

A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah
Jannatul Ferdous *Editors*

Governance, Migration and Security in International Relations



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Preface

The edited volume explores the complex and dynamic relationships between governance, migration, and global security in the modern world. This volume brings together a wide range of scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to examine the multifaceted nature of migration and its implications for international relations and security.

Migration as a global phenomenon has become an integral part of the intricate web of the modern world. Various factors influence it, including economic opportunities, environmental concerns, political conflicts, and social aspirations. Cross-border migration presents challenges and opportunities to states, societies, and individuals. The governance of migration and its impact on international relations and security have emerged as essential areas that require in-depth study and analysis. This anthology aims to enhance our understanding of migration governance in the context of contemporary international relations and security issues. It analyzes the policies, practices, and frameworks states and international organizations use to manage migration flows and address related security issues. This book provides a holistic perspective on the complex dynamics by examining the intersecting disciplines of governance, migration, international relations, and security.

The chapters in this volume address various issues and concerns, including migration policy, border control, human rights, security, refugee protection, displacement, and transnational organized crime. The authors illuminate the complexities of migration policy and its implications for international relations and security using a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches.

We recognize the inherent complexity and moral ambiguity associated with migration governance. Migration governance is not just a national concern; it is intertwined with more considerable global challenges such as economic inequality, climate change, human rights abuses, and political instability. Effective migration management, therefore, requires a comprehensive and collaborative strategy that takes into account the rights, dignity, and well-being of migrants while addressing the legitimate security and socioeconomic concerns of states.

This book also underscores the interaction between migration and security. While the securitization of migration has often been used as a framework, we emphasize the need for a balanced and nuanced approach. Examining the complex interactions between migration, governance, and security, we aim to challenge prevailing narratives and contribute to a more informed and constructive dialog on these critical issues.

We sincerely thank the authors who contributed their time, expertise, and insights to this anthology. Their scholarly rigour and diverse perspectives enrich the discourse on governance, migration, international relations, and security. We also thank readers for their interest in this complex and multifaceted topic.

We hope this book will stimulate meaningful discussions and encourage further research, policy development, and active action on migration policy. By examining the interconnectedness of migration, governance, international relations, and security, we aim to promote inclusive, humane, and rights-based approaches that improve the well-being of migrants, foster cooperation among states, and contribute to global peace and security.

Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam
Cumilla, Bangladesh
2023

A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah
Jannatul Ferdous

Contents

Part I Migration and International Relations

- 1 Introduction Connecting Governance, Migration, International Relations, and Security** 3
A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah and Jannatul Ferdous
- 2 Revisiting International Migration Governance** 17
Jannatul Ferdous
- 3 International Relations Versus International Migration: Complements or Substitutes?** 33
Diotima Chattoraj
- 4 Migration and Overseas Employment Governance in Bangladesh: Outlook and Challenges** 49
H. M. Khalid Hossain Bhuiyan and Warefta Rahman

Part II Governance, International Relations and Security

- 5 Re-imagining Migration and Security** 73
Jannatul Ferdous and Niaz Ahmed Khan
- 6 Great Power Competition and Cyber Security** 89
Marko Pavićević and Mohammad Razaul Karim
- 7 China's Strategic Partnership with Bangladesh: India's Reaction and Global Migration Effects** 103
Mohammad Razaul Karim
- 8 Renewed Agenda for International Relations and Implications for Migration** 117
Jannatul Ferdous and Niaz Ahmed Khan

9 Migration, International Relations, Governance, and Security	
Fallacies Debunked	131
Jannatul Ferdous and A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah	
Author Index	147

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Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BMET	Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training
BOESL	Bangladesh Overseas Employment Services Limited
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAA	Citizenship Amendment Act
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IR	International Relations
MEWOE	Ministry of Overseas Welfare and Employment
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NELM	New Economics of Labour Migration
NRC	National Register of Citizens
PKB	Probashi Kallyan Bank
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Asom
UN	United Nations
WEWB	Wage Earner's Welfare Board
WHO	World Health Organization

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1	Overseas employment in 2023 (upto April 2023). <i>Source</i> Illustrated from Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (http://www.old.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/statisticalDataAction)	52
Fig. 4.2	MoEW & OE and its attached agencies. <i>Source</i> The Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment (MEWOE). http://www.probash.gov.bd/	57
Fig. 4.3	Policy making process in overseas employment. <i>Source Illustrated from</i> Islam, (2016), pp. 16	62

List of Tables

Table 4.1	Top 10 countries with the highest number of emigrants (former residents living internationally)	51
Table 4.2	Total overseas employment of Bangladesh (1976–2023)	53

Part I
Migration and International Relations

Chapter 1

Introduction Connecting Governance, Migration, International Relations, and Security



A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah and Jannatul Ferdous

Governance, migration, international relations, and security interact in a complex and varied approach that has enormous repercussions for individuals, societies, and states worldwide. Governance refers to the structures, institutions, and processes established to administer and regulate society, such as political, economic, and legal frameworks (International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2015). Various variables typically influence migration, including economic opportunities, political instability, violence, and environmental change (ILO, 2017). International relations are the ties between nations and the many actors in the global world, such as governments, international organizations, and non-state actors such as corporations and civil society groups. In this context, security refers to protecting persons and society from various threats, such as armed conflict, terrorism, and cyberattacks (Ullah, 2018; Ullah & Huque, 2020). The relationship between these four domains is intricate and frequently complicated. For instance, governance frameworks can influence the extent to which migration is facilitated or restricted, with policies such as border control and immigration restrictions substantially affecting who can cross borders and under what conditions (Hossain & Ullah, 2004; Ullah, 2009). Nevertheless, migration can substantially affect governance, as the influx of new populations frequently alters political, economic, and social systems.

Consequently, international relations significantly impact the governance structures and migration policies of individual nations (Ullah, 2015). The acts of international organizations, such as the United Nations, can affect the policies and practices of individual nations. Still, trade agreements and other types of international cooperation can increase cross-border migration. Lastly, security concerns significantly

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impact states' policies and practices about governance and migration (Czaika et al., 2014). Fears about terrorism and other security threats can result in more robust border controls and limits on the movement of people (Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018), while armed conflict and other types of violence can cause massive migration and displacement.

The research gap in the fields of governance, migration, international relations, and security is evident in the limited number of comprehensive studies that examine the interconnections and interdependencies among these areas. While a significant body of research focuses on each of these fields individually, there needs to be integrated analyses that explore the complex relationships and synergies between them. Bridging this research gap is crucial for developing a more nuanced understanding of how governance structures, international relations frameworks, and security considerations intersect and shape migration dynamics. Such research would contribute to a more holistic approach to policymaking and enable the identification of effective strategies to address the challenges and opportunities arising from the complex interplay of governance, migration, international relations, and security. By filling this research gap, scholars can provide valuable insights that inform evidence-based decision-making and contribute to developing comprehensive frameworks to address the multifaceted nature of these issues.

The lack of research addressing governance, migration, international relations, and security in a combined framework is a notable gap in the existing literature. While each of these topics has been extensively studied in isolation, there needs to be more comprehensive and integrated research that examines the intricate interplay between them. Understanding the complex dynamics between governance, migration, international relations, and security requires an interdisciplinary approach considering the political, social, economic, and legal dimensions. By exploring these topics together, we gain a more holistic understanding of the challenges and opportunities posed by migration, the implications for international relations, and the broader security implications at global, regional, and local levels. Bridging this research gap is essential for informing evidence-based policies and fostering effective collaboration among various stakeholders in addressing the complexities of contemporary migration and security dynamics.

The book deconsecrates that the interplay between governance, migration, international relations, and security is a complex and constantly evolving dynamic that has significant implications for individuals, societies, and nations worldwide. Understanding these dynamics and their implications is critical for policymakers, academics, and anyone interested in how our global community is shaped and governed. The study of governance, migration, international relations, and security has become increasingly significant in the scholarship of today's globalized world for several reasons (Ullah et al., 2020). First, globalization has led to an unprecedented level of interconnectedness between nations, resulting in a need for increased understanding of how governance frameworks, migration patterns, and international relations impact security both within and between nations (Cholewinski et al., 2008).

Second, the movement of people across borders has become a significant issue in today's world, with more people on the move now than at any time in human history.

Understanding the drivers and consequences of migration is essential for policymakers seeking to develop effective immigration policies and manage migration's social and economic impacts. Third, international relations' increasingly complex and interdependent nature requires scholars and policymakers to develop a nuanced understanding of how different actors, including governments, international organizations, and non-state actors, interact and influence each other. This understanding is critical for policymakers seeking to build effective international partnerships and respond to global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and economic crises. Fourth, security concerns have become increasingly pressing today, with the rise of non-state actors such as terrorist groups and the proliferation of cyber threats. Understanding the complex interplay between governance, migration, and international relations is critical for developing effective strategies to address these threats and ensure the safety and security of individuals and societies worldwide (Betts & Collier, 2017). Studying governance, migration, international relations, and security is essential for a comprehensive understanding of the complex and interconnected challenges facing our global community in the 21st century. As such, it is critical for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners seeking to address these challenges and build a more peaceful, just, and sustainable world.

Governance, migration, international relations, and security are interconnected and interdependent in several ways, and their interaction can have significant implications for individuals, societies, and nations worldwide (Bommes, & Geddes, 2000). First, governance frameworks play a critical role in shaping the policies and practices related to migration and security. Governments set policies and regulations determining who can enter and exit their borders, under what conditions, and with what rights and protections (Joppke, 1999). These policies, in turn, can have significant implications for the individuals and communities affected by them and the societies and economies of the sending and receiving countries.

Second, migration patterns can have significant implications for governance and international relations. Large-scale migration can lead to significant demographic changes and political power shifts while impacting economic and social structures (Ullah et al, 2021b). This can create challenges for governance systems, which must adapt to changing circumstances, as well as for international relations, as sending and receiving countries negotiate the terms of migration and the responsibilities of each party. Third, international relations play a critical role in shaping the governance frameworks and policies related to migration and security (Guild, 2011). International organizations and agreements, such as the United Nations, can influence the policies and practices of individual nations. In contrast, trade agreements and other forms of international cooperation can create increased migration and mobility opportunities. Fourth, security concerns can impact governance frameworks and policies related to migration. Concerns around terrorism and other forms of violence can lead to tighter border controls and restrictions on the movement of people. In contrast, military conflict and other forms of violence can drive large-scale migration and displacement.

Governance, migration, international relations, and security are interconnected and interdependent, and their interaction can have significant implications for individuals, societies, and nations worldwide. Understanding these dynamics and their

implications is critical for policymakers, academics, and anyone interested in how our global community is shaped and governed (Kabir & Alam, 2023; Weiner, 1995).

Evolution of Migration Governance

Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has shaped societies throughout history. As people have moved across borders in search of better opportunities, safety, or refuge, the issue of how to govern and manage migration has become increasingly critical. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the evolution of migration governance, examining the key milestones and shifts in approach from early historical periods to the present day.

Migration has been a constant feature of human history, with various forms of governance emerging to regulate the movement of people. In ancient civilizations, city-states often established rules and regulations to control the influx of migrants. For instance, the Code of Hammurabi in ancient Babylon addressed the rights and obligations of migrants and imposed penalties for illegal entry or overstaying. Similarly, the Silk Road facilitated people's movement across continents, establishing trade routes and systems to manage migration flows.

The era of colonization brought about significant changes in migration governance. European powers established colonies worldwide, resulting in forced migrations and the displacement of indigenous populations. During this period, migration policies primarily served the interests of colonial powers, with little consideration for the rights and well-being of migrants. The transatlantic slave trade was a brutal manifestation of this approach, where millions of Africans were forcibly transported to the Americas as part of a highly exploitative system.

The rise of nation-states in the 19th and 20th centuries brought about new challenges and approaches to migration governance. Governments began to assert control over their borders and develop policies to regulate the entry and settlement of migrants. The Industrial Revolution and the need for labour in rapidly growing economies led to guest worker programs and recruitment schemes, which sought to manage labour migration flows while maintaining control over the workforce.

The aftermath of World War II and the horrors of the Holocaust highlighted the need for a more comprehensive approach to migration governance, particularly for those fleeing persecution or conflict. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 marked a significant turning point, leading to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This landmark document recognized the right to asylum and laid the foundation for international agreements and frameworks protecting refugees and migrants.

Globalization, economic interdependence, and technological advancements have reshaped migration governance in recent decades. Countries have increasingly recognized the benefits of migration for their economies and have adopted more comprehensive migration policies. The shift towards comprehensive approaches acknowledges the interconnectedness of migration with various sectors, such as labour

markets, social welfare, and integration. This approach emphasizes the rights of migrants while addressing concerns related to security, social cohesion, and economic impacts (Castles, & Miller, 2009).

Migration governance has also seen the emergence of regional integration initiatives and bilateral agreements. Examples include the European Union's Schengen Agreement, allowing passport-free travel among member states, and various free movement agreements in other regions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These regional arrangements aim to facilitate labour mobility, enhance economic cooperation, and promote regional stability while ensuring some level of regulation and governance.

While significant progress has been made in migration governance, numerous challenges persist. Irregular migration, human trafficking, and exploiting migrants continue to be pressing concerns. Additionally, the global displacement crisis and increased climate-induced migration pose new challenges that require innovative and collaborative approaches. Governments, international organizations, civil society, and other stakeholders must work together to develop inclusive and human rights-based migration governance frameworks that balance security concerns with protecting migrants' rights.

Significance of Migration in International Relations

Migration, international relations, and security have become increasingly significant in today's reality due to many interconnected factors. Globalization, geopolitical shifts, socioeconomic disparities, and the rise of non-state actors have all contributed to the growing importance of these issues. This paper explores how and why migration, international relations, and security have gained such prominence in contemporary times.

Globalization has transformed the world into a highly interconnected and interdependent system. Rapid transportation, communication, and technology advancements have facilitated greater mobility, making migration a more feasible option for individuals and communities (Sassen, 2000). The movement of people across borders for various purposes, such as economic opportunities, education, and seeking asylum, has become more prevalent. This increased mobility has profound implications for societies, economies, and the dynamics of international relations.

Demographic changes play a crucial role in the significance of migration today. Aging populations, declining birth rates, and labour market demands have created demographic imbalances, particularly in developed countries. The need for skilled workers, as well as labour-intensive sectors, has fuelled the demand for migrant workers. Migration has become essential to economic growth, filling gaps in labour markets and contributing to innovation, entrepreneurship, and remittances.

Socioeconomic disparities and political instability have driven significant flows of forced migration, including refugees and internally displaced persons. Conflicts, persecution, human rights violations, and environmental factors have uprooted

millions of people, leading to protracted humanitarian crises. These forced migrations have captured global attention and have become a pressing concern for the international community. The management and protection of refugees and displaced persons have become critical issues in international relations, requiring coordinated efforts and multilateral cooperation.

In today's reality, migration, international relations, and security are inherently interconnected. The movement of people across borders has implications for national security, public safety, and social cohesion. The transnational nature of threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, and spreading of infectious diseases, necessitates cooperation and information sharing among nations. The ability of non-state actors to exploit migration flows and undermine security has heightened the need for comprehensive approaches to border management, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism efforts.

The protection of human rights has emerged as a fundamental aspect of migration governance and international relations. Recognizing that migrants, regardless of their status, are entitled to dignity, safety, and fair treatment has gained significant traction. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements provide the foundation for protecting migrants' rights. Governments and international organizations face balancing security concerns with protecting human rights, fostering integration, and combating xenophobia and discrimination.

The impact of climate change has amplified the significance of migration, international relations, and security. Rising sea levels, natural disasters, desertification, and resource scarcity can potentially displace millions in the coming decades. Climate-induced migration presents complex challenges, including needing pre-emptive measures, international cooperation, and sustainable development practices. The nexus between environmental pressures, migration, and conflict requires integrated approaches to address the root causes and mitigate future risks.

Migration Governance and Security

Migration governance and security are dynamic and evolving areas of study, particularly in the context of the global south and global north (Williams, 2012). The unique challenges, contexts, and perspectives in these regions have resulted in the emergence of new knowledge and insights. This paper explores critical developments and understandings regarding migration governance and security in the global south and north, highlighting the similarities, differences, and implications for policymaking and international cooperation.

Global South: Migration Governance and Security

The global south often experiences complex mixed migration flows involving various categories of migrants, including economic migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons. This necessitates flexible and context-specific migration governance frameworks to address the diverse needs and vulnerabilities of different migrant groups.

Regional organizations and initiatives play a crucial role in migration governance in the global south. For example, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have developed regional frameworks, such as the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, to facilitate safe, orderly, and regular migration within the region. These initiatives emphasize regional cooperation, labour mobility, and the protection of migrants' rights.

In the global south, human security is often central to migration governance. This approach considers the multidimensional security aspects, including human rights, development, and social cohesion (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). It highlights the importance of addressing the root causes of migration, such as poverty, inequality, and conflict, to ensure sustainable and inclusive outcomes.

Global North: Migration Governance and Security

The global north has witnessed a trend of securitizing migration, mainly due to security concerns, terrorism threats, and public anxieties. This approach often emphasizes border control, surveillance, and restrictive policies, which can have implications for human rights and the protection of vulnerable migrants (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2000).

In the global north, migration governance increasingly focuses on integration and social cohesion. Policies and initiatives are designed to promote the participation and inclusion of migrants in host societies, recognizing their contributions to economies and cultural diversity. Integration programs often encompass language training, access to education, employment opportunities, and community engagement.

Migration governance in the global north involves extensive bilateral and transnational cooperation, mainly through agreements and partnerships with countries of origin and transit. Collaboration on border management, information sharing, and capacity building initiatives are common to address irregular migration and combat transnational criminal networks.

The global south and global north can benefit from comprehensive approaches to migration governance that address economic, social, and security dimensions. This requires coordination among various sectors and stakeholders, including governments, international organizations, civil society, and the private sector. A human rights-based approach is essential in migration governance in both regions. Protecting migrants' rights, ensuring their access to justice, and addressing vulnerabilities

are critical for promoting security, social cohesion, and sustainable development. Enhanced knowledge sharing and capacity building between the global south and the global north can lead to more effective migration governance and security outcomes. Sharing experiences, best practices, and lessons learned can contribute to evidence-based policymaking and improved cooperation.

This chapter summarizes the chapters and analyses their contributions to our understanding of the institutions, politics, and normative aspects of international migration governance. The conclusion presents contrasting perspectives on the future of global migration governance. Let us highlight the messages conveyed in the following chapters and examine the extent to which the chapters are consistent with the main argument of this volume.

Chapter 2 describes the components of international migration governance. It consists of the laws, regulations, and customs governing individuals' movement across international borders. In recent years, the issue of international migration has become more complicated and contentious, as large-scale migration and displacement pose significant challenges for governments and societies. It is necessary to revisit international migration governance to address these obstacles and build a more complete and adequate framework for controlling migration. Examining existing policies and practices critically, identifying areas for improvement, and establishing new ways that are more sensitive to the needs of migrants, their host communities, and the larger global community are the objectives of this chapter.

Revisiting international migration governance is imperative in evolving migration patterns and global challenges. The current landscape of migration is characterized by increasing complexity, including mixed migration flows, forced displacement, and climate-induced migration. Consequently, the existing governance frameworks may need to address contemporary migration's multifaceted nature adequately. By revisiting international migration governance, scholars and policymakers can reassess the effectiveness of existing mechanisms, identify gaps, and propose innovative approaches that are responsive to the needs of migrants, uphold human rights, and promote sustainable and inclusive development. This process requires a collaborative effort involving governments, international organizations, civil society, and academia to ensure a comprehensive and holistic approach that considers the diverse factors influencing migration and its impacts on societies, economies, and security.

Furthermore, revisiting international migration governance necessitates shifting focus towards cooperation and partnership. The challenges posed by migration are transnational and require collective action and shared responsibility. This entails strengthening regional and global cooperation frameworks, such as regional integration initiatives, bilateral agreements, and multilateral cooperation mechanisms. It also involves engaging with countries of origin, transit, and destination to foster dialogue, information sharing, and capacity building. By revisiting international migration governance through a lens of cooperation, policymakers can strive for more coordinated and coherent responses to migration challenges while ensuring that the rights and well-being of migrants are at the forefront of decision-making processes.

Chapter 3 investigates whether International Relations and International Migration complement each other. Migration is a result of globalization and strengthens cross-border socioeconomic and political ties, as proven by both academic research and practical experience. There is little doubt that globalization has displaced millions of people and set in motion difficult-to-control population shifts. Hence, increased migration is one of globalization's most apparent and significant facets: an increasing number of individuals relocate inside and beyond national borders in search of better economic opportunities and lifestyles. Migration contributes to sustainable development despite its typically unfavourable perception. With the help of proper policies, remittances can contribute to local economic growth in low-income and emerging nations such as India and Bangladesh. Even in several industrialized nations with aging populations, such as Europe and Southeast Asia, migrant workers comprise a growing labour force and sustain national welfare systems. The national and international policy must acknowledge migration's contribution to sustainable development and expressly defend migrants' rights, which are often disregarded in efforts to restrict their mobility. This qualitative study collects data through Internet research, document and report analysis, and a review of numerous pertinent literature. Existing data indicates that migrants/migration establish and influence state-to-state interactions, and that these relations should be fully explored. Thus, international migration enhances international relations.

Chapter 4 shows that managing migration and foreign employment governance has become increasingly important in Bangladesh because of the high emigration rate and the influx of remittances. Bangladesh's government has recognized migration's importance as critical to economic growth and poverty reduction. As a result, it has established governance mechanisms to regulate migration flows, protect the rights of migrant workers, and ensure the welfare of the diaspora population. The creation of institutions such as the Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (BMET) and the Wage Earners' Welfare Board (WEWB) reflects the government's commitment to managing migration and addressing the needs of Bangladeshi migrant workers abroad. However, despite these efforts, challenges persist in the governance of migration and overseas employment in Bangladesh.

One of the critical challenges is the issue of migrant worker protection and welfare. Despite the government's efforts to enforce regulations and establish bilateral agreements with destination countries, exploitation, abuse, and human rights violations still occur. Migrant workers often face challenges related to recruitment practices, working conditions, wage theft, and limited access to legal remedies. Strengthening mechanisms for pre-departure orientation, providing better protection during the recruitment process, and establishing effective channels for addressing grievances are crucial steps in enhancing the governance of migration and overseas employment in Bangladesh. Additionally, ensuring effective coordination and cooperation between government agencies, recruitment agencies, civil society organizations, and destination countries is essential for addressing the multifaceted challenges faced by migrant workers.

Another challenge lies in the reintegration and utilization of remittances for sustainable development. Bangladesh is heavily dependent on remittances, which

contribute significantly to its economy. However, there is a need to develop effective mechanisms for utilizing remittances to promote inclusive and sustainable development. This includes initiatives to enhance financial literacy among migrant workers and their families, promote investments in productive sectors, and facilitate diaspora engagement in national development processes. Additionally, addressing the issue of brain drain and promoting skill development and entrepreneurship among returnee migrants are essential aspects of migration and overseas employment governance in Bangladesh. By addressing these challenges, Bangladesh can further strengthen its governance frameworks to maximize the benefits of migration and overseas employment for its development.

Chapter 5 shows that migration and security in a global context require a change of perspective and approaches that move beyond the traditional framework of securitization. Instead of solely focusing on border control and national security concerns, re-imagining migration and security entails recognizing the interconnectedness of migration with various global challenges. This includes factors such as economic inequalities, social cohesion, human rights, and sustainable development. By adopting a comprehensive and human-centred approach, policymakers can address the complexities of migration and security in a more inclusive and effective manner.

Re-imagining migration and security also requires embracing a collaborative and multilateral approach. Migration is a global phenomenon that transcends national boundaries, and addressing its challenges necessitates international cooperation and shared responsibility (Ullah et al., 2021a). This involves fostering dialogue, information sharing, and capacity building among countries of origin, transit, and destination. It also involves engaging with international organizations, civil society, and the private sector to develop innovative solutions and policies that balance security concerns with respect for human rights and the dignity of migrants. By re-imagining migration and security in a global context, we can strive for a more holistic and forward-thinking approach that promotes the well-being of migrants, ensures the security of societies, and fosters inclusive and sustainable development worldwide.

Chapter 6 discussed an essential and nearly new area of competition among great powers and cybersecurity, which has significant implications for migration governance in today's global landscape. As major powers vie for influence and dominance, cyber warfare and security threats have become prominent tools in their strategic arsenal. Migration governance, which deals with the movement of people across borders, is not immune to these dynamics. The increasing digitization of migration processes, such as visa applications, border controls, and information sharing, opens up vulnerabilities that state and non-state actors can exploit for various purposes, including espionage, destabilization, and the manipulation of migration flows. As a result, ensuring robust cyber security measures becomes critical for safeguarding the integrity of migration governance systems and protecting the privacy and rights of migrants.

Great power competition and cyber security challenges also have broader implications for migration governance regarding policy responses and cooperation. Migration is a global phenomenon that requires collaborative efforts among countries and

international organizations. However, cooperation can become more challenging in the context of great power competition and divergent national interests. Cyber security threats can undermine trust and cooperation among states, affecting information sharing and collaborative initiatives on migration governance. Moreover, migration can be used as a tool in great power competition, with states employing migration policies to gain advantages or influence other countries. Therefore, managing the intersection of great power competition, cyber security, and migration governance requires enhanced international cooperation, information sharing, and the development of resilient and secure migration governance systems that prioritize protecting migrants' rights and the integrity of migration processes.

Chapter 7 focuses on China's strategic engagement with Bangladesh, which has significantly impacted migration dynamics in the region and has attracted the attention of neighbouring India. China has increased its economic investment and infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, including developing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These engagements can potentially impact migration patterns, as they can lead to economic opportunities, job creation, and enhanced connectivity between the two countries. Chinese investments could potentially attract migrants from Bangladesh seeking employment and economic prospects. Additionally, Chinese engagement in infrastructure development could facilitate migration-related movements, such as transportation and logistics, which may impact migration flows between the two countries. India, as a close neighbour of Bangladesh, is attentive to China's strategic engagement and its potential influence on migration dynamics. India may view Chinese investments and influence as a challenge to its regional interests, including in terms of migration-related developments. As a response, India may seek to strengthen its bilateral ties with Bangladesh, enhance economic cooperation, and offer alternate pathways for trade, investment, and migration to maintain its influence in the region. India's response could involve initiatives that promote closer economic integration, regional connectivity, and people-to-people exchanges to maintain its position as a strategic partner for Bangladesh, potentially impacting migration flows between the two countries.

Chapter 8 looks at the renewed international relations agenda in recent years, which has several implications for migration governance and policy. One notable change is the recognition of migration as an integral part of the global agenda, emphasizing the interconnectedness of migration, development, and security. The United Nations' adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) in 2018 exemplifies this renewed focus on migration in international relations. The GCM promotes a comprehensive approach to migration, highlighting the need for cooperation among states, respect for migrants' rights, and the recognition of the positive contributions of migration to sustainable development. This renewed agenda encourages countries to adopt inclusive and rights-based migration policies, address the root causes of migration, and foster international cooperation to manage migration challenges effectively.

The implications of this renewed agenda for migration are manifold. Firstly, it underscores the importance of multilateralism and global cooperation in addressing migration challenges. Recognizing migration as a shared responsibility, countries

are encouraged to work collaboratively to develop comprehensive migration policies, exchange best practices, and establish mechanisms for information sharing and capacity building. This shift in international relations provides opportunities for countries to engage in dialogue, learn from one another's experiences, and develop joint solutions to common migration challenges. Additionally, the renewed agenda calls for a human rights-based approach to migration, emphasizing the protection of migrants' rights, including access to essential services, justice, and opportunities for social and economic integration. This places greater importance on addressing issues such as xenophobia, discrimination, and the exploitation of migrants while fostering inclusive societies that embrace diversity. Overall, the renewed agenda for international relations brings a more holistic and collaborative approach to migration governance, with implications for policy development, cooperation, and the protection of migrants' rights on a global scale.

Conclusion

The evolution of migration governance reflects the changing social, economic, and political landscapes throughout history. From ancient city-states to modern nation-states, the approach to migration governance has shifted significantly. The recognition of migrants' rights, the establishment of international frameworks, and the emphasis on comprehensive policies demonstrate progress in addressing the complexities of migration. However, challenges remain, and ongoing efforts are required to ensure that migration governance promotes human dignity, social cohesion, and economic development in an increasingly interconnected world.

Migration, international relations, and security have become central issues in today's reality due to globalization, demographic changes, inequalities, and transnational challenges. The interconnectedness of these issues necessitates comprehensive and collaborative approaches that balance security concerns, human rights, and socioeconomic considerations. As societies become increasingly diverse and interconnected, understanding and effectively addressing migration, international relations, and security challenges are vital for promoting global stability, prosperity, and the protection of human rights.

New knowledge about migration governance and security in the global south and north highlights the importance of context-specific approaches, regional cooperation, integration, and respect for human rights. While challenges exist, such as securitization tendencies and socioeconomic disparities, there are opportunities for enhanced cooperation and knowledge exchange. By embracing comprehensive and inclusive approaches, policymakers can better address the complexities of migration, promote security, and foster sustainable development in both regions and beyond.

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Chapter 2

Revisiting International Migration Governance



Jannatul Ferdous

Introduction

The governance of international migration refers to the frameworks, policies, and mechanisms created at the global level to manage and regulate the movement of people across international borders. It covers a wide range of issues, including migrant rights and protection, border control and security, labour migration, refugee protection, and the integration of migrants into host societies. International migration governance involves cooperation and coordination among states to address the challenges and opportunities associated with migration.

Historically, international migration has been a significant aspect of human history, triggered by various factors such as economic opportunities, political conflicts, and social and demographic changes (Ullah, 2010). In recent decades, globalization, improved transportation, and communication technologies have enabled greater mobility, resulting in an increase in the scale and complexity of international migration (Ullah, 2015). As a result, there has been a recognition that effective governance mechanisms are needed to address the diverse and changing challenges of migration.

At the global level, the United Nations plays a central role in managing international migration. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) works with the UN and other stakeholders to promote safe, orderly, and regular migration. IOM promotes dialog, provides technical assistance, and supports capacity building in migration policy development, data collection, and migrant rights. In recent years, international migration governance has gained prominence, with several important initiatives and agreements shaping the global discourse on migration. A key milestone is the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) in 2018. The GCM is a non-legally binding framework that sets out 23 goals

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and commitments to address the multidimensional aspects of migration. It emphasizes protecting migrants' rights, enhancing cooperation, and promoting migrants' contribution to sustainable development.

International and regional organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the European Union (EU) play an important role in shaping migration policy. The ILO advocates for the rights and welfare of migrant workers and seeks to ensure fair labour migration practices. The EU has developed a comprehensive framework that combines migration and asylum policies and focuses on border management, asylum procedures, and integration measures.

However, international migration regimes face several challenges. The increasing politicization of migration issues in some contexts further complicates efforts to develop a comprehensive and inclusive governance framework (Ullah, 2009, 2015). Of course, national interests and sovereignty concerns can sometimes hinder practical cooperation and coordination among countries. The different needs and vulnerabilities of different migrant groups, including refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular migrants, pose particular challenges that require tailored responses.

As we advance, it is essential to strengthen international cooperation and dialog on migration governance. This includes addressing the root causes of migration, promoting regular and safe migration channels, ensuring the protection of migrants' human rights, improving labour migration mechanisms, and facilitating the integration of migrants into host societies. By working together, nations can develop more effective and humane approaches to international migration governance (Ullah, 2018) that uphold the dignity and well-being of all migrants while harnessing the potential benefits of migration for both countries of origin and destination.

As evidenced by numerous regional, global, and multi-stakeholder processes, migration, highlighted as a critical factor for development, is increasingly recognized as a significant trend. Although migration is essential as a development objective and is affected by geopolitical challenges, there has long been no regime to regulate it (IOM, 2020). International migration is a defining and expanding part of the global reality. Over time, its scale, complexity, and impact have increased. Migrants face difficulties in their countries of origin, destination, and transit despite being recognized as a significant force in accelerating sustainable development. Migrants and their families face threats to their security, dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms regardless of their migration status (United Nations, 2020). Cross-border migrations and geopolitics are closely related; both can express and initiate geopolitical processes. However, critical geopolitical scholars have paid little attention to global migration or even refugee movements for a long time (Allen et al., 2018).

One billion people, or one-seventh of all people, are on the move, more than at any other time in recorded history (Ullah, 2010). A variety of factors influence individual mobility. Economic factors, climate change, natural and man-made disasters, conflict, demographic trends associated with an aging industrial population, growing numbers of young people out of work in developing countries, and widening social and economic inequalities all contribute to migration (IOM, 2020). Migration patterns are changing traditional linkages between governments, international organizations, and regional integration actors (Panizzon & Van Riemsdijk, 2019). The

global pandemic has led to ad hoc and unilateral responses to migration, mobility, and border management while highlighting the need for global coordination. To be effective, global governance in this area requires the participation of actors outside states and international institutions. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) emphasizes the participation of migrants and their organizations directly affected by global policies (Rother, 2022).

Most migrants, regardless of gender, are transient workers responding to changing demographics, economic demand in destination countries throughout the region and beyond, and a thriving labour market. However, migration in the region is becoming more diverse. Throughout their lives, significant numbers of migrants migrate repeatedly to various destination countries and occasionally return to their home countries. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers seek protection in neighbouring countries. Some expatriates move abroad for educational, family, retirement, or long-term housing reasons. Most migrants travel through conventional routes, although many migrants travel under unusual conditions. Migrants and their families are entitled to the same protection and human rights as everyone else, regardless of their status.

Nonetheless, insecurity, exclusion, and even violence are commonplace problems for migrants. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted and exacerbated these risks, and migrants are disproportionately affected by the health, mobility, and socioeconomic consequences (United Nations, 2020). Return and reintegration fundamentally differ from immigration and integration in recipient countries, primarily because the sending state, a crucial actor in the reintegration process, occupies a subordinate geopolitical position (Kuschminder, 2017). Indeed, the reintegration plans of all parties involved are closely intertwined with the geopolitics of migration management. Under these circumstances, the personal and pragmatic reintegration and remigration strategies of migrants are both an expression and a catalyst of geopolitics at multiple levels.

In high-income countries, the emphasis on borders and security contrasts sharply with the informality and uncertainty with which migrants must manage their ontological security during the return and reintegration process. Therefore, reintegration should be viewed as a process influenced by multiple, possibly conflicting, legal, political, and social factors acknowledged and utilized by multiple stakeholders (Vathi et al., 2022). The ultimate diagnostic test is the ability of global migration policies to improve the lives of people on the ground. If a policy problem is not even placed on the global agenda, a solution is much less likely to be found.

Migration Governance

Conceptually, migration governance involves understanding and defining the principles, frameworks, and mechanisms that guide the governance of international migration. It encompasses the complex web of policies, laws, institutions, and practices that govern the movement of people across borders. Migration governance goes beyond simply regulating the entry and residence of migrants; it also involves addressing

the multiple aspects of migration, such as human rights, labour market dynamics, social integration, and development impacts. It requires a holistic and comprehensive approach that considers the needs and aspirations of migrants, the interests of sending and receiving countries, and the broader global context. Migration is intrinsically intertwined with various policy domains, such as development, security, and human rights. This paper, drawing on Sriskandarajah's seminal work (2005), delves into the intricate nature of migration governance and highlights the significance of recognizing the roles and responsibilities of diverse stakeholders, including governments, international organizations, civil society, and migrants themselves, in shaping migration policies and practices. By discerning the interconnectedness between migration and these policy realms, a holistic approach towards migration governance can be developed, enabling informed and effective decision-making processes.

A well-managed migration mechanism is required to achieve the goals. The entire process must be governed by a comprehensive migration governance framework incorporating all current and future migration-related facts. The framework should help implement results-based reporting and planning on national migration governance efforts and developments (IOM, 2020). In managing and regulating global migration flows, migration governance is exploring the newly developed concept of "migration partnerships."

The goal of the partnership approach to migration is to ensure an equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of migration among countries of origin, transit, and destination (Kunz et al., 2011). A labour migration governance system would include the following components: (1) the collection and analysis of relevant data on labour mobility; (2) interaction with social partners; (3) the adoption of a standards-based migration methodology; (4) the establishment of institutional systems for policy formulation, management, and cooperation; (5) the implementation of informed and transparent labour migration procedures; (6) the provision of adequate and up-to-date vocational education and training; (7) the introduction of basic decent work standards in all sectors. However, only the characteristics of labour migration should be considered (IOM, 2020) to account for the complexity of reintegration and the potential conflicts that may arise from multiple ideological views, norms, and practices by making connections between geopolitical events at different levels, their impact on return, and the likelihood, extent, and "outcomes" of reintegration (Reuber, 2009).

This is particularly relevant to feminist geopolitical perspectives because they "connect international representation to the geographies of everyday life" (Dowler & Sharp, 2001) and help us understand how national and international migration are replicated in our everyday actions. Although internal and external mobility are essential factors in a country's economic growth, they are also associated with development problems. Migration has a negative reputation, particularly regarding the potential for mistreatment and exploitation of foreign labour (Dungo et al., 2013).

Migration is negatively impacted by irregular migration, internal and external displacement, high recruitment costs, human rights violations, limited socioeconomic engagement in destination countries, inadequate access to information and services, and difficulties in reintegrating returnee's nexus development (IOM, 2020). Migrants and their families often incur significant costs in both the country of origin

and destination, and they are not adequately compensated. Whether migration has positive or negative impacts, the process involves several human rights issues. One of these issues is the relationship between migrant workers and the social security system (de la Garza, 2010). Although the global community is increasingly aware of the megatrend of migration, a comprehensive framework has been needed to outline the components of well-managed migration or effective regulation of human movement (IOM, 2020; Hyndman, 2012).

As a result of the complexity of return migration, our current understanding of reintegration still needs to be clarified ((Marino & Lietaert, 2022; Vathi et al., 2022). This lack of a coherent conceptual framework goes hand in hand with the representation of return and reintegration in public discourse and migration governance in terms of symbolism and implementation (IOM, 2017). The migration governance framework is based on the premise that a state, as the principal actor in migration, mobility, and nationality issues, has the sovereign authority to determine, within the framework of international law, who enters and who stays on its territory and under what conditions. Citizens, migrants, international institutions, the business sector, trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, community groups, religious organizations, and academics all contribute to the governance of migration through their interactions with countries and each other.

Global Compact

The interplay between the Global Compact and international migration policy is characterized by a complex relationship aimed at addressing the challenges and opportunities associated with migration at the global level. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, adopted in December 2018, is a landmark agreement designed to enhance international cooperation on migration (Szulecki et al., 2020). The Global Compact is a non-binding framework that sets out a series of principles and commitments to help countries better manage migration. It emphasizes the importance of protecting migrants' rights, promoting their integration and social cohesion, and addressing the root causes of migration (United Nations, 2018). On the other hand, international migration governance refers to the broader system of norms, laws, and institutions that regulate migration at the global level. This includes international treaties, regional agreements, and national policies that determine how countries manage migration flows, protect migrants' rights, and address related problems such as human trafficking and smuggling.

The Global Compact and international migration policy are linked in several ways. First, the Global Compact complements existing international frameworks and provides a common reference point for countries to align their policies and practices. It promotes cooperation among governments, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders to address migration challenges together (Siegel, 2019). Second, the Global Compact recognizes the importance of multi-level governance and promotes coordination and cooperation among countries at the regional and global levels. It

recognizes that migration is a complex phenomenon that requires collective action and shared responsibility. Third, the Global Compact promotes a human rights-based approach to migration that prioritizes the protection of migrants' rights and the provision of services and support for their well-being. It is guided by existing international human rights standards and calls for greater respect for migrants' dignity and their access to justice and social services.

It is important to note that the Global Compact is a non-binding agreement, which means that its implementation depends on the willingness of countries to translate its principles into concrete policies and actions (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2019). The interplay between the Global Compact and international migration policy therefore depends on the political will and commitment of states to prioritize and advance the Compact's goals. The Global Compact and international migration policies are mutually reinforcing and aim to create a more coordinated, comprehensive, and rights-based approach to managing migration at the global level. While putting these principles into practice remains a challenge, the interplay between the Global Compact and international migration governance provides a platform for dialog, collaboration, and progress in addressing the complex and changing issue of migration (Sandvik & Lixinski, 2019).

The Relevance of Global Compact

The global compact is relevant to today's world for several reasons. Recognizing the global nature of migration: migration is a global phenomenon that affects countries of origin, transit, and destination. The Global Compact recognizes the need for international cooperation and coordination to effectively manage migration flows and address their various dimensions. It provides a platform for countries to exchange best practices, share experiences, and develop joint strategies to address migration challenges. Protecting migrants' rights: The Global Compact places great emphasis on protecting the rights of migrants. It recognizes that migrants, regardless of their status, are entitled to the same universal human rights as all other people. By advocating and promoting a human rights-based approach to migration, the Compact seeks to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity, have access to justice, and are treated fairly and equally before the law (Ruhs & Palme, 2020).

The Global Compact encourages countries to strengthen migration policy frameworks and strategies to improve governance and policy coherence. It calls for comprehensive approaches that address migration's social, economic, and demographic aspects. By promoting policy coherence and coordination, the Compact seeks to minimize irregular migration, combat human trafficking and smuggling, and maximize the benefits of migration for both migrants and society. Addressing the root causes of migration: the Global Compact recognizes that various factors, including poverty, conflict, climate change, and lack of opportunity often trigger migration. It emphasizes addressing these root causes to reduce forced and irregular migration. By promoting sustainable development, poverty reduction, and investment in education

and job creation, the pact seeks to address the underlying factors that force people to migrate. Facilitating regular and orderly migration: the Global Compact encourages countries to promote safe and regular migration channels. It recognizes the benefits of well-managed migration for migrants and societies, including economic growth, cultural diversity, and social development. By facilitating regular migration channels, such as labour mobility and family reunification programs, the Compact aims to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities associated with irregular migration.

To achieve its goals, the Global Compact promotes multi-stakeholder partnerships involving governments, civil society organizations, the private sector, and international organizations. It provides a framework for dialog, collaboration, and knowledge sharing among these stakeholders, promoting a more inclusive and collaborative approach to managing international migration. The Global Compact for International Migration is essential because it promotes a comprehensive, rights-based, and cooperative approach to addressing migration issues. It recognizes the need for global solutions and cooperation to ensure that migration is safe and orderly and benefits migrants and societies. Since the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration launch, there have been some notable qualitative changes in migration management.

Although it is still relatively early to fully assess the impact of the Compact, some important developments can be observed: Increased awareness and commitment: the Global Compact has raised awareness among governments, policymakers, and the international community about the importance of migration management and the need for international cooperation. It has provided a framework for dialog and encouraged countries to reaffirm their commitment to protecting migrants' rights, promoting safe migration, and addressing the root causes of migration. Strengthened policy frameworks: The Global Compact has led countries to review and strengthen their migration policies and frameworks. Many countries have undertaken policy reforms to bring their practices in line with the principles and objectives of the Compact. These include developing national action plans, legislative changes, and institutional reforms aimed at improving migration management and the protection of migrants' rights.

Increased international cooperation: the Covenant has enabled greater cooperation and collaboration on migration-related issues. It has provided a platform for countries to share knowledge and best practices and to work together to address common challenges. The Pact's emphasis on partnerships among different actors has fostered collaboration among governments, civil society organizations, and international organizations, supporting a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to migration management (Betts & Omata, 2019). Human rights-based approach: the Global Compact has underscored the importance of a human rights-based approach to migration policy. It has helped change discourse and practice to recognize migrants as rights holders regardless of their migration status. This has led to a greater emphasis on protecting migrants' rights, including access to health care, education, and justice, and addressing discrimination and xenophobia.

Focus on Data and Evidence-Based Policy: The Compact emphasizes the importance of data collection, analysis, and evidence-based policymaking in migration

management. It calls for using disaggregated data to better understand migration trends, drivers, and impacts. This has led to increased migration data collection and analysis efforts, enabling countries to develop more informed policies and actions.

It is important to note that the implementation and impact of the Global Compact varies from country to country and region to region. The qualitative changes mentioned above are common, and progress in migration management depends on political will, resource allocation, and the specific contexts and challenges each country faces. The introduction of the Global Compact has contributed to a shift in migration management towards a more comprehensive, collaborative, and rights-based approach (McAuliffe et al., 2019). While challenges remain, the Compact has been instrumental in shaping the discourse and practices related to migration management worldwide.

Migration and SDGs

Migration is a phenomenon with many facets. Migration, both international and domestic, is linked to development. Key development frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which sets out development goals to be achieved by 2030 and includes migration-specific targets, have greatly facilitated recognition of the positive impact of migration. Target 10.7 promotes responsible, regular, orderly, and safe human mobility, notably through well-designed migration policies. Target 8.8 promotes safe working conditions for all workers, particularly migrant workers, women migrants, and workers in precarious employment (IOM, 2020).

The 2030 Agenda's integrated development strategy (Sachs, 2012) refers to the so-called "triple bottom line," which seeks to reconcile competing social, economic, and environmental concerns. Eleven of the seventeen SDGs and 169 targets created to fulfil this commitment are related to migration. Nonetheless, the inclusion of migration in the SDGs can support migrant workers' rights, as several goals and targets relate to social protection, universal human rights law, and the ILO's reasonable employment approach. However, only if North–South development NGOs, civil society, grassroots movements, trade unions, and labour movements actively participate in alternative development agendas and technical implementation strategies that prevent the SDGs from having a genuinely revolutionary impact (Banks et al., 2015).

However, it called for "sector-specific development policies" and recognized the need to protect migrant workers and the demand for unskilled labour in care and agriculture. It also reaffirmed the inclusion of migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In terms of international migration governance, civil society organizations have stepped up efforts to implement the United Nations Global Compact on Migration and the migration-related SDGs (Likić-Brborić, 2018). It is critical to assess whether the SDGs and migration governance will address the underlying problems that decades of uniform top-down neoliberal development plans and their technological implementation have caused to shift lives and work (Likić-Brborić,

2018). Despite the extensive advocacy for migrant workers' rights and social protection in migration policies, the main challenge remains to address mobility's social and personal costs and protect migrant workers from the worst forms of exploitation, informatization, and precarity. These are intertwined with neoliberal changes in development policies that paradoxically exacerbate the vulnerabilities and fears that are the leading causes of forced migration. Moreover, they view migration as a preferred means of survival that reproduces precarity through linkages in existing systems of formal and informal migration and global production. For example, an economic paradox complemented by a migration strategy for development purposes is the use of economic development tactics that generate inequality and poverty (Panchamukhi, 2000).

People in the region, facing poverty, high unemployment, and underemployment, have turned to temporary migration in search of work. In addition to political and military conflict, human rights abuses, corruption, and political persecution contribute to dangerous and disorderly migration. Sudden and slow-onset natural disasters, climate change, and environmental degradation cause massive internal and international migration. Different skill levels have access to established pathways of labour mobility within the region. However, these can be costly and burdensome, especially for workers in essential occupations, leading to a preference for irregular pathways in some migration corridors. In addition, legal routes have not kept pace with business demand for workers or the increase in job seekers. There is a need for safe, regular, and accessible migration routes for other types of migrants, including those migrating for child safety, family reunification, educational opportunities, and humanitarian reasons (United Nations, 2020).

Migration has numerous positive effects, as it increases the likelihood of employment and promotes a better understanding of socioeconomic factors among migrants and natives of the destination country (Ghosh, 2009). Migration can reduce labour market pressures by lowering unemployment rates, increasing opportunities for economic advancement, and creating opportunities for the social transfer of information, workplace skills, and life skills in regions of origin. Migration is an inevitable and potentially beneficial aspect of a community's economic and social existence. Employment opportunities abroad help reduce the unemployment rate in Bangladesh, alleviate misery, and increase the country's foreign exchange reserves (Barkat et al., 2014; Hossain & Ullah, 2004; Ullah, 2005). Migration and human development are closely linked on several levels. Many people have a positive attitude towards migration, especially when it brings internal and external financial benefits to the country of origin. In addition, migrants benefit from increasing their knowledge and skills, contributing to socioeconomic development.

Because migrant workers make up the majority of migrants in the region and private recruitment agencies dominate the recruitment sector in many countries, migrant workers risk being exploited and subject to human rights abuses if recruitment practices are not regulated or meet international, regional, and national standards. Recruitment abuses diminish the benefits of migration for migrant workers, their families, and society as a whole. Both immigration law and practice discriminate

against women, and they are particularly vulnerable to assault, abuse, and exploitation in the workplace, especially as domestic workers. Adopting wage protections, establishing grievance channels, enforcing workplace safety and health standards, promoting respectable work, and provisions for worker mobility are best practices that demonstrate how government collaboration with relevant stakeholders at the national and regional levels can lead to improvements. International enforcement of laws and regulations on employment practices and decent work is needed to ensure compliance by employers and hiring companies (United Nations, 2020).

The Pandemic and Migration Governance

The expanding geopolitics of return migration requires a comprehensive examination of the politics of integration and return. The focus on geopolitics suggests that reintegration is examined not only as a consequence of migrants' lives or formal state efforts but also as deeply interwoven with the historical sociocultural and political contexts in which it occurs (Vathi et al., 2022). COVID-19 has affected all Asian and Pacific countries, with the most disadvantaged populations suffering the most (Ullah et al., 2022). The epidemic has disproportionately affected migrants in the region. The pandemic impacts migrants in complicated, intertwined ways that go beyond their health and affect their socioeconomic status and security. These impacts result from personal, social, situational, and structural factors. Interactions with other risk factors for infection, such as migrants' gender, age, and disability, exacerbate them (United Nations, 2020). Because it is "controlled by a complex architecture of international governance" that includes both legally enforceable transnational rules and regulations and a variety of "soft law" practices spread across many levels of governance (Kunz et al., 2011), it has proven both overly complex and dysfunctional in addressing current migration challenges. The complexity results from the diversity of migration and its location in different areas of international law at different levels of governance. Global migration governance is produced by processes spanning multiple geographic scales, including an emerging transnational scale, which is not identical to the international system.

They distinguish three basic approaches to international migration governance. The first is the national mode, in which the nation-state remains the primary regulator of migration by overseeing border crossings and protecting access to territory, land, citizenship, and rights. The second mode is the international mode, which requires formal and informal coordination among state actors to regulate migration. This includes bilateral, regional, and multinational arrangements. A new transnational mode of migration governance has also been identified as "a neoliberal assessment of the role of governments in controlling market dynamics such as migration" (Gamlen & Marsh, 2011). Local governments play an indispensable role in day-to-day operations and often take the initiative. The IOM (2017) notes that mayors and other local government officials lead in achieving migration, including economic,

social, and cultural integration. Due to obstruction of essential health services, unsanitary and overcrowded living conditions, barriers to health-seeking behaviours, and increased exposure to sick individuals due to their position as indispensable workers, migrants in the region are at greater risk of contracting the disease. Disruption or discontinuation of essential health services such as sexual and reproductive health care and nutrition has other profound implications. Lack of income has reduced the cost of a healthy diet and increased overall access to food.

This is of particular concern for migrants, who often live in urban areas where food prices are higher and more volatile than in rural areas due to frequent closures, travel restrictions, and reliance on retail markets. Children of migrants face high levels of food insecurity (United Nations, 2020). Migration management needs to occur at the state and societal levels. This can be achieved by establishing interagency procedures to address all migration-related policy concerns. And by establishing channels for frequent engagement with non-state actors critical to effective migration management, such as migrant employers and recruiters, labour unions, migrant and diaspora organizations, academics, and most importantly, migrants themselves (IOM, 2017). Migration impacts every nation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In recent decades, the number of people moving within and between Asian and Pacific countries has increased.

A variety of factors has fuelled this development and has had a profound impact on all of these countries, as well as on migrants and their families. Migration in the region is highly complex due to the number of parties involved, their interactions with each other and with the rest of the world, the different demographic, political, social, economic, and environmental contexts of the region, the influence of geography in a region where small island and city-states coexist with countries with large geographic expanses, and the degree of uncertainty about the impact of the future. In general, both sending and receiving countries, as well as the migrants themselves, have benefited tremendously from international migration in the region. However, numerous obstacles and hazards in the region prevent safe, regular, and orderly movement. The numerous impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on migrants show how vulnerable and unable they are to fight back, even though they are so crucial to fighting the epidemic and to the long-term recovery of countries in the region and abroad (United Nations, 2020).

Given the current unfavourable environment, it may be challenging to formulate sound immigration policies. To counteract this, it is necessary to gather and widely disseminate data and facts about migration and the predominantly positive role that migrants have played in the past. To achieve this, we must improve our methods for collecting, analysing, and using migration data and information. To improve global migration management (IOM, 2017), the international community must take the necessary practical steps. Because this arrangement depends on returnees' resources, reintegration is likely to be quite different for assisted returnees, deported citizens, and voluntarily returning citizens. These differences necessitate a discussion of the role of geopolitics in the various dimensions of return strategies and programs. These differences are reflected in returnees' social support, which is critical to their multi-step and non-linear reintegration process (Lietaert & Kuschminder, 2021). Due to

migration's extensive social, economic, and political impacts, the need for migration management is gaining increasing attention. Governmental and nongovernmental entities are highly concerned about migration and seek ways to regulate it to maximize its benefits and minimize costs. Without a global migration management system, states often set up multi-level migration management as needed (Betts, 2011).

Sovereignty and International Standard

Under international law, each state has the sovereign right to determine its migration policy and regulate freedom of movement within its borders. States should consider the legitimate concern of home countries to protect the rights and interests of their citizens abroad. States should seek mutually beneficial solutions within the framework of international law, particularly international human rights law, labour law, and the law of the sea, under the premise of sovereign equality (United Nations, 2020). The majority of migrants who travel internationally remain in the destination country and return without incident or the need for special assistance. Yet millions of migrants and refugees are vulnerable because of their characteristics, environment, or legal situation. To identify and assist these individuals as part of effective migration management, techniques must be used that are child-centred, gender-sensitive, and culturally relevant. A state must provide assistance and protection to all forced migrants entering its territory by humanitarian and human rights norms. It is necessary to criminalize forced labour, human trafficking, and the smuggling of migrants. However, it is inappropriate to prosecute forced labourers, traffickers, or illegal immigrants. Regardless of gender, age, or other distinguishing characteristics, migrants must have access to justice and redress in transit and destination states. There should be no restrictions on a person's ability to travel to any country, including their own, at any time (IOM, 2020).

Member states in the region have ratified basic international human rights treaties, relevant norms of labour, criminal and humanitarian law, and the law of the sea. If they still need to do so, states in the region should ratify or accede to the international treaties and use them to regulate international migration (United Nations, 2020). Immigration policy is often the subject of controversial political debates that may be motivated by populist ideals. Any migration policy must be based on evidence and a comprehensive examination of the benefits and risks of migration to the state. Effective migration management, therefore requires government-wide plans that involve all ministries with responsibilities related to the movement of people. A state would also seek to understand and incorporate migration patterns into legislation, considering their links to environmental damage, climate change, and crises. Travel and temporary mobility, immigration, emigration, citizenship, labour markets, economic and social development, industry, trade, social cohesion, social services, health, education, law enforcement, foreign policy, trade, and humanitarian policy are among the laws and policies that affect the way people move. Similar to how immigration laws and policies are addressed, other policy areas can be significantly

impacted. Effective migration management, therefore, depends on government-wide initiatives involving all ministries with people movement responsibilities. Consequently, a state can ensure its migration and mobility strategy serves its overarching interests (IOM, 2020).

Child-Sensitivity and Gender-Responsiveness

For the many migrant children and children of migrants in the region, especially those “left behind” by one or both parents, the risks to child safety posed by migration and limited access to essential services are of great concern. Regardless of the child’s migration status, all migration-related policies and procedures, particularly for unaccompanied children and those separated from their parents, must always prioritize the child’s best interests. In addition to respecting and promoting the right to family life and family unity, migration policies should ensure that children affected by migration have access to national systems, including protection, education, health, justice, and social protection (United Nations, 2020). All migration-related policies should recognize and promote the autonomy, agency, and leadership of migrant women and girls. These policies should also strengthen and protect the rights of all migrants, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Despite the region’s progress on gender equality and women’s empowerment, women and girls who migrate continue to face limited opportunities and a high risk of being neglected, exploited, and discriminated against (United Nations, 2020).

Sustainable Development and Collaboration

Migration is a multifaceted phenomenon that has significant implications for sustainable development. Governments should increase their efforts to achieve sustainable development, as a significant acceleration in all areas is needed to achieve the 2030 Agenda goals. The Global Compact on Migration goals can be implemented with more outstanding commitment and dedication to the goals of the 2030 Agenda, and vice versa (United Nations, 2020). By their very nature, migration, and mobility involve multiple parties, including governments and their neighbours, local governments, diasporas, businesses, and trade unions. The missions of many intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations also include humanitarian assistance and migration. Collaboration is necessary to increase knowledge about migration and develop comprehensive strategies (IOM, 2020) to manage migration effectively. Differing perspectives and experiences on return are influenced not only by each individual’s unique circumstances but also by the broader political relationships and interests among participants in the migration and return processes. Losses inextricably linked to migration and return are also a consequence of the injustices underlying these relationships. Because not all migration journeys benefit migrants (Vathi

et al., 2022), reintegration strategies and programs should identify the components that need to be restored to achieve embedded reintegration.

Conclusion

Governance of international migration must prioritize protecting migrants' rights to ensure they are not exploited, abused, or discriminated against. This involves upholding the rights of refugees and asylum seekers and ensuring access to health-care, education, and legal protection. The governance of international migration should be sensitive to shifting migratory patterns, such as those caused by climate change or economic instability. This demands the establishment of policies and practices that are adaptable, flexible, and grounded in scientific knowledge. This should be more inclusive and participatory, incorporating a variety of stakeholders in decision-making processes, such as civil society organizations, migrants, and their host communities. This can ensure that policies and practices are more responsive to the interests and concerns of all stakeholders and that the advantages of migration are more evenly distributed. The protection of human rights, the management of migrant flows, and the promotion of greater inclusion and participation in decision-making processes must be a top priority. We can achieve a more just and sustainable future by adopting a more comprehensive and collaborative approach to international migration governance.

Migration into, out of, and within the borders of Asia-Pacific countries is significant and growing. Due to increasing connectivity, development, and demand, men, women, girls, and boys go through (or avoid) complex and often costly migration processes to access migration opportunities. Remittances to families and communities in countries of origin are critical assistance that reduces poverty and enables millions of households to invest in health and education. Through work and innovation, migrants contribute to developing their host countries by bringing valuable knowledge and experience and bridging the gap between their home and host countries. Migrants who can migrate safely, regularly, and orderly are prime candidates for such donations (United Nations, 2020). Given the unprecedented level of mobility in our time, it is more important than ever to promote safe, regular, orderly, and responsible migration. To maximize the benefits and potential of migration, well-regulated methods of migration and human mobility are needed. Given the complexity and scope of migration as a field of work, many conventions or frameworks need to provide an effective, balanced, and practical approach to managing migration (IOM, 2020).

Migrants should be viewed as skilled bottom-up geopolitical actors who can use their migration capital to position themselves advantageously vis-à-vis socio-political regimes of value, morality, extraterritorial belonging, and governance in the context of return, even if they cannot fully understand the geopolitics of migration governance. Reintegration should be viewed as a process that depends on multiple, often incompatible, legal, political, and socioeconomic factors supported

and exploited by different actors. The increased return caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has undoubtedly created new dynamics and research opportunities for studying the multifaceted geopolitics of reintegration, the initiatives taken by countries of origin to retain returning citizens, and the emerging ontologies of (in)mobility with their political and everyday expressions (Vathi et al., 2022).

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Chapter 3

International Relations Versus International Migration: Complements or Substitutes?



Diotima Chattoraj

Introduction

Cross-border population movements in recent years, particularly from developing countries to developed countries and between developing countries, have significantly impacted international relations. The number of international migrants rose to 281 million in 2020, meaning that 3.6% of the world's population lived outside their country of birth in that year (Natarajan et al., 2022). An estimated 86.7 million international migrants lived in Europe in 2020, followed by 85.6 million in Asia (ibid.).

Migration reports show that conflicts between states with population movements are reported in the press: In Bosnia and Herzegovina, violent conflict in the 1990s and ongoing instability in the region since then have forced much of the population to migrate. In 2019, about 50% of the 3.3 million people born in Bosnia and Herzegovina lived elsewhere. Sri Lankan Tamils from northern Sri Lanka fled to India, and Tamil secessionists called on India to invade Sri Lanka, comparing their situation to Bangladesh in 1971. The Vietnamese offensive in Kampuchea led to a new movement of refugees to the Thai border (Weiner, 1985). Israelis, working secretly with the Sudanese and others, transport Ethiopian Jews to Israel; after that, the Ethiopians protest that their citizens have been kidnapped. Relations between Nigeria and Ghana were strained when the Nigerian government announced that 700,000 migrant workers must leave immediately. Job opportunities and other factors have lured about 10% of the Filipino population abroad (World 101, 2023).

These points are taken from newspaper reports, but one could easily add to this list from reports in recent years. We are dealing with a growing phenomenon that scholars still need to incorporate into their understanding of international migration or international relations. Theories of international migration pay remarkably little

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attention to state intervention. In contrast, the literature on international relations has little to say about population movements except to describe the refugee phenomenon as a consequence of conflict. How state actions affect population movements, when such movements lead to conflict and when to cooperate, and what governments do in their domestic policies to adjust to or influence population flows are questions that have received far too little attention.

Objective and Methodology

This chapter aims to examine whether international relations and international migration are complementary. This qualitative study collects data through internet research, analysis of documents and reports, and a review of a large body of relevant literature. The internet search (Chattoraj, 2017) provided several online reports, documents, and newspaper articles. I conducted an in-depth review of the literature on IR and international migration.

International Migration

The movement of people from one place to another for residential or work purposes is called migration. International migration has become a global phenomenon whose complexity and impact are widely felt. From a country's development perspective, international migration has advantages and disadvantages. It is argued that migration is a positive force for development as it facilitates the host country's development. The country can obtain the needed knowledge, experience, and services from skilled and unskilled labour. However, the receiving country may also suffer from unwelcome migrants entering the country as refugees. On the other hand, the sending country may need more skilled workers despite receiving remittances. Economic and political factors, family reunifications, and natural disasters sometimes lead to migration.

In terms of the current global situation, it can be observed that internal and external conflicts of sovereign states force people to leave these countries. The best example is the migration of people from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Libya, and Syria due to civil wars. On the other hand, poverty and lack of adequate jobs have become reasons for people to leave countries, which is considered economic migration. This is often seen in migration between countries, especially from developing to developed countries. There is a worldwide trend of people from developing countries moving to developed countries in search of a more comfortable life. In addition, more travel opportunities and faster information flow have facilitated migration worldwide. Therefore, migration has become a major demographic force worldwide in recent decades, mainly due to globalization.

In today's world of 281 million "international migrants" (World Migration Report, 2022), migration has become one of the most important and pressing global issues that

deserves attention because of its ubiquity, impact, and accompanying consequences. At the heart of migration are people and their hopes, fears, triumphs, and tragedies, which makes this topic fascinating but also compelling and pertinent (Chattoraj, 2020). They leave behind their roots and migrate due to socioeconomic, climatic, demographic, and political conditions and dwindling resources (Ullah et al. 2021). Although often driven by the search for better living conditions and new opportunities, a massive number of people (estimated at more than 108.4 million (UNHCR, 2022) are forced to do so as a result of wars, protracted conflicts, massive human rights violations, oppression of minorities, natural and man-made disasters, civil unrest, and so on.

Facets of International Migration

International migration is divided into different categories based on the factors that influence migration. They are discussed in the following part. Labour migration is defined as a cross-border movement for employment in another country. It includes highly skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled migrants. Labour migration includes highly skilled, unskilled, low-wage, and temporary workers. When international migrants intend to return to their home country after living in a foreign country as international migrants and stay in their own country for at least one year, they are referred to as return migrants. People who move from one country to another for family reunification and formation are called chain migrants. Asylum seekers who visit a foreign country and apply for refugee status there are called asylum migrants.

People who move from one country to another as asylum seekers, refugees, and internally displaced persons are called forced migrants. Forced migration includes refugees and asylum seekers who cross borders due to conflict and political insecurity and displaced people who have lost their settlements due to natural disasters and construction projects (Bell et al., 2010; Castles, 2003). International retirement migration is when retirees acquire real estate abroad for their residence (Bell et al., 2010). The other standard categorization in the literature is voluntary migration (Hugo, 2008; Zetter, 2015). People who move for various reasons, including those who provide labour, are considered voluntary migrants. They migrate voluntarily in search of personal benefits.

In addition to the above terms, different terms are used to identify different types of migration. The most popular term is economic migration. It is defined as the decision to move from one country to another to improve one's standard of living through better-paying jobs and better facilities. This is very similar to the concept of traditional labour migration. Economic migration focuses on the economic benefits.

Another concept that appears in the literature is that of political migrants. These people move from one country to another due to civil wars and political discrimination in their home countries. Environmental migration is also a popular term in the literature (Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009). Environmental migrants leave their home countries due to environmental conditions such as desertification, sea level rise, and

droughts. In light of the above, it can be noted that the types of international migration are constantly changing over time. This is because researchers are identifying new categories of migration based on new push and pull factors. Thus, migration is an issue that is constantly changing with changing socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions.

Migration Through Theoretical Lenses

There are several theories of international migration in the literature. Migration theories are helpful because they provide theoretical clues to understand the movement of people in a larger context. This may relate to economic, social, legal, political, cultural, ethnic, or other phenomena. Theories of international migration provide scientific knowledge about international migration and bring to light systematic and specific regularities related to migration and the relationships between them. Therefore, it is helpful to briefly analyse the standard theories of international migration.

Neo-classical Theory

The oldest and best-known theory of international migration is a neoclassical theory, which explains the impact of labour migration on economic development (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). According to this theory and its extensions, the cause of international migration is the geographic imbalance between the demand and supply of labour. In regions where labour supply is elastic, but workers are low-wage, and their marginal productivity is low, workers tend to migrate to a high-wage country (Massey et al., 1993). As a result of this trend, remittance generation is a strong incentive for labour-sending countries to encourage out-migration. Moreover, migration contributes to the country's economy by receiving the labour by boosting production, and the country receiving the remittances could ideally reduce its income inequality and wage inequality (Prakash, 2009).

However, the implicit idea behind this theory is that eliminating wage inequality would end labour movements, and labour migration would reach its minimum. Harris and Todaro (1970) support this argument and emphasize that the decision to migrate is strongly influenced by the job opportunities available to the migrant in the initial period and the expected income differentials. Another critical assumption within the neoclassical explanation is that the international flow of labour occurs primarily in labour markets and that other markets do not play a crucial role concerning international migration (Massey et al., 1993). Considering these assumptions, one could argue that the neoclassical approach is optimistic about the impact of migration on labour-sending countries because of high expectations of reduced poverty, unemployment, and overpopulation.

The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM)

New Economics of Labour Migration was developed to challenge the assumptions and conclusions of neoclassical theory. NELM focuses on migration from the individual micro-level to meso units such as families, households, or other culturally defined units. In other words, an essential insight of this new approach is that the decision to migrate is not only an individual decision but a collective decision of households or families whose goal is to increase not only income but also a risk management strategy in the context of market failure, in addition to labour market failure (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016).

However, theory suggests not ignoring individual behaviour but examining it in a group context. When a group is considered, households can diversify the risks of economic well-being by using labour resources in different ways. Massey et al. (1993) argue that family members could be induced to earn income to minimize the risks of job insecurity and income fluctuations by assigning them to economic activities in both the country of origin and the host country. In this way, deteriorations in local income could be offset by remittances from migrants and vice versa (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). Cassarino (2004) advances the argument that migrants' return to their country of origin is logical after achieving goals such as savings, insurance, household needs, acquisition of investment capital, and skills.

Dual Labour Market Theory

In 1979, Michael J. Piore presented the Dual Labour Market Theory, a departure from micro-level models. The model departs from viewing migration as a consequence of individuals' choices and argues that international migration results from the intrinsic labour needs of contemporary industrial societies (Massey et al., 1993). Michael (1979) points out that the constant demand of industrialized and developed countries for labour to support their development propaganda is the cause of international migration. In other words, international migration occurs not because of push factors in the source countries but because of pull factors in the receiving countries. According to Michael, push factors are low wages and high unemployment, while pull factors are essential and unavoidable needs expected of foreign workers in host countries. In addition, this theory emphasizes four core characteristics of developed countries that explain the attraction of workers from other countries, namely structural inflation, motivational problems, economic dualism, and labour supply demographics (Massey et al., 1993).

Network Theory

Migration network is a contemporary concept related to the concept of social capital. Arango (2000) defines the migration network as a “set of interpersonal relationships that connect migrants with relatives, friends, or compatriots back home who share information, provide financial support, and facilitate employment opportunities and housing in various ways.” These networks reduce the costs and risks of migration and increase the expected net returns to migration (Massey et al., 1993). As a result of these networks, subsequent migrations have positively contributed to improving opportunities for other migrants in their decision-making process. Vertovec (2002) and Dustmann et al. (2005) also find that diaspora and other networks can influence migrants’ choice of destinations. Network ties are shown to be a form of social capital that provides broad access to employment abroad (Massey et al., 1993). Accordingly, the network migration mechanism’s positive effects have influenced the sending country’s development, creating significant legal, political, and financial barriers to immigration in the receiving country (Ullah, 2013; Ullah & Hossain, 2011). Therefore, these multinational or transnational corporations have produced a variety of goods, capital, ideas, and skills, contributing to the promotion of social, political, and cultural ties in addition to economic ones (Prakash, 2009).

Migration System Theory

The core assumption behind this theory is that migration helps to change economic, social, cultural, and institutional conditions in both the receiving and sending countries. De Haas (2010) has noted that network theory is closely linked to migration systems theory. Moreover, the systems approach focuses on the macro and micro linkages of places associated with the migration process (Kritz et al., 1992). Micro-level factors include kinship and friendship systems, while macro-level factors focus on economics, governance, political systems, national immigration policies, and cultural and social systems. Unlike other models, migration systems theory emphasizes the reciprocal link between migration and development (De Haas, 2010). Therefore, this theory is relevant for developing a theoretical framework that views migration from a broader development perspective. Not only economic development but also social development is enhanced by migration. For example, remittances to family members can change the social and economic context of the countries that send workers. Thus, migration can influence the socioeconomic development of the country of origin and promote subsequent migration at both the macro and micro-levels.

Institutional Theory

With the emergence of international migration, several institutions and organizations have been established to capitalize on the imbalance between the employers of the countries receiving labour and the potential migrants of the countries sending labour. There needs to be a significant mismatch between the large numbers of people seeking employment opportunities in developed countries and the limited immigrant visas available in those countries (Massey et al., 1993). As a result, many for-profit and non-profit organizations have been established to address the problems of immigrants and employers. Most non-profit organizations emphasize the humanitarian aspect of migrants. In contrast, for-profit organizations work with private entrepreneurs to facilitate border crossings, forge legal and travel documents, arrange marriages between migrants and legal residents/citizens of the destination country, and provide loans at high-interest rates in exchange for fees (Massey et al., 1993). Because for-profit organizations often behave illegally, most non-profit organizations assist affected migrants through counselling, social services, legal advice, education about immigration laws, etc. Institutional theory is critical in today's context to create more favourable and robust policy frameworks for sending and receiving countries.

Cumulative Causation Theory

The cumulative causation theory was developed by Gunnar Myrdal in 1956. It was further developed by Douglas Massey and his colleagues (Massey et al., 1994). The theory explains why a migration flow begins and continues to increase (Fussell & Massey, 2004). In short, it describes how the number of migrants leaving increases over time as the first migrant provides social capital to relatives, friends, and others in the country of origin, which ultimately encourages them to quickly find work in destination countries and expose themselves to minimal risk (Jennissen, 2004). This situation stimulates and influences people to migrate more and more.

International Relations

International relations studies is the interaction of nation-states and non-governmental organizations in politics, economics, and security. Professionals work in academia, government, and non-profit organizations to understand and develop cooperative exchanges between nations that benefit trade, security, quality of life, and the environment. The study and practice of international relations are interdisciplinary, combining the fields of economics, history, and political science to examine

issues such as human rights, global poverty, the environment, economics, globalization, security, global ethics, and the political environment (Mahmud & Jabin, 2022).

Extraordinary economic integration, unprecedented threats to peace and security, and an international focus on human rights and environmental protection highlight the complexity of international relations in the twenty-first century. Twenty-first century. This means that the study of international relations must focus on interdisciplinary research that addresses, anticipates, and ultimately resolves public policy problems.

International relations (often referred to as international affairs) has a broad purpose in contemporary society as it seeks to understand:

- The origins of war and the maintenance of peace
- The nature and exercise of power within the global system
- The changing nature of state and non-state actors involved in international decision-making.

The Value of International Relations in a Globalized Society

Although international relations have become essential due to our increasingly interconnected world, the concept is undoubtedly familiar. The earliest form of international relations was the conclusion of treaties between nations.

The study and practice of international relations are valuable in today's world for many reasons:

- International relations promote successful trade policies between nations.
- International relations promote travel related to business, tourism, and immigration and provide opportunities for people to improve their lives.
- International relations allow nations to cooperate, pool resources, and share information to address global problems that transcend a particular country or region. Current global problems include pandemics, terrorism, and the environment.
- International relations promote human culture through cultural exchange, diplomacy, and political development.

The practice of international relations is beneficial in a wide range of areas. Some examples include Humanitarian and intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, Oxfam International, the World Food Program; government agencies such as the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and many others.

The Theories and Principles of International Relations

International relations may be an offshoot of political science, but this field of study is intense. As our global society evolves and expands, so will international relations as we explore new and exciting ways to connect our complex world.

Examining the Levels of State Behaviour

International relations often determine the level at which state behaviour is analysed:

- System-level analysis: system-level analysis examines the international system, more specifically how the international system affects the behaviour of nation-states, with the key variable being that the international system involves the power of individual states rather than being independent of them.
- State-level analysis: state-level analysis examines how the characteristics of a state determine its foreign policy behaviour. This type of analysis often considers states as having cultural characteristics based on their religious or social traditions and historical heritage and includes an analysis of economic and geographic factors.
- Organizational level analysis: organizational level analysis examines how organizations within a state influence the state's foreign policy behaviour. In other words, organizational level analysis assumes that organizations—not states—make the decisions that determine a state's foreign policy.
- Individual-level analysis: Individual-level analysis considers heads of state to be the most significant foreign policy influencers.

Examining the Theories of International Relations

The study of international relations began as a theoretical discipline. Two foundational texts in the field, E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) and Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (1948), were theoretical works in three respects. Both developed a broad framework of analysis that distilled the essence of international politics from disparate events; both sought to provide future analysts with the theoretical tools for understanding general patterns underlying seemingly unique episodes; and both reflected on the forms of political action that were most appropriate in a field where the power struggle was paramount. Their main message was that efforts to reform the international system that ignore the power struggle are quickly doomed to failure. They claimed that the liberal internationalist worldview was primarily responsible for the interwar crisis.

Jack Donnelly (2022) analyses classical realism, which dominated the discipline for at least the first fifty years and continues to significantly influence the discipline today. The writings of early realists such as Carr and Morgenthau remain essential

reference points in contemporary debates more than five decades after their initial publication. Donnelly (2022) explains that neorealism, which emerged in the late 1970s and was at the centre of most debates in the following two decades, was one of the most critical challenges to classical realism.

Burchill et al. (2022) discusses the evolution of the liberal tradition, noting in particular that many contemporary neoliberal accounts of the world market and defenses of free trade can be traced back to ideas espoused by economic liberals in the nineteenth century. Other features of the perspective that have been influential in recent years include the defense of universal human rights culture and the development of international criminal law, the study of ‘cooperation under anarchy’ in the context of neoliberal institutionalism, and the critical discussion of liberal peace. Andrew Linklater and Saramago (2022) analyse the English School and Marxism. In the years since 1998, there has been a resurgence of interest in the English School’s theory of international society and its position as a ‘third way’ between the pessimism of realism and the more idealistic forms of liberalism and various radical perspectives, including Marxism.

Linklater and Saramago (2022) pay particular attention to the contribution of Wight, Vincent, and Bull to this discipline, noting its special relevance to contemporary discussions of human rights, humanitarian intervention, and the use of force in international affairs. He also discusses Marxism, which has often been criticized by neorealists and members of the English School, although neither has anchored his critique in a careful interpretation of one of his main theoretical opponents. Richard Devetak (2022) explains the postmodern turn in the social sciences through the writings of Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard and analyses its influence on international relations since the 1980s. Criticism of the “Enlightenment project” of universal human emancipation is an important element of this chapter, as is the emphasis on criticism of “totalizing” perspectives seen as a threat to the flourishing of human difference.

Constructivism, discussed by Christian Reus-Smit (2022), has proved a powerful challenge to orthodox perspectives, especially theories that assume states derive particular interests from their location in a lawless state. In a famous argument against these approaches, Alexander Wendt (1992) argued that “anarchy is what states make of it.” The claim was that anarchy is socially constructed, that the beliefs and attitudes of states shape it; it is not an immutable structure that imposes certain constraints on states and forces everyone to participate in an endless struggle for power and security. Constructivism, which focuses on the relationship between interests and identities, includes several competing approaches.

Jacqui True (2022) sheds light on a topic that did not appear on the international relations agenda until the mid-1980s, namely feminism. This perspective cannot be reduced to an examination of the place of women in the global order. However, many feminists, such as Cynthia Enloe, have set out to explain how wars and global economic development affect women. The invisibility of women in mainstream approaches and many critical alternatives has been one reason for the development of feminist literature.

Matthew Paterson (2022) discusses developments within green political thought. Environmental degradation, transboundary pollution, and climate change have greatly influenced the study of global politics. These issues have been addressed in studies of “international regimes” with responsibility for environmental issues. Global justice issues have been the focus of discussions of equitable distribution between rich and poor and moral responsibility for remedying environmental damage. Obligations to nonhuman species and future generations are essential issues in environmental ethics.

International Migration and International Relations: Relating the Two

Migration is a consequence of globalization, which strengthens cross-border socio-economic and political relations, as both academic research and practical experience show. Undoubtedly, it can be said that globalization has displaced millions of people and set population shifts that are difficult to control. Therefore, increasing migration is one of the most obvious and essential facets of globalization, with growing numbers of people moving within and beyond national borders in search of better economic opportunities and lifestyles.

In addition, Ullah and colleagues (2019) have pointed out that skill shortages in occupations such as ICT, health (doctors, nurses, midwives), science and technology, engineering, and mathematics, as well as education and skill mismatches are significant issues in several countries around the world. The decline in the birth rate is one of the main reasons for this, which, in the long term, contributes to a shortage of skilled workers and a high demand for healthcare professionals (Ullah et al., 2019). The need for international professionals has increased in some Asian countries due to labour supply–demand mismatch issues. In Thailand, for example, there were skill shortages in several sectors due to a lack of skilled labour in the Thai market, both in quantity and quality, to meet the growing demand (Ullah & Alkaff, 2018). In addition, many ASEAN countries became dependent on foreign technologies, which led to a growing import of foreign skilled labour. Singapore and Malaysia, for example, have relied on migrant workers to increase their pool of skilled workers. Currently, there are (developing) countries with a surplus of human resources that can provide labour to deficit (developed) countries. In other words: Some countries have a skills shortage, while others have a surplus (Ullah et al., 2019).

In addition, due to the growing demand for personal and domestic services, especially in high-income countries, the demand for foreign or immigrant domestic workers has increased (FDW). This has led to many FDWs migrating from South Asian and Southeast Asian countries to different parts of the world. In addition, large numbers of low-skilled and semi-skilled workers, better known as migrant workers (MW), migrate from developing countries to more developed countries in search of

jobs and other opportunities to improve their economic and social conditions, as well as for their family members left behind (Rahman et al., 2014).

The economic aspect of development through migration is equated to international remittances, which is the portion of migrant workers' income that is remitted back to their home countries (Ullah et al., 2022). Migrant workers receive a higher income abroad than they would have at home, which leads to their personal growth, advancement, and empowerment, as well as that of their families (Rahman et al., 2014). With the remittances received, the wife or parents left behind by the MWs receive a higher income, more respect in society, and thus a more robust social position. The children in the family receive better education and health services and, in time, better employment. The family enjoys a better lifestyle and gradually moves up the socioeconomic strata. In addition, by joining together, extended family members gain prestige in society and enjoy many benefits such as financial support, better marriage prospects, etc. From micro-level benefits in the household, international migration leads to macro-level economic development (Rahman et al., 2014). As a result, international migration to developed countries improves relations between low-income and developing countries.

Besides cash, migrants also contribute to developing their countries of origin through non-monetary transfers or in-kind remittances: Ideas, practices, social capital, and identities (Ullah et al., 2022). Thus, we see that there are different types of remittances (Ullah et al., 2022), which include social and political (Levitt, 1996) and biological remittances (Ullah & Alkaff, 2018) in addition to monetary transfers. In-kind remittances are worth considering because they play an essential role in international collective development, bring the social influences of migration to the forefront, and represent potential public support (Gakunzi, 2006). Although monetary remittances are more likely to address social injustice, in-kind remittances (social, political, and cultural) significantly impact significant development paradigm shifts in Asia's major economies (Ullah et al., 2022). Ullah et al. (2022) argue that exporting and importing nations benefited from these in-kind transfers and that the "migrant population" in the country of origin and destination played an essential role in nation-building through such remittances.

International migration is considered an essential component of development in many economies because of its contribution to development in both origin and destination countries (Orbeta & Gonzales, 2013). Host countries implement their projects and achieve their goals with the support of migrants, while countries of origin benefit from various types of remittances from migrants (Orbeta & Gonzales, 2013). Thus, it is a reciprocal trade in which the sending side receives remittances, and the receiving side works (Ullah et al., 2019).

Conceptualizing some of the terms in the skilled labour market by Ullah et al. (2019) allows us to understand better the position of international migration and IR: 'brain circulation' refers to the transfer of knowledge by nationals living abroad when they return home to establish and maintain social, professional, and business relationships with destination countries (Saxenian, 2005). 'Brain exchange' is about the benefits of the specialized experience of professionals working abroad, benefiting both sending and receiving countries (Ullah et al., 2019), while 'brain gain' is

the accumulation of specialized human capital for highly skilled migrants in destination countries (Ciumasu, 2010). ‘Brain networking’ is a long-term commitment of expatriates to a distant collaboration that can facilitate the decision of the undecided to return home when they fall in and out of the network, and ‘brain outflow’ is the outflow of underutilized professionals in source countries. It results from weak demand for skilled labour in the home country. Some scholars use the terms ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain networking’ interchangeably (Saxenian, 2005).

‘Brain train’ refers to mobility specifically for education or training purposes, and ‘brain drain’ is the phenomenon of highly skilled and talented professionals moving from one country to another (Adekola, 2017). ‘Brain waste’ is when workers are forced to work unregulated jobs or change careers. Brain overflow occurs when emigration occurs due to an oversupply or overqualification of labour in a particular country (Pellegrino, 2001). Brain strain is when there is clear evidence that migration flows have negatively impacted the sending economy. ‘Brain desertification’ refers to highly skilled migrants who do not return and maintain ties to their countries of origin (Adekola, 2017). “Brain drain” is the loss of the most talented individuals who can contribute to development (Glaser, 1978).

However, in the context of the nation-state, this mobility is perceived by some as a “brain drain” and by others as a “brain gain” (Mejía et al., 1979). In the debates, there was a clear shift from “brain drain” to “brain gain” (Rahman, 2013). Theoretically, there are two main options for brain gain: the return option and the diaspora option (Ullah et al., 2019). The return option involves the physical return of expatriates to their countries of origin, and the diaspora option refers to the long-distance mobilization and participation of expatriates in developing their countries of origin (Meyer, 2007). The “diaspora option” reconceptualizes brain drain by identifying it as a form of “brain circulation” through the exchange of scholars, business people, and teachers, in which educational migrants who remain abroad find ways to participate in economic development (Rahman, 2013). This diaspora option plays a vital role by turning a potential loss from brain drain into a significant gain (Meyer & Brown, 1999). This option allows expatriates to contribute to their home country without giving up their overseas situation (Gaillard & Gaillard, 2003). The diaspora option, in the form of “diaspora knowledge networks,” brings together exceptional individuals and institutions by facilitating the flow of knowledge and financial resources between home and host countries (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006). Relations between host and sending countries are thus strengthened in all respects. Thus, from the above discussion, I contend that international migration enhances international relations.

Conclusion

Migration contributes to sustainable development despite its typically unfavourable perception. This chapter shows that different remittances contribute to local economic growth in low-income countries and emerging economies such as India and

Bangladesh. Even in several industrialized nations with aging populations, such as Europe and Southeast Asia, migrant workers are a growing part of the labour force and support national welfare systems. National and international policies must recognize the contribution of migration to sustainable development and explicitly defend the rights of migrants, which are too often ignored in efforts to limit their mobility. This chapter concludes that no country can thrive without the efforts of migrants. Therefore, international relations also depend on international migration.

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Chapter 4

Migration and Overseas Employment Governance in Bangladesh: Outlook and Challenges



H. M. Khalid Hossain Bhuiyan and Warefta Rahman

Introduction

This chapter comprehensively examines Bangladesh's evolving governance framework concerning international migration and overseas employment. This study explores the multifaceted landscape of migration policies, regulations, and practices within Bangladesh's dynamic labour migration patterns (Ullah, 2010). Drawing on extensive research and analysis, it sheds light on the remarkable growth of overseas employment from Bangladesh and the associated challenges. We elucidate the complexities of governance in managing this substantial labour outflow, considering the interests of migrant workers and the nation's economic development objectives. With a keen focus on the challenges, this chapter discusses issues such as ensuring the protection of migrant workers' rights, addressing labour market demands abroad, and enhancing policy coherence. Supported by empirical evidence and a deep understanding of the subject matter, this publication is an essential resource for Bangladesh's policymakers, academics, and practitioners engaged in international migration governance.

Migration benefits the economy in two ways: first, it helps reduce unemployment, and second, it leads to remittances. Bangladesh's development has benefited from the steady increase in migration in recent years as the inflow of remittances has increased annually (Islam, 2010). Migration and remittances are undoubtedly linked. Both contribute significantly to reducing misery in the home country (Masum et al, 2012). For developing countries like Bangladesh, remittances have become essential to socioeconomic development, where overseas employment is inevitable (Al Masud &

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Hamzah, 2018) Remittances are essential in maintaining a stable balance of payments and accumulating foreign exchange reserves. They also contribute significantly to the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Migration is increasingly recognized as a development option for workers' families, especially illiterate and unskilled workers (Hossain, 2001; Islam, 2010).

Similar to other South Asian countries, Bangladesh's labour force is composed of professionals, experts, semi-skilled workers, and workers with lower levels of education (Islam, 2010, 2015). The local wage labour cannot absorb the vast, inadequately educated, and skilled labour force. This massive labour force should be employed to ensure their participation in the country's economic development and improve their living standards.

Justifying Employment Abroad: Bangladesh Perspective

Bangladesh is considered a resilient country with a significant labour force potential. To meet the demands of the global labour market, Bangladesh is continuously upgrading the skills of this vast labour force, numbering about 60 million people, through skills development programs and training (Islam, 2015; Ullah et al., 2015). Bangladesh can only accommodate some available low-skilled, semi-skilled, skilled, and professional labour. As a result, Bangladeshis must seek employment abroad. Several foreign countries also rely on importing labour from abroad. With only 6,078 workers, Bangladesh began sending workers abroad in 1976 (BMET, 2020).

Remittances from workers abroad have long been recognized as an essential economic factor for the country. Bangladesh, an overpopulated but impoverished country, seized the opportunity to send its large population abroad to generate remittances. As of April 2019, the Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (BMET) estimates that 12.42 billion people have moved to more than 165 countries. With record-breaking remittances of \$15.54 billion in 2018, the country's foreign exchange reserves reached a significant milestone (Haque, 2019). Compared to the number of male workers leaving Bangladesh, more female workers are leaving the country. Since 1991, more than 0.7 million women have gone abroad as domestic or garment workers (Haque, 2019) (Table 4.1).

Before 2001, the Bureau of Migrant Employment and Training (BMET) was the leading regulatory agency for worker migration under the Ministry of Labour (Haque, 2019). In 2001, the government established the Ministry of Overseas Foreigners Welfare and Employment to recognize the importance of labour migration as a source of foreign exchange generation and job creation in industries other than ready-made garments and agriculture (Haque, 2019; Islam, 2010). After the derogation, the ministry took measures, including enacting laws and regulations to monitor foreign recruitment agencies, monitoring labour demand and supply in the global market, and upgrading skills (Uddin & Abedin, 2019). Before 2011, no significant actions were taken to support the rights and interests of migrant workers. In 2011, the government of Bangladesh ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights

Table 4.1 Top 10 countries with the highest number of emigrants (former residents living internationally)

Country	Number of emigrants (in million)
India	17.9
Mexico	11.1
Russia	10.8
China	10.5
Syria	8.5
Bangladesh	7.4
Pakistan	6.3
Ukraine	6.1
Philippines	6.1
Afghanistan	5.9

Source United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2020)

of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. The original convention was concluded in 1990. Since then, the government has amended and restructured the system to regulate and monitor migration (Haque, 2019).

About 7.5 million Bangladeshi migrants are currently employed in different regions. Between 0.3 and 0.4 million people leave Bangladesh annually (Islam, 2010, 2015). According to migration statistics, 3,90,702 people left Bangladesh in 2010 (Islam, 2015). Although Bangladeshi workers can be found in 143 countries worldwide, the Middle East and Malaysia account for nearly 90% of Bangladeshi migration. Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Malaysia, and Singapore are among the most visited destination countries (BMET, 2020) (Fig. 4.1).

Approximately 7.5 million Bangladeshi migrants are currently employed in various regions of the world. Every year, between 0.3 and 0.4 million people leave Bangladesh (Islam, 2015). In 2010, there were 3,907,022 outflows from Bangladesh, according to migration statistics. Although Bangladeshi workers can be found in 143 countries worldwide, the Middle East and Malaysia account for nearly 90% of the country's total migration. Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Malaysia, and Singapore are the most popular destinations (Islam, 2015) (Table 4.2).

The population of transient visitors in Bangladesh was divided into four categories. They are professionals, experts, semi-skilled and unskilled (Islam, 2010; BMET, 2020). Professionals include doctors, architects, nurses, and educators. Workers in the manufacturing or textile industries are classified as professionals; tailors, bricklayers, and others are classified as semi-skilled; and housekeepers, cleaners, and labourers are classified as less skilled (Islam, 2010).




Fig. 4.1 Overseas employment in 2023 (upto April 2023). *Source* Illustrated from Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (<http://www.old.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/statisticalDataAction>)

Overseas Employment

Long-term migration from Bangladesh is not a new phenomenon, but there is little research-based literature that comprehensively addresses this issue (Monem, 2018). According to Siddiqui (2004), Bengalis have a long history of migration. During the British era, a significant number of Bengalis migrated to Burma and Assam, for example. Later, there was significant immigration to the United Kingdom and the United States. Many landless Sylheti peasants reportedly found work in the Hooghli shipyards in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when they found that there were few employment opportunities in their homeland (Azad, 2019). It is believed that many of them boarded British merchant ships during this period (Alam, 1988). During this period, Bengali seamen from the southeast, such as Chittagong and Noakhali, located near the Bay of Bengal, became known for their seamanship as they transported goods from Calcutta to a variety of destinations. Numerous individuals who were not from regions bordering the sea, such as Sylhet, and therefore had no experience in seafaring, joined the ships of the British merchant navy in the prospect of a favourable opportunity, but worked mainly as ‘khalashis,’ cooks, cook’s assistants, and cleaners. According to experts on Sylheti migration, this group lacked seafaring experience and abandoned ship at the first opportunity (Alam, 1988). This tendency to ‘ship-hop’ eventually led to the establishment of small Bengali communities near ports in Burma, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to Siddiqui (2004), inhabitants of these tiny settlements are Sylhetis, the earliest immigrants to Bengal. According to Naff (1993), some Bengali immigrants mistook Latin America for the United States and settled there. However, written documents on Bengali immigration indicate that a small number of

Table 4.2 Total overseas employment of Bangladesh (1976–2023)

Countries	Employment (in number)
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	5,438,212
United Arab Emirates	2,532,673
Kuwait	662,366
Oman	1,812,746
Qatar	854,594
Bahrain	410,485
Lebanon	269,357
Jordan	212,650
Libya	122,673
Sudan	12,426
Malaysia	1,208,775
Singapore	901,347
South Korea	49,858
United Kingdom	12,540
Italy	66,217
Japan	2970
Egypt	23,144
Brunei	78,126
Mauritius	75,853
Iraq	303,763
Others	242,035
Total	15,171,877

Source Bureau of Manpower, Employment & Training (2023)

Bengalis jumped ship in Detroit and Michigan in the 1920s and 1930s. This tendency to abandon ships explains why Sylheti seafarers dominated Bengali settlements in London, Liverpool, and Bristol (Monem, 2018).

After that, Bengali immigration continued. Even before World War II, many urban Bengalis of relatively high socioeconomic status who had completed their higher education in the United Kingdom migrated and settled as citizens after beginning their new careers (Monem, 2018). In the mid-twentieth century, a second wave of migration began after the seafarers. Due to labour shortages caused by the World War and rising costs II, the British government enacted policies to facilitate and encourage migration from former colonies in the 1950s, when emigration to the UK increased significantly. This new policy gave the green light to previously settled Bengali seafaring migrants who encouraged and brought their relatives who lived in their former places of residence. Generally, these young men worked in heavy industry in northern cities such as Birmingham and Oldham (Siddiqui, 2004), while those who wanted to work as ironers or tailors in the garment industry lived in

London. Bengali immigration to the United Kingdom increased again in the 1980s when these individuals brought their spouses and children with them. A small number of immigrants were not economically motivated, but the vast majority were economic migrants (Monem, 2018).

Unlike the second generation of Bangladeshi immigrants in the United Kingdom, those who immigrated to the United States in the 1960s were professionals and skilled migrants (Mapril, 2014). Large numbers of young Bengali students immigrated to the United States for higher education. Some of these students, discouraged by the prospects in their homeland, which was then dominated by West Pakistanis, never returned (Monem, 2018). The majority of the students received permanent residency.

The immigration trend has continued over time. The “Opportunity Visa” (OP-1 1990–91) and the “Diversity Visa” (DV 1995–96) have encouraged migration from Bangladesh to the United States since the 1990s, but unlike the second wave, most of these immigrants are neither skilled professionals nor students. The majority of immigrants in the latter two categories, however, have secondary education. A sense of community is developing in the large metropolitan areas to which these people have moved, especially in the South and East. When choosing a new place to live, these new immigrants look for relatives or acquaintances (Elahi & Rahman, 2021); thus, the faster the Bengali population increases in the major cities, the more of these people settle there. This contributes significantly to the development of a strong sense of community among these immigrants, thus facilitating their assimilation (Siddiqui, 2004). The highest concentration of Bangladeshi immigrants in the United States is found in New York, according to a study by the Migration Policy Institute. In addition, California, Texas, New Jersey, Michigan, and Florida are known for their Bangladeshi populations. New York City and surrounding communities have the highest concentration of Bangladeshi immigrants compared to other major cities. Washington, DC, Detroit, and Los Angeles also have a high percentage of Bangladeshi immigrants (Monem, 2018; MPI, 2014).

In addition to the United States and the United Kingdom, many long-term Bangladeshi migrants have settled in countries on other continents, such as Italy, Australia, Greece, Canada, Spain, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and most Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, at various times as students, workers, and refugees. In addition, many of them stay and do business in these countries without valid permits. Without data, it is difficult to determine the number of these long-term migrants and their demographic and occupational characteristics. A 1986 study in the United States found that 61% of non-citizen Bangladeshi permanent residents were students. According to Monem (2018), ninety percent of Bengali immigrants in the United States were employed in 1992. It is also widely known that Bengali immigration to the United States has increased over time.

According to one study, the average age of Bangladeshi immigrants in the United States is 39, and 84 percent of the population is of working age (MPI, 2014). Only twenty percent of second generation Bangladeshi immigrants are of working age. The average age of the second generation is nine years old. Seventy-nine percent of the

second generation have both a mother and a father born in Bangladesh. According to the same study, the Bangladeshi diaspora population is better educated and has higher household incomes than the general U.S. population. Diaspora members are more likely to have a bachelor's degree or higher than the U.S. population. Bangladeshi diaspora households have a median income of \$54,000, which is \$4,000 more than the median income for all U.S. households (Rahman, 2013). In 2012, the Bangladeshi diaspora in the United States remitted approximately \$694 million to Bangladesh. Employment indicators among members of the Bangladeshi diaspora are similar to those of the U.S. population in general, with comparable rates of labour force participation, employment, and share of managerial or professional occupations (Kibria, 2022; MPI, 2014).

The first generation of emigrants from the United Kingdom included both skilled and unskilled labour, such as doctors, engineers, accountants, teachers, businessmen, nurses, economists, and researchers. Nevertheless, the second and third generations of the Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK are much more educated and enlightened, and almost all occupational groups are represented. This observation is supported by Siddiqui's (2004) finding that the new generation of Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK is thriving. They are successful in numerous disciplines. Specific individuals have made new contributions in research, education, and health. Many second generation émigrés are successful in journalism and media-related fields, and some are also successful in politics. In contrast, little is known about migrants from other European, African, and Asian countries (Azad, 2019). These regions are separate from the subject of research in this area. In all other developed countries, however, the Bangladeshi diaspora population is thought to represent a wide range of occupations. In addition to the elementary labour category, most Bangladeshi emigrants in Australia and Canada are employed in at least seven different occupational categories (Monem, 2018).

Although Bangladesh's diaspora population has made only sporadic contributions throughout its history, the country as a whole has benefited enormously. Long-time emigrants were crucial to Bangladesh's victory in the struggle for independence from the British government. Members of the Bangladeshi diaspora have contributed significantly to the country's development in various ways. One of the most important contributions is remittances, which account for many of the country's foreign exchange reserves (Ahmed, 2021). However, the diaspora has other potentials, and the government has not made much effort in the past to systematically exploit these potentials. There is still a lack of information about the Bangladeshi diaspora, which is unfortunate. To engage the Bangladeshi diaspora so that they can contribute to the ongoing development process in Bangladesh, it is essential to develop a deeper understanding of the nature of the diaspora and the many opportunities it presents (Monem, 2018).

Legal Basis for the Employment of Bangladeshis Abroad

The Emigration Ordinance issued by the government in 1982 was the first to regulate the Bangladeshi labour market abroad (UNESCAP, 2012). To meet the requirements of this regulation, Bangladeshi migrant workers must have a legally binding employment contract and a valid work visa before leaving the country to take a job abroad. Under Section 8.1, Bangladeshi nationals who leave the country are punishable by a fine of up to 5,000 Bangladeshi taka (TK) (US\$65) or imprisonment for up to one year, whichever comes first (Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, 2023). This provision is intended to ensure that Bangladeshis comply with the law. In addition, Section 8.1 grants the government the power to restrict the emigration of individuals who have specific characteristics “in the public interest.” The government has the authority to issue licenses to recruiters under Section 10 and to revoke those licenses under Section 23 if they violate recruiting regulations, such as charging migrants excessive fees. These violations can occur when a recruiter violates the recruitment regulations (Ministry of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs, 2023).

The “3 R’s,” which are recruitment, remittances, and returns, are handled by the following three significant agencies (UNESCAP, 2012): The umbrella Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment; the regulatory Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET); the government employment agency, Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services.

Bangladesh adopted the Bangladesh Overseas Employment Policy in October 2006, encouraging the emigration of Bangladeshis to other countries for protection. The Wage Earners Welfare Fund was established in 1990 and is funded by fees from migrants (an initial fee of 1,000 Bangladeshi taka (TK) (\$15)), interest on deposits paid by recruiters, and a 10% surcharge on fees charged by Bangladeshi missions abroad for passports and other services. These schemes were introduced in December 2002, and the fund supports offices manned by BMET staff at Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport (UNESCAP, 2012). At these counters, migrants are screened and assisted in leaving and returning to Bangladesh. The fund also provides financial assistance to the families of migrants who have died in Bangladesh and returning migrants who have not been paid by their employers abroad. It also provides legal assistance to migrants working abroad and arranges for the repatriation of the remains of migrants who died while working abroad. The fund is administered by a council of ministers from various ministries, the Bangladeshi Association of International Recruiting Ministries (BAIRA), and the Bangladeshi association of recruiting agencies (UNESCAP, 2012).

The BMET was established in 1976 under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour and currently maintains 17 offices throughout the country (BMET, 2020). Its mission is to coordinate employment promotion and skills training, promote employment of Bangladeshis abroad, and encourage foreigners living abroad to send remittances home. It is also responsible for promoting the employment of Bangladeshis in Bangladesh. It also provides employment assistance to migrants, regulates private employment agencies, and researches the relationship between migration




Fig. 4.2 MoEW & OE and its attached agencies. *Source* The Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment (MEWOE). <http://www.probashi.gov.bd/>

and economic development. Before migrants are allowed to leave Bangladesh, their employment contracts must be registered with the BMET. This process, usually conducted with the help of placement agencies, is one of the last to be completed before departure (BMET, 2020). The BMET reported in 2009 that approximately three million Bangladeshis have registered since the registration process began in June 2004. Those who register with the BMET receive a BMET-issued photo card ID with their personal information and a photograph (BMET, 2020).

The Ministry of Overseas Welfare and Employment (MEWOE), established on December 20, 2001, in response to lobbying by nongovernmental organizations, is responsible for developing policies for overseas employment and administering the Wage Earners' Welfare Fund (Mitra & Hossain, 2004). It also works with the Ministry of Labour to monitor recruitment practices, license private recruiters, and serve migrants through labour attachés at Bangladeshi diplomatic missions abroad. Since 2008, "Bangladeshis living abroad who send money home have been designated as "special citizens" (MEWOE, 2023) (Fig. 4.2).

The implementation of the government's policies, planning, and programs related to the administration of overseas employment is done through the agencies under this ministry, namely, the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), the Wage Earner's Welfare Board (WEWB), Bangladesh Overseas Employment Services Limited (BOESL), and Probashi Kallyan Bank (PKB) (Moniruzzaman, 2016, Uddin, 2014).

Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment: Allocation of Business

1. Welfare of Bangladeshi expatriates and protection of their rights
2. Expatriates' grievances and their redress
3. Facilitation of investment in Bangladesh by expatriates
4. Projects to involve expatriates in economic and social activities in Bangladesh
5. Registration of recruitment agencies
6. Overseas employment at all levels.

- 6A. Training and skill development related to overseas employment.
 7. Matters related to Bangladesh Overseas Employment Services Limited
 8. Public sector organizations and enterprises dealing with overseas employment, including BMET
 9. Administration of the Labour Department in Bangladesh Overseas Missions and appointment of officers and staff of this department
 10. Administration of the Welfare Fund for wage earners
 11. Promotion of Bangladeshi culture among people living abroad
 12. Liaison with associations of Bangladeshis living abroad
 13. Secretariat administration, including financial matters
 14. Administration and control of the subordinate office.

(Source Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment <http://www.probash.gov.bd/>).

Overseas Labour Wings

The ministry has 29 labour departments in 27 Bangladeshi missions abroad. The officials promote employment abroad and provide welfare to the migrants (MEWOE, 2023). The missions usually provide the following services to migrant workers (MEWOE, 2023): They seek to reduce problems with nonpayment of wages and other benefits by labour courts and other related offices by offering legal assistance to workers. Workforce export promotion requires market analysis and relationship building with key businesses and potential employers in the public and private sectors. It addresses the health and safety of migrant workers by visiting their workplaces and addressing their concerns. When contract violations occur, the Department of Labour works to resolve the problem by contacting the employers in question, lobbying the host government—particularly those dealing with foreign workers—to monitor contract violations by employers and recruiters.

Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET)

The Bureau of Migrant Employment and Training (BMET) is a subdivision of the Department established in 1976 to carry out the Department's many plans and policies for improving labour migration and protecting migrant welfare and training (BMET, 2020). The BMET is tasked with overseeing and monitoring the operations of employment agencies. The BMET's main responsibilities include registering persons seeking employment in the domestic and international labour markets, promoting employment opportunities in the domestic and international labour markets, protecting the legal rights of migrant workers, and providing social assistance to migrants. The BMET is responsible for collecting labour market data,

compiling it, and distributing it. The BMET is also involved in human resource development programs. Under these programs, skills training in a wide range of occupations suitable for employment is provided through the nationwide network of training institutions (BMET, 2020).

Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited (BOESL)

Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited (BOESL) is the only “state-owned” company in Bangladesh that exports labour (BOESL, 2023). In 1984, the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh established Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited (BOESL) to generate more foreign exchange by exporting skilled and unskilled labour. BOESL’s mission is to provide the highest quality services as a development partner based on mutual trust while minimizing migration costs compared to its competitors. BOESL’s main objective is to provide foreign employers with qualified applicants. BOESL collects fees from the placed workers at no profit and no loss (Siddiqui, 2006). BOESL is the only company established by the government to compete healthily and professionally with other private agencies in the sector and to ensure safe and transparent migration. Since 1984, we have achieved the goal of minimal migration costs, and we continue to work to reduce them (Siddiqui, 2005). The main goal of this company is to provide foreign employers with trustworthy, effective, and fast services in the field of recruitment and assignment to their complete satisfaction. Potential temporary immigration applicants now receive information via mobile applications (BOESL, 2023).

Probashi Kallayan Bank (PKB)

The government established Probashi Kallyan Bank in 2010 to provide loans without collateral to workers who go abroad to work, to help returnees find jobs in the country, to facilitate sending remittances, and to encourage wage earners to invest in the country (Probashi Kallayan Bank, 2023). PKB has 54 branches across the country and several terminals at Bangladesh’s international airports. It accepts deposits, loans migrants and returnees, buys and sells foreign currencies, etc. PKB has approved loans worth Tk 214.6 billion with a repayment rate of about 86 percent and extended migrant loans to 22,490 people as of March 2017 (Probashi Kallayan Bank, 2023). PKB not only provides loans, but also manages and collects fees from about 2,000 job seekers from abroad per day. After obtaining a work contract, visa, and passport, migrants can receive the funds. The maximum processing time for a loan is three days. It is not uncommon for PKB to provide loans to job seekers who wish to immigrate to any country. The loan term granted by PKB depends on the employment contract.

The first two months of the two-year stay abroad are a grace period. The immigrant must repay the loan with an interest rate of 9 percent within the next 22 months. The loan amount for immigrants in Middle Eastern countries is Tk. 84,000, while in Europe, it is Tk.

PKB does not encounter any processing difficulties in approving loans. However, there needs to be a bigger funding problem. Migrants are not interested in setting up savings accounts with PKB because it has no clearing house. However, PKB offers savings accounts with terms of 3 to 10 years and interest rates between 5 and 7.5% per year. It is a time-consuming process for PKB to clear migrant workers' checks with the help of other banks. If migrants could clear their checks through PKB, the government could invest more money in various initiatives. The government is taking the necessary steps to transform this bank into a regular commercial bank to provide services to migrant workers like any other bank and fulfill its original purpose (Probashi Kallayan Bank, 2023).

Wage Earners' Welfare Board (WEWB)

In 1990, the government established the "Wages Earners' Welfare Fund" to provide social benefits to migrant workers (WEWB, 2023). The name "Wage Earners' Welfare Board" has been introduced. Through this fund, migrant workers and their families are supported. This fund is administered by a Board of Directors composed of inter-ministerial representatives. At the highest level, the Ministry of Overseas Welfare and Employment, BMET, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism, Bangladesh Bank, WEWB and Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA) are represented. The WEWB works to promote and protect the rights and interests of migrant workers and their families by providing financial, legal, and technical assistance. The body's mission is "to ensure the long-term and meaningful well-being of migrant workers at home and abroad." WEWB's mission is to achieve sustainable improvements in the following areas (WEWB, 2023):

- quality of life of family members of workers who died abroad,
- The social reintegration of returning migrant workers and
- Pursuing desired education for the deserving children of workers legally working abroad.

Currently, WEWB provides the following services to transit migrants on behalf of the Ministry.

Pre-departure briefing: Ready-to-depart workers receive a briefing on life abroad and the services provided by consulates and embassies abroad.

Probash Bandhu Call Center for Migrant Workers: Passport-related hotline services for migrant workers 24 h a day; information on returning sick or disabled migrant

workers; information on scholarship programs for migrant workers; provision of legal assistance by missions; assistance for stranded migrant workers returning home (WEWB, 2023). Services for deceased workers and family welfare: transferring the bodies of deceased workers from abroad to the country. Deceased workers are transferred to their families at three airports. Covering the cost of repatriating the bodies of deceased wage earners from abroad to the country and issuing 35,000 taka (around US\$400) at the airports for the repatriation and burial of the body of each deceased wage earner. In addition, 0.3 million BDT (2727.27 USD) will be provided to the family members of workers who die abroad (Monem, 2018).

Benefits for sick and suffering migrant workers: provide cash and other assistance to struggling migrant workers. Sick or injured migrant workers can receive ambulances, which also help them get to and from the hospital. Services to the families of migrant workers in Bangladesh: provide scholarships to needy children of migrant workers (WEWB, 2023). One thousand five hundred scholarships are awarded each year. Providing the families of migrant workers with certificates for various purposes, providing funds for their protection, and removing obstacles that prevent them from helping the local government (WEWB, 2023). Through the Welfare Desk in the offices of DC, provide assistance to migrant workers and their families in the District Employment and Manpower Office (DEMO).

Services for international migrant workers: Providing safe housing and legal assistance to migrant workers through missions. Equipping workers with smart ID cards and repatriation from dangerous areas (WEWB, 2023).

Overseas Employment Policy 2006

- (a) Policy Parameters of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment Policy in Bangladesh: Bangladesh adopted an Overseas Employment Policy in 2006 to ensure the possibility of long and short-term migration of men and women from all regions of Bangladesh at reasonable cost (MEWOE, 2019). (i) The policy aims to organize the overseas employment sector and ensure the welfare of Bangladeshi workers abroad; (ii) The main features of the policy are as follows: It eliminates the possibility of irregular migration; The policy represents the commitment of the government to protect the rights, dignity and safety of all migrant workers inside and outside the country; It establishes measures to ensure the social protection of families and property left behind by temporary and permanent migrants; It prevents misconduct in the recruitment of labour from being considered a violation of the national interest and ensures accountability of the individuals, governments, and private organizations involved; It promotes remittance flows through official channels and provides assistance to workers and their families so that remittances are used effectively and efficiently (Liton & Alauddin, 2017); It facilitates the social and economic reintegration of returning migrant workers; It emphasizes the provision of necessary

resources and the strengthening of existing institutional infrastructure and staff for implementation. (iii) An action plan for the implementation of the policy indicators identified in the Overseas Employment Promoters (OEPs) should be established, in phases (Islam, 2011); (iv) Capacity building for the implementation of the Overseas Employment Policy must include, Educate and train people who want to work as migrants so they can compete in global markets; Assistance and advocacy for migrants while they live abroad; Negotiate fair contracts and bilateral agreements (Nath & Mamun, 2010).

- (b) Policy-making processes, particularly in relation to overseas employment (Fig. 4.3).
- (c) Role of different institutions, actors, stakeholders, organizations, and groups involved in making policy making (Islam, 2011; MOWOE, 2023): Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism; Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training; Department of Passport and Immigration; Airport Authorities; Recruiting Agencies; NGOs and Civil Society.
- (d) Other Policies of the Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment (Islam, 2011), Selection of CIP (NRB) policy, 2006; Special privilege policy of expatriate Bangladeshis for remittance, 2008; Medical Test policy for overseas employment 2008.

The Policy is based on six objectives, which are (MEWOWE, 2019; Islam, 2011): Giving people a chance to work while protecting their rights and respect; Giving migrant workers and their families social security; Making sure that migrant workers and their families have access to welfare services and benefits at all stages of labour migration; Ensuring gender equality in the labour migration process by encouraging

Fig. 4.3 Policy making process in overseas employment. *Source Illustrated from Islam, (2016), pp. 16*



more women to work in safe and decent jobs abroad; Including labour migration in the national development and planning framework; and Creating a system of labour migration governance that is efficient and involves people (Ullah & Huque, 2020).

Policy guidelines were formulated and developed based on the above six goals (Islam, 2011). Eleven policy guidelines were developed to provide opportunities to work with protection and human dignity. 14 policies to provide social security for migrant workers and their families; 14 policies to provide welfare services and benefits to support migrant workers and their families at all stages of labour migration; 11 policies to ensure gender equality in the labour migration process by promoting greater participation of women in safe and decent employment abroad; 15 policies to mainstream labour migration into the national development and planning framework (MEWOE, 2019).

Global Compact on Migration for Overseas Employment

On December 10–11, 2018, in Morocco, the GFMD reaffirmed the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and United Nations member states adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration to strengthen international cooperation on all forms of migration significantly (Haque, 2019). The Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are the foundation for the Global Compact on Migration. Although the framework is non-binding and based on commitments made by member states in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, it represents a turning point in the history of global migration discourse and international cooperation. It is widely known that Bangladesh is the country of origin for this GCM. This Global Compact includes seventeen goals to promote safe, regular, and orderly migration (Haque, 2019; IOM, 2023).

First, the pact recognizes the importance of accurate and disaggregated data on migrants who travel internationally for economic and livelihood purposes or who are victims of climate change, natural disasters, or political instability (Masuduz-zaman, 2014). This is essential to promoting safe, regular, and orderly movements. In addition, the pact strives to educate migrants about legal immigration, the importance of identity documents, and the reasons for leaving the country. Global cooperation between countries of origin and destination on fair and ethical recruitment practices ensures serious employment, reduces migrant vulnerability, responds to migrant rescue and identification missions, combats human trafficking, and coordinates border management. The Global Compact on Migration aims to improve the capacity of states to protect, assist, and cooperate with migrants throughout the migration cycle (Haque, 2019; IOM, 2023).

Governments are also responsible for ensuring that migrants have access to essential services (under Goal No. 15 of the Compact) and are provided with the means to achieve full integration and social cohesion (under Goal No. 16). Goal No. 18 of the Compact provides that governments shall support the development of qualifications and the mutual recognition of skills, credentials, and competencies (Haque,

2019; IOM, 2023). However, governments are responsible for creating favourable conditions for immigrants and diaspora members to contribute to sustainable growth fully. Similar to SDG 10.c, the pact's goal is to promote faster, safer, and cheaper remittances to support the financial inclusion of migrant workers. In a country like Bangladesh, where attitudes toward returning migrants vary widely within the community and society, reintegrating migrants is difficult. Therefore, the Covenant includes establishing a system for reintegrating foreign workers and a comprehensive plan for the portability of labour and social security benefits for migrant workers (IOM, 2023).

Challenges of Overseas Employment Governance in Bangladesh

Challenges

The need for a central organization to collect donations. To engage the diaspora community, it will be critical to establish an online database for long-term migrants (Monem, 2018). This database will help contact government agencies, chambers of commerce, universities, and research institutions for the necessary support. Unfortunately, there is currently no reliable database on long-term migrants from Bangladesh. Most long-term migrants still do not know that the Ministry of Economy and Labour (MoEL) has an online registration mechanism. Even if they were aware, permanent migrants may be less motivated to register themselves than temporary migrants because they may not need the services associated with registration and the smart card ID as much. Some permanent migrants may not be motivated to share their information until sufficient trust is built in this new system and its goals, which will undoubtedly require action by the government and other stakeholders. These migrants are not entitled to remain in their country of residence (Monem, 2018). The NRAs have established several groups with Bangladeshi members abroad, and many of these associations are divided along national political lines. This mobilization will take work and effort. Therefore, in the initial stages of confidence building, it is essential to select the associations and organizations with which you work carefully. It would be a good idea to begin the PIE effort with a few carefully selected organizations abroad at the outset. Still, we also recommend maintaining awareness of the government's interest and initiative in the larger diaspora community. It is easier said than done to engage the diaspora and maintain their interest at every stage of the national effort, which is a significant challenge. Nevertheless, many techniques can be developed, considering that the appropriate people and groups must be selected for initial collaboration, with equal weight given to the other people and groups (Abrar & Billah, 2016).

Political Perspectives and Possible Difficulties

One of the main obstacles may be the need for explicit policy provisions for the participation of international residents. It may be necessary to develop a new policy to ensure the cooperation of multiple ministries. Different ministries may need to participate in new projects that fall outside their jurisdiction (Monem, 2018). As a result, the mandates and business areas of the relevant government departments must be revised to include all critical aspects of international engagement. Although there is a ministry, its scope does not include all foreign-related issues. Ongoing interdepartmental coordination is difficult to achieve. To facilitate such collaboration, we propose the establishment of “diaspora engagement cells” within each relevant ministry and agency (similar to the innovation cells that the current administration has already established within the government apparatus) (Shahanaz, 2020).

Philanthropy can only be sustained with significant trust building among NRAs. Certain NRAs may be skeptical if the request for philanthropy is not based on a carefully selected list of development initiatives at the national or local level. NRAs must be provided with project details and an explanation of how they will benefit the citizens of Bangladesh. A special account must be established to receive donations from NRA individuals or organizations. Not all government agencies have this authority unless there is a specific directive. Such funds must be managed transparently so that senders can track how and on what the money is spent online. They can also obtain information about the impact of the initiatives via the Internet. All of these measures, despite their complexity, are essential to the short-, medium-, and long-term success of philanthropy. The lack of comprehensive studies of foreign participation in Bangladesh on the supply side could be problematic (Monem, 2018).

Institutional Level Challenges

There needs to be an institutional framework and a national-level initiative to engage with expatriate populations and access their significant other resources outside remittances. A broad-based national effort with solid government involvement is needed to achieve this. A secretariat for such a facility must be in place virtually and physically. The ministry needs to explore new employment opportunities, especially those that offer higher salaries, respectable pay, and a high standard of living (Karim et al., 2020). New sectors that generate demand could be explored and recognized based on the expanding economy and changing demands of society. If they have to return in an emergency, Bangladesh needs to make plans for using its human resources in the country’s domestic economy. When people borrow money at high interest rates and flee hoping for a better future, but return empty-handed for various reasons, the situation is serious. The government should have made plans to incorporate the resettlement of experienced workers into the economy’s growth. To ensure that returning

workers do not face difficulties in retirement, a mandatory savings plan like a pension program could be introduced (Monem, 2018).

Conclusion

With a population of nearly 170 million people, it is a challenge for the government of Bangladesh to use its human resources effectively. The government needs to recognize that labour migration has the potential to contribute to the socioeconomic development of the country and therefore requires structural reform. A digital migration management system has been introduced to maximize the positive impact of migration and minimize the negative. Although the Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment has started to prioritize diaspora participation, it is still very early, and nothing has been done to find ways to engage the global expatriate community in the overall development of Bangladesh. This requires a significant shift in policy and programmatic initiatives driven from the highest political level. Although there are signs that policymakers are moving in the right direction (Karim, 2021), it is essential to remember that the ministry (and the government machinery) is primarily concerned with supporting migrant workers and ensuring their safety during their overseas assignments. As this study shows, there are diaspora communities all over the world that are active, professional, highly skilled, and well-connected. If a proper channel for diaspora engagement is created, these communities would be more than willing to support various development initiatives of the Bangladesh government or provide necessary technical assistance. Although the government and the ministry know that more should be done to support the diaspora population, no specific action plan has yet been developed to achieve this goal. Migrant workers' remittances are one of the most essential tools to alleviate poverty.

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Part II
Governance, International Relations
and Security

Chapter 5

Re-imagining Migration and Security



Jannatul Ferdous and Niaz Ahmed Khan

Introduction

Migration became a security issue due to the geopolitical upheavals that accompanied the end of the Cold War and the more significant social and political changes associated with “globalization.” In this situation, both characteristics are applied. As a result, today’s debates on migration and security reflect changes in the phenomenon of migration and its perception. Migration was a social and economic phenomenon that belonged to social and economic history, historical sociology, and anthropology (Huysmans & Squire, 2009). However, migration is becoming an essential topic in discussions of global politics. Security is a geographical issue, as different regions have different physical conditions and cultural systems that impact the security of that region. Like geography, national security encompasses time, space, and contents (Almansoori, 2021). In the geopolitics of the twenty-first century, the complexity of global migration is becoming increasingly prominent. The scientific evidence that immigration generally benefits economies and societies and the growing hostility with which policymakers, especially in developed countries, view large-scale cross-border migration are at odds, leaving policymakers in various countries divided (Naik & Randolph, 2018). Migration is an everyday phenomenon for many children and youth worldwide. They are forced to leave their homes and communities for safety, better economic prospects, and other opportunities. A minority of people cross continents (Hovil et al., 2021). Most people remain in their home countries, while a few move to neighboring countries. To understand the role that the imagined dimension of life plays in the life stories of the interlocutors, it is necessary to

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explain the motivations, hopes, expectations, and perceptions related to their imagined dimension of life and how migration became a conscious strategy and decision. This is essential for understanding the role that the imagined aspect of existence plays in the life narratives of the interviewees. In this chapter, the migration route is reconstructed, starting with the motivation for migration (García, 2021).

Planning for human mobility within borders is crucial, but outdated stereotypes and false assumptions still mar our understanding of internal migration. First, internal migration is often portrayed as a ‘push–pull’ movement of impoverished people from rural villages to huge megacities. People are lured from economically depressed communities to cities with higher wages and more opportunities. This portrayal emphasizes a singular, linear migration story and has been widely accepted in popular culture and much of the academic literature on development economics for more than a century. However, this account needs to be completed, true. Second, it is widely assumed that internal migration is the root cause of, or even a substitute for, rising urbanization rates. Internal migration is called the influx of peasants into megacities (Naik & Randolph, 2018). As a result, urbanization is viewed as a simple, straightforward process in which cities grow through the influx of rural workers. Due to increasing concerns about terrorism, especially after September 11, 2001, international migration is a hotly contested issue and has become a central part of the global security agenda (Ullah et al., 2020). There needs to be more relevant baseline data and a gap in the academic literature demonstrating the link between migration and security. This chapter defines the conditions under which migration can be considered a security risk.

Migration: A Security Issue?

The term “securitization” refers to the possibility of a problem becoming an existential threat and the harm it currently causes (Umansky, 2016). From the perspective of security studies and migration studies, the migration/security nexus can be viewed from two perspectives. As a result of its organization according to different study agendas, the field is highly differentiated and contested. In reality, both security and migration studies are complex and multifaceted disciplines. One can approach security in security studies strategically as a value or state to be achieved or critically as knowledge, discourse, technology, or practice. Both approaches to security are legitimate. In migration studies, the term “migration” can refer either exclusively to economic movement or, more broadly, to forced migration, thus including refugee studies and labor migration studies. This suggests that the terms “migration” and “security,” which are used to describe a variety of behaviors with different rationales, are highly contested (Huysmans & Squire, 2009). It is a social construction that invades a zone of security by employing the rhetoric of discursive danger, threat, and occurrence to justify adopting extreme measures (Waever et al., 1993). Public discourse on the relationship between migration and security often focuses on issues

of public safety and the protection of citizens. Many argue that unauthorized immigration threatens national security (Ullah et al., 2020). Immigration is now a sensitive and emotionally charged issue.

Socioeconomic, climatic, demographic, and political conditions and dwindling resources force people to move and uproot their families. This is occasionally distorted to fuel fears of human tsunamis that cross international borders (Zoubir, 2017). Rarely is consideration given to the many factors that influence migration. The discourse on the relationship between migration and security means that tensions and resentment are easily stoked when the topic of migration is raised. The risks, especially to host countries, are widely known, but little attention is paid to the migrants who take these risks (Ullah et al., 2020). Most of the literature is dominated by these prejudiced notions that demonstrate bias against the immigrant community. In this age of globalization, it is critical to understand the relationship between migration and security. Most discussions of security move beyond the traditional and narrow definition of security as protecting a state from threats outside its borders (Soenmez, 1998) to consider a broader and more relevant set of dangers related to globalization (Krause, 1998). Securing immigration accelerated after September 11, significantly impacting immigration and national security in the United States (Rudolph, 2017).

The desire to realize one's potential and a better life are common motives for migration. The "American and European dreams" and other Western ideals of a better life can be recreated in Western contexts through symbolic resources such as mass media, tourism, nation-building, international cooperation, and immigrant narratives (García, 2021). This can affect how individuals perceive other places and people, considering migration is complex and often politically sensitive. Even though partnerships are an important tool for governance, it is essential to be realistic about what collaboration on migration can achieve. Building trust takes time, and partners often need to pay more attention to the time it takes to listen to and try to understand each other. Collaboration requires an equal footing; this approach could be characterized by shared leadership and responsibility. Each party should make a compelling offer and request to the other. Involving the right people is also essential, and collaboration should include many levels of government in addition to immigrants and labor market participants (ICMPD, 2021).

Migration Threatens to State Security

Since migration first became the subject of scientific study, the relationship between migration and (lack of) security has been the subject of much debate. Others claim that migration and security are inextricably linked, while some experts maintain that there is no relationship between the two issues (Basarabă & Nistor, 2015). Indeed, the view that immigration threatens national security has evolved in recent years due to the significant increase in foreign immigrants and the growing importance of the security agenda in various policy areas (IOM, 2010). Several seminal articles have introduced migration into security studies, presenting it as a critical element of an overarching

security agenda. For example, it has been asserted that a national security plan and migration policy should incorporate both migration and national security (Rudolph, 2006). Strategic methodologies that consider migration often view security as a value or condition that changes due to migration and, by extension, state efforts to control migration. They have greatly enhanced the legitimacy of migration studies within the mainstream of international relations and strategic studies in the United States (Choucri, 2002). Here, factors such as refugees becoming violent political activists (Loescher, 1992), the impact of migration on social cohesion, and whether there is a sufficient labor pool are considered (Rudolph, 2006). As a result, migration research has expanded beyond its traditional economic focus on state immigration policy. This has been accomplished by security and migration researchers (Constant & Zimmermann, 2005). Migration and refugee studies have begun to converge because of the broader dynamics that have resulted. By demonstrating how security considerations affect a state's immigration policy, strategic analysts are drawing attention to the importance of migration to security studies (Loescher, 1992; Vernez, 1996). These analyses focus on articulating the fundamental principles that govern the relationship between migration patterns and security policy. Although migration (or at least some types of migration) is often described as a "threat" to national security (Huysmans & Squire, 2009), strategic analysts who view security as a goal or ideal have also argued for less restrictive immigration rules using security as a reference point.

The ability to legitimize migration as a "threat" is an essential concern for tactical and human security measures related to migration and security. Viewing security as a value or desirable outcome, these analysts often assume that migration policies can be designed to improve state security, enhance migrant security, or improve the security of both countries and migrants. This is accomplished by framing migration as a "threat" to security, thereby bringing free movement under the purview of security (Huysmans, 1995). According to critical security studies specialists, strategic and human security measures could help improve the security of migration or free movement (Huysmans, 2006). Because of these limitations, strategic and human security methods cannot advance the intellectual terrain at the intersection of security and migration in all its social, political, and ethical complexity (Huysmans, 2006).

Moreover, strategic methods reduce migration's political and social complexity to strategic interactions between states, minimizing moral concerns about how securing migration leads to exclusions, violence, and injustices in the security sector. Migration affects perceptions of a state's authority and security (e.g., as an economic resource or cultural factor affecting social cohesion). Theories of human security fail to understand how framing migration in terms of two competing security claims, safety and national security, different implications for the accumulation of human contacts, and the struggle for professional and political legitimacy. They divert attention from the government and raise moral concerns but ultimately fail (Huysmans & Squire, 2009).

In an era of travel restrictions and nationalist sentiment, the vice president's remarks inadvertently spread anti-immigrant sentiment worldwide. The warning also drew attention to a pervasive problem: the failure of the U.S. government to acknowledge its role in promoting the conditions that lead to immigration. On December 18,

International Migrants Day, the international community, particularly the United States, must confront the legacy of imperialism that promotes involuntary migration while successfully excluding migrants (Forrest, 2021). For nations to understand the spatial manifestations of economic development and make informed decisions about the future of cities and people, an in-depth study of internal migration is needed. Information on where migrants settle, how long they stay, how often they migrate, and whether they return home is essential for developing effective migration and urbanization management policies.

Moreover, it is essential to evaluate migration data in light of the multiple narratives they represent and from various perspectives (Naik & Randolph, 2018). Most countries need more analytical tools to fully grasp the complexity and nature of current internal migration trends. Ineffective governance can affect migration, the economy, employment, and national security. Such concerns are legitimate, but they must be measured against the many positive and negative impacts of global migration on governments' fundamental national security interests (Adamson, 2006). As a result, migration regimes emphasize the Global Compact on Migration, the first intergovernmental negotiated agreement concluded under the auspices of the United Nations that comprehensively addresses all aspects of international migration (IOM, 2010). Uncontrolled mass migration that invades a country's territory is a potential risk (Waever, 1995). In this case, the behavior of the immigrants is different. However, the act would stand out if the perpetrator were a dominant group member, which he is not. Consequently, members of a minority group are subject to hate and hate crimes (Ullah et al., 2020).

When Migration “Crises” Aren’t Sudden, but Organized

The twenty-first century has been dubbed “the century of the migrant” due to the number of international tourists and illegal workers forced to abandon their countries due to natural disasters, economic hardship, or military conflict (Castles & Miller, 2009; Estevens, 2018). Consequently, structural and institutional changes are occurring in international politics, economics, and society due to (forced) migration (Castles, 2010; Estevens, 2018). The relationship between migration, security, and their interaction is complicated and problematic due to the fundamental arbitrariness of all three concepts (Choucri, 2002). This reveals a fascinating disparity in what security means to many individuals: while safety could be absolute, it depends on the viewer's perspective; one person's safety could be another person's insecurity; measures intended to improve security may produce feelings of inadequacy; and (i.e., subjective). Therefore, we argue that human capital, including cultural and social capital, determines the social security concept (Ullah et al., 2020). After 9/11, securing immigration increased, significantly impacting both immigration and national security in the U.S. (Rudolph, 2017). The United States has a well-earned reputation for undermining the peace and sovereignty of post-colonial

nations through war and imperialism, only to be appalled by the resulting human suffering and migration.

The actions of the United States in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia have triggered migration surges. Thousands of Afghans will be relocated after the United States leaves Afghanistan in August 2021, evoking memories of the 1970s Vietnamese population relocation. The disastrous War on Drugs and Cold War regime overthrows are just two examples of destabilizing U.S. activities that have significantly contributed to the “issue” of migration in Central America. Unrest in the Global South has frequently preceded U.S. operations and global dominance aspirations. Often, the most significant barrier to future migration surges is the hostile borders of the Global North (Forrest, 2021). Every day, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) detain tens of thousands of immigrants. These organizations have utilized government funding to criminalize immigrants, militarize U.S. border communities, and concentrate civil immigration enforcement on mass incarceration and monitoring. This system is becoming increasingly abusive, bigoted, and dehumanizing. In the 1980s, the country’s reliance on militarized law enforcement and widespread imprisonment practices increased (Maldonado, 2022).

The American detention strategy for immigrants is inhumane and destructive. The COVID-19 outbreak worsened conditions in jails, prisons, and other correctional facilities. ICE detainees have been subjected to inhuman treatment, including disregard for coronavirus mitigation protocols, medical malfeasance, deprivation of food and other necessities, mental and physical torture, and even death. Immigrants who are Black, Indigenous, and other people of color who are detained disproportionately in the United States, particularly Black immigrants, are exposed to more significant dangers. These detention policies reflect a culture that criminalizes immigrants. Instead of imprisoning migrants, the government should establish secure alternatives that shield individuals from violence while they navigate the immigration system (Maldonado, 2022).

Legal or unauthorized migration can threaten national security and, by extension, an individual’s safety. With the increasing importance of the security agenda in various policy areas and response to the significant increase in foreign immigrants, the view that immigration threatens national security has undoubtedly increased in recent years (IOM, 2010). Ineffective management can impact migration, the economy, employment, and national security. Such concerns are legitimate, but they must be balanced against global migration’s positive and negative impacts on states’ fundamental national security interests (Adamson, 2006). As a result, migration regimes focus on the Global Compact on Migration, the first agreement to address all international migration concerns at the interstate level under the auspices of the UN (IOM, 2010).

Challenges of Migration & Security

It is often assumed that migrants who leave or have left their countries are a security risk because of their sheer numbers. Although border security, criminalization of migration (Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018), and detention as a deterrent do not discourage people from making the journey (to migrate), they make life even more complex and agonizing for an already vulnerable group. According to the leading migration researchers and security policymakers about these issues, a paradigm shift is long overdue. Migration is a widespread phenomenon. The nearly one billion migrants suffer from a false association. People are at risk at various stages of the migration process when they leave their home countries and routinely cross multiple other countries and dangerous borders, regardless of their motivations for migrating (Ullah et al., 2020). Immigrants face security challenges in their homes and in new countries (Ullah et al., 2020). Including people fleeing violence and war, seeking work, education, or family reunification, as well as many others for whom these motivations are contradictory and difficult to reconcile with official classification, adds to the complexity of migration. Due to obligations under international law to provide security and services to migrants and locals alike, cross-border travel often threatens state sovereignty and illegal migrants are often called “irregular” migrants. Due to state restrictions on permissible pathways for regular migration and tightened border controls, global movements are more dangerous today than ever. Many children and youth may be “stuck” for extended periods at different points in their journey, neither in their country of origin nor in a place where they feel they can build a new home (Hovil et al., 2021).

The escalation of uncontrolled mass migration poses a potential threat because it could violate national territory (Waever, 1995). Since the beginning of academic research on migration, the relationship between migration and (in)security has been controversial. While some scholars argue that there is no relationship between migration and security, others say the two are inextricably linked (Basarabă & Nistor, 2015). It has been shown that the relationship between migration and security discriminates against immigrants (Omidvar, 2002). In addition, immigrants make up most of the population in each destination country. Because of this distinction, even minor crimes are amplified and can dwarf offenses committed by the majority population (Ullah et al., 2020). The vast majority of undocumented immigrants remain the same as they have always been: people seeking a better life, not terrorists seeking to end their own lives; therefore, it is a fallacy to equate unauthorized immigration with terrorism (Fan, 2007).

The fictional association leads to poor decision-making that focuses on fighting terrorism rather than striking a balance between humanism, human needs, privilege, property, and conscience (Fan, 2007). The government’s primary responsibility is to ensure citizens’ safety, but that does not mean they should disregard the complexities of [immigration] policy. The heuristics and fallacies of social psychology have revealed new information about how people think and make decisions. Through a process known as heuristic judgment, in which the substituted question differs from

the actual question or issue, people replace complex concerns with simpler ones. Consequently, heuristics, known as systematic biases, always lead to predictable decision errors (Fan, 2007). In the context of migration, intolerance toward migrants has become a significant security risk. The rise of bigotry, xenophobia, and intolerance substantially threatens developing a multicultural society.

This consistently criminalizes immigration. In recent years, more and more politicians on the far right have publicly espoused racist or xenophobic political agendas, which they have incorporated into immigration laws to criminalize and exclude migrants. This, of course, heightens security concerns (Ullah et al., 2020). The new rejection movement is fueled by discontent at home and dissatisfaction with globalization in countries that have advocated closed border systems (Carens, 2013; Giddens, 1981). Criminal groups commit numerous assaults, robberies, and kidnappings due to the restricted closed border system (Ullah & Hossain, 2011). Police and immigration officials abuse people and extort money from them at an alarming rate (Ullah et al., 2020).

The securitization of migration does not adequately justify border security. Restrictions on movement hinder potential migrants. States decide on admissibility and exclusion. The “securitization” of migration (Lazaridis & Wickens, 1999) has led to a variety of restrictive measures, including tighter border restrictions, extensive operations culminating in mass deportations, and xenophobic attitudes toward “the other.” As a result of the economic crisis and the resulting social, economic, and other conditions of insecurity for citizens that have served as a breeding ground for far-right groups in various parts of the world, the case for adopting strict security measures and policies to restrict cross-border movement has grown (Ullah et al., 2020). Migrants are more likely than other workers to be affected by occupational accidents and fatalities because they are assigned to the most dangerous and risky occupations (Ullah et al., 2020). Due to the high risk of employment in agriculture, fishing, and mining, workers in developing countries are more vulnerable to accidents and fatalities (International Labor Organization). Laws and practices governing occupational health and safety vary widely from country to country (ILO, 2013).

Western democracies are increasingly torn between their liberal ethos and ability to properly and safely control their borders during heightened security concerns and increased government action to restrict immigration to the developed world. In response to this dichotomy, liberal states have rethought their approaches to immigration control and adopted convergent policies, as a study of policy implementation in the United States and Europe shows. States have delegated policymaking to nonstate actors because of their financial and political ability to facilitate or impede migration, travel, and return. This includes the transfer of state responsibilities to decentralized authorities and the state’s adoption of a complex network of actors. Changing gatekeepers in external and internal locations to private (e.g., airlines, travel agencies, employers), local (e.g., civil society actors such as churches, elected officials, and unions), and supranational/international actors has allowed liberal states to expand their sphere of influence and circumvent certain restrictions (e.g., the EU, Mexico, and ICAO).

They show that the “migration playing field” has expanded in our increasingly interconnected world. Thus, government agencies have found solutions that simultaneously allay public concerns about migration and security, circumvent legal and normative restrictions, and promote trade and tourism flows (Lahav, 2003). As a result of the pandemic, migration-related global pressures are increasing. For many former migrants who have returned home during the pandemic or have been stranded in countries without jobs, the desire to flee becomes more urgent each week. As employment opportunities and financial resources diminish, economic and social pressures increase. Many immigrants who still have jobs are risking their own lives, families, and communities by working on the front lines of the pandemic (Yayboke & McAuliffe, 2021).

Academics and activists pay little attention to research on xenophobia, racism, and nativism. Migrants are exposed to significant levels of hostility and xenophobia due to the belief that one’s nation-state is superior to others and constant concerns about various problems and competition for scarce resources (Ullah & Huque, 2019). Each region where migration occurs has unique circumstances, whether people migrate due to war, natural disasters, or a desire for better opportunities. Society stigmatizes immigrants. Stigma and prejudice may exist. Depending on the security level in their home country. In many parts of the world, immigrants are stigmatized and used as scapegoats in economic hardships and terrorist attacks (Ullah et al., 2020).

Fueled by growing inequality, these demands require outlets that may not be readily available after the pandemic. Once vaccination coverage rates are high enough to allow safe and widespread migration of people again, the global supply of migrant workers will be more excellent. Whether isolated abroad or unable to make ends meet at home, migrants will be ready to return to work. However, some of the existing barriers to human mobility will persist long after the immediate health risks have subsided, especially in countries where policymakers have longed for an opportunity to reduce immigration. These politicians will exploit the remaining hostility between nations and the economic protectionist tendencies of their populations in the aftermath of the pandemic. Governments that have long reinforced unnecessary barriers to entry under the guise of the pandemic are likely to continue these policies (Yayboko & McAuliffe, 2021).

Way Forward

Academics specializing in substantive security studies have raised several challenging questions critical to studying the migration-security nexus. The emphasis on these questions represents a significant departure from the concept of security (and insecurity) presented in the previous section, in which security is viewed less as a desirable goal and more as a necessary facilitator of the interaction between migration and policy. Critical analysts characterize security as a concept with multiple meanings and as an expression of social and political practices of governance that effectively control human mobility, as opposed to viewing security as an expression of

the dangers that mobility poses or is perceived to pose. This underscores the normative nature of writing about safety and the rapid transformation of safety knowledge into insuring knowledge. Security knowledge that often uses the terminology of human trafficking produces crime statistics that distinguish between immigrants and the native population or presents security as a trade-off between personal and national security, supporting the notion that immigration is a security risk (Huysmans & Squire, 2009). Immigration-related issues have sparked debates about whether and how to classify an issue as secure. The feasibility of security evaluations independent of the securitization process is one of the most critical issues in this context (Huysmans, 2002).

This has led to conversations about the de-curation of issues such as immigration (Aradau, 2004). To avoid the “stratification” of migration in this context, integrating the case of security practices into an agenda that examines the political structure of mobility is one of the most essential strategies. Then, security is no longer the primary concern but becomes one of several factors that define, influence, and constrain movement. The relationship between migration and security can be considered critical political theory or critical political sociology (Huysmans & Squire, 2009).

The dominant paradigm needs to be removed from U.S. immigration laws. As part of this transition, imperialist and militarist strategies that have historically harmed the Global South and influenced migration patterns must be re-examined (Forrest, 2021). These recommendations address various actors, hereafter called “migration actors,” including national and local governments, intergovernmental organizations, donor partners, international organizations, and global and national civil society organizations (Hovil et al., 2021). Introducing the issue of violence and its political justification can help broaden political understanding of the relationship between migration and security. Violence perpetrated by migrant warriors or against migrants would not be considered a trade-off between national and human security. The political dimension of violence takes precedence over security (Huysmans & Squire, 2009).

Foreign Policy is Associated with Migration Partnerships

Although migration policy’s internal and external aspects are inextricably linked, it can be challenging to articulate this regarding diplomatic goals. Foreign policy can and should play a more vital role in building partnerships, even though interior ministries are usually the institutions charged with managing migration. This is due to the limited negotiating power of interior ministries. It is emphasized that better coordination and use of foreign policy would allow the EU to make a more attractive offer to its partners. However, even if foreign policy actors support migration alliances, foreign policy should rely on something other than this type of cooperation (ICMPD, 2021).

A Child-Centered Perspective and Systems for Child Protection

All parties involved in migration should adopt a child-centered perspective on the causes and effects of migration, recognizing that children have a right to protection regardless of the circumstances or nature of migration. Specifically, stakeholders should consider the perspectives and testimonies of children and adolescent migrants in their activities, ensure that the various dimensions of vulnerability are considered, and tailor interventions accordingly; promote the need for more thorough child welfare investigations and assessments; develop and implement comprehensive information programs; and enhance opportunities for children and adolescents (Hovil et al., 2021). To ensure adequate protection of all children, especially migrant children, regardless of country or migration status, child protection services must be modernized and improved. As this violates children's rights and is contrary to the best interests of the child, stakeholders should develop appropriate mechanisms to prevent the detention of migrant children, their separation from parents, and any return operations that risk violating the principle of non-refoulment; they should support legislation and policies that facilitate access to documents; they should ensure effective legal processes to reduce impunity for trafficking and exploitation; and they should provide a safe environment for all migrants (Hovil et al., 2021).

Keep in Mind Your Neighbors' Neighbors

Europe often favors its immediate neighborhood or its countries of origin for promoting alliances. But it is also essential to interact with middle-income countries along migration routes. Although most mixed migration in Africa occurs within the continent rather than outside, the southern borders of North African countries are often ignored when responding to migration patterns. Programming that encourages neighbors to work together must recognize these gaps and realities so that people ultimately do not feel the need to migrate or can do so safely. The same considerations apply to a comprehensive migration pathways strategy (ICMPD, 2021).

A Multisectoral and Integrated Approach

Create and implement programs that ensure that children, regardless of their immigration status and citizenship, do not face barriers to accessing essential services such as clean water, washing facilities, schools, and primary, secondary, and tertiary health care facilities. Migration stakeholders should, therefore, adopt a multi-sectoral and integrated approach. A multi-sectoral system should facilitate access to clean water, washing facilities, money, communication, education/training, and job placement. Child protection efforts should be linked to interventions in other related areas such

as education, social protection, and health. Efforts should also be made to monitor access to services. Children interviewed emphasized that they need access to money, communication, and employment services to transition to adulthood safely (Hovil et al., 2021).

Prepare the Ground for Popular Acceptance

Conflicts may also arise over issues other than the partner in question. Public opinion can hinder migration cooperation and must be considered when developing partnership narratives and approaches. Expanding legal options is critical for European partner countries to make cooperation palatable to their citizens. Hence, a narrow focus on contentious issues such as return often leads to a dead end. The political space needed to develop and implement cooperation efforts can be created by placing common interests at the center of the narrative. All parties involved have a common interest in managed migration, but it is essential to recognize that this interest goes beyond combating illegal immigration to providing legal pathways.

Acceptance of Migration Following COVID-19

Covid-19 has proven that “there is a method where there is a will.” Governments have gone above and beyond to protect their citizens during the pandemic. Unusual immigration and movement regulations were enacted to ensure crops could be harvested, health care could be staffed, and nursing homes could operate safely. To prevent them from becoming transshipment points for virus transmission, special attention was given to immigrant detention centers and unauthorized migrant communities. Flexible and rapid responses to these emergencies have ensured that most in need have access to health care, and the importance of migrant workers has been recognized. Governments have shown what can be achieved when the will is there. The next step is to reassess international migration urgently. In the aftermath of the pandemic, the criminal organizations that supported false routes before COVID-19 are still active and will continue to pose a security threat. Increased opportunities for migrants and those who wish to become migrants must be accompanied by increased prosecution of smugglers and traffickers. Migrants will continue to seek to relocate when the former do, but the latter do not, but this comes with higher costs, greater vulnerability, and greater risk as smugglers themselves adjust to harsher and riskier working conditions (Yayboke & McAuliffe, 2021).

Conclusions

Unless we want security to be the unifying factor in our analyses, we must consider it in the context of political engagement, the legitimacy of violence, various technologies of inclusion and exclusion, and the citizenship debate. In conjunction with other political factors, there is always a particular strategy, method, and concern used: Security. To conduct policy studies on the nexus between security and migration, it is necessary to understand how security practices operate in a political context where there are different perspectives on human mobility and how they are related to disagreements about what (legitimate) political action means, the role of violence, competing theories of justice, etc. This interpretation of the relationship between migration and security is at odds with the study's goal, which is to understand the security implications of migration and the securitization of mobility. Numerous necessary migration and security operations are involved. Securitization processes are included in social and societal discourse, as are discussions of important policy issues rarely framed solely in terms of security. Rather than supporting the notion that some nations or particular migrants are "at risk" from migration (Huysmans & Squire, 2009), it is better to view migration as a positive force. In the age of globalization, the blurring of borders and the need to transform citizenship and sovereignty may put the Westphalian nation-state at risk. However, due to the globalization of migration, more unauthorized migratory movements have exacerbated border security, fueled nationalist sentiments, and fostered national and non-national divisions. These conflicts at the global and state levels show that globalization is opposed by a variety of forces (Estevens, 2018).

This chapter demonstrates the need to connect security-oriented discourses on migration with an awareness of societal and national risks. Framing migration issues as security problems is detrimental to both the protection of migrants and the stability of host countries. As security-related migration dynamics have ignited and exacerbated tensions and hostility between migrants and hosts in many countries, integration can be challenging (Francesca & Scribner, 2013). There is a complex relationship between migration and security. Therefore, simple conclusions may be unfair to migrants and their host countries. However, it is too simplistic and biased to place all the blame on migrants, focusing exclusively on the host/native population (the majority group) and using fallacious association techniques. In reality, most migrants labeled as dangerous or wrong seek a better life and refuge from the dangers they face in their home countries. These people have made significant sacrifices throughout migration, including giving up their origins, livelihoods, and families. Even if they have reached their destination, the dangers remain. This is because they are oversimplified or socially stigmatized by minority groups (who may have committed crimes). Rather than underestimating the value and safety of migrants, it is critical to redefine how security and migration are perceived (Ullah et al., 2020).

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Chapter 6

Great Power Competition and Cyber Security



Marko Pavićević and Mohammad Razaul Karim

Introduction

When we think of the internet, vulnerability is the keyword. Cybersecurity is wholly related to the internet, so the potential for vulnerability and exploitation by random actors is very high. Countries, companies, and individuals must protect their assets by identifying these vulnerabilities and creating various protection mechanisms. Cybersecurity is a method of protecting networks and algorithms from unauthorized access. Protecting privacy is the primary goal of cybersecurity. Securing networks include methods to protect data. One challenge for cybersecurity is the new technology that is increasingly being used by various actors, such as hackers, for data breaches. Data is increasingly stored in the cloud, which poses the risk of cyber-attacks. Cybersecurity has started to influence international politics, and the most significant threat is hacking the information systems of countries and major companies. Cybersecurity is becoming a new aspect of warfare, and countries increasingly use cybersecurity as part of their security strategies and foreign policies. This chapter is about conceptualizing cyber security and incorporating the theory of offensive realism into cyber security.

The intensifying competition among major powers in the field of cybersecurity has significant implications for international migration (Brenner, 2004). Major global powers are vying for dominance in the digital domain, using cyber tactics such as espionage, data breaches, and even disruption of critical infrastructure. These cyber activities can impact international migration in several ways. First, cyber-attacks on government systems can compromise sensitive immigration data and affect the

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processing of visas and refugee applications. Second, cyber threats can disrupt the functioning of critical industries, leading to economic downturns and job losses, which can affect migration patterns. In addition, diminishing trust in digital systems due to cyber threats may encourage people to move to countries vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities for human trafficking and exploitation highlights the interplay between cybersecurity and the mobility of people. Policymakers must address these interlinked challenges in light of the evolving landscape of great power competition to protect cybersecurity and international migration systems' integrity.

Cyber threats pose a potential threat to infrastructure with substantial economic losses and security implications. There is the potential to damage a country's strategic infrastructure, which can disrupt its ability to function (Lawson, 2013). For countries, security is paramount, and they will do everything they can to strengthen their power to prevent potential losses from the impact of cyber security. The complex interdependence between countries increases the potential cybersecurity threat. Countries increasingly view cybersecurity as a national security challenge (Choo, 2011, p. 720). Close ties between countries are still significant to achieve economic (absolute) gains. However, the zero-sum implication of cybersecurity forces countries to focus more on relative gains, where a loss for one side means a gain for another. Countries may increasingly treat cyberattacks like armed attacks, which means that the side that considers itself the victim will retaliate justifiably.

Cybercriminals initiate cyber-attacks via one or more computers to steal relevant data. Data is considered the new oil in the information age, which means that various parties will go to great lengths to obtain information using information technology. The biggest problem with cyber-attacks is identifying the origin of the attack. Cyber-attacks can change the nature of warfare, where the attacker's identity remains hidden (Rid & Buchanan, 2014, p. 30). In traditional war, the enemy is highly identifiable; in cyber warfare, the enemy is hidden and not easily identifiable. Accordingly, it is difficult to address the problem and gain the support of politicians and the public to retaliate as a country. Cyber-attacks are not visible to politicians and the public, so it takes work to coordinate the response. The perception of the attack is less pronounced than traditional attacks. Accordingly, communicating hacking attacks can be challenging for countries, as the release of information can damage sources on the one hand but also improve defense infrastructure on the other. The new wars will be cyber wars, where countries need more knowledge and better awareness of how dangerous cyber-attacks can be and what consequences they can have.

Cyber risks can take many forms of affecting information systems. They can include the theft of personal data, the disruption of business processes, and the exposure of sensitive information (Biener et al. 2014, p. 132). Cyber risk at the international level between countries risks exposing essential information. A new form of security will protect a society's information infrastructure. In addition, knowledge will be attacked, whereby the hackers will not be recognised, and it will not be a physical attack but a virtual one. Countries must align their legal systems accordingly and get the public and private sectors to cooperate to protect the information infrastructure (Wenger, 2001). Protecting the infrastructure, which includes industry,

the military, society, etc., is essential. This can be done through detection, encryption, and remediation. The goal is to create a large-scale system that prevents attacks (Collier et al., 2013).

Cyber espionage, especially economic cyber espionage, is increasingly carried out by states. States that engage in cyber espionage fall within the ambit of international law and seek to reap the benefits of cyber espionage, which is not strictly regulated at the international level. Economic expansion and avoiding isolation are important reasons states engage in cyber espionage (Skinner, 2013). Cyber espionage is possible because we live in an anarchic international system, even though the international community tries to regulate matters. States will constantly try to find loopholes in the design and use cyber tools to increase their power advantage. The future geopolitics of digital espionage is based on great powers like the United States and China developing mechanisms to steal information from each other. Despite the information infrastructure they have, they will constantly penetrate each other's networks to gain economic and intelligence advantages (Bronk, 2010). The United States is increasingly concerned that cyber espionage from other countries, particularly China, will reduce military advantage and lead to knowledge transfer from the West to the East (Gilli & Gilli, 2019). International law does not currently cover all aspects of cyber conflict worldwide, and countries will use the opportunity to increase their share of power in the cyber domain.

Cyber conflicts are changing the way states interact. They cannot be directly violent as in traditional war but happen clandestinely. Nevertheless, cyber conflicts can change the nature of political and economic relations between countries (Maness & Valeriano, 2015) and create fear and skepticism, leading to offensive strategies that make security problems in the future. Cyber conflict is not independent of traditional armed conflict but goes hand in hand with it. It can change a country's information network, affecting the use of weapons and armed forces. In other words, there is the possibility of miscalculations that can have negative consequences.

Moreover, cyber conflicts can sometimes be triggered without the knowledge of the political leadership, which has excellent potential for traditional armed conflicts (Gompert & Libicki, 2014). Nevertheless, countries are refraining from using cyber conflicts as a tool for international armed conflict. Cyber operations will challenge states in the future, as both state and non-state actors will be involved in cyber conflicts (Schmitt, 2012). Overall, cyber conflicts increase skepticism and fear, which may lead to a more excellent synchronisation of traditional warfare and cyber capabilities to increase power and reduce the likelihood of attack.

The biggest threat and fear for countries is the development of cyberterrorist factions, which can have a political background but can also be semi-independent and carry out cyberattacks. Cyber-terrorists will increasingly seek to exploit vulnerabilities in countries' infrastructure systems, while countries will seek to pre-empt the attacks (Rathmell, 1997). The problem is that countries are fighting an invisible enemy and, simultaneously, trying to develop an infrastructure to pre-empt the attacks by the same invisible enemy. Cyber-terror is a growing fear among countries with the developed awareness that the next cyber-attack will happen shortly. The problem with cyberterrorism is that the perpetrators are rarely known, and those behind it

are usually entirely unknown (Stohl, 2006). This raises issues between countries, which can accuse each other of cyber-attacks, while each can deny it and blame it on independent parties within countries that have nothing to do with governments. Cyber-terrorism is even more dangerous than a hacking attack in the sense that it also has an impact on the physical world. For example, a cyber-attack can disrupt the system that controls aircraft, leading to a crash and human lives. A psychological intimidation factor also aims to create fear in society (Kenney, 2015). Fear is the most significant consequence of potential cyber-terrorism, as countries will increasingly make, or at least attempt to create, a mutual defense system. This may lead to a new level of aggressive foreign policy, which may trigger unique power struggles at the international level.

The above leads us to the idea of cyber-war, to the question of whether there can be an actual war and whether it can be considered a war. A cyber war is an aggressive action involving computer information systems that can be damaged or destroyed. Cyberwar still consists in using force in the form of computer systems to change the status quo and inflict damage. The difference with traditional war is that, in most cases, cyber war does not involve direct human casualties (Rid, 2012). Nevertheless, it can spontaneously trigger a traditional war claiming human lives.

In some cases, human casualties may occur, as in the case of the plane mentioned earlier. Cyber-attacks are not based on physical attacks, but they can cause them. Accordingly, a cyber-attack is considered a cyber war because it can lead to traditional warfare (Stone, 2013). Reality is what we make of it, and, accordingly, cyber war is increasingly perceived as a war that can have long-lasting consequences, arguing that it can trigger traditional warfare. Cyberwar creates norms where countries feel obliged to retaliate and improve computer network defenses. Countries retain the subjective right to punish and deter future (cyber) attackers. The most significant consequences of cyber war are collateral damage and escalating responses (Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011). If we think of anarchy as the structure of the international system, then that is our reality. That is our reality if we believe we have international institutions and norms. The new truth is that cybersecurity is becoming more and more critical because countries want to protect themselves from possible cyber-attacks that can have negative economic and security consequences. Even if cyber security problems do not directly lead to the death of people, they can lead to misjudgements and poor foreign policy decisions that can be fatal for societies and their citizens.

Compared to power, cyber power is based on resources associated with the cyber domain. It can also create a competitive advantage using computer systems connected to the cyber domain. This power is used to dominate cyberspace or to gain a competitive advantage in other areas, such as traditional security. The nature of cyber power is dynamic, artificial, and an ongoing trend. Due to the nature of the Internet and its freedom of action, there will be an attack rather than a defense strategy in the cyber domain (Nye, 2010). Because of the unknown enemy in cyberspace, states will pursue an offensive strategy to increase their power share and attack first. Powerful states, as always, have the advantage of being more potent than smaller states because of their resources in the cyber domain. Cyber power gives a new, desirable impetus

to the tendency towards war. Countries can carry out (cyber) attacks on other countries and destroy their essential infrastructure without the victim knowing who the attacker is (Betz, 2012). Power is the ability to make the other side do something it is unwilling to do. A solid military power of one country can cause other, smaller countries to do something they would not have done otherwise. Cyber power is a whole new level of power where countries have an invisible power to hurt the other side. This type of war is potentially more dangerous than the traditional one because people are afraid and perceive the unknown negatively.

Among the types of warfare that can develop from the cyber domain is espionage to gather information about the enemy. There is sabotage in the sense of preventing the adversary from doing something that can cause harm. Of course, there is also propaganda, which aims to spread false information about the other side. But above all, there is economic disruption, which seeks to harm the opponent economically. Cyberspace will impact domestic and international politics as the motivation to steal and gather information in the economic sphere increases.

Nevertheless, cyberspace will remain the same power politics at the international level. The difference is that cyberspace will change the way the game is played. Cyberspace will necessitate the development of regimes in which countries establish rules to which they must adhere (Forsyth & Pope, 2014). Regardless, there will be power politics in cyberspace where countries will do everything, they can to maximise their power and create a competitive advantage.

Role of Offensive Realism in Cyber Security

The only way for states to achieve their goals at the international level is to develop policies that address the issues and problems that countries face. Cybersecurity is an increasing problem for states, potentially leading to the issues that countries must deal with. A state does not want another state to be able to corrupt the algorithm that affects, for example, the stock market or any other aspect that is important for the welfare of the country. A country's foreign policy aims to protect its interests, repel attacks, and use means that benefit the country. Being safe from attacks is essential for a nation; the only way to achieve this is to be very powerful. It is also necessary to ensure that the other side is aware of this because only then is it less likely to be attacked (Levi, 1970). In traditional security politics, countries try to maximise their power to deter others from attacking. States tend to change the status quo for their benefit constantly. Since the international system is anarchic, states are forced to increase their share of power because no one will save them. Distrust and fear are a constant tendency in the international system because states have offensive capabilities (Mearsheimer, 1994), and countries are likely to behave recklessly (Mearsheimer, 2009). Countries know that everyone has cyber capabilities in some form and that no international law or institution can protect them from attack. The only way for a country to defend itself is to build cyber power capabilities to deter or attack the other side and gain the necessary intelligence.

States do not want to have peers, and there are five reasons why they seek power. First, no international institution or higher authority can save them from the perpetrators. Second, every state has some offensive capability to hurt others. Third, one side always tries to determine what the other wants and its intentions. Fourth, the goal of any state is to ensure that it survives and remains in one piece. Finally, states are rational actors that will do anything to stay (Mearsheimer, 2001). As mentioned earlier, there are no overarching international institutions that can protect countries from cyber-attacks or wars, only themselves. Even if the cyber attackers are invisible, countries know that everyone has some form of cyber capabilities with which they can harm others. Accordingly, countries will do everything possible to build their cyber power.

Moreover, country A is still determining when and in what way country B will use its cyber capabilities. Accordingly, country A will build up its cyber capabilities to prevent country B's attack. In the information age, it is rational for countries to maximise their cyber capabilities and avoid any attack that could damage their infrastructure or trigger a traditional war. There is a perception that country A can (cyber)attack country B at any second, and therefore any international actor will try to upset the balance of power to its advantage and maximise its power whenever and wherever possible. States do not always act aggressively, and what can make them very aggressive are misjudgements that hurt their actions. Adverse reactions can have a very negative outcome. Cybersecurity increases the risk of miscalculation compared to traditional security. There is a high level of intelligence in traditional military capabilities, but there is not enough intelligence for cyber capabilities, and there is a high risk of miscalculation. The security competition is constantly reinforced by fear, and states want to reduce it in any way they can. Military power is a tangible power that supports this fear and enables a state to dominate a particular region if it has more relative power (Mearsheimer, 2001). Conversely, cyber power is invisible and unknown to countries and their intelligence services, which can further increase fear, leading to serious foreign policy mistakes. The information age crosses borders; attacks can be instantaneous, they can be secret, and there is a possibility that the perpetrators will not be found.

Ideology and economic interests are important factors in international politics. Still, the realist nature of the global system argues that power politics matters because survival is the state's ultimate goal (Mearsheimer, 2001). States may seek some form of economic cooperation that involves institutions, but at the end of the day, scepticism will prevail, and they will engage in power politics. Even if cybersecurity does not directly lead to human casualties (perhaps in some instances), it can contribute to traditional miscalculations and wars that can lead to human losses. Countries ostensibly cooperate to create a more secure world order but, in reality, build military and other capabilities for survival and relative gain. Great powers make a world order for personal growth and survival. John Mearsheimer argues that the international order that emerges at a particular time results from selfish strategies by the great powers at that time, not the result of cooperation and good intentions (Mearsheimer, 2001). A cyber order will be created at some point, but the states involved in this process will

make an order that suits their interests and reduces their chances of being attacked and destroyed.

The realist world argues that cooperation is perceived negatively even though there is cooperation. Cooperation would have been possible if countries believed in absolute gain. Since countries are focused on relative growth and the balance of power is indispensable, having a favourable view of cooperation is impossible. Moreover, full cooperation is impossible because countries do not show their true motives and hide their military capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2001). This becomes even more exaggerated regarding cyber security, which is inherently secretive and difficult to detect. In a realistic world, country A will try to have more cyber capabilities than country B because the former does not believe the latter's intentions. The relative gain will be the new normal in the power struggle between countries in the era of cyber security. In a lawless world, countries want to dominate their region, be hegemon in their backyard, and ensure that no one else dominates other areas. The complex world of cyber security does not allow for such a simple explanation because the information age needs to set boundaries like traditional security.

To some extent, the internet is still free, connected, and globalised in cooperation and communication. Nevertheless, it complicates how we will conceptualize the international system in the information age. We can only say with certainty that power politics will reach a new level where the enemy is invisible, and the potential for miscalculation is higher. In cybersecurity, it is not possible (at least not yet) for country A to somehow get country B and country C to wage war against each other. Blackmail is becoming increasingly rare because country A cannot threaten country B. After all, it is still determining who it is threatening against. Wars in which country A attacks country B to destroy strategic computer infrastructure are still possible and will always be relevant. Moreover, this type of war will be more ruthless than traditional war because the enemy is invisible, fear is greater, the potential for misjudgement is higher, and this can spill over into actual war by military means.

Every great power has one goal: to have a significantly more significant power advantage over other countries and, as mentioned earlier, to ensure that no one else dominates its backyard. A hegemon in one area wants to keep itself as far away from the outside world as possible and leave it to other local powers to deal with a potential hegemon in that area. A distant hegemon will pass the buck to regional powers, and the former will only intervene if the latter cannot deal with a potential hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001). All previous arguments are not credible when it comes to cyber security. A country can cooperate with another country in the cyber domain but can only partially pass the buck and stay out of it.

Cyber capability transcends geographical boundaries and offers the potential for a new power struggle that will be global in scope. Countries can attack each other without leaving their backyard. In traditional security politics, bypassing the back is more appropriate than balancing because the distant hegemon can remain abroad. In a bipolar world where local powers cannot keep the regional hegemon in check, balancing is the better strategy. Buck-passing is the better strategy in a multipolar world with large distances between opposing sides. Balancing is better than buck-passing in an unbalanced multipolar world because the local power cannot confront

a potential hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001). Cybersecurity becomes more critical at a time when we have an unbalanced multipolar order. This order makes the struggle even more difficult. In a bipolar order, two powers could have agreed (perhaps and to some extent) on the rules of cyber cooperation. Since we live in an unbalanced multipolar order, the power struggle will be great; skepticism and the potential for miscalculation could lead to undesirable outcomes. We can think of a miscalculation where one country (cyber) attacks another country's computer system that controls nuclear capabilities. A miscalculation in this situation can have long-lasting consequences for humanity. The bottom line is that cyber security (in this day and age) is not as dangerous as traditional security. Still, it is more unknown, treacherous, and holds great potential for miscalculations that can negatively impact traditional security.

Cyber realism is more than a computer system; it is the online political behaviour pattern. The cyber domain will change the physical environment, where law and technology are not enough but are shaped by realist tendencies. Nevertheless, there will be a tendency to regulate the cyber domain (Wall, 2004). Countries always try to handle international affairs, but only to the extent that it does not affect their personal interests and room for manoeuvre. In the traditional realist sense, war could be prevented if some powers, preferably two, dominate the system and others join these two. A possible cyber war can change the game's rules because even small forces can carry out (cyber) attacks on big powers. In a cyber war, complete information systems can be destroyed, affecting the economy, infrastructure, intelligence services, etc. Compared to traditional war, countries with a developed infrastructure have more to defend and lose in cyber war than countries with a less developed information infrastructure. In traditional war, a small country has much more to lose regarding its national interests. In cyber war, a smaller state can eliminate or at least damage a strong power (Barlow, 2010, p. 4). Different countries use offensive strategies in the cyber domain, and there are several reasons for this. First, building offensive capacity in the cyber domain is cheaper, where software and cyber soldiers are needed, and hardware is optional. Second, an offensive strategy is better because defensive systems require cooperation with the private sector, which is difficult in developed countries.

Moreover, an offensive strategy is appropriate in cyber war because it is expected to become a traditional war in response to negative perceptions and misinterpretation (Isnarti, 2016). Cyberwar will always create this fear of spillover into traditional battle. Accordingly, states will constantly push to maximise their power in the cyber domain. This will lead to an information system where others accept no norms. There is no agreement on what constitutes aggressive use of cyber power. The norms could be more specific, adequately understood and remain secretive (Maurer, 2019). Cybersecurity will bring a new security dilemma to international relations. Nevertheless, one factor in international relations will remain the same: all states will maximise their power and rely on offensive strategies.

Great Power Competition in the Cyber Domain

The competition of great powers arises from states doing everything in their ability to survive, satisfy their needs, and increase their relative strength. Moreover, since the form of the international system is anarchy, states will act selfishly, creating an environment of confusion and negative perception that can have long-lasting adverse effects. The realistic view of the cyber domain is still timely because the competition between powers will remain unchanged. In other words, new mechanisms, such as the cyber domain, will impact security, but anarchy and power politics will remain a constant force that determines international relations. The psychology of warfare and security dilemma, firmly held by realists, will remain the same even with the new trends in cyber security (Eriksson & Giacomello, 2006). Cyber security does not change the game; instead, it changes and modifies the tendency towards power struggle. Countries adjust to the new information infrastructure and adapt it to the existing anarchic system for their advantage and survival.

The general public, and thus states, are slowly accepting the new realities of the internet and the cyber domain, which are becoming more and more of a reality. As mentioned earlier, cybersecurity is changing the rules of international relations, as an individual can use a computer to disrupt another country's information infrastructure. Furthermore, cybersecurity transcends geographical boundaries and creates an anonymity that is difficult to deter and detect. It is tough for countries to develop a comprehensive cyber strategy that represents a unified foreign policy approach (Harknett & Stever, 2011). Nevertheless, states will use the increasingly new information infrastructure to their advantage to increase their relative power and create deterrence against attack. Cyber warfare is now a reality as countries use computer viruses to damage other countries' military systems. Cyber security is not just a concomitant of traditional warfare but an increasingly distinct field that is becoming the primary weapon of states (Yujun & Chen, 2018, p. 68). Nevertheless, it is argued that there will not be full-scale cyber warfare as in traditional warfare. Still, somewhat incidental points such as cyber-attacks, cyber espionage, etc., notwithstanding, cyber security will increase the security dilemma between states, which may affect traditional safety on a whole new level for which states are not yet prepared.

The lack of a normative framework, rules, and the increasing sophistication of cyber capabilities can lead to military clashes and an uncertain future between states. If one country turns off the cyber capabilities of another, there will be an escalation of traditional military conflict. The cyber domain complicates security issues as perpetrators are difficult to detect. Countries often still determine against whom to retaliate (Domingo, 2016, p. 160). Accordingly, states compete with each other and pursue power maximisation strategies to build cyber capabilities to defend or at least deter potential attacks. The aim is to reduce the risk of being attacked, incapacitated, and unable to respond to threats. Three factors drive the increasing use of cyber capabilities: Technology, Politics, and Science (Dunn Cavelty & Wenger, 2019, p. 5). Politics will use advanced technology in the same way as traditional military capabilities to build power, leading to conflict. Every country will realise

that cyber power is the future and will engage in a build-up that will lead to a cyber race and security problems.

Cyber security is a vast field encompassing individuals' online privacy, corporate infrastructure, industrial infrastructure, and military infrastructure. This security also affects international relations, where developing and establishing a national cyber security strategy is challenging. This can be formed with the help of three factors. First, it is essential to note that national cybersecurity protects individual cybersecurity concerns. Second, cybersecurity serves to identify potential threats, such as cyber terrorists or cyber-spies, that may threaten society and its citizens in both economic and security terms. Thirdly, cyber security is another area where new rules and norms are being developed (Carr, 2016, p. 50). The country will create a national cybersecurity strategy to protect individuals, key businesses, and information infrastructure. It will also seek to identify potential cyber threats that could disrupt state security and the economy. As the world is in a constant war of ideas, certain states will adopt a cyber strategy to create a normative framework that serves their interests.

Cybersecurity refers to the online sphere, where resilience plays an important role. This means countries take specific measures to protect the system from attacks and breakdowns. The aim is to prevent the attack or ensure the system returns to normal after the cyber-attack. Countries will constantly strive to have a comprehensive cyber security system to prevent an attack from another country (Gagliardone & Sambuli, 2015). The constant tendency to improve the design and increase cyber capabilities will lead to countries distrusting each other. Distrust creates a negative perception, leading to a security dilemma that can hurt traditional military security. This mistrust and fear will lead states to form alliances to reduce the attack risk. The reason for the partnership is the need for more ability to defend themselves, with one state expecting help from the other in the event of an attack. Second, states will create institutions that give them power to promote their interests and increase their power in the cyber domain. Third, states will seek to enforce their normative frameworks to increase their influence (Burton, 2013). Fear leads countries to seek partners internationally to be more assertive when allying with another country. Two countries share intelligence and knowledge, giving the impression of being more powerful together and thus reducing the risk of attack.

Furthermore, institutions can be a powerful tool to institutionalise power and reduce the attack risk. Cooperation and creating common standards can also reduce the risk of cybersecurity problems. For example, two countries can work together to create a normative framework in the cyber domain that reduces mistrust and, thus, security problems. The argument is that a cyberwar can be potentially more damaging than a conventional war. A cyberwar can be more secretive and forceful, requiring more scrutiny to identify the attacker. A cyber war can have enormous consequences because of the secrecy and the unknown that the cyber domain brings (Abebe, 2016). The security dilemma revolves around the negative perception of the other side and the unknown capabilities that the other side possesses. A very suspicious aspect of cyber security is the lack of knowledge, cooperation, and a vast potential for development. Countries are constantly suspicious of each other's cyber

potential, which leads to increased cyber capacity building, eventually leading to a full-blown cyber war that can escalate into a conventional war.

The United States has traditionally been the target of cyber-attacks, although it can become a cyber superpower. The United States has fought many wars over the last few decades and has realised that it is essential to complement these conventional wars with cyber capabilities. They want to be able to damage another country's computer network and penetrate or destroy another country's military capabilities. Moreover, building cyber capacity will reduce attacks on the computer networks of the United States (Saltzman, 2013). In this way, the cybersecurity dilemma begins when strong powers like the United States realise that capacity building is suitable for both defense and attack purposes. However, other countries will not rest until they have built the necessary capacity for defense and attack. Russia, on the other hand, is taking a milder approach to cyber security. Some scholars and policymakers believe that the cyber domain is somewhat independent of conventional security, while others believe cybersecurity is part of traditional security.

Nevertheless, they are trying to develop a "separate internet" that can be controlled locally, suggesting that Russia is trying to reconcile better traditional security and cybersecurity (Chekov et al., 2019, p. 37). China has a tradition of cyber-attacks with advanced hacking systems. It uses its cyber capabilities for economic and propaganda purposes. Its internet is controlled, targeted, and constantly developed. The idea is that the private and public sectors should work together for the good of China (Nurkolov, 2017, p. 5). Great powers will be constantly suspicious of other powers, leading them to create capacities to defend themselves or attack others for economic gains or security interests. Major powers such as the United States, Russia, and China are prioritising their cyber capabilities, seeking to claim cyber sovereignty and increasingly investing in artificial intelligence that will reshape the geopolitical order.

Information and cyber warfare can range from disrupting elections to spying on economic and security information to disrupting the entire system that controls military capabilities. The main goal of the cyber domain will be to maintain the domestic narrative while attempting to disrupt the foreign narrative (Rosenberger, 2020, p. 148). Cyber security and information security, in general, will shape the geopolitics of the 21st century because countries will realise the great potential it offers. The realist perspective says that norms and institutions will play a minor role because countries seek to increase their power for survival and economic benefit. If they push normative frameworks and institutions, it will only be to increase their power. Cyberwar is not out of the question with this trend, and we are still trying to determine the consequences before these norms based on cooperation are created.

A cyber war can have severe repercussions for a nuclear war; in the first case the attack can be unknown, while in the second case, the attack can be visible, the first case having severe repercussions on triggering the second. A cyber-attack can damage the information system of a particular country, while a nuclear attack can eradicate it. A nuclear strike can be triggered if a cyber-attack disrupts the information system. The goal of a cyber-attack is not destruction but disruption. This suggests that one country will use cyber power to disrupt another country's system and attack

it with conventional weapons. A cyber war can involve constant attacks and disruption, while a single nuclear attack can completely devastate a country or even a larger area. Offensive cyberattacks can increase the possibility of a nuclear attack. They complement each other with a covert cyber-attack, while a nuclear attack requires clear intent. Cyberattacks reinforce negative perceptions that can lead to an uncalculated nuclear strike (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2017). The only way that cyber war does not lead to an all-out atomic attack is if there is complete synchronisation between the two (Cimbala, 2017). If we look at it practically, different government officials may serve country's cyber domain and nuclear capabilities in a country. There is a need for synchronisation between these departments to have good communication that reduces misjudgements and sudden reactions, and even then, misjudgements in the nuclear domain are possible.

The field of cybersecurity in international relations increasingly faces the risk of retaliation based on negative perceptions and misperceptions when one country is unsure of another country's intentions. There is no full-scale war due to cybersecurity; instead, it serves as an information-gathering tool and a disruptive factor in the international arena. Nonetheless, the increasing use of cyber offensive capabilities may create the potential for full-scale retaliation, whether in the cyber or traditional domain (Brandong & Jensen, 2019). The factor of secrecy and the unknown plays a vital role because, compared to traditional security, where countries know each other's military capabilities, in cyber security, there is a constant suspicion regarding capabilities and intentions, leading to a security dilemma and competition between major powers, which always carries the risk of spill over into traditional warfare.

Conclusion

Since the dawn of time, skepticism and fear have led to security dilemmas between nations in the international arena. These dilemmas lead to policies and strategies that have long-lasting consequences for international relations and the global system. Countries wage wars with the available resources and technologies of the time. In international relations, countries usually have two options. One option is cooperating and creating institutions and norms that will guide relations. The other option is to be guided by realism, which means that skepticism, fear, and power lead states to pursue the maximisation of their power in the interest of survival. Unfortunately, nationalism, which guides foreign policy, always wins. States pursue a strategy of power maximisation guided by a zero-sum game where the benefit to one side means the loss to the other. The cyber domain is still unknown and is accordingly in the process of developing foreign policy initiatives. However, as it is a new field, it brings uncertainty and fear between countries, which means that it will lead to competition between powers in the short and medium term, while it could lead to cooperation in the long term. Shortly, we will see competition between powers in the field of cyber security, which will certainly impact traditional security.

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Chapter 7

China's Strategic Partnership with Bangladesh: India's Reaction and Global Migration Effects



Mohammad Razaul Karim

Introduction

India and China have several bilateral and multilateral problems and are competing to expand their influence in South Asian countries. The cross-border Sino-Indian rivalry has shifted to dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The coastal region of Bangladesh is one of the deciding factors in who will dominate the South Asian seas. India sees China's BOB-centred investments as a 'string of pearls' policy, and Bangladesh is an important 'pearl' in this 'string.' China has expanded its diplomatic activities, plays a vital role in regional and global institutions, and has more influence in Asia and the world. Recently, China's investments in South Asia have steadily increased over decades and have significantly influenced this region. Wagner noted that China keeps its bilateral relations instead of using multilateral structures to strengthen its dominant position in the South Asian region (Wagner, 2016). China's relations with South Asian nations, especially Bangladesh, span all areas, including economic, military, cultural exchanges, tourism, communications, energy, and non-traditional security assistance (Rengma, 2012).

South Asia is an 'Indo-centric' region considering its geographical size and location, colossal population, and superiority in terms of military equipped with nuclear weapons, economic and soft power (Chakrabarti, 2012). An Indian researcher notes that "geographic proximity, socio-cultural affinity, common security interests, economic development and the use of shared rivers" are the main features of India's interaction with its neighbours (Karim, 2009). Bangladesh's perspective is no exception. Bangladesh and India are closely linked geographically, historically, and culturally, significantly impacting their bilateral relations. India played an important role in Bangladesh's nine-month liberation war in 1971. In 1972, Sheikh Mujib and the Indian Prime Minister declared in a joint communiqué that "Bangladesh and India

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would live in eternal friendship as brothers” as both countries “share an identity of ideals, views, and values and live in friendship (Rashid, 2015).” It is clear, then, that the relationship between the two countries was initially shaped by historical events such as the Bangladesh Liberation War. Such emotional ties set the tone for bilateral relations between the countries. Later, issues like border and transit problems, border killings, water sharing, domestic politics, and growing bilateral trade deficits between Bangladesh and India gradually pushed Dhaka towards China.

India considers Bangladesh as its traditional security backwater and sphere of influence. Indian Prime Ministers Nehru and Indira Gandhi sought to restrict the South Asian region as part of their national security and protect their political interests through various economic, military, and political interventions. India always sought to improve cooperation in key defense areas such as military supplies, joint military exercises, and non-traditional security to counter China’s growing influence in Bangladesh. Although all material elements supported India, it could have been more successful in establishing itself as a regional leader.

China’s strategic partnership with Bangladesh has become a significant geopolitical development in South Asia, with profound implications for the regional balance of power and international migration dynamics (Ullah, 2022). China’s strategic overtures to Bangladesh have evolved over the years to encompass various economic, infrastructural, and diplomatic engagements. At the same time, India, the neighbouring superpower, has been closely monitoring these developments and responding strategically to safeguard its interests and regional influence. This complicated triangular dynamic has attracted the interest of scholars and policymakers worldwide as it reflects not only the evolving geopolitics of South Asia but also the potential impact on global migration patterns. The following discourse addresses the intricacies of China’s strategic engagement with Bangladesh, India’s strategic responses, and the implications for international migration (Ullah, 2010; Ullah & Haque, 2020). It draws on insights from various sources and scholarly analyses to illuminate this complex interplay of interests in a rapidly changing world order.

Bangladesh’s geographic location is an important geopolitical factor. The visit of current Chinese President Xi Jinping to Bangladesh on October 14–15, 2016, is considered one of the most remarkable events in Bangladesh’s diplomatic and geopolitical history. President Xi stated during the visit, “We have agreed to upgrade China-Bangladesh relations from a comprehensive cooperative partnership to a strategic cooperative partnership (Kabir, 2016).” He added, “Bangladesh is a significant country in the Indian Ocean due to its strategic location. The relationship between Bangladesh and China is strategic, and the Chinese government is cooperating with Bangladesh from this perspective (Bangladesh Awami League, 2014).” To counter the positions, India has also started offering aid packages to smaller South Asian countries, including Bangladesh, for infrastructure development. China and India are essential partners for Dhaka; favouring one could harm the country’s national interests. This situation presents us with an empirical puzzle: How are the smaller countries, especially Bangladesh, affected by the changing regional dynamics in South Asia? To analyse the above problem and in light of the empirical puzzle presented above, the chapter will address some questions: How do India and China

compete for influence over small states? Why does Bangladesh's entanglement with China raise security concerns for India?

China's Strategic Engagement with Bangladