nationalism, that of Malaysia redeemed.” In his vision, a “unified Malaysia … will be a powerful factor in the oceanic world …” and this “will vindicate us from the contumely of the alien people.” He ended the piece rather forcefully by chiding those who were incredulous: “… your answer to this Challenge will be your verdict on the capacity of your race for civilization, and your vision of a redeemed Malaysia will be the salvation of your posterity.”

Vinzons led a group that established the Young Philippines Movement aimed at helping the country to become “great.” The members of this movement included future political luminaries such as Arturo Tolentino, Carlos P. Romulo, Manuel Roxas, Jose Laurel, Jr., Maximo Kalaw, Rafael Palma and Diosdado Macapagal, among many others. They were fired up by intense nationalism — a form of nationalism that was remarkable for being imbued with strong elements of Pan-Malayanism. In 1938, it made one of its aims to “secure the political independence of member nations from foreign rule and the establishment of free Malayan Republics.”

Meeting martyrdom in 1942 in the hands of the Japanese, Vinzons did not see the more concrete steps taken toward his dream of “Malaysia Irredenta.” Earlier leaders were supportive, and even took some steps toward this direction, but it was Diosdado Macapagal, himself a member of the Young Philippines Movement and a close friend of Vinzons’, who did the most toward realizing the idea by initiating in 1962 the shortlived Maphilindo. In pursuing the idea of Maphilindo, it was not lost on Macapagal its long illustrious roots going back to Indios Bravos, Quezon, Vinzons, Recto, and Quirino.

Macapagal emphasized the pragmatic nature of the organization: as a step toward fostering unity among Asian countries in the face of Western dominance. It was not, he underscored, meant to form a unified supranational state out of the three countries involved. “… [I]ts central purpose is to capitalize upon the natural and unavoidable realities of geographies and politics in our part of the world.” The common Malay racial origin that the three countries supposedly share served only as a starting point of cooperation that was envisioned to expand in the future to include other countries. In his words:

For the nations of Asia to promote unity among themselves, they must first start among nations with a common denominator of common ties and common interests as the Malay peoples because the Malay peoples
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are bound together by ties of common racial origin, common tradition, common culture, and a common past that calls for a common future.\textsuperscript{92}

Salazar as Prime Mover

Among scholars in the “maphilindian civilization,”\textsuperscript{93} it is probably Zeus Salazar who has done the most in developing Pan-Malayan identity through scholarly efforts. His book, \textit{Malayan Connection: Ang Pilipinas sa Dunia Melayu} (1998), constitutes probably the most developed articulation thus far of a version of Pan-Malayanism as a consciously political-cultural-academic project. He hardly figures in the discussion on Malayness,\textsuperscript{94} but with impressive intellect and academic credentials,\textsuperscript{95} which includes fluency in several European and Austronesian languages, it seems unwise to just cursorily pay attention let alone dismiss his views on the question. The danger of doing so seems exemplified, as I will show later, by the case of Milner, who in his book, \textit{The Malays}, appears indifferent and has paid no more than perfunctory attention to Salazar and his book. I will provide in this section a fairly extensive treatment of Salazar and his ideas as this will serve not only as a handy synthesis of Pan-Malayanism as seen from a Filipino standpoint, but also a clear expression of a particular brand of Filipino Malayness.

The politically conscious character of Salazar’s scholarship on history and culture of the Philippines in particular and the Malay world in general, is implied in the introduction of his book, \textit{Malayan Connection: Ang Pilipinas sa Dunia Melayu}. This is a compilation of several articles about the subject he wrote over a span of more than 30 years. In deliberately combining in the title three languages — English, Filipino and Bahasa Melayu — not only does he wish to indicate that the book contains articles he has written or translated from/into various languages (including European languages), he simultaneously seeks to underscore the more-than-skin-deep affinity of the Filipino culture to the Malay World. In addition, he also seems to suggest the sense of confidence that members of the Malay World exude in their discursive exchange with the “outsider,” the West.\textsuperscript{96} Read against the background of contentious academic and cultural politics in the Philippines, this amounts to a polemic against scholars and other individuals, who in his view, remained stuck with a colonial mind frame. It also addresses those, who in his view, have mistaken his \textit{Pantayong Pananaw} as parochial or nativist.\textsuperscript{97} Furthermore, by insisting on writing in Filipino in at least some of the articles, he frames the discourse on Malayness on Filipino terms (of course as he defines it); it implies that Malayness cannot be fully understood without considering Filipino identity, in the same way that Filipino identity cannot be appraised without Malayness as a constituting element.
Salazar’s project entails tracing the roots of Filipino identity to the deepest pre-colonial past possible. He rejects the notion that Filipinos did not have long and deep history before the Spaniards came, and that development of Filipino culture depended on foreign influences (namely, Indians, Chinese, Arabs and Europeans). He shares with many Filipino intellectuals the fierce anti-colonial attitude, but unlike others who opt to combat colonialism and neo-colonialism using tools that are rooted in Western civilization or in colonial experience itself (Marxism, alternative or adaptive modernities, postcolonial theory, etc.), he seeks to recuperate what amounts to the “indigenous” as a viable alternative to the Western and the colonial. His efforts, in other words, is geared toward formulating a counter-civilizational alternative, something that is not dissimilar, so it seems to me, to what Chakrabarty calls “provincializing Europe.” In this undertaking, the notion of *Dunia Melayu* and the Philippines’ putative oneness with it plays a crucial role.

