

A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ISLAMIC REFORM AND REVIVAL IN BRUNEI AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF THE 20TH CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

This paper is a modest attempt at presenting some historical evidence on religious reform in Brunei and clarifying some issues pertaining to it. It focuses on the diverse stages of Islamic reform and revival, delineating the continuous and stable historical patterns, and showing the changing and salient historical dynamics. The case of Islamic reform and revival in Brunei Darussalam offers some insights on the historical phenomenon of radicalism and, particularly, the absence of any inherent link between, and logic in, the development of reform and revival and the emergence of radicalism, militancy, extremism, and terrorism.

The reforms undertaken during the latter part of the 20th century are reexamined in order to put it in relief against diverse aspects of reform and the formation of new institutions in the early part of the century. As such, the paper will look into the significance of Haji Muhammad's controversial theological views in the mid-19th century compared to a defensive, if not apologetic, treatise written in 1908 and the implementation of the *Mohammedan Law* since 1911/1912. Various milestones of the reform and revival throughout the 20th century, ending with the formation of the Islamic economic institutions, are discussed and compared with the comparable phenomena during the first half of the century.

INTRODUCTION

The 1905/1906 Residency agreement emerged as a stage and signpost for many changes that took place in Brunei until 1959. In the same way, the declaration of Brunei's independence in 1984 paved the way for major transformations and further changes. What was the position and role of Islam *vis-à-vis* these changes and transformations?

When the history of 19th century Brunei, including the status of Islam therein, was seen from the outsiders' perspective, only little emphasis seems to have been placed on the country's vitality, let alone its strength. More specifically, relevant to this discussion, Islam was considered a spent force. For example, Low, St John and Treacher¹ give their respective impressions of the declining religious vigour in Brunei. Treacher² found that the only marked religious building in the capital, the mosque, was in a dilapidated condition. Yet, even they could not ignore the fact that the religious life in the mid-19th century was thriving. As St. John³ reports, open debate and counter opinions and practices were allowed to take place, as can be seen in the theological controversies initiated by a newly emerging religious scholar, Haji Muhammad, in the mid-19th century.

When searching for the source of vitality and hope in such a difficult situation, it would be appropriate to refer to a situation that arose in Melaka, where Melakan Bendahara assured the Sultan, during their flight in the wake of Portuguese occupation of Melaka in 1511, that there was nothing to worry about if they had to abandon the Melakan capital, since, to him, as long as the *raja* existed among the Malays then the territory and capital will automatically follow. It was the *raja* who mattered. This is not a dogma, but something which had historical and sociological logic.

In Brunei, the monarchy proved to be the *tiang sere* (central pillar) of survival in the 19th century and the source of revival at the beginning of the 20th century. When one looks at the 1888 "Pact" (*wasiat*) which put the country under the protection of Great Britain, one may raise questions such as the following: What were the implications of such an arrangement? How did this idea gain support from the different sectors and determine the forward-looking orientation of the country?

Certainly, the conditions of the country after the Pacific War and, also, later after the declaration of independence, differed from that in the late 19th century. Yet, Brunei continued to witness the continuing patterns of *raja*-centric initiatives and change. The legitimacy and support provided by the ruler remained indispensable in the formation of Islamic institutions and the propagation of reformist ideas and plans. This can be seen in the foundation of diverse bodies and institutions from the *Undang-Undang Ugama Islam* 1955 to the Islamic banks in the 1990s.

When launching a more focused study than had been done previously on Islamic reform in Brunei, the present writer was inspired by the two dominant approaches, if not paradigms, in tracing modernization among Muslim societies and, to some extent, also the other states in Southeast Asia: one, ideological; and the other, institutional.

A crucial point in, or perhaps an assumption of, this paper is the significance of the Holy Cities for the discussion. For, while Islamic scholarship in Mecca and Medina had experienced a decline for centuries, these cities nevertheless figured prominently in arousing a revival of religious consciousness among Muslims. The explanation for this that immediately comes to mind is that the gathering of pilgrims and migrants from all over the Muslim world created an atmosphere conducive to discussion, exchanges, and plans for further action. It is under such circumstances that the Jawah came to and returned from the Holy Cities.

Islamic reform in Brunei followed a different path compared to that in many other parts of the Islamic world, or even in Southeast Asia. Nothing equivalent to Haji Miskin from early 19th century West Sumatra or reformist *Persatuan Islam* in early 20th century Batavia can be found in Brunei. It would be of interest to note that it was during the period of the British Residency (1906-1959) that many aspects of Islamic reform took place in the country; these encompassed education, law enforcement, scripturalization and administration of Islamic affairs.

A number of works have been written on Islamic reforms in many parts of Southeast Asia since the nineteenth century. These were usually related to movements started in the Holy Cities (Mecca and Medina), Cairo, Delhi and Istanbul, including Wahhabism, *Tanzimat* and 'Abduhism. An immediate question arises as to why scholars avoided talking about any similar phenomenon in Brunei. A facile answer would, of course, be that Brunei may have never experienced the propagation of such ideas on its soil. It is, however, the belief of the present writer that this kind of explanation is not fully in accord with the development of various Islamic institutions and the implementation of religious reforms in Brunei since the beginning of the 20th century.

The terms "reform and reformism" used in this paper are intended to imply attempts at the realization of the pristine and true value of Islam, according to the vision of contemporary Muslim communities.⁴ "Revival and revivalism" refer to the determination and conscious attempts by Muslims to relate Islamic values and teachings to their life, especially in the face of rapid change, modernization and globalization.

In Brunei, the turn of the 20th century was marked by many events, religious and otherwise, which have had an extended and significant impact upon its society. Why was reform necessary? Was it natural in Islamic history? What were the conditions that were conducive to Islamic reform? In order to address these issues it would be necessary, first and foremost, to examine the background to the period of reform.

This paper takes the view which asserts that social and economic changes taking place in any part of society have certain impacts on its other domains.⁵ The discussion focuses on characteristics and milestones of religious life in the country starting from the response to scripturalization and vigorous institutionalization and bureaucratization launched by the new administration since 1906, to the transformation and rapid changes in the last decades of the 20th century. It is hoped that through that approach more light could be shed on the patterns and characteristics of Islamic reform and revival in Brunei. It can be said that, in Brunei, reform and revival tended to coincide but they never led to the radicalization of Islamic discourse, let alone terrorism. Brunei's case, also, clearly indicates the importance of considering historical factors in socio-religious, economic and political phenomena, including Islamic revivalism.

SIGNPOSTS IN THE BACKGROUND TO ISLAMIC REFORM AND REVIVAL IN 20TH CENTURY BRUNEI

The Beginning

What happened in Brunei at the turn of the 20th century cannot be seen in isolation from its surroundings and milieu as well as its ties with the Muslim world as a whole and, more importantly, its past. No climax exists in intellectual history since ideas and inventions may be accumulated but not fossilized, nor ossified. Some events which anticipated the changes that were to follow had taken place in nineteenth century Brunei as, for example, the foundation of "Brunei House" (*rumah wakaf*) in Mecca in 1807,⁶ the writing of *Syair Rakis* by Pengiran Shahbandar⁷ and the socio-religious circumstances which surrounded the emergence of Haji Muhammad during the second quarter of the 19th century.⁸

In Brunei, scripturalization was marked by new waves of religious and administrative developments such as the introduction of the Shadhiliya and the newly formed Qādiriya wa-Naqshbandiyya orders, emphasis on reference to the standard *fiqh* texts (Islamic law according to the Shafi'i school), and the introduction of a new system of government from 1905/1906. All these developments facilitated the institutionalization of Islamic visions and teachings within new bodies and forms.

What was novel in Brunei society by the turn of the 20th century? Despite the small size of its population, between 12,000 and 25,000,⁹ Brunei appears to have looked positively toward the twentieth century. The ruling sultan was a strong, experienced and intelligent leader. His decision to put his country under the protection of Great Britain in 1888 and 1905/1906 was a well-calculated move. These political and, consequent, economic changes seem to have some bearing on the socio-religious life of the Brunei people. The sultan became, more than ever before, the paramount symbol of Islam in the state, and responded to this favourable socio-religious development by, for example, initiating closer ties with the Ottoman Sultan, 'Abd al-Hamid (1876-1909). Within this context it is not surprising, therefore, to find that, as reported by Treacher,¹⁰ a Brunei youth was sent to study and train in Istanbul in the 1880s. Indeed, parallel to identical phenomena in Southeast Asia, it is possible that more Bruneians would have had better access to the Middle East, especially through pilgrimage and prolonged stays (*mukim* or *iqāma*) among the Jawi (*Jāwī*)¹¹ community in Mecca.¹² Moreover, these ties were confirmed by a letter that was claimed to have been sent to the Ottoman Sultan requesting help against the threat of the Brookes.¹³

Furthermore, the pilgrimage undertaken by Haji 'Abdul Mokti bin Nassar and his consequent prolonged stay in Mecca around the turn of the 20th century provides us with an interesting case for close examination. The ability of more Bruneians to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca at this time shows, *inter alia*, the much improved socio-economic conditions of the people,¹⁴ when looked at in the perspective of the earlier situation. Political stability and reforms, and administrative efficiency were the main factors which helped to enhance the country's production levels and, therefore, its economy.¹⁵

The decision by Haji 'Abdul Mokti to stay in Mecca long is interesting in two respects. In addition to his personal inclination for study, it is possible that an additional stimulus may have been the higher level of Islamic scholarship he had achieved at home. This can be gleaned from the fact that despite his stay of only three years in the Holy City of Mecca, he had mastered Arabic and read a number of books. Upon his return to Brunei he was given an important assignments in delivering sermons and propagating religious teachings. Indeed, his *balai* (religious and educational centre) was to become the most influential religious centre in Brunei during the first half of the twentieth century.¹⁶ Secondly, Haji 'Abdul Mokti's stay in Mecca indicates the existence of ties between Brunei and the Jawi community in the Holy City. It is not clear whether the Brunei House in Mecca was still in operation at that time.¹⁷ Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the Jawi community in Mecca must have included some Brunei pilgrims and students. Thus, Haji 'Abdul Mokti's stay served to strengthen already existing ties.

Since the end of the eighteenth century, Brunei had welcomed the newly-propagated *ṭarīqa* orders¹⁸ in Southeast Asia such as Khalwatiya, Sammāniya, and Shādhiliya. Interesting features in this development, as far as this paper is concerned, were their emphasis on al-Ghazālī's reformulation of Muslim worship in a Sufi manner and *vice versa*.¹⁹ Unfortunately, further research on the development of these *ṭarīqa* orders in Brunei remains to be done.²⁰

By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, a large segment of the Jawi community in Mecca was strongly in favour of the Qādiriya, Naqshbandiyya, or the neo-Qādiriya-Naqshbandiyya. The latter was reformulated by the famous Bornean Sufi master, Shaykh Ahmad Khaṭīb Sambas.²¹ Brunei was also not spared the influence of this new *ṭarīqa*. For example, we now know that two Brunei masters, Haji Ahmad bin Dato Imam and Haji 'Abdul Mokti, acted as links to Shaykh Ahmad Khaṭīb Sambas.²²

For the present study of Islamic reform, the introduction of the neo-Qādiriya-Naqshbandiyya to Brunei is significant. The adoption and propagation of this *ṭarīqa* by a group of *sharī'ah*-oriented scholars²³ created closer ties between popular religious practices and scripturalized teaching of Islam in the forms of *fiqh*, *aqida*, *tafsir* and *ḥadīth*. In other words, the *ṭarīqa* followers were more exposed to learning, or were at least following some conventional forms of worship as expounded by the *ulama*. This development explains the widespread circulation of short treatises on the basic tenets of Islam among Muslims in Southeast Asia, including Brunei.²⁴

The available texts were not limited to those written in Arabic as more basic religious texts were also translated into Malay. Some were written locally, even though many were still imported. What is the significance of these texts for Islamic reform in Brunei? The most obvious result of the growing number of religious texts was the increasing scripturalization that occurred in Brunei. The texts were read and explained by the better

trained scholars, either Bruneians who had studied locally and/or abroad or peripatetic scholars from many different parts of the Islamic world.

This development was related to several changes in both the Middle East and Southeast Asia since the nineteenth century. Firstly, the reaction of the *ṭarīqa* orders and the *fiqh* schools to Wahhabism resulted in the proliferation of simple religious texts for the masses. Many of these were specifically composed by Jawi scholars or were translated from well-known treatises, mostly by Shafi'i scholars (*fuqahā*).²⁵ Secondly, the Ottoman Sultan, 'Abd al-Hamīd (1876-1909), who vigorously adopted Pan-Islamism in his foreign policy, was in favour of Islamic solidarity and unity. Not surprisingly, the publication of religious books was encouraged and supported. Indeed, in 1884 an official Ottoman press was established in Mecca.²⁶ Its publications included many Jawi/Malay texts. This was facilitated by the appointment of a Jawi scholar, Ahmad bin Muhammad Zayn al-Patani, as head of the Malay section in the press. Thirdly, better communication between Southeast Asia and the Middle East after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had a significant impact on the increasing numbers of Southeast Asian pilgrims, including Bruneians.²⁷ Accordingly, more people joined the Jawi community in Mecca to study and, also, more books were sent home to Southeast Asia. Fourthly, the proliferation of the printing press in Southeast Asia since the last quarter of the nineteenth century was partly responsible for the publication of religious texts for local consumption. Finally, the response of the proponents of the *fiqh* schools to Wahhabism and, to a lesser degree, Muhammad 'Abduh's reform, stimulated the publication of texts addressing either the educated or the masses, calling on them to state their position on given issues; this point shall further be taken up later.

The return of better trained scholars in larger numbers from Mecca facilitated the establishment of religious educational centres. In many parts of Java, Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, such religio-educational centres such as *surau* and *pondok* were founded.²⁸ Through these institutions of learning, the dissemination of more organized and advanced knowledge of Islam was undertaken seriously. In Brunei, the period was signified by the reinvigoration of scholarly circles in *Kampung Air* (Water Village). The *balai* of Burung Pingai led the revival of scholarly undertakings in Brunei.²⁹ Many prominent religious figures' references to Haji 'Abdul Mokti indicates that reform had taken place in his *balai*. There were several factors which had contributed to the prominence of Haji 'Abdul Mokti. Firstly, he was an erudite scholar, having stayed in Mecca for more than three years. Secondly, he was, also, known for his writings on socio-religious subjects which directly answered many of the questions and problems of his contemporaries. Thirdly, he introduced the *sharī'a*-oriented *ṭarīqa*, Qādiriya-Naqshbandiyya, to many people in the country. Finally, Haji 'Abdul Mokti was a man of action, teaching, counselling and preaching. Indeed, as has been elaborated by the present writer elsewhere³⁰, he introduced new religious elements in his teaching, based on the more scripturalized form of Islam.

During the early part of the twentieth century, the Brunei *ulama* were concerned, *inter alia*, with the impact of Islamic reformism on the population. Their concern can be examined through the contemporary writings and treatises. A number of religious writings were produced by Brunei scholars followed further development and institutionalization of religious administration in the 1950s. Around this time, major religious undertakings, including the codification of religious enactment, the *Qadi* laws, and formal religious education, were initiated. The third phase, the maturation of the earlier development, is characterized by the emergence of new generations of Brunei scholars and the proliferation of their writings. Indeed, since the early part of the 1960s, diverse religious publications emerged and more institutionalization took place in the country. This period became crucial and formative in determining the major transformations in the

administration of Islamic affairs and the initiatives to locate Islam in the centre of Brunei's endeavors to maintain an Islamic way of life amidst modernization and globalization.

The present discussion in relation to the above would be only to the extent of covering the major works on Islam before Brunei's independence, for several reasons. First of all, the last decade of the twentieth century appears to be very complex with the amalgamation of diverse factors in intellectual history, especially Islamic revivalism; the Brunei part has become more difficult to interpret without more extended study. More importantly, since historians normally tend to let events "settle" before launching a study, I believe that the phenomenon of religion in Brunei since 1980s should be located within the wider context of Islamic revivalism and its strong link with the extensive international networks. Put differently, more time and endeavor are needed not only to examine the intellectual history but also Islamic revivalism in the country after the 1980s.

THE FIRST STAGE OF REFORM (Pre-1950s)

Islamic reforms have struck a responsive chord in many parts of Southeast Asia since the late-eighteenth century. These reforms are usually related to the movements started in the Holy Cities, Cairo, Istanbul and the Indian Sub-Continent, including Wahhabism, Tanzimat and 'Abduhism. Although Brunei never experienced the propagation of such ideas on its soil, I believe that an identical phenomenon did take place in Brunei, especially with the development of various Islamic institutions and the implementation of religious reforms in Brunei since the beginning of this century.

With the increasing pressure meted out by the European powers in the region since the 19th century, Brunei suffered politically and economically. More and more local leaders at the peripheries exercised power on their own or in collaboration with outsiders. Accordingly, the elites in Brunei competed more aggressively to secure better position and access to limited economic resources available. Not surprisingly, political crises and rivalry among the ruling class became recurrent features during the first half of the 19th century.

Let us now examine the intellectual foundation that paved the way for Islamic reform in the country after 1906. I shall refer to two episodes of intellectual movement launched in Brunei around this period. First, as indicated earlier, Haji 'Abdul Mokti (d.1946) used an evolutionary approach to scripturalization. The tenor of his teachings was Islamic spirituality. They were oriented closely to the Qur'an and other Islamic texts. Many lines were illustrated with citations from the Qur'an, the *Hadith*, the sayings of the *ulama*, and some well-known texts which interestingly, as stated above, belonged to the "book of wonders" (*mujarrabāt*).

Generally speaking, the scholarly world of Haji 'Abdul Mokti belonged to this period of transformation and transition. He was at once an *adat*-oriented expert and a scriptural *'ālim*. He used popular vocabularies, which were certainly familiar to his society, in order to transmit a scripturalized version of Islam to enhance people's religious understanding and practice. In fact, he attempted to facilitate the complex process of adaptation to Islam among his Muslim countrymen.

On the other hand, a text on the centrality of *nīya* (composed in 1902 or 1907), which was added and attached to the Brunei version of *al-Hikam al-'Aṭā'īya*, contains a straightforward emphasis on scripturalization. It deals with the question of intention (*nīya*) in prayers. Reference was always made to prominent Shafi'i scholars such as Imam Haramayn al-Juwayni (d.1105), al-Ghazzālī (d.1111), al-Nawawī (d.1278), al-Zarkashī, al-Subkī, al-Sharbiṇī (d.1569), Ibn al-Hajar al-Haytamī (1565), al-Anṣārī (d.1520), and al-Ramlī (d.1596). This brief text is very important for our present scholarly understanding of the period, in that it helped us to determine the level of scripturalization in Brunei by

the turn of this century. The author warns Muslims not to follow "the teaching of the ignorant people who did not study under knowledgeable figures" (*pengajar[an] orang yang jāhil yang tiada mengambil daripada orang yang 'ālim*). It is clear that the text was written in response to the confusion in society resulting from the spread of the teachings of a particular religious group. This religious group ridiculed those people who had followed the *ulama's* (*fuqahā'*) way of performing the intention (*nīya*) for being "novices." The arguments contained in the group's criticisms and the alternatives they offered indicate that the group based its views on the Sufi approach to divinity. What mattered most for these people was the attainment of unity with God. For example, the *nīya* was not just pronouncement and intention but, more importantly for them, it connoted approaching God directly (*apabila hadirilah dhat Muhammad di dalam hati maka serasa hadirkan zat Allah ta'ala*).

Yet it is possible that the reason for writing the text was to resolve the controversies around the *nīya* raised by the literalists and 'Abduh's followers.³¹ For them, the attachment of the wording *usalli* etc. was regarded as useless or even religiously wrong (*bid'a*). But for the Shafi'i's a *nīya* connoted three basic elements, that is, *qasad* (purpose), *ta'arrud* (concentration), and *ta'ayyun* (specification), which usually materialized in the wording of the "intention" for the prayers. As far as the study of intellectual history is concerned the response of the *ulama* towards the reform movement can be clearly categorized as reform, especially in the context of Islam in nineteenth and twentieth century Southeast Asia. Anyway, this response also contained many elements of readjustment and restatement of well-accepted religious practices and ideas.

If these few intellectual and religious episodes show the internal dynamism of Islamic society, then the administrative reform and socio-political changes since 1906 can be regarded as external factors to the religious reform. In 1911 the British Resident, inspired by the British experience in the Malay Peninsula, requested the *ulama* to formulate a legal document concerning family law, for administrative efficiency. The various religious enactments in 1912, 1913 and 1924³² then became the sole reference in any religious dispute and adjudication in the subject. The administrative reform brought uniformity, standardization, and centralization into the religious administration. The *qādī*ship was headed by the *Tuan Qādī*,³³ who was promoted in 1941 to Chief *Qādī*. The reform was also shown by the centralization and unification of religious education since the 1930s. The post-war period witnessed further systematization of the religious administration by the establishment of the *Jabatan Hal Ehwal Ugama* (Department of Religious Affairs). All institutional changes in the field of religious organization during the Residency, however, remained fully under the umbrella of the highest religious authorities in Brunei, the ruler, who was assisted by the *ulama* and other experts.

THE SECOND STAGE (late-1940s and 1950s): BUREAUCRATIZATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The growth of population and the rapid development of Brunei after the Pacific War necessitated the improvement of religious services, particularly after the coronation of the Sultan Begawan in May 1951. For example, on January 31, 1948 Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin approved the formation of a board of 18 religious advisers (*Penasehat2 Jumaah Sharaiah*) with the stipulation that all religious appeal cases be "heard and decided by the Board." On 16 February 1948, the Resident issued a circular notifying the appointment of 19 religious advisers as members of the Board. In order to facilitate the work of the Board, various enactments on the administration of Islamic law (*Jumaah Sharaiah*) that had been put in place in the Malay Peninsula were introduced in Brunei for observation and consideration. Moreover, in response to the changed situation in the Belait district, the ruler appointed

Awang Mohd. Suhaili bin Hj. Yaakub to be a special *qāḍī* for Belait in August 1950.³⁴ As a result, the District Officer of Belait no longer acted as vice-*qāḍī*. A proposal was, also, made the following year to appoint a *qāḍī* for Temburong district. Nevertheless, the position of district *qāḍīs* became formal only sometime after the implementation of the 1955 Enactment (*Undang-Undang Ugama*). Indeed, even by April 1957 the district officers of Tutong and Temburong continued to function also as local *qāḍīs* in their respective district. In addition, the salary of religious functionaries was reviewed and readjusted.

During this period various official religious celebrations were held in Brunei and the beginnings for these came in the 1940s. In 1948, for example, during the celebration of the Hijrah New Year, the *jāmi*-mosque committee in Bandar Brunei organized a Qur'an reading competition for Muslim men in the town. This was the first open competition ever held in the country, and was the precursor to later developments as, for example, in 1962 when the Qur'an reading competition had been held in conjunction with the coming of the fasting month of Ramadan; more specifically, it was designed to allow Brunei to send its best readers to the international competition organized in Kuala Lumpur during the second half of Ramadan. Moreover, the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (*Mawlid*) developed into a public occasion by 1956, and although less elaborate celebrations had been regularly held by the Bruneians even before 1950s, the grand parade around town that was organized only during the 1950s. It is notable that since 1953 two socio-religious organizations took over the sponsorship of public celebrations (*Mawlid* and Hijrah New Year) in their respective districts: the Islamic Unity (*Perkasa*) of Bandar Brunei³⁵ and the *Ikhwānūl Muslimīn* of Kuala Belait. The elaborate celebrations of other important Islamic events took place publicly only in the 1960s. The state dignitaries were invited to these celebrations. Indeed, during these occasions it was customary to have religious messages from the ruler and other religious speeches were also made.

During the 1950s, a number of notable features emerged in conjunction with the arrival of *Hari Raya Puasa* (*Īd al-Fiṭr*). First of all, as followers of the Shafi'i School, Bruneians started and ended their fasting according to the sighting of the new moon of Ramadan and Shawwal respectively. A committee consisting of the *ulama* and meteorologists and surveyors was formed under the aegis of the Chief *Qāḍī* for sighting the new moon from the hills and sea-coasts on the 29th Sha'ban and Ramadan. The observations were then submitted to the Chief *Qāḍī*, who presented it to the Sultan for a final decision. In addition, the collection of funds and goods, besides *zakāt* and *zakāt al-fiṭr* (*fiṭrah*), was centrally organized, and the collections were distributed to patients in the hospital, prisoners, and needy orphans.

In 1951 a proposal was made to replace the Courts Enactment of 1908. With regard to the Islamic court, the proposal made a special reference, in Section 3 of 6 consecutive chapters (Chapter 13 to 18), to the Courts of Kathis.³⁶ The Section specified the formation of the courts of *qāḍīs*, their authority, appointments, dismissals, the cooperation with the Courts of Magistrates of the First Class and appeals against their decision. The consequent Enactment in 1951, while maintaining the *status quo* (i.e., the status of the Courts of *Qāḍīs* was equal to that of the Courts of Magistrates of the Third Class), improved the administration of Islamic law by specifying that, appeals concerning a decision of the Courts of the *Qāḍīs* should be made to "the Sultan in the Religious Council". This is a significant shift from the previous Enactment, especially the Mohammedan Law of 1912, which specified that appeals be made to "the Sultan in the State Council". The change was made possible primarily because of the formation of the board of *Penasehat Jumaah Sharaiah* in 1948. On 14 August 1959, the Board was renamed Religious Advisory Board (*Majlis Meshuarat Jumaah Penasehat Share'ah*) and had 16 members. In 1958 the Board

had 14 members and was chaired by the most senior *wazīr*, Pengiran Bendahara. Under this arrangement, the administration of Islamic law came to be solely under the supervision of Islamic experts in the board.

In 1954 the Religious Consultative Council (*Mejlis Meshuarat Shara'iyah*) was established. According to the letter sent by the officer of the Department of State Customs, Religion & Social Welfare, dated 27 July, 1954, five religious officials were re-appointed to the Board for Religious Officials. The Official Notification was, then, issued by the Resident on 16 August, 1954. Ten days later, on 27 August, 1954, the notification of 153/1954 was issued by the Resident announcing the appointment by the Sultan of ten prominent figures to be "members of the Sultan-in-Religious Council" for the State of Brunei.³⁷ The Sultan was chairman of the Council. All five members of the Board for Religious Officials, except Pehin Tuan Imam Haji Sa'at, were included in the list of appointments. Indeed, the formation of the 1954 Religious Consultative Council was "in pursuance of Section 17 (2) of the Courts Enactment [of] 1951." Following the establishment of the Department of Religious Affairs in July 1954, various activities on the propagation of Islamic teachings and the administration of Islam were taken over from the Office of the Chief *Qāḍī*. The link between the Board and the Council was strong. Many proposals put forward by the Board were adopted and ratified by the Council. On many occasions the two bodies held their meetings concomitantly, particularly during 1959. Following the proclamation of the 1959 Constitution on 29 September 1959, both the Council and the Board were dissolved. At the meeting held on 17 September 1959, the Sultan formally announced that the meeting was to be the last. Nevertheless, the decision did not imply that the reorganization and institutionalization of religious affairs in the country was to come to an end.

From the brief discussion above, it is clear that the Residency heralded a new direction in the application and administration of Islamic law.³⁸ During this period the application of Islamic law was circumscribed and restricted to family matters, yet the application of the law became more systematic and fixed. Previously most of the legal issues were dealt with at the local levels through the *ulama* and other local leaders - and only if no solution could be reached at this level, were they submitted to the ruler - but by this time, certain legal cases were reported and transferred to the *Qāḍī* Court. Although such a legal institution was not a novelty in Islamic law and Islamic history, in Brunei it meant much in terms of the systematization of Islamic reform and institutionalization of law.

The 1955 Religious Enactment

The overall administrative reform in Brunei required other government bodies, including the religious bureaucracy, to work more efficiently and professionally. In the eyes of the Resident, for instance, the codification of Islamic law was necessary. Further development during the post-Pacific War even created pressure upon Islamic leaders to respond quickly in this direction. They eventually came up with a plan and a series of religious enactments.

The enforcement of the Religious Council, State Custom and Kathis Courts Enactment of 1955 led to various changes in the administration of Islam in the country. For one, it automatically abrogated the Mohammedan Laws Enactment of 1912, the Mohammedan Marriage and Divorce Registration Enactment of 1913, and the [Kathis] Courts Enactment of 1951 (No. 6). The 1955 Enactment No.20 came into force on February 1, 1956.³⁹ With regard to Islamic affairs, it made provision for the establishment of a religious council for Muslims and for matters relating to marriage and divorce, and revised the powers and duties of the *Qāḍī* Courts. Nevertheless, one important outcome of the 1955 Enactment was the re-organization of religious courts (*qāḍī courts*). For example, they were soon separated from magistrate courts and stood autonomously as a religious institution.

After the implementation of the 1955 Enactment, the offices of *qādis* were established in all the districts. The office was headed by a full *qādī*. Four *qādis* were appointed for Kuala Belait, Temburong, Brunei-Muara and Tutong. Their authority and duties were specified in the Enactment. In addition to their official duties they were also heads of the local mosques and *surau* administrations.

One major outcome of the 1955 Enactment was the formation of the Religious Council (*Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Negeri*) in 1956. The Council was given the highest authority in religious affairs and, at the same time, it functioned as a body to assist and advise the Sultan in religious matters. According to the 1955 Enactment, the religious Council is responsible for many aspects of religious affairs and activities in the country. Its authority includes: i) the collection of the religious taxes [*zakāt* and *zakāt al-fitr* (*fitrih*)] (No. 114); ii) issuance of permits to mobilize funds for religious purposes (No. 122); iii) supervision of mosques throughout the country (No.123); iv) registration of new converts (No.164); v) supervision over the belief and practice of Muslims according to the concept of the *Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamā'ah* and the Shāfi'i school respectively (No.42-3); vi) taking care of wealth and property (*amanah*) which are left without inheritors (No.9, 99); vii) dealing with other parties in all matters under its authority (No.7-8); viii) supervision over the implementation of Islamic law (*Hukum Shara'*); ensuring that all written laws in the country and the state customs are observed and implemented (No.39); and ix) acting as the highest body in managing Islamic affairs and providing assistance/advice to the Sultan (No.38).

The 1955 Enactment shows the strength of Islam in Brunei. On the other hand, it also reflects the influence of the British in the administration of justice in the country. It is stated, for example, in Chapter 39 of the 1955 Enactment, that the Council should consider and implement the meaning (*kehendak*) of all written laws in the country, the Islamic law (*Hukum Shara'*) and the state customs. But since the written laws were derived mostly from Western and British laws, it is clear that the Majlis cannot fully implement the *Shari'a*. More particularly, the 1955 Enactment did not fully reflect the *Shari'a*.

The implementation of the 1955 Enactment brought about the formation, among other things, of two committees in 1956, under the authority of the Religious Council: i) the Committee of Law; and ii) the Committee of Courts. Appointments of members to these committees were made by the Sultan and countersigned by the British Resident. (After the promulgation of the 1959 Constitution, such an interference by the Resident, of course, elapsed.) Nine eminent figures were appointed to the first Committee⁴⁰; this Committee continued to serve until 1963 when the Sultan appointed a new committee. Out of the nine members only three did not belong to the Council. The most important role of this Committee was to provide legal counsel (*fatwā*) to the community.⁴¹ It was, also, responsible in proposing a list of candidates to the posts of *imam*, *khaṭīb*, and/or *bilal* when vacancies fell; this would mean that this Committee, or rather the Religious Council under which it functioned, for some time, especially in the 1950s, also functioned as the Executive in religious affairs. The second Committee had two "regular members" and three "additional members" According to the 1955 Enactment, the *Muftī* automatically assumed the chairmanship of this Committee; however, this stipulation could be implemented only in 1967. The main responsibility of the Committee was to advise the courts in the country on matters related to Islamic law.

A further examination of the *Undang-Undang Islam* of 1911, *Undang-Undang Nikah Cherai Islam*, ratified by the State Council in November 19, 1912 and in June 17, 1913, respectively, and *Undang-Undang Ugama* 1955, is necessary to understand the development of religious intellectual life in Brunei during the Residency period. If the text which discusses the *nīya*, mentioned above, emphasizes the centrality of upholding the Shāfi'i scholars' opinions, the new legal enactments opened the possibilities of using, for

example, a non-Shāfi'i *ulama's* views if they conformed to the needs of the general welfare of the community (*Undang-Undang Ugama*, 1955:17).⁴² Even though this is stipulated only for cases wherein the Shāfi'i school offers opinion (*qaul*) which contradicts the general welfare of the community (*berlawanan dengan m[asla]hat orang ramai*), the spirit is novel in the context of the school of Islamic law, particularly among the Shāfi'is.⁴³ If previously the choice was limited to the Shāfi'i scholars' opinions, including those based on weak argument (*qaul yang dzaif*), now the jurisprudential bases were broadened to cover: general welfare, rationalization (*difikirkan*), explanation and interpretation (*diterangkan*). In this connection, it would be only appropriate to recast the general view about religious change: Islam has central meanings and symbols, which motivate and become the model for Muslims; yet individual Muslims have no stable and unified decoding mechanism (which is of course open to challenges and changes) to internalize and grasp fully the symbols, despite the claim to the centrality of and eternity of these symbols and meanings.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, similar to the processes of institutionalization and bureaucratization found in any modernizing administrative system, the spirit of reform above has to be curbed and conducted through the patterns of unification and centralization of religious affairs. The *Undang-Undang Ugama* 1955 contains many ideas and programmes, which are geared towards increasing the efficiency and modernization of religious management. Despite its apparent contradiction and paradox, we have to bear in mind that we are actually dealing with, at least two phenomena at the same time under each of religion and modernization and reform and institutionalization.

Formal religious education and religious functionaries (*ulama*)

The reorganization of religious education in Brunei since 1930s has resulted in the systematization and sophistication of religious teaching methods.⁴⁵ For instance, the bearers of Islamic knowledge have to go through formal education which usually connotes the award of certificates and degrees. Brunei's links with many Islamic centres within Southeast Asia and to its west is as old as the Indian Ocean trade route when it was dominated by Muslim traders. The much improved economic conditions after the 1930s must have had a direct impact on the increasing numbers of Brunei pilgrims and students proceeding to the Middle East, to mention only the most favored destination.⁴⁶

The impact of the Pacific War on Brunei education, as in many other fields, was negative. Religious education suffered from the closing of the only known private *madrasa* in the country. There is no record about its revival even after the war. Nevertheless, as I have shown above, religious instruction was re-opened in the Malay schools in 1946. Concomitant with this, the organization of religious education was improved by the appointment of a *nazir* and a head of religious teachers. Later, in 1950, three students were sent to *Madrasah al-Junied al-Islamiah* of Singapore and in 1951, a religious official applied to the government to be given permission to study in Mecca for three years. During the 1950s more *ulama* from abroad, especially the Malay Peninsula, were invited to teach at religious educational centres and to manage Islamic institutions in Brunei. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to suggest that the postwar period was a time of major regeneration in the leadership of Islamic administration. Various attempts were made to improve the quality and/or level of scholarship, services, and institution of the Brunei *ulama*, corresponding to the phase of modernization in other fields of the state administration.

Since 1946 particular measures were undertaken to improve the organization of religious centers and their functionaries. As can be seen in the official reports of the period, the salaries of these functionaries was reviewed and readjusted. New appointments were made to various posts, including the various mosque officials. Until 1947 the

*qāḍī*ship had offices in Bandar Brunei, Tutong, and Kuala Belait and later, in 1951, a proposal was made to appoint a Deputy *Qāḍī* for the Temburong District.

During the Residency a number of noted Brunei *ulama* were promoted or had risen to prominence. Some of them held important positions in the religious bureaucracy, for example, Pehin Tuan Imam Haji Muhyiddin (until 1917)⁴⁷, Khatib 'Abd al-Razzaq (1918; and in 1919 as Pehin Siraja Khatib), Haji 'Abdul Mokti (1917 as Pehin Datu Imam), Pg. Mohammad Salleh (1941 as *Qāḍī Besar*), and Khatib Muhammad Sa'd bin Juru Apong (1939; 1945 Pehin Tuan Imam; 1957 Pehin Siraja Khatib). The fact that most of these *ulama* had written several treatises on Islam indicates that besides their formal duties they had ample opportunities to serve the people directly and provide them with religious reference and guidance. This involvement with societal affairs resulted in the emergence of an interesting and unique scholarship which partly depicted the local understanding and reformulation of Islamic teachings.

The participation of the established *ulama* in the new religious institutions continued to be indispensable until the 1960s. Since the Sultan continued to appoint, and gave titles to, *ulama* to religious leadership, no significant change occurred in the real position of established *ulama* in the new institutions. Indeed, the highest religious leadership was given to *pengirans* such as Pg. Pemanca, Pg. Shahbandar and Pg. Anak Kemaluddin. Only slowly, since the early 1960s, were several posts of importance in the new institutions assigned to the newly educated *ulama* who graduated from al-Junied, the Islamic College in Klang and al-Azhar. These few *homines novi* increasingly won the support of the ruler and gained popularity among the people. Shortly upon his return from al-Azhar in November 1963, for example, Awang Haji Mohammad Zain was appointed as Deputy of the Chief *Qāḍī*. He was also known at the time as an influential public speaker.

In a nutshell, several factors can be said to have worked for the intensive reforms in the religious affairs in Brunei during the 1950s. These included: i) reforms in many other fields; ii) the personality of the ruler; iii) national awakening among segments of the population; and iv) better access to information through modern education, visits/exchanges and mass media.

It would be of interest to note here that in 1953, a religious organization, *Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*, was founded in Brunei. It had nothing to do with al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn of Egypt. Is it possible, however, that the adoption of the name was inspired by the popularity of the Egyptian Ikhwān during the period?⁴⁸ Indeed, the Ikhwān of Brunei set up various activities which had a novel orientation. For example, they actively organized public celebrations on salient occasions in the Islamic calendar, including the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, the *hijra* and the sending down of the Qur'an.

THE THIRD STAGE (1960s to Independence): INDIGENIZATION AND MATURATION

In studying reform and revivalism in Brunei since 1950s, this section will focus on the major issues that occupied the mind of contemporary Muslim scholars in Brunei with a view to shedding some light on the intellectual development and contemporary discourse among them. For this purpose, I have referred primarily to articles and treatises published by Brunei scholars. Most of their works are found in treatises, local journals and newspapers. Interestingly, in the early 1960s a low profile scholar published his work on *Sifat Duapuluh dengan Syair Nasihat* in Kuala Lumpur.⁴⁹ For the purpose of the present paper, an inclusive approach was adopted in the use of all these materials. It is significant that most writings on Islam during the period were undertaken by newly educated Bruneians⁵⁰; it would be pertinent to remark here that these writers and speakers on Islam

were all *madrassa*-trained scholars.⁵¹ By virtue of their new training, they were better prepared, unlike the previous ones,⁵² to participate in public debate and express their ideas through writing. I must admit, however, that all writings of the period were relatively scanty and no comprehensive and detailed study of particular issues existed. Indeed, this is a crucial distinguishing characteristic of the religious literature in this period compared to that of the later decades. Although the existing literature of the period cannot be dismissed as a natural flow of Islamic intellectual tradition in general, it is clear that many writers of the time responded to the ongoing changes in society. I strongly believe that despite external stimuli and influences, the Bruneians expressed their own understanding, from an Islamic perspective, of evolving modern Brunei and beyond.

It is necessary to note in advance that my preliminary findings suggest that novel ideas about contemporary socio-religious issues were voiced by the newly-educated Bruneians, whereas balancing, and perhaps dominant, opinions continued to be expressed by well-established religious officials. Indeed, the intellectual discourse among Brunei *ulama* has shown the influential position of the well-established scholars, thereby pushing into oblivion the refreshing voices of the newly-educated scholars, thus giving way to a new equilibrium.

One has to admit that studying Islam as a universal religion has a bias toward comparative perspectives. Even though Brunei is taken as a case in the present study, it would be immediately apparent that similar cases in other parts of the Muslim World, especially Muslim Southeast Asia, have to be brought in. The discussion will centre on the following issues: Islam in the modern world; economic development and progress; nationalism and patriotism; concern over negative impacts of rapid change and popular Western culture; equality and brotherhood in Islam; Islam *vis-à-vis* the West and local customs; pluralism; Islam as state ideology and way of life (identity, custom and culture); worldly success and high morality among Muslims; balanced development (material and spiritual components); and evolutionary approach to change.

Almost all of these topics show relevance to contemporary issues and are, thus, contextual. The unfolding of socio-political and economic changes of the period set the background for the intellectual responses among Brunei Muslims. For the sake of clarity, the discussion is under the following three rubrics: political; cultural; and socio-economic.

Political

The promulgation of the Brunei Constitution of 1959 had a direct impact on the position of Islam in the state. The Constitution specifies several edicts on Islam in Brunei, including Islam as state religion, the adoption of Shāfi'i school and the *ahl al-sunna wal-jamā'a* interpretation and the Islamic requirement for higher offices. To the present writer's knowledge, although the Constitution was promulgated in September 1959, no open and detailed discussion of its Islamic contents,⁵³ as far as I know, took place until ten years later in 1969. With the return of an increasing number of graduates from Islamic colleges, especially al-Azhar University, and the appointment of many religious experts from Malaysia, a serious discussion of the formal position of Islam in the country might have taken place.

It was Awang Haji Mohammad Zain, an al-Azhar graduate and an important religious office holder, who first raised the issue of Islam in the Constitution.⁵⁴ According to Mohammad Zain, the official position of Islam in the state structure means that Islam is the philosophy of the state and comprehensive way of life. The official status of Islam has ramifications in the nomination of the ruler, the highest officials, and the setting up of formal Islamic institutions, Islamic schools (of law) or interpretations (in theology).

Mohammad Zain pushes his point by arguing that the official status of Islam should be brought to make it the basis of all aspects of Brunei life from the daily activities to legislation and administration.⁵⁵

Moreover, Mohammad Zain elaborates on the statement of Sultan Begawan on August 3, 1972, about Brunei identity as consisting of the monarchy, Islam and Malay culture; these crucial components of identity should also be considered the state ideology. The important position of Islam in society, state and ideology must be maintained and propagated through the dissemination of better information about Islam to the public and provision of enough instruction on Islam to all students (see *Majalah* 29:3-4). Being educated and, at the same time, occupying a key position in the government, he maintained that Islam needs to be propagated and implemented through diverse channels, especially the official ones. Indeed, toward the end of 1972 special forums on the position of Islam as state ideology were held in all district capitals. The participants at the forums, such as Yahya Haji Ibrahim, 'Abd al-Hamid Bakal, 'Abd al-'Aziz Juned and Mohammad Jamil al-Sufri, came from the leading young religious scholars in the country.

The question of political legitimacy was raised in the context of Islamic experience. Unlike what Braighlinn (1992: 33-34) calls intensive and deliberate use of Islam as novel base of political legitimacy, many Brunei writers of the period insisted on the almost natural right of the rulers to govern by virtue of being *sultan*. One of them (see *Majalah* 27:8-10) insists that modern state requires an honest leader who carries out noble goals and Islamic-oriented programs. In early Islamic period, the Prophet Muhammad won respect and loyalty (*bay'a*) by virtue of his mission in unifying mankind and achieving God's mercy. Being leader of Islam in the country, the ruler has the support of the population.

Better education, professionalism and growing socio-political awareness among the Bruneians also had an impact among the religious circles (*Majalah* 6:8-15). One writer in 1963 argued that the prevailing economic backwardness and the "dual-economic" structure in the country resulted from the imperialist policy, and that Muslims remained poor whereas others grew richer and economically more dominant. In order to alleviate the problem, he suggested that the government should implement the preferential distribution of trading licenses to Muslims and allocation of higher quotas of local workers in all companies, and that Muslims should be given more opportunities to run businesses and open companies. In the same breath the writer quickly adds that Muslims are not xenophobic or racist; however, they need to exert their rights and regain their dignity in their own country. It is also important, he maintains, that the country is open to anyone who honestly wants to develop it and live peacefully with Muslims. He warns his fellow Muslims against letting urban centres be dominated by foreigners and non-Muslims, lest they lose all important modern facilities and find themselves in a disadvantageous position.

The appointment of religious school leavers (Grade Six) as teachers was an attempt to place more locals in teaching positions. Indeed, with the growing numbers of new religious classes throughout the districts, particularly after 1963, the demand for religious instructors and teachers rose significantly (see *Majalah* 7:2; 10:43; 17:27). Although the religious schools were originally intended to provide basic religious training for boys and girls, the school leavers were needed to alleviate the shortage of trained religious teachers in newly established classes. In addition, an increasing number of school leavers happen to work toward self-reliance in skilled and professional sectors.

Patriotism emerged quite clearly in some writings of the period. Islam, which does not distinguish religion and public life is seen as the basis of modern state. Following this argument a writer of the *Majalah* (6:13-14) contends that the government must consistently protect and advance the interest of its Muslim population. This is more

particularly so since Muslims are the prime defenders and vanguards of the ruler, the nation, ruler and Islam. In addition, only by implementing Islam fully in private and public life, can the stability and prosperity of the nation be secured.

Religious teachers who enjoyed close links to, and social prestige in, society should have general knowledge and ongoing developments in the world. In the perspective of the increasing awareness about threats to political instability during the period, religious teachers were regarded as important agents to bring about social harmony in the midst of social uncertainty; this was particularly relevant even more after the December 1962 rebellion. In order to provide the religious teachers with general knowledge, exposure to current issues and relevant guidance so as to make the students to be effective in their role in bringing about social harmony, they were given short courses on various topics such as administration, health, law and economic development. The rationale in this endeavour was that, by virtue of their close contact with the people, they might perform their role better after gaining some training. Indeed, in early 1964 religious teachers pledged non-involvement in any political party or activities (see *Majalah* 2: 4-5; 7: 3, 6; 8: 27).

Nation-building can be more effectively undertaken by utilizing religious institutions. Mosques, for example, have been seen by the authorities as the best venue for establishing links and cooperation among members of the society at large. After 1963, for example, the Friday sermons which were centrally organized focused on real issues relevant to the daily life of the population, such as the value of hard-work, perseverance, thrift and hoping for a better future. Also, public talks and sermons continued to be carefully prepared by the Department of Religious Affairs for uniformity and the avoidance of controversies (*Majalah* 6:3; 17:11).

Cultural

It was evident from various religious publications and other contemporary works that religious leaders in Brunei had serious concern over negative impacts of rapid change and, especially, popular Western, culture.⁵⁶ The range of central issues raised during the period, according to the sources concerned, cover moral decadence, missionary activities, religious controversies, social unrest, political participation, the tendency to adopt various glamorous facets of Western culture, ignorance of Islam, and pornography and reading materials portraying violence.

The progressively increasing impact of modernization on Brunei society from about the early sixties has stimulated a debate over the Islamic stand toward Western culture and local customs. One of the important issues that occupied a considerable attention among contemporary writers was issues related to women. For example, in discussing women, education and morality, Rahmah binti Mustafa (*Majalah* 10-11: 27-8, 40) argues that Islam, like other religions, urges women to study and uphold high standards of morality; yet, it is a fact that many young women who go to school are inclined to imitate the undesirable symbols of Western way of life. She maintains that there was nothing wrong with choosing education and various disciplines, but women should uphold moral values in adopting and implementing their knowledge. Muslim women, she further stressed, should behave in keeping with Islamic and Oriental norms and values (*sebagai seorang wanita Islam dan wanita timur*) and have enough knowledge and high morality; knowledge, morality and adherence to ethics should continue to remain hallmarks of their behaviour even in their old age.

According to some other writers (see *Majalah* 22: 27; *Lambaian Islam* 1971: 55-73, 77-84), the adoption of some aspects of Western civilization, especially in the fields of science, research and technology, should be encouraged, for during the glory of Islamic civilization, Muslim communities were leading in these fields. For example, the prestige

of the Bayt al-Hikma of Baghdad during al-Ma'mun's reign was acknowledged widely. It would be pertinent to note, in this context, that the *Majalah* (23:28-30,33) published a translation of Maulana Mawdudi's response to Pope Paul's letter of "Peace" on December 8, 1967. This publication is significant in two ways: (i) it shows clearly that religious scholars in Brunei were keen to learn about the latest issues discussed by Muslim scholars in different part of Islamic world; and (ii) that it was necessary to take a firm stand on certain issues raised by such non-Islamic entities as the Pope, while acknowledging, at the same time, the shared common ground.

Many articles and speeches published in the *Majalah* and monographs of the Department of Religious Affairs insist on the centrality of Islam in forming modern culture and society; what follows is a summary of the main points they raised. Although they acknowledge the need to learn from many different sources, including the West and local traditions, they single out Islam as the backbone of new society.

It is claimed that Islam has fostered the development of Brunei individuals who have contributed to the emergence of a set of highly sophisticated customs. Islam has become source of unity, loyalty, honesty and love of stability and respect toward the law. Cooperation and stability will pave the way for development and progress (... *bahawa hanya agama sahaja yang dapat memberikan bimbingan prinsipal ke arah tujuan yang murni itu* [prosperity]). Development and prosperity can be completed only by applying Islam fully (*jika agama menjadi terasnya yang utama*). Islam encourages economic development and progress. To do this stability and peace must be maintained in this country. Moreover, the propagation of Islam should be pursued more seriously through mosques, schools, courses, publications and mass media (*Majalah* 28:3-4).

According to Ustadh 'Abd al-'Aziz Juned, civilization did not emerge fully in response to, or by virtue of, physical needs alone. Some form of "belief" must have paved the way for the high levels of culture. From the very beginning of human life, they need principles or beliefs to relate to "God." Islam came with guidance on how to achieve high levels of morality for all. By submitting to Allah it will be easier to achieve that goal. Prophets, as God's messengers, deliver divine guidance to bring humans to full humanity. Islam has a powerful and successful mission in correcting the social evils; for example slavery, violation of the rights of women and economic exploitation. In order to prove that the pre-Islamic period was decadent, the Ustadh quoted some points from such scholars as Wells and Ibn Khaldūn.

The local customs have also been a subject of religious scrutiny in some writings. In general, the Bruneians highly value their customs and culture. With increasing scripturalization and access to diverse religious writings, some Bruneians also raise several issues on particular religious practices which are closely linked to local tradition. In most cases, the practices surrounding the rites of passage, the welcoming of pilgrims, and other ceremonies which are held during the religious celebrations, are criticized of being un-Islamic (*Majalah* 9: 38; 27: 25). However, wisdom is recommended in eradicating such un-Islamic practices. Any reformer should present his ideas in the context of local needs and sensitivity in order to avoid conflict. According to one writer, decadent customs and habits must be changed but with wisdom and sensibility (*Majalah* 28:25-8).

Religious and ethnic pluralism occupied the minds of some contemporary writers and leaders. It is important to state clearly that the prevailing opinion in the country favors the inclusive practical approach to diverse ethnic groups and religious practices; however, such practices do not represent the official stand of the state and its approach to religion and ethnicity (see Pehin Md. Zain 1998: 82-83).⁵⁷ The tone of most articles during the period emphasizes cooperation and harmony in the religious field and ethnic relations. For example, one writer asserts that Islam does not contradict earlier religions, it only introduces changes in accordance with the changing conditions (*Majalah* 4: 4). Another

writer urges Muslims to compete positively and openly with other segments of the population. They should be confident in undertaking economic pursuits and businesses which have been the domain of non-Muslims. They should enter these fields and show that they are capable. Achievements in such pursuits can not only raise the image of Muslims, but they also prove that Islam is a force that is directed toward prosperity and progress (*Majalah* 31: 3,8). Many higher officials never failed to insist on the importance of cooperation among different segments of Brunei plural society. To them, such an approach is consonant with what Prophet Muhammad did after his migration to Medina which had harboured diverse groups and religions.⁵⁸

In their call for social and religious activism, these scholars insist on an evolutionary approach to change, and the importance of ensuring that change does not create confrontation and inability in society. For example, a senior religious official (*Majalah* 32:3-4) urges the conservative and older mosque officials to work closely and exchange opinions with the younger and more educated religious teachers. However, he warns these religious teachers not to act high-handedly and unsettle the prevailing socio-religious harmony. Thus, local religious teachers should prepare themselves well for any religious occasions, including *berzikir*, *bertahlil* and other rites of passage and adapt them to local conditions. Even in introducing changes to decadent customs and habits, they should pay attention to local sensibility and exercise wisdom (*Majalah* 25:13-4; 28:26). Emphasis on maintaining social equilibrium is also shown in the reminders addressed to many degree holders who have been assigned to key position in the government; they should adore local customs and uphold Islamic identity in their attempts to reform and modernize society.

Socio-economic

Many writers of the period emphasize the importance of economic development and progress. They point out that the early Muslim generations succeeded in achieving economic prosperity and progress since they were fully committed to the teachings of Islam. An article in *Lambaian Islam* (1971:107-15) lists five reasons for the decline of Islamic civilization: internal strife, ethnic chauvinism, external threats, structural change of the world economy and the abandonment of Islamic teachings. It seems to suggest that since Muslims fail to apply the divine law comprehensively, they miss God's promise and, therefore, experience adverse consequences. Indeed, one writer (*Majalah* 6: 8-15) argues in a straightforward fashion that the separation between Islam and politics in today's Muslim states forms a central cause for economic and political decline. It is implied that the hesitation of many Muslim leaders to provide clear support economically and politically to the Muslim *umma* results in uncertainty and even backwardness. Put differently, Muslim leaders should adopt political-economic policies, which clearly favour Muslims; only then will development and progress be secured for the community. The success and prosperity of Muslims will guarantee peace and harmony among diverse communities.

The backwardness of contemporary Muslim societies results from imbalance between material and spiritual development. Several articles in *Lambaian Islam* argue quite clearly that the present decadence of the *umma* is caused by the abandonment of Islamic teachings, or by the wrong adoption of pseudo-religious practices, and their backwardness has nothing to do with their adoption of Islam.⁵⁹ On the contrary, they state that half-heartedness and inconsistency in their implementation of Islamic teaching caused indignity and crisis. They further go on to say that, in order to get round the present debacle, Muslims have to return to true Islam and practice it fully as a comprehensive and

balanced approach to the world and beyond. Since Islam gives emphasis on science and technology, Muslims should master both, while refining their spirituality.⁶⁰

The global environment of the Cold War and the threat of major ideologies of the period forced political leaders to campaign for unity and harmony. In Brunei Islam is credited with power to bring unity and peace. Only under such a conducive atmosphere, economic development and political stability can be realized. More particularly, Islam's call for unity and brotherhood is consonant with the prevailing political matrix in the country. Thus support for the government is the only guaranteed channel to progress (*Majalah* 8:5-6).

In its efforts to maximize the mobilization of the *zakāt*, the government, in 1969, introduced via the Department of Religious Affairs, guideline and administrative measures to ensure the maximum collection of the *zakāt* and its utilization for the economic benefit of the community (*Majalah* 24: 3-10).

Moreover, some writers (*Majalah* 13:33) insist that Muslims should aim not only at the worldly glory, but the life after death should also be given high priority. Islam provides a complete set of teaching and discipline in this world, at personal and societal levels and even beyond. In conjunction with this, Islamic states should implement policies based on the Qur'an, the *hadīth* and opinions of Muslim scholars (*kerana agama Islam tak pernah bersalahan atau pun memerangi fikiran-fikiran yang waras dan tak pernah agama itu menganjurkan sesuatu atau melarang sesuatu untuk keruntuhan manusia*). Justice and prosperity become Islam's ultimate goal as expressed in a Qur'anic term *balda tayyiba wa-rabb ghafūr*. Rulers must be honest to their people. 'Ibāda is not limited to worship; it includes any good deeds for the sake of God. Indeed, the Qur'an deals mostly with aspects related to non-worship, in a strict sense. Muslims should take life seriously to prepare their future since this world and the Hereafter cannot be separated (*dunia dan akhirat tak dapat dipisahkan*). Our backwardness now is caused by such neglect of the worldly affairs (*Majalah* 14:13-14).⁶¹

Another writer asserts (*Majalah* 30:15-6,21) that Islam wants its followers to be strong and respected. This can be achieved by making themselves advanced and influential in the world order. Islam is not a barrier to development and progress, even though today's Muslims are backward. For example, the early Islamic glory was due largely to the implementation of Islamic principles. Thus, if today's Muslims are far behind, they must first fully implement Islam in order to overcome this backwardness. Indeed, this world is a preparation for the eternity, and the followers have to take advantage for the benefit of themselves, society and nation. Without the strength, progress and wealth we cannot do much in this world and, logically, for the Hereafter, too. Furthermore, Muslims should be the first to support and take the lead in the government development plans. In this way, the objective of "making Islam a way of life" can be realized. Muslims cannot be disinterested in development and the facilities provided by the state. The building of various infra-structures is intended to stimulate production and industrialization. Muslims should initiate and benefit from all these. They should not think only of self-salvation by following a narrow understanding of worship. Any beneficial deed, which aims to please God is *farāḍ kifāya* [*kehendak Islam* or *'ibāda*]. A Muslim has a double duty for this world and for the Hereafter (*tugas hidup dan tugas untuk akhirat*).

In the editorial of the *Majalah* volume 31 (1973), the head of the Department of Religious Affairs states that development must be based on a balance between spiritual and material components. The government has the objective of creating religious awareness among Bruneians by pursuing many different means such as education, publications and mass media. By providing a strong moral basis in society, the image of the country is enhanced; But this is not enough. The Bruneians have to prove that they excel in economic activities too. The government has provided many facilities and strong

support for Muslims should take advantage and, thus, compete with other segments of society successfully. Muslims should throw away from their minds any ideas as to the superiority of certain groups or their monopoly in economic fields. They should enter those fields and show that they too are capable.

Religious movements: *ṭarīqas* and revivalism

The rapid changes that took place in Brunei following the Pacific War also provided a better opportunity for strengthening ties and relations with the outside world, including the Islamic world. As a part of the wider Islamic world Brunei has always felt the impact of changes occurring among Muslims worldwide. As has been argued elsewhere by the present writer, Brunei, as an Islamic centre, formed a nodal point of Islamic networks.⁶² Religious activities and institutions formed the strongest links in the networks, these links have generally persisted and survived against the vicissitudes of political conflict and decline. The intensity of ties and links with the outside world depended very much on the attractiveness and ability of Brunei to communicate with it. This explains why Brunei was largely excluded from the reformist activities during the early part of the 20th century. It is primarily because of local initiatives that some degrees of ties were kept alive; this was in contrast to the intensive contacts in the earlier period when Brunei enjoyed power and wealth, especially during the 16th and 17th centuries.

More importantly, by 1959 Brunei ended the Residency system, and the Sultan, thus, recovered his full control over the internal affairs of the country, in addition to his authority over religious affairs. During the Residency period, the emphasis on administrative reform in the religious field, did not, indirectly, favour the development of the *ṭarīqa* order. The *ṭarīqa* with its various branches survived, but remained low profile, as they were adhered to at a personal level.⁶³ Nevertheless, the impact of the *ṭarīqa*-styled expression continued to be prevalent among the religious features of Brunei. The popularity of various forms of *dhikr* is a clear example of this. Indeed, participation in such intense religious experience created a conducive atmosphere for further Islamization, that is a practitioner would be more open to pursue more serious religious knowledge. Such closer attachment to religion undoubtedly had potential to link the more-involved Muslims in the country with reformist movements in other Muslim societies.

Since the late 1960s, the Bruneians have seen the emergence of various religious activities, if not movements. Most of them were offshoots of parent-organizations abroad.⁶⁴ Some features of the activities were related to forms of martial art (*silat*). The most influential grouping at the time was the *Naṣrul Haqq*. It grew very fast in the Malay Peninsula following the May 1969 crisis. In Brunei a comparable movement took the form of a martial art association called *Silat Lintau*. It was propagated in the late 1970s by a certain Ishak bin Hassan of the Malay Peninsula. Its impact on Brunei was seen quite strongly among the youth, students and individuals of the armed forces and the police.⁶⁵ Undoubtedly, its strict discipline, protrusive symbols and promise of supernatural power were very attractive for many of them. In the early 1970s, a sergeant in the army propagated the teachings of the Mufarriḍiyya order; this order won a following among diverse segments of the population, primarily due to its liberal ideas on salvation. When these orders received more support among misinformed masses, the Mufti issued a *fatwā* condemning them as un-Islamic.⁶⁶

Brunei also actively participated in enhancing Islamic resurgence during the second half of this century. The concerted efforts at improving Islamic education and restoring institutions during the 1950s can be said to be Brunei's response to the ongoing awakening in the Islamic World. In the second-half of the 20th century, it was the ruler who took the initiative and sponsored many changes in religious administration and activities. The

restoration of Islam as the official religion of the state, as contained in the 1959 Constitution, was a loud and clear statement that Brunei had a firm commitment to Islamization. Indeed, a firm foundation for this had already laid from the 1960s. Towards fulfilling the spirit of the 1959 Constitution in relation to Islam, steps were taken in establishing more religious schools, opening of religious classes for adults, revamping of the mosque committees,⁶⁷ and publishing religious literature. This also coincided with the return of newly educated Bruneians from many higher education centres in the region and the Middle East. They were soon appointed to key positions in the religious bureaucracy. Some even published fresh and stimulating articles on Islam.⁶⁸ Moreover, in 1967 the Sultan called on the Bruneians to strive with greater vigour after implementing Islam as a way of life.⁶⁹

Although Brunei never witnessed the emergence of an Islamic party, the echo of Islamic revivalism can be seen in many features. First of all, the opening of religious schools since 1956 has created the opportunity for girls to be fully enrolled in religious instruction. Accordingly, Brunei women who became mothers since the mid-1960s had much better knowledge about scriptural Islam. In the long run they were more prone to adapt and practice features of orthodox Islam, including those relating to the education of their children and to their public appearance and modes of dressing. Indeed, by the late 1970s, for example, more and more Brunei women covered their heads in public.⁷⁰ Islam has become the subject of public discourse in Brunei, and even those who had advocated a secular lifestyle showed respect for the return to the pristine teachings of Islam.⁷¹ Religious gatherings and lectures became usual features in the government departments and, after independence, ministries.⁷² The initiatives of the ruler in bringing Brunei closer to the Muslim World had a lot to do with the formal adoption of Islamic leaning in the government circles.⁷³

POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (1984 onwards): AN OVERVIEW

New economic and financial institutions: The Islamic system

The increasing pressure on many Muslim countries to have an Islamic system of finance has led to the establishment of many new financial institutions. The tremendous price hike of oil and the consequent financial boom enjoyed by Muslim oil-producing countries after 1973 forced many Muslim governments to reform and modernize their monetary and financial systems. For example, since the mid-1970s attempts had been made among various Islamic circles to run an Islamic banking system. Indeed, the Muslim World League held several seminars on Islamic economics during the period. A positive response to the idea of having an Islamic banking system came from Dubai when the Islamic Bank of Dubai was founded in 1975. Before the end of the 1970s, no less than seven new financial institutions using an Islamic system were established, mostly in the Middle East. Outside the Middle East, Pakistan and Malaysia took similar steps when Islamic systems of banking were introduced into the existing banking system in 1981 and 1983 respectively.

In Brunei concrete steps toward the foundation of Islamic financial institutions took place from the end of the 1980s, after a period of Islamic revival, several aspects of which have already been described in this paper. Perhaps influenced by the increasing numbers of Islamic banks founded in many Islamic countries, a committee for the foundation of an Islamic Bank in Brunei was laid in 1987 (Abdul Aziz Juned, 1992: 186). More specifically, a definite plan for establishing an Islamic system in banking took place after the Ruler announced his support for the enterprise in late 1990.⁷⁴ A year later, in September 1991, an Islamic savings bank, known as *Tabung Amanah Islam Brunei* (TAIB), was established. It was modelled mainly on what had earlier been established in Malaysia. The primary aim of the institution was to provide financial services and business transactions in an Islamic way (*ibid.*: 188). The

success of the TAIB in attracting customers led to another major step in the Islamization of the financial system when, on January 13, 1993, the International Bank of Brunei was restructured to become the *Islamic Bank of Brunei*.

Thus, although Brunei Darussalam was not among the early protagonists of the Islamic financial system, it did not want to be left behind its brethren. Its participation in the increasingly popular and successful system shows that Brunei is well aware of its ties with the wider Muslim World.

When Southeast Asia was plagued with major financial crisis in 1997, Brunei was not exempted. However, its economic structure, especially its principal source of income, oil and gas, saved it from the destabilizing effect of the crisis.

Religious movements: revivalism

Rather serious religious movements emerged in Brunei with the increasing activities of some well-known orders. Since the early 1980s, the representatives of the Ahmadiyya order,⁷⁵ the *Jamā'at al-Arqām*,⁷⁶ and the *Tabligh* movement extended their preaching to Brunei. The *Tabligh* movement had attracted a few but dedicated followers among educated Bruneians, although their numbers were not very large. Perhaps due mainly to its low profile presence, the *Tabligh* did not raise eyebrows among religious authorities.⁷⁷

The leaders of the Ahmadiyya order formed a branch in Brunei in 1982. Since then it has developed into an active group, providing religious guidance for its followers. It has regular weekly meetings. As a group it has become an effective source of spiritual and socio-religious identification for the increasing numbers of followers.

The influence of the *Jamā'at al-Arqām* - elsewhere also known as *Dārul Arqām* - was felt in Brunei since the early 1980s. Many Bruneians who joined *al-Arqām* never formed a formal network linking to its headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. They joined the movements as individuals. The followers of the Arqām in Brunei, however, appeared in public quite similar to their brethren in the headquarters. Since they did not formally found a branch in the country, their activities centred on already existing traditional religious patterns. For example, they organized meetings concomitant with religious gatherings (*majlis*) such as *tahlil*, *tadārus*, and rites of passage. As their numbers increased, regular meetings were also held, especially to strengthen the bond and spread the teachings of the movement. Nevertheless, the stronger nucleus revolved around the individual families. It was here that the Arqāmīs of the country first implemented the religious model established by the leaders in Sungai Pencala in Kuala Lumpur.

When the leadership of the Arqām initiated a few controversial teachings around 1988, their impact upon the Arqāmīs in Brunei was not insignificant. The deviant view upheld by them during the period was that Muhammad al-Suhaimi will emerge as the Saviour (*al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar*) for Muslims. The Arqāmīs became more exclusive and acknowledged the supreme authority of the Arqām leader, *Ustādh Asy'ari* Muhammad; this can be seen, for example, in the high position given to his picture in the houses of the Arqāmīs.⁷⁸ Many Arqāmīs even went to Sungai Pencala to attend special gatherings (*majlis al-yaqāza*) led by the *Ustādh* to reveal those who sinned; these gatherings were apparently effective in making the Arqāmīs to be rather submissive to him. When it was clear that the Arqāmīs were becoming more aggressive in their efforts at winning over their followers and upholding their newly acquired ideology, the Brunei government banned the propagation of the Arqām teachings in the country on 12 February, 1991. Nevertheless, the Arqām phenomenon in Brunei shows clearly the enthusiasm of some segments of the population to Islamic activities. More specifically, it confirmed the link between Brunei and other Islamic centres.

Education

During the 1990s, the impact of Islamization and revivalism was strongly felt in the country. At the same time, Brunei was also vigilant toward any deviance in this trend as can be seen in its affirmative action against Jama'at al-Arqam in 1991. In the light of the complex contours of Islamic revivalism, Brunei reexamined its overall education policy and undertaking. The focus was redirected towards ways and means of instilling religious values among all Bruneians, especially pupils and students and, at the same time, moving forward as sophisticated citizens in the era of rapid advances in information and communication technology. In this context, higher education remained a pivotal concern. Exclusivism in Islamic education slowly gave way to comprehensiveness as advocated by prominent Muslim thinkers and educators.

Having achieved greater scholarship, Brunei's al-Azhar-trained scholars had no difficulty in building ties with other Muslim scholars internationally. Before joining al-Azhar University they had studied at the Al-Junied Religious School (Sekolah Arab Al-Junied) in Singapore,⁷⁹ and the Islamic College of Malaya in Kelang, Malaysia.⁸⁰ Brunei scholars completing their first degree at al-Azhar enjoyed access to a variegated academic circle. The years of interaction with different colleagues opened their minds to new and wider horizons. Indeed, a Brunei student in Cairo reported that his stay in Cairo not only introduced him to purely religious subjects but also to diverse other disciplines, and even to nationalism and military drills.⁸¹ Moreover, various collections of writings and poems written by Brunei students abroad, including Cairo, indicate that they read widely and participated in current scholarly debates and developments.⁸² Similarly, in her study on Indonesian students in Cairo, Mona Abaza noted that these students brought home with them outlooks nurtured by diverse social, intellectual, political and cultural exchanges during their long stay in Egypt.⁸³ Nevertheless, the strongest link maintained by these graduates was with their *alma mater*; for most of the experts in the different religious disciplines this was al-Azhar University, whereas middle rank officials generally completed their higher studies at religious institutions in Singapore and Malaysia. Despite their erudition and religious scholarship, Bruneians who graduated from al-Azhar opted for the evolutionary approach towards reform in the religious field.

The debates launched, policies made and changes introduced in making Islamic education more easily available and more sophisticated and responsive to challenges can all be considered natural outcomes of Brunei's relentless efforts in the search for a way of life in full consonance with Islamic teachings while maintaining Bruneian identity and within the context of the imperatives of living within a global environment with all its challenges and opportunities.

SUMMARY

The central issue of reform and revival in 20th century Brunei focuses on the relevance of Islam to the life of the nation. The stability and continuing pattern of Islamization in Brunei, including reform and revival, can be explained partly with reference to the country's determination to opt for the moderate implementation of Islam.

Brunei pays special attention to its position as a Muslim state. It has played a significant role among Muslim countries. It is also participating in the diverse networks operating among Muslim states and communities. Although Brunei has definitely opted for a particular version and expression of Islam, it has never closed its doors to more intensive communication with other Muslim countries. Contrary to what has been claimed by Braighlinn (1992: 64-65), Brunei's predilection for a particular version of Islam should not be seen as merely a political contingency. The widespread adoption of the traditional approach to Islam, in fact, has led

the political leaders to accommodate it within Brunei polity. It is pertinent to point out that the religious revivalism among Muslims worldwide has had a positive impact on Bruneian religious attitudes in that it has made Islam more meaningful and relevant. Following the more recent religio-political developments and socio-economic changes in the region, Brunei has pro-actively responded to new challenges; however, this topic which requires further study is more appropriate to be dealt with on another occasion.

By adhering to a well-defined belief system and religious practices, Brunei has maintained a relatively stable religious life. The strength of its religious bureaucracy has been effective in limiting the influence of controversial ideas and personalities. Some might argue that, despite its success in achieving religious uniformity and stability, Bruneians may still be prone to be influenced by new religious movements. The religious establishment seems to be aware of such challenges as suggested by their positive response to various developments in the Muslim World. Attempts made in the country in multifarious ways are a clear testimony that Bruneians are joining their other fellow Muslim brethren to live Islamically within the modern world.

END NOTES

¹ Hugh Low, *Sarawak: Inhabitants and Productions*. New Impression of 1988 (London: Frank Cass, 1848), p. 106; Spencer St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East: Travels in Sabah and Sarawak in the 1860s*. Reprint of the 1862 edition (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1886), p. 248; W. H. Treacher, "British Borneo: Sketches of Brunei, Sarawak, Labuan and North Borneo." *Journal of the Straits Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, 20 (1889): 27; *Brunei Annual Report (BAR)* 1906.

² W. H. Treacher, "British Borneo: Sketches of Brunei, Sarawak, Labuan and North Borneo." *Journal of the Straits Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, 20 (1889): 27; *Brunei Annual Report (BAR)* 1906.

³ Spencer St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East: Travels in Sabah and Sarawak in the 1860s*. Reprint of the 1862 edition (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1886), p. 248.

⁴ Earlier scholars such as Smith, Gibb, Rahman, Voll, and Watt have put forward some characteristics of the reform movement in Muslim society. See H.A.R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962); Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966); Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1984); W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); John Voll, "Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs: An Ulama Group in 18th Century Haramayn and Their Impact in the Islamic World," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 15 (1980), pp. 264-73; Voll, "Renewal and reform in Islamic history: Tajdid and Islah," in J. L. Esposito (ed.), *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1988).

In Islamic literature the idea of reform is expressed in many different ways. Among them are the emergence of *Mahdi* (saviour), the expectation of a *mujaddid* (reformer) around the turn of each Hijri century, and not least the inherence of *mujtahid* (original thinker and interpreter) for every age and place. On these topics see Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1981); G. Lewy, *Religion and Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

⁵ For some comparisons, see Edmund Burke III and Ira Lapidus, eds., *Islam, Politics and Social Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

⁶ See Iik Arifin, (1992), "Brunei Sebagai Sebuah Pusat Jaringan (Network) Intelektual Islam di Asia Tenggara," in *Sumbangsih UBD: Essays on Brunei Darussalam*, edited by Pehin Dato Hj. Abu Bakar Hj. Apang (BSB: Universiti Brunei of Danissalam, Akademi Pengajian Brunei, pp. 148-163; P. L. Amin Sweeney (ed.), "Silsilah Raja-Raja Berunai," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 41.2 (1968), B.

⁷ On the significance of *Syair Rakis* in the intellectual history of 19th century Brunei, see Hj. Matussin Omar, "Pengarang Syair Rakis -Pengiran Syahbandar Mohammad Salleh Ibnu Pengiran Syarmayuda-, Cita-cita Sosial dan Politiknya" (Bandar Seri Begawan: Brunei Museum, n. d.).

⁸ For more details on this, see the paper, "Intellectual Tradition in A Malay World: Ulama and Education in Brunei". *Jurnal Pendidikan*, 3, pp. 35-60.

⁹ Hugh Low, *Sarawak: Inhabitants and Productions*. New Impression of 1988 (London: Frank Cass, 1848), p. 106; Spencer St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East: Travels in Sabah and Sarawak in the 1860s*. Reprint of the 1862 edition (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1886), p. 248; W. H. Treacher, "British

Borneo: Sketches of Brunei, Sarawak, Labuan and North Borneo." *Journal of the Straits Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, 20 (1889): 27; *Brunei Annual Report (BAR)* 1906; Peter Blundell, *On the Fringe of Eastern Seas* (New York: R. M. McBride, 1924), p. 77; D. E. Brown, *Brunei: The Structure and History of A Bornean Malay Sultanate*, Brunei Museum Journal Monograph No. 2, 1970, pp. 40-41.

¹⁰ Treacher, "British Borneo", p. 40.

¹¹ In this work the term Jawi not *Jāwī* will be used throughout.

¹² Cf. *Brunei Annual Report* 1911:12-3.

¹³ The relationship was close as evidenced by the letter sent on 15 Safar 1321/1903 whereby the Sultan told his Ottoman counterpart about the difficult situation in Brunei. A copy of the letter is kept at the Brunei History Centre in Bandar Seri Begawan. Cf. D. S. Ranjit Singh, *Brunei 1839-1983: The Problems of Political Survival* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 96, note 71.

¹⁴ See *BAR* 1911.

¹⁵ Blundell's story (1924) gives us a glimpse of the economy of Brunei during the period.

¹⁶ Information on Haji 'Abdul Mokti is scattered throughout various notes and paragraphs written by different scholars, see Pehin Dato Hj. Yahya bin Hj. Ibrahim, "Pehin-Pehin Manteri Ugama Sebagai Institusi dan Peranan Mereka dalam Pentadbiran dan Pemerintahan Negara di Brunei", Paper for the *International Seminar on Islamic Civilization in the Malay World*, 1-5 June, 1989, Bandar Seri Begawan; Ahmad Ibrahim, "Undang-undang Islam di Malaysia", in Ismail Hussein et al. (eds.), *Tamadun Melayu*, 1: 334-53, Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1989; Suhaili bin Hj. Hassan et al., *Mengenal Tokoh-tokoh Agama di Brunei*, Bandar Seri Begawan: Brunei Museum, 1986; Suhaili bin Hj. Hassan et al., *Tokoh-Tokoh Agama di Brunei Darussalam: Pengenalan Ringkas*. Special Publication No. 23, Bandar Seri Begawan: Brunei Museum, 1992.

¹⁷ On the purchase of this house by Khatib 'Abdul Latif in 1807, see P. L. Amin Sweeney (ed.), "Silsilah Raja-raja Berunai", *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 41.2 (1968): B31.

¹⁸ *Tariqa* is often spelled tarekat in Malay/Indonesian. It is used to denote Islamic brotherhood which emphasizes experiential exercises in order to attach oneself closer to God. The followers of the *tariqa* generally maintain that their exercises are relevant to and derivative of the *shari'a* (Islamic teaching). For more detailed information on the *tariqa*, see F. de Jong, *Turuq and Turuq-Linked Institutions in Nineteenth Century Egypt. A Historical Study in Organizational Dimensions of Islamic Mysticism*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978; Hawash Abdullah, *Perkembangan Ilmu Tasawuf dan Tokoh-Tokohnya di Nusantara*, Surabaya: al-Ikhlās, 1980.

¹⁹ For more information on this development, see M. Chatib Quzwain, *Mengenal Allah. Suatu Studi mengenai Ajaran Tasawuf* Syekh 'Abdus-Samad al-Palimbani, Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1985; Anthony H. Johns, "Islam in the Malay World: An Explanatory Survey with some Reference to Quranic Exegesis", in R. Israel and Anthony H. Johns (eds.), *Islam in Asia: Southeast and East Asia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 115-161; Anthony H. Johns, "Quranic Exegesis in the Malay World: In Search of a Profile", in Andrew Rippin (ed.), *Approaches to the History of the Qur'an* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 257-8.

²⁰ Some preliminary studies can be found in Hj. Abd. Karim bin Hj. Abd. Rahnan, "Perkembangan Islam di Brunei: Satu Tinjauan dari Beberapa Sudut Bermula dari Abad ke-14 hingga Abad ke-19." Unpublished paper [1989]; also later in this paper.

²¹ For more details on this Shaykh see Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century: Daily Life, Customs and Learning. The Muslims of the East-Indian Archipelago*, tr. J.A. Monahan (Leiden: Brill, 1970), pp. 262, 276-78; Syed M. Naquib al-Attas, *Some Aspects of Sufism as Understood and Practised among the Malays* (Singapore: Malaysia Sociological Research Institute Ltd., 1963), pp. 32-33; Hawash Abdullah, *Perkembangan Ilmu Tasawuf*, pp. 177-82; Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), pp. 85-87; Martin van Bruinessen, "The Origins and Development of the Naqshbandi Order in Indonesia", *Der Islam* 67 (1990), pp. 169-70.

²² See the writings of Haji 'Abdul Mokti, for example the manuscript at the Brunei Museum BM/Arkib/63/80; also the writings of Pehin Mohd. Sa'd bin Juru Apong, for instance BM/Arkib/69/80.

²³ For a brief but helpful insight into the *shari'a*-mindedness of the followers of the Qādiriyya wa-Naqshbandiyya, see Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of Its History and Significance", *Studia Islamica* 44 (1976): 123-52; John Voll, "Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs", pp. 268-70; van Bruinessen, "The Origins and Development", p. 156.

²⁴ The wide circulation of such texts as 'Abd al-Samad al-Palimbangi's *Hidāyat al-Sālikīn* (1778), 'Abd Allāh ibn Husayn Ba'alawī's *Sullām al-Tawfiq* (1854), and Salīm ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Sumayr al-Hadramī's *Safinat al-Najā* (prior to 1853) among Muslims in Southeast Asia is well acknowledged, see Zamakhsyari, *Tradisi Pesantren*, 1982; Mohd. Nor bin Ngah, *Kitab Jawi: Islamic Thought of the Malay Muslim Scholars*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984; M. B. Hooker and Virginia Matheson "Jawi Literature in Patani: The Maintenance of an Islamic Tradition", *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 61.1 (1988): 1-86; van Bruinessen, "Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script used in the Pesantren Milieu", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 146 (1990): 226-69.

²⁵ See for example Arshad al-Banjari's *Sabil al-Muhtadin* (1781), his *Perukunan* (edited by his disciple 'Abd al-Rashid al-Banjari, Daud ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Idris al-Patani's *Kashf al-Ghumma* (1841), and Muhammad ibn Ismā'il's *Maṭla' al-Badrayn* (1885).

²⁶ Snouck, *Mekka*, p. 286.

²⁷ See *BAR* 1911.

²⁸ On this phenomenon see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982); Hooker and Matheson 1987. The presence of such institutions in Brunei was rejected, see Matassim Hj. Jibah, "Perkembangan Persekolahan Melayu di Brunei dalam Pentadbiran Sistem Residen 1906-1959", *Brunei Museum Journal* 5.3 (1983), p. 2. But as we shall see, by the second decade of the 20th century a number of *balai* in Kampung Air were extensively used for religious and educational purposes.

²⁹ For more information on this, see Hj. Abdul Latif Hj. Ibrahim, "Peranan Rumah-Rumah Perkumpulan dalam Masyarakat Melayu Brunei", in *Ikhtisar Budaya*, Bandar Seri Begawan: DBP, 1986-1976, pp. 87-9.

³⁰ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor (1992). Intellectual Tradition in a Malay World: Ulama and Education in Brunei. *Jurnal Pendidikan*, 3(3): 34-60.

³¹ The same spirit of defense was expressed by Awang Ahmad Shah of Tutong when he wrote in *Fajar Sarawak* 8 (15 May 1930) and 9 (June 1930); for more details see Iik, "Socio-Religious Changes in Brunei after the Pacific War", *Islamic Studies Quarterly Journal* 35.1 (1996), p. 49.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 51, referring to Minutes of State Council of 1913.

³³ The appointment of *qādi* seems to have taken place some time after 1913 and before 1915.

³⁴ The *qādi* continued to abide by the Courts Enactment of 1908 until May 1952 when it was replaced by 35¹

³⁵ At the time, this organization (*Persatuan Kesatuan Islam or Perkasa*) was the only one registered formally in the state. Its goals were focused on the achievement of prosperity, harmony, security and happiness of the people and the state; and on the improvement of Islamic education. It strove to defend the monarchy and implement Islamic teachings. The leaders of the organization consisted mainly of the higher nobility and religious officials.

³⁶ The terms *kathi* and *kadi* are the local derivatives of *qādi* (Muslim judge).

³⁷ The establishment of the Council since 1948, and particularly the implementation of the 1951 Courts Enactment on May 1, 1952, improved the reconsideration of appeals submitted by the Courts of Kathis, as the cases would be handled by experts in Islamic law in the Council. Previously the appeals were made to the State Council.

³⁸ Nevertheless we have to bear in mind that the universal contexts of the reform movement in the Muslim world during the period must also be taken into account. Muslims in Southeast Asia in different degrees were involved in the process of on-going Islamization. This means that communication between them on the one hand and with many other fellow Muslims in many parts of the world on the other got stronger with the advance of modern transportation and mass media. Their better knowledge of each other had an effect in magnifying exchanges of experience and information.

³⁹ The Enactment was adapted from the Islamic Laws Enactment of Kelantan. Some adjustment was made in accordance with the local conditions.

⁴⁰ According to the 1955 Enactment the Committee should consist of the *Mufti* as chairman, two members of the Religious Council, and six others either appointed from among the members of the Council or qualified religious experts. The quorum is specified to be a chairman and four other members. Even though the *Mufti* was specified as chairman of the Committee, the post of *Mufti* was left vacant until 1962, and thus the chairmanship was held by others. Only after the formation of the third committee in 1967, the *Mufti* occupied the chairmanship of the Committee.

⁴¹ The procedure of issuing a *fatwā* was specified that the *Mufti* was required to act meticulously by paying more attention to the opinions of the *Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah* school and the benefit and interest (*maslahat*) of the community.

⁴² This option is given in cases where the views of the Shāfi'is are against the general welfare of the community.

⁴³ It should be mentioned that among the *fuqahā'* a negative term (*tafiq*) has been used to indicate an individual's way of following the *shari'a* eclectically, by choosing suitable opinions of the diverse schools for very personal reasons.

⁴⁴ It can be argued that Islamic civilization has produced various works on many different fields, including *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis), *uṣūl al-dīn* (principles of belief), *fiqh* (Islamic law), *uṣūl al-fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), and Sufism. All claimed to have been derived from the two original sources, the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. Are these works intended to provide Muslims with the standard means and reference? Nevertheless, history of Muslim societies has shown the recurrent emergence of original thinkers (*mujtahids*) and reformers (*mujaddids*) who have also been sanctioned by Islam.

⁴⁵ It can also be argued that the formalization of Islamic education in Brunei has negatively affected the survival of traditional Islamic centers of learning such as the *balai*. The end of the *balai*'s role in providing

instruction and developing Islamic scholarship in general must be acknowledged as a loss for Brunei. Of course modern and sophisticated educational centers have been built to compensate for this; however, as we know they are still working hard to replace the loss caused by the downfall of the *balai* as educational center in this country.

⁴⁶ After 1930, Brunei regularly sent its students to be trained as teachers in many centers in the Malay Peninsula, England, Sarawak, and Sabah.

⁴⁷ Later, on January 28, 1918, he was promoted to a non-religious post, as *Datu' Perdana Menteri*.

⁴⁸ The popularity of the name Ikhwan al-Muslimin in the Malay World and its association with novel Islamic activities and modern organization around this period can be seen in the Malay Peninsula, Singapore and North Borneo.

⁴⁹ Haji Metasim bin Mat Ja'far, *Sifat Duapuluh dengan Syair Nasihat* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press, 1962).

⁵⁰ Since during the period, the Brunei government appointed religious officials, teachers and administrators from among the Malaysians, it is unavoidable that in some cases the writings in Brunei were products of such expatriates. I maintain that, they are not only few, they also represent the same religious tone and ideas as widely held in Brunei during the period.

⁵¹ Interestingly, one figure, Pehin Dato Mohammad Jamil, who was head of Language and Literature Bureau, participated actively in religious forum and discussions. The only explanation is that he belonged to the well-established religious family. He is a son of a higher religious official, *pehin menteri agama*. Despite his formal secular education, he showed keen interest in and deep intellectual curiosity on Islamic issues.

⁵² Most *ulama* of this generation were occupied with providing immediate religious need of the population. Since literacy was not very high, writing was not very effective in this direction.

⁵³ It is interesting that the Brunei People Party (*Parti Rakyat Brunei*) which mobilized the population for political activism in the late 1950s and early 1960s never seriously adopted an Islamic policy. It is rare that its leaders consciously used Islamic symbols or ideas to win support among Bruneians.

⁵⁴ His argument on the issue can be found in *Majalah Jabatan Hal-Ehwal Ugama Brunei* (hereafter *Majalah*) 23: 11-14; 24: 25-27. Cf. Pehin Dato Hj. Md. Zain Hj. Serudin, *Brunei Darussalam: Persepsi Sejarah dan Masyarakatnya* (Bandar Seri Begawan: Azza, 1992), pp. 91-102.

⁵⁵ In this case he quoted a royal statement during the celebration of the 'Id al-Fitr in 1967. "The aim [of all Islamic activities in Brunei] is to make Islam a comprehensive and auspicious way of life" (*Majalah* 24: 25). Furthermore, a writer argues (*Majalah* 14: 13-14) that Islam provides a complete set of teaching and discipline in this world: at personal and societal levels and even beyond. Islamic states should implement policies based on the Qur'an, *hadith* and opinions of Muslim scholars (*kerana ugama Islam tak pernah bersalahan atau pun memerangi fikiran yang waras dan tak pemah ugama itu menganjurkan sesuatu atau melarang sesuatu untuk keruntuhan manusia*). Indeed, justice and prosperity become Islam's goal - *balda jayyiba wa-rabb ghafur*. Rulers must be honest to their people. 'Ibada is not limited to worship: any good deeds for the sake of God. The Qur'an deals mostly with non-worship in a strict sense. Muslims should take life seriously to prepare their future (*dunia dan akhirat tak dapat dipisahkan*). Our backwardness now is caused by such neglect of worldly affairs.

⁵⁶ *Majalah* 17:21-2, in the context of youth as "hope of the future". The maintenance of morality is obligatory upon every individual Muslim. If necessary, special rules and police have to be established to eradicate immorality. (*Majalah* 10:7-8) Pg. Ali, a former head of Department of Religious Affairs asserts that our quest for modernity should not contradict Islam and Brunei custom. He praised the spread of schools and religious classes for adult. (*Majalah* 10:15-16) Dato Marsal Maun insists that in such crucial time, people need to show responsibility to religion and nation. The government planned to have general elections to give people opportunities to send their representatives to the State Council.

⁵⁷ According to him, *Brunei mengiktiraf wujudnya bangsa lain dan agama, tetapi ini tidaklah bermakna penerimaan terhadap konsep 'Brunei sebagai sebuah negara yang berbilang bangsa dan berbilang agama dalam amalan rasmi begara.'*

⁵⁸ (*Majalah* 17: 12,23) "... kita di negeri Brunei yang penduduknya terdiri daripada berbagai bangsa dan berbagai ugama hendaklah kita mencari semangat dan bekerjasama, khususnya dalam melahirkan keamanan dan ketenteraman."

⁵⁹ *Lambaian Islam* 1971: 77-94. In deflating the popular negative ideas of the time, a writer argues that it is wrong to assume that the present decline of the *umma* has anything to do with Islamic precepts of "do-and-don't". Indeed, modernity cannot be symbolized with night club, sauna parlour and beer. Only with knowledge Muslims may overcome the prevailing crisis and become more assertive.

⁶⁰ (*Majalah* 2: 31-32) When a person feels that success comes only from material gains, he can easily regard Islam as handicap to progress. "*Islam menyuruh berusaha*" (supported with three Qur'anic verses and sophisticated arguments). "*Islam adalah ugama pembangunan yang menggerakkan manusia ke jalan keselamatan hidup di dunia dan akhirat.... Malahan manusia wajib berusaha untuk memperoleh*

kebahagian dan menghindaan kepapaan di dalam dunia. Adalah merusak keimanan untuk mengatakan bahwa kemiskinan adalah nasib dan takdir Allah."

⁶¹ In the words of Ustadh 'Abd al-Hamid Bakal, time in this world is invaluable. Muslims should perform his responsibilities to the world and to God. They should take advantage of their short stay in this world to have enough preparation now and in the hereafter, including worship to God and good deeds toward oneself, family, society and nation (*Majalah* 27: 11-3).

⁶² Iik Arifin, "Brunei Sebagai Sebuah Pusat Jaringan (Network) Intelektual Islam di Asia Tenggara," in Dato Abu Bakar Apong (ed.), *Sumbangsih UBD: Essays on Brunei Darussalam* (Bandar Seri Begawan: Academy of Brunei Studies, 1992), pp. 148-163.

⁶³ In my opinion, several factors caused the *fariqa* to be practiced at a personal level. First, the informality of the *fariqa* orders did not fit into the legal reform launched by the authorities. Second, the requirement to have a licence to spread Islamic teachings deterred the mushrooming of orders in their full-fledged form. This is despite the fact that the *fariqa* practices survived in local forms or practices for personal religious satisfaction. Third, the structure of Islamic leadership in the country in which the ruler topped the religio-political ladder put pressure on the *fariqa* to run leaderless or to accept the status quo.

⁶⁴ Since our focus here is on the Islamic organizations, we put aside the discussion on such groupings as the Baha'is who won converts in Brunei during the 1960s.

⁶⁵ Suhaili, "Penyelewengan dari Dasar Aqidah Ahli Sunnah", p. 238.

⁶⁶ See the Mufti's *fatwa* No. 39-46/MKB.2/1971; cf. Hjh. Aishah binti OKML Haji Md. Yusof, "Pusat Da'wah Islamiah dan Islamisasi di Brunei Darussalam" (Thesis. Post-Graduate Studies, State Institute of Islamic Studies, Jakarta, 1993), p. 147-148.

⁶⁷ In 1964 the Islamic Council of Brunei formed a central committee of mosques. It became a model for local mosque committees throughout the country. In 1970 the number of mosques reached 40 with 77 officials, including 54 imams. See Aishah, "Pusat Da'wah Islamiah", p. 318.

⁶⁸ See several religious columns in *Pelita Brunei* 1966.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, December 1967.

⁷⁰ I got this impression when comparing pictures of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, as well as my own personal observation of Brunei students in Cairo during the mid-1970s and those in recent times. Cf. Robert Malley, "Feature: A New Middle East," *The New York Review of Books* 53 (September 21, 2006): 14.

⁷¹ Aishah, "Pusat Da'wah Islamiah", pp. 338-40.

⁷² A senior officer in the Department of Religious Affairs complained in December 1979 that many prominent Bruneians wanted to negate the role of Islam in public life by among other things encouraging the opening of more places for entertainment. Yet it was these same persons who felt uneasy about the juvenile delinquency and thus advocated "quite seriously" the provision of Islamic teaching to the public. Quoted in Aishah, "Pusat Da'wah Islamiah", p. 338, note 14.

⁷³ Since independence Brunei has become member of various international and regional Islamic bodies and organizations, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Moreover, the Islamic influence on government officers grew stronger, see the articles by Hj. Badaruddin P. Hj. Othman, *Ugama dengan Pegawai Kerajaan* (Bandar Seri Begawan: Information Department, 1982); Hj. Badaruddin P. Hj. Othman, *Ugama Rasmi: Latar Belakang dan Sumbangan Pegawai Kerajaan* (Bandar Seri Begawan: Information Department, 1983).

⁷⁴ "As a nation with a strong Islamic basis, we have the obligation to take steps forward presenting ourselves among other countries which have set up [Islamic financial] enterprises" (*Sebagai sebuah negara yang mempunyai teras keislaman yang kuat, maka kita adalah wajib melangkah ke hadapan turut menampilkan diri bersama-sama mereka yang telah memulakan usaha*), quoted in Pehin Abdul Aziz Juned 1992: 190-1.

⁷⁵ For more information on the Ahmadiya order (Tariqa Ahmadiya) in the broader context, see Hamdan 1990. This order should not be confused with either Qadiani or Lahore Ahmadiya. The Ahmadiya order has headquarters in Egypt.

⁷⁶ For more information on the Jamā'at al-Arqām, see Judith Nagata, *The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984).

⁷⁷ For more details on the Tabligh activities in Brunei see Aishah, "Pusat Da'wah Islamiah", pp. 199-211, and on the Ahmadiya pp. 162-79.

⁷⁸ Aishah, "Pusat Da'wah Islamiah dan Islamisasi di Brunei Darussalam." Thesis. Post-Graduate Studies, State Institute of Islamic Studies, Jakarta, 1993, p.193.

⁷⁹ The first batch of Brunei students joined this institution in 1950. It consisted of three students, including the present minister of Religious Affairs. The sending of Bruneians to Al-Junied continued until 1983, when Brunei Arabic Secondary School graduates were directly admitted to al-Azhar University, without attending preparatory years at Al-Junied.

⁸⁰ The three students who finished their Islamic secondary education joined the Islamic College in 1956. They were followed by others until the early 1970s.

⁸¹ *Pelita Brunei* 19 March 1961, p. 2.

⁸² On these collections see, for example, Yahya M. S., *Perjalanan Malam Kalimantan Menuju Siang: Kumpulan Puisi Pilihan 1961-1984* (Bandar Seri Begawan: Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1988), especially p. 76-9, 118-55; *Puisi Hidayat*, vol. 1 and 2. Bandar Seri Begawan: Jabatan Hal-Ehwal Ugama, Siri Rangkaian Islamiyah No.1 (1971) and 2 (1975); *Pakatan: Antologi Sajak* (Bandar Seri Begawan: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1976).

⁸³ Abaza, "Changing Images of Three Generations of Azharites in Indonesia", ISEAS Occasional Paper No. 88 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).

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