Contrary to what one might expect, the claim to Malayness in Salazar’s formulation does not conflict with his efforts at Filipino nation-building. What he wishes to accomplish is to re-mold the Filipino nation in a form that depends not on the vestiges of almost four centuries of Western colonization; this can be done by relocating the roots of the nation to the *Dunia Melayu*. He insists that this is the world in which Filipinos originally belonged, but with the deepening of Christianization and Hispanization since the mid-17th century, Filipinos have been estranged from it. In his view, the Filipino nation shares fundamental roots with other nations in the *Dunia Melayu*, even in the greater Austronesian world, and these roots go deep into a very distant past at the time of the “great dispersal” of the Austronesians.

In Salazar’s formulation, the emergence of the Filipino nation was an outcome of the “particularization” process, as a part of the bigger process of cultural differentiation that ran parallel in various parts of the globe. Such differentiation he sees as a logical outgrowth of human interaction with fellow humans and with the natural environment whose varied and changing features set the stage for the formation of cultural communities distinct from one another. In the grand scheme that he imagines, as manifest for instance in the framework he drew for *Tadhana*, the process started with the geological transformations that gave rise, among others things, to the future Philippine archipelago. *Homonisation* followed referring to the universal evolutionary process that saw the emergence of humans, including the “Philippine Adam.” The next phase of cultural differentiation saw the emergence of Austronesians as distinct from the other major groups such as Indo-Europeans, Hamito-Semites and Sino-Tibetan. As the process proceeded, the Malay World took shape divergent from fellow Austronesian kins such as Micronesians, Melanesians
and Polynesians (collectively what he called the “Oceanic World”). Finally, the “Philippine Forms” gradually took shape roughly from 200 AD to 1565 AD in the context of the Malay World, sharing many of its cultural characteristics but also attaining its own distinctive features. As he shows in various articles in Malayan Connection, religion, burial practices and languages are among the specific areas that Filipinos share with the rest of the Malay and Austronesian worlds.

He also provides in the same book a historical schema that helps explain the development of Dunia Melayu as a unified cultural unit and a historical area of analysis. In this schema, the coming of the Spaniards in the Philippines, not the capture by the Portuguese of Malacca, marked a new era in its history, marking the process of a divergent development among various components of Dunia Melayu. That is to say that the bond that hitherto tied them to a cultural unit began to disintegrate and the Philippines was set off to a trajectory astray from that of others. Nevertheless, such divergence was not complete, and never were the ties totally eradicated; the small traditions shared by the common people maintained or nurtured them. Total divergence was accomplished, he claims, only among elites to whom the impact of Westernization was most trenchant.

For Salazar, therefore, what the Propagandists, Mabini, Vinzons, Macapagal and others had done, amounted to plotting the trajectory of the return of the Filipinos to their “real” roots, the Malay world.

Jocano: “Filipinos are not Malay”

One scholar stood out for attacking the notion that Filipinos were Malay. In a landmark article, “Questions and Challenges in Philippine Prehistory,” which was a more developed version of a critique that he articulated at least a decade earlier, F. Landa Jocano staked a claim for the need to overhaul much of the accounts about Philippine prehistory, including the longstanding belief in Malay origin of Filipinos. His critique rested on three pillars: (1) inadequacy of empirical support; (2) problems in interpretation; and (3) questionable implications.

Jocano painstakingly showed that available evidence — archaeological, ethnological, genetic — cannot establish the Malay origin of the Filipinos. He argued:

One needs to remember that the term Malay is an ethnic term … Later, it was used loosely to denote a biological meaning such as race. It is unscientific therefore to relate ethnic labels to strictly paleo-biological evidence where blood typing and genetic examination are impossible …
[F]ossil evidence suggests that the peoples in the region — Indonesian, Malays, Filipinos — are the end result of both the long process of evolution and that later events of movements of people.  

Jocano also argued that “[c]ulturally … it is erroneous to state that Filipino culture is Malay in orientation … [as Filipino] historical experience and social organizations differ from those of the people identified as Malay.”  

Where similarities existed, he further claimed, they owed to the “adaptive response” or “ecological adaptation” to the same “island world.” Concerned about the unflattering implications of the wave migration theory, Jocano fiercely denied the subordinate position of the Filipino culture vis-à-vis that of Indonesia and Malaysia — categories that he underlined as mere creations of colonialism. He argued that the similarity of ecological environment in the region made it more sensible to talk about a common base culture from which the cultures of the Malay, Indonesian and the Filipinos all evolved.  

In his words, “[t]hey stand co-equal as ethnic groups, without any one being the dominant group, racially or culturally” (italics original). At the bottom line of Jocano’s critique of the “Filipinos-as-Malay” thesis was the concern about the implied subordinate position of Filipinos. Whereas others, such as Salazar, Vinzons, Macapagal and the Propagandists, saw the inclusion of the Philippines into Malay World as boon to the effort to create national identity, Jocano regarded it as a stumbling block. In his view, “[u]nless [the] myth of encompassing ‘Malay World’ is corrected … [Filipinos] would not be able to firmly establish … cultural roots and national identity as a people … or ever appreciate the long historical development of [their] cultural heritage.”  

Jocano’s critique, I underline, did not actually deny the affinity between modern-day Filipinos and Malays. This is clear in his notion of common base culture supposedly shared by peoples of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, which in his view resulted from their adaptive responses to a broadly similar tropical environment. With the popularity of the ideas associated with the dispersal of the Austronesian-speaking people who were believed to be the distant progenitors of the modern-day Filipinos and Malays, among others, Jocano’s ideas have found fertile grounds to thrive. 

Locating Filipino Malayness in the Analytics of Malayness

Notwithstanding Jocano’s valiant efforts, his views seem overwhelmed by the deep-seated and popular belief among Filipinos about their being Malay. I should note that what can be covered here are only ideas and projects emanating from Christian Filipinos. The forms of Malayness espoused by Muslims in Mindanao are not explored here. As exemplified by Ahmed Parfahn’s book,
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*Malayan Grandeur*, the sense of affinity with Malays that Muslims Filipinos feel appears much more developed in Mindanao and Sulu than elsewhere in the Philippines. It no doubt deserves a separate and thorough examination.

This chapter points to some of the modalities and the contexts within which different groups or individuals have consciously appropriated or rejected Malayness for particular purposes. Of course, there are those who seem to live with it as if it were already a part of day-to-day lives. As the life cycle unfolds, or as new experiences such as travel, migration or temporary work overseas ensue, both the notion and modes of appropriation of Malayness and the extent of their awareness or lack thereof, may also change. By seriously considering Filipino Malayness, one affirms and reinforces the situational and instrumental dimension of identity formation. This analytic trope is common in the analyses of Malayness as evident in the works of Anthony Milner, Shamsul A.B., Joel Kahn, Leonard Andaya, Adrian Vickers, and Anthony Reid, among others.

Anthony Milner in his book, *The Malays*, demonstrates the enormous diversity and fluidity of the notion of “Malayness” as conceived and practiced in different parts of the Malay World “proper.” In his words, it is an “idea in motion.” The case of the Philippines as spelled out in the previous section confirms and amplifies his observations. Given that I have not dealt with in this chapter the forms of Malayness in Mindanao and Sulu, we can only imagine how much more fluid and diverse the pictures would get if all other possibilities are mapped out, especially when we include the “other Malays” (in Joel Kahn’s terms) beyond the Philippines and the Malay world proper.

What is remarkable is that despite the recognition of such fluidity, analysts seem to be hamstrung by dominant definition of Malayness — as marked by Islam, *Bahasa Melayu* and “Malay” adat. Even the more accommodating definition of Malays in Singapore — that which puts premium on the acceptance by the Malay community as a whole — as well as in Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei remains largely within the ambit of such a hegemonic definition. The reason for this probably lies in the limited geographic domains on which scholars have focused their attention. By limiting the analytic platform within the Malay world proper, they easily take for granted the preponderance of the traditional markers of Malayness. With the naturalising effect of such preponderance, it has become difficult to imagine Malayness beyond the confines of these markers. This is precisely a condition that nurtures what otherwise is a particular notion of Malayness to become *the* Malayness, as enshrined for instance in *ketuanan Melayu*. A major analytic challenge thus is how to “provincialize,” borrowing Chakrabarty’s term, the notion of Malayness underscoring the fact that various forms have emerged in different social and
historical contexts, such as in the Philippines, under altogether different and
sometimes competing matrices of power relations. By juxtaposing Malayness
in Malaysia (and neighboring areas) to a sharply different variant, for example,
Filipino Malayness, alternative analytic imaginaries become possible. It could
help undo the support for, if not really destabilize, what has through the years
become the political and analytic hegemony of the conventional notion of
Malayness. Considering the case of the Philippines, in other words, reinforces
Joel Kahn’s efforts in the book, Other Malays, to recover the cosmopolitan
character of Malayness — a character whose development was suppressed by
the emergence of the hegemonic Malayness.

Some analysts are anxious over the possibility that too much emphasis
on diversity and fluidity results in trivializing Malayness. This poses the danger
of denying its analytic and political salience. The challenge rests in striking
a balance between the extremes of an essentialist, reified and reductionist
formulation on the one hand and a floating signification on the other, which
is what Milner seeks to do in The Malays. After devoting over 200 pages to
show the fluidity, contingency and diversity of the concept, he categorically
declares in the end that “Malay” as a category is by no means empty of essential
meaning. That is, while “[w]e cannot speak of a coherent, stable ‘Malay
essence,’” there nevertheless are “reference points for Malayness” which are
“elements (and motifs) in the heritage of ideas with which modern ‘Malays’ are
in dialogue.”

The examples of the reference points that Milner has identified
include nama, politeness, aspects of kerajaan system, “followership,” “top-down
ideological leadership,” and plural society. These are obviously reflective of the
historical development in the Malay world proper. One wonders about the cases
of “other Malaynesses,” such as that in the Philippines, where these “reference
points” hardly matter, or if they do, not to a significant degree.

Considering the case of the Philippines brings into sharp relief the
problems attendant to the confining of the analytics of Malayness to the
Malay world proper. By restricting himself to this geographic area, Milner,
among other scholars, seems oblivious to the possibility that he has in effect
reinforced the ideological foundation of the hegemonic form of Malayness that
pervades in Malaysia — precisely the opposite of which is what he intends to
achieve in his book, The Malays. By admitting that there are in fact “reference
points for Malayness” and these are drawn from the long tradition of “Malays”
in the Malay world proper, he sets the limit to the fluidity of Malayness he
painstakingly demonstrates in over 200 pages. To note, such a limit could
not have been easily imposed had Milner considered the case of Malayness in
the Philippines where “reference points for Malayness” assume an altogether
different set of definitions. By producing through semantic or conceptual
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refinement, an avatar of the otherwise objectionable notion of “Malay essence,” he inadvertently lends support to the claim that *ketuanan melayu* is in fact an organic and historic, and not just a political right of the “Malays.”

To avoid these problems, I suggest that the analytics of Malayness be readjusted to accommodate a number of questions whose intent is primarily the search for accountability and nuances. It is, concurring with Kahn and Vickers, not enough simply to demonstrate the constructedness, fluidity and contingency of Malayness, both as analytic concept and as lived experience. It is also necessary to account for the agents of, and the reasons for, such a construction and the resilience of the ideas on Malayness amongst those who perceive themselves as Malays. There is, in other words, the need to deal squarely with the question of power differential, an area in which Milner’s book is rather evasive if not really unmindful. Of equal importance is the need to zero in on the micro level of the constructive processes to enable a nuanced accounting of the calculus of power relations.

In accord with Milner’s focus on “Malayness” rather than the “Malays,” I think analysis should bypass the questions of who the Malays are and what their origins were, which tend to be deterministic, overly linear and recuperative of the Orientalist tradition. The primary task, I argue, is to frame the analysis guided by two complementary sets of questions with the intent of creating a complete set of maps of Malaynesses of various projections. These maps show: (1) the range of diversity; (2) the extent and manifestations of fluidity; (3) the competing or parallel discursive platforms; and (3) the changes all these underwent through time.

The first set of questions: who are those regarded as Malay? Regarded by whom? Who accepts and who rejects such a claim? Under what contexts and time, and why is such a claim made, accepted or rejected?

The second set: among those who are considered as Malay, to whom does Malayness really matter? To whom does it not matter, and under what contexts, time, and for what reason/s?

Reworking the analytics of Malayness around these questions enables the disaggregating, nuancing, contextualizing and particularizing of the conceptions of Malayness. These moves seem necessary as antidote to the tendency of certain streams in Malayness studies to dwell on the aggregates and generalities, which inadvertently leads to the reinforcing of the hegemonic notions of Malayness. It also allows accommodating all possible cases of Malayness, not just those in the Malay world proper. In addition, it paves for emphasis not just on the historical and social contingency of Malayness, or any identity marker for that matter, but also on the specificity of human experience that often gets sacrificed in the name of analytic rigor, conceptual clarity or historical continuity.
The case of the Philippines, as spelled out in previous sections of this chapter, allows a glimpse as to why this reworking may be necessary. The Filipinos, as shown earlier, have long regarded themselves as Malays, but others including many scholars, ordinary Malaysians and Indonesians, find such a claim odd, to say the least. What could account for this situation? Things appear to be changing of late with at least some Malaysians, as noted above, having begun to recognize Filipinos’ Malayness. One may ask the reasons for such recognition, and why in the 1990s, and why it seems dismissed by many scholars as political ploy that is devoid of analytic significance? By asking the first set of questions specified above, we set the task to account for the process of negotiation among stakeholders that inheres in identity formation. Furthermore, we are warned of the need to be reflexive about one’s analytic stance, which entails acknowledging the multiplicity of possible analytic standpoints and the choice one makes in upholding one stance over other possibilities. What enabling conditions, for instance, make it easy or natural for scholars to exclude Filipino Malayness in their analysis? What makes it difficult for Malayness scholars to recognize the hegemonic analytic position that they inhabit when they confine their analysis within the Malay world proper?

The first set of questions also entails factoring into analysis the temporal and spatial contexts within which analysis takes place, as well as the context to which it addresses itself. It must be interrogated, for instance, why Milner, for all efforts to demonstrate the enormous extent of fluidity of Malayness, ends up with the idea of “Malay reference points.” What is the convention in Malay studies, in particular, and in Southeast Asian area studies in general that tends to dissuade one from taking fluidity as analytic trope of its logical conclusion? If one had carried such analysis in the heyday of the linguistic turn in the humanities and social sciences in the 1990s, would the outcome be any different? What role does the expectation of the targeted audience play in shaping one’s analytic stance?

The case of Filipino Malayness also highlights the need to raise the second set of questions cited above. That Malayness matters to Filipinos does not mean that its significance is shared by all, neither is its extent uniform among those who hold it important. For Salazar, Parfahn, Vinzons and Macapagal, for instance, Filipino Malayness had certainly much greater importance than that upheld, say, by Quezon and Quirino, and even more so than by some of the bloggers I mentioned in the early part of the chapter. Even within the same group of, say, the Propagandists, Malayness seemed to carry more weight in the imagination of Paterno and de los Reyes than that in Rizal. For individuals such as Jocano and natrinur (one of the bloggers I mentioned earlier), not only does it not matter, it should have never mattered right from the very
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start. There is a need, in other words, to be sensitive to the enormous range of possible variations among groups and individuals, which necessarily calls for a micro-level analysis. This suggests that perhaps it is not safe to assume that simply because the Malay community in general benefits from *ketuanan melayu*, and that it disadvantages the Chinese and Indian communities, the situation necessarily means that Malayness matters to all of them. A question may be raised as to whether discourses on Malayness are to an extent driven by the anxieties generated by the dialectics of intra-elite engagement. That is, for ordinary individuals across the ethnic divides, it has become a naturalized, if not already a natural, aspect of day-to-day life with which they have already learned to live, if not embrace. Rather than “rescuing” the ordinary people from their “false consciousness,” and allowing the vocal, anxious few the metonymic privilege of standing for the rest of the community, an approach that produces a nuanced, mega-pixelled picture might be necessary to complement the macro-level approaches. The essential point is that, whether Malayness matters to groups or individuals depends largely on their position in the scheme of things at a particular time and place; on the need they perceive for such an identity marker; and on the extent to which they imbibe it as a part of their self-constitution.

Still another question raised upon considering the case of the Philippines concerns the need to “provincialize” Malayness. Provincializing Malayness entails being sensitive to the modalities by which it assumes particular character or shapes within a particular environment in a given time. Being at the periphery of the Malay world, with Malayness that is heavily accented by Christian and other Western traditions, the case of the Philippines is well placed to remind us that being Malay is not all about Islam, *Bahasa Melayu*, Sultan and Malay *adat*. Cases of course of non-Muslim doing *masuk Melayu* are well recognized in the existing analytics of Malayness, but having involved numerically smaller and oftentimes politically marginalized populations, these cases become easy prey to the tyranny of statistical notion of reality. Consequently, it remains difficult to imagine Malayness outside the conventionally predominant markers. By taking the Philippines with 95 million people on board, it helps strip the hegemonic Malayness of the fiction of universality and fixity that it projects.

Provincializing Malayness also requires *historicizing*, as opposed to *historicalizing* identity, as has been fairly common in the field of historical studies of Malayness. Both approaches acknowledge the determinant role of history in causing or shaping a phenomenon, such as Malayness. Things happen as they do because of the character of the time or the historical context, not because of some metaphysical and teleological designs. The differences, though, are crucial. To *historicise* is to foreground the discursive and the representational
nature of historical accounts without denying their historicity. It emphasizes the break or discontinuities and thus the specificity of a historical experience. Exemplary of this approach include Kahn’s *Other Malays* and Adrian Vicker’s “‘Malay Identity’: Modernity, Invented Tradition and Forms of Knowledge.” Minus the last few pages in Milner’s book where the idea of “reference points of Malayness” figures prominently, it is also a good example.

To *historicalize*, on the other hand, is to downplay the distinction between, if not really conflate, representation and reality; to anchor a thing or a phenomenon to its supposedly primeval originary point; and to underscore the continuity of a thing or an experience. The farther back the roots go, the more historic it is and hence the more authentic it appears. This approach seems exemplified by Andaya’s *Leaves of the Same Tree*, as I will further discuss below.

A *historicalized* approach takes an idea, an act or an event as but a unit in a long chain that unfolds leading to a particular end result. This creates a sense of necessity or inevitability to each unit in the chain, and more so to the chain itself and its products. The resulting situation lends them — the unit, the chain and the products — the power that accrues to the true and the natural. With *historized* mindset on the other hand, historical necessity or inevitability is not readily assumed, if not denied altogether, as the notion of historical accident predominates. While there may be a chain, it is at best short and it is clear that it is but one of the numerous permutations by which an event or idea emerges from the convergence of forces whose possible combinations cannot be *a priori* determined.

As analytic strategy, *historicalization* entails imposing conceptual unity or order, in a scale much greater than is perhaps called for, to the otherwise fragmented and potentially multi-directional set of events. *Historicization*, on the other hand, being sensitive to the fragmentary and highly contingent character of historical phenomenon, is careful to limit conceptual order to the bare essentials. Its objective is not to establish historical truth, without implying denial of historical truthfulness, but to demonstrate the historical contingency of a phenomenon as well as its representation.

To demonstrate these differences, allow me to discuss a number of examples. Notwithstanding the categorical declaration that he does not wish to “establish the antiquity of the Malayu people but simply try to understand how such a group could have emerged from an ancient past …,” Andaya in his article, “The Search for the ‘Origins’ of Malayu,” and in the book, *Leaves of the Same Tree*, cannot escape the historicization of Malayness. By “sketch[ing] the historical environment which produced the conditions for a specifically Malayu ethnic awareness,” Andaya traces the roots of Malayness to the seventh century Straits of Malaka, in effect rendering Malayness or Malayu ethnicity the
appearance of continuity and conceptual singularity whose origins are traceable to centuries of unbroken development from some ancient originary points. By tracing its roots to the deepest past research allows, he inadvertently creates a unitary thread that binds the otherwise disparate and fragmented Malaynesses into one overarching family concept of Malay or Malayness, as beautifully evoked in the title of his book, *Leaves of the Same Tree*. Consequently, it denies ontological possibility for each form of Malayness that might have emerged from the highly variable contexts across time and space within the past 13 centuries, including those in the Philippines. When he declares that “[t]he political struggle for the right to claim to be the centre of the Melayu has been won by Malaysia,” what is otherwise a plain statement of fact tells more. Not only does he put closure to what may just be a temporary moment or a stage in the ongoing struggle to define Malayness, he also inadvertently privileges Malayness in Malaysia as the Malayness — an analytic act that can only marginalize if not really exclude other possible conceptions of Malayness. This is one of those instances when the line between the analytical and the political blurs and they synergize to form a highly potent support for a political project. The danger, it should be noted, lies not necessarily in the search for historical origins but in allowing conceptual imperialism — Malayness in Malaysia as the Malayness because it is rooted in deep history — to emerge from the otherwise innocuous search for such origins.

To a lesser extent, similar observation may be said of Anthony Reid, who, in discussing the “origins of Malayness,” claims that the “term ‘Melayu’ is very ancient.” He goes on to trace some of the earliest mention of the term to Ptolemy in the second century CE, an Arab geographer in the twelfth century and seventh century Chinese records, among others. Despite expending efforts in the subsequent parts of his article to demonstrate the fluidity and “contextuality” of Malayness in various periods from the seventh to the 20th century, the whole article is about “Melayu as a source of diverse modern identities” (italics added). He undertakes a search for the originary point, in this case the Melayu — what he calls the “cultural complex centred in the language called Melayu” — and links it to the three variant forms of contemporary Malayness found in Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. In effect, what he does historicalizes the connection. The issue here is not whether establishing such a long-drawn connection is historically accurate, but whether it is politically warranted. If the idea is to destabilize the hegemonic Malayness in Malaysia or in the Malay World, his notions of “core culture” or “core ethnie” that is founded on an ancient-rooted Melayu cannot be of help.

Crucial too in the historicized approach by Kahn and Vickers is the highlighting of the question of accountability or power relations as central element
in knowledge construction. Kahn specifically asks, if Malayness, as a form of nationalist narrative, is “constructed or imagined … then who constructed or imagined them? Why … and why such constructions take the form that they did?”\textsuperscript{119} According to Vickers, the answer lies not in the “colonial ‘invented tradition’, but [in] a local construction onto which colonial forms of hegemony were imposed.”\textsuperscript{120} Put differently, “[the colonial invention of Malay identity was negotiated between a native ruling group and a European group, but it involved the co-option and consent of people on various levels …]”\textsuperscript{121}

Describing Malayness as “peranakan culture par excellence,”\textsuperscript{122} Kahn for his part paints a shifting picture of the enabling environment for the emergence of the hegemonic form of Malayness, and conversely the suppression of the alternative narrative that — because it was suppressed — did not come to exist in full form. This, he calls “the history that never was.”\textsuperscript{123} By suggesting the existence of the history that never was, Kahn’s approach in effect denies the sense of inevitability that accompanies the historicalized approaches to Malayness. It must be emphasized that this sense of inevitability is the crucible from which the insidious power of knowledge emanates, and which serves as a bedrock of all identity-driven politics, including Malayness.

**Conclusion**

Being at the periphery of the Malay world and an exemplar of a very divergent notion of being Malay, considering the case of the Filipino Malayness promises to open analytic possibilities. These include a wider space for exploring the processes that led the contingent to appear natural, the particular to become the universal, and the provisional to assume the status of the conventional. With 95 million people, more than 80 percent of whom are Catholics, Filipino Malayness renders the Islamic element in “Malayness proper,” for one, to appear no longer universal and natural, but universalized and naturalized — a situation made possible by a particular configuration of historically defined power relations which had obtained in a particular context in Malaysia. Looking at this way helps in accounting more adequately for the social or historical constructedness of Malayness, something that longstanding approaches have been doing but were circumscribed by self-imposed geographic and conceptual limits.

As shown earlier, discernible is a pattern of instrumentalist logic that runs through the appropriation of Malayness in the Philippines from the time of Rizal, Vinzons, Macapagal all the way to Salazar. For common people who have passed through at least ten years of compulsory education since the early 20th century, as some of the e-forum participants mentioned earlier can attest to,
it has become almost a taken-for-granted matter. This situation gives Filipino Malayness the appearance of superficiality and being contrived; a claim that, so critics may aver, risks trivializing Malayness, likening it to a hat that one wears and takes off at one’s convenience.

Evaluating Filipino Malayness as contrived or superficial, and dismissing it on this basis, presupposes the existence of a “proper” Malayness, against which all other forms of Malaynesses ought to be measured. This approach poses the danger of granting a priori particular form of Malayness a privileged position that effectively serves as an analytic holy cow. This situation cannot but skew analysis toward an unrecognized bias. On the political level, the danger lies in the support it lends to the hegemonic Malayness that forms the backbone of the much maligned ketuanan Melayu.

Granting that Filipino Malayness is contrived and superficial, it remains crucial to the analytics of Malayness to account for a full range of forms which Malayness takes. It also highlights the instrumental aspects of identity formation, which at its core ketuanan Melayu or perhaps any identity-making project — national, regional, personal — is largely all about. The fear of trivializing Malayness is also denied its foundation once we realize that identity formation does require some form of trivialization to unsettle it and make it less politically dangerous. Perhaps it is not wrong to say happier are those to whom their ethnic identity matters less. Why is it that some scholars tend to make the problematization of ethnic or personal identity a default analytic mode should by itself form a part of a serious enquiry.

Finally, the Philippine case ought to be considered to broaden further the spectrum of ideas on or approaches to the analysis of Malayness. For example, had Milner resisted strongly enough the urge to dismiss Filipino Malayness offhand; had he at least skimmed through the literature since the time of Rizal and other Propagandists, in particular Salazar’s book, The Malayan Connection, which he cited but did not really engage with, he would have saved himself from the awkward position of proposing — as though it was a new approach — that Malay or Malayness be seen not through the prism of ethnicity but through civilization. It is an approach or an idea that is well worn out, and is probably over a hundred years old in Philippine literature on Malayness.

Notes

2. Yahoo! Answers.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. This statement refers to the common textbook knowledge in the Philippines that the peopling of the Philippines was accomplished through a series of migrations supposedly by Negritos (Ita, Aeta or Ayta in the Philippines), Indonesians and Malays, the succeeding group bringing in more advanced culture than the preceding.


6. Among contributors to the volume, only Leonard Andaya (“The Search for the ‘Origins’ of Melayu”) and Anthony Reid (“Understanding Malay [Malay] as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities”) have noted, albeit in passing, the inclusion of the Philippines to the Malay World.


9. Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree, p. 22.

10. See map of Sea of Malay in Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree, p. 23.


15. Ibid.


24. Despite claiming the affinity of Filipinos to the Malay, Jose Rizal and Isabelo de los Reyes expressed some doubts about it. See further discussion below.


28. See Milner, The Malays, pp. 1–18; and Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree, pp. 1–17.

29. This fear is noted in Milner, The Malays, p. 8.


36. Citing personal communication with Peter Borschberg, Milner cautions against interpreting the frequent use of the term “Malay” by the Europeans as reflecting endogenous use of the term. In his words: “… [T]he generalized European usage of ‘Malay’ is a convenient code word for those concerned with trade, diplomacy and categorization used by the people themselves.” See Milner, “Afterword,” p. 248.

37. William H. Scott has noted, for instance, that the Europeans might have first met the Filipinos not in the Visayas but in Malacca, owing to the presence of a Filipino community (called “Luzones”) there in the early 1500s, before Magellan came. They were not just petty traders but also shipowners and large-scale exporters in the China trade. See William H. Scott, *Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture Society* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press), pp. 193–5.


41. There was a longstanding claim of the Philippines’ “membership” to the sphere of Srivijayan and later Madjapahit influence, but this was seriously disputed and discredited in the 1960s or even earlier. The finding of the LCI lends credence to this old claim, and efforts have been made to re-establish it.

42. Andaya, “‘Origins’ of Melayu,” p. 63; Andaya, *Leaves of the Same Tree*, p. 56.

43. Zeus A. Salazar, “The Malay World,” pp. 89–91. In his view, it was only in the 1660s, coinciding with the success of the Spaniards in establishing a Spanish outpost in Zamboanga and about a hundred years after Legazpi reached Cebu, that the ties with the Malay World were partially cut off.

44. For a thorough and insightful analysis of Taveras’ and de los Reyes’ life and works, see Resil Mojares, *Brains of the Nation: Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Taveras, Isabelo de los Reyes and the Production of Modern Knowledge* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2006).

45. Joaquín Martínez de Zúñiga, *An Historical View of the Philippine Islands: Exhibiting their Discovery, Population, Language, Government, Manners, Customs*,
Filipinos as Malay


46. Mojares, Brains of the Nation, p. 46.

47. Ibid., p. 47. For a systematic and penetrating analysis of Pedro Paterno’s intellectual life, see Mojares, Brains of the Nation, pp. 1–118. See also Portia Reyes, “A Treasonous History of Filipino Historiography: The Life and Times of Pedro Paterno, 1858–1911,” South East Asia Research 14, 1 (2006), 87–121.

48. Mojares, Brains of the Nation, p. 129. For examples of Tavera’s scholarly output, see El Sanscrito en la Lengua Tagalog (Sanskrit in Tagalog Language) and Contribucion para el estudio de los antigos alfabetos Filipinos (Contribution to the Study of Filipino Ancient Alphabets). For an overview and assessment of these and other works by Tavera, see Mojares, Brains of the Nation, pp. 119–252


50. Ibid., p. 299.

51. Ibid., p. 300.

52. Ibid., p. 301.


56. Based on the rough drafts or notes taken by Rizal about the subject, it appears that aside from Marsden, he also had read works of Crawford, Pichering, Newbold, O’Riley, Low, Anderson, Moor, Humboldt, Valentyn, Muller, van der Funk, Brandel, Logan, Zellinger, Buschmann, Dalton, d’Urville, Hoerenbout, Hersburgh, Bopp, de Barros, Raffles, Hageman, Trembro, Schamarda, and W. Earl. Unfortunately, the specific titles were not included in Rizal’s notes. See “Notes on Melanesia, Malaysia and Polynesia,” and “The People of the Indian Archipelago,” in Jose Rizal’s Political and Historical Writings (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2007[1964]), pp. 372–82, 364–71.


58. Jose Rizal’s letter to Ferdinand Blumentritt, 20 November 1895, Rizal-Blumentritt Correspondence, at <http://www.univie.ac.at/ksa/apsis/aufi/rizal/rbcor204.htm> [accessed 20 March 2009]. In the 26 April 1891 letter, Blumentritt persuaded Rizal not to go back to the Philippines but to go to Leiden instead to see Professor Kern to study the “Malayan language.” Available online at <http://www.univie.ac.at/ksa/apsis/aufi/rizal/rbcor165.htm> [accessed 23 March 2009].

60. “Rizal-Blumentritt Correspondence,” 17 April 1890.
61. Ibid.
70. One notable exception is Antonio Molina, *The Philippines through the Centuries*, vol. 1 (Manila: UST Cooperative, 1960). This textbook is remarkable for providing a detailed treatment of the Malays and “Filipino Malays” in the pre-Spanish period and is at the same time measured in its assessment of the supposed “Malay traits,” practices and institutions. See Chapter 1.
73. Barrows, *A History of the Philippines*, pp. 32–5. It is interesting to note here Barrows’ sharp dichotomous use of “tribe” referring to the earlier migrants and “people” to refer to the later group who allegedly were more civilized.

76. In Salazar’s assessment, what Parfahn had achieved in this book, was “to present … a not too subtle caricature of the thesis of ‘Aryan’ supremacy (and, subsidiarily, Eurocentric development) in universal history.” Salazar, Malayan Connection, p. 232.

77. Salazar, Malayan Connection, p. 220.

78. Ibid., p. 218. I should note that if read against the backdrop of Stephen Oppenheimer’s celebrated and controversial book, Eden in the East (1998), a number of Parfahn’s fantastic and mind-blowing claims would not appear so far-fetched.

79. Salazar, Malayan Connection, p. 218.

80. Ibid., p. 216.

81. A certain Prince Osman Hussin, allegedly a nephew of a Sultan in Sumatra, and who happened to be studying in Manila during that time, was one of the members. Ranavalona C. Vinzons-Gaite, “Wenceslao Q. Vinzons: A Youth to Remember,” Mimeograph, University of the Philippine, Filipiniana Collection, 1977, p. 6.


86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.


90. Macapagal, The Philippines Turns East, p. 43.

91. Ibid., p. 4.

92. Ibid., p. 48.

93. Salazar uses this term to refer to the Malay World, obviously borrowing from the shortlived supranational group MAPHILINDO. See Salazar, Malayan Connection, p. 354.

94. Among three major works on Malayness that have appeared in recent years, only Milner cited him, albeit grudgingly and in passing. The recently published book by Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (2010) offers in over two pages by far the most expansive treatment of Salazar and Filipino Malayness among “‘mainstream” Western scholars of Malayness.

95. He completed a PhD in Ethnology at Sorbonne, University of Paris. He also studied at École Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes (Paris), Freie
Universität Berlin, and University of Leiden, in addition to the University of the Philippines. He is proficient in several languages, namely Spanish, French, German, Russian, Malay, Tagalog, and Bikol, among others.


98. Tadhana is the massive 21-volume Philippine history-writing project launched by Marcos in the 1970s in partnership with a group of Filipino scholars.


100. I base this observation on the Filipino translation of the two articles done by Gerry See and Zeus Salazar, respectively. See Salazar, *Malayan Connection*, pp. 364–6, 369–70.

101. See “L’importance de l’hoizon Philippin dans lés etudes indonésiennes,” translated by R. Guillermo as “Ang Kahalagahan ng Abot-tanaw ng Pilipinas sa Araling Indones” (The Significance of Philippine Horizon [or Perspective] in the Study of Indonesia), in Salazar, *Malayan Connection*, pp. 371–2. Salazar posits that the trajectory of Philippine history has long been astray from its Indo-Malay roots but is now returning to those roots. This idea is explored more in-depth in “Kulturelle Entfremdung und Nationalismus: die Philippinische Elite im 19-Jahrhundert” (Pagkatiwalag na Pangkalinangan at Nasyonalismo: Ang Pilipinong Elit sa Ika-19 na Dantaon) (Cultural Alienation and Nationalism: Philippine Elite in the Nineteenth Century), trans. Ramon Guillermo, in Salazar, *Malayan Connection*, pp. 367–8. This article argues that the Western orientation of the Filipino elites in the 19th century had alienated them from the “Filipino nation.” Such alienation, according to Salazar, had a far-reaching consequence on the Propaganda movement and the course of the Philippine Revolution, and its impacts are still felt up to now. The author shows that the ilustrados’ educational experience in Europe was the primary factor in their alienation from their own culture.

104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
110. For Anthony Reid, Malay language is the core cultural marker of Malayness. See “Understanding Melayu,” p. 3.
112. Ibid., p. 241.
113. This echoes Kahn, *Other Malays*, p. 3.
116. Ibid., p. 75.
117. Reid, “Understanding Melayu,” p. 3.
118. Ibid.
119. Kahn, *Other Malays*, p. 3.
121. Ibid., p. 29.
123. Ibid., p. 3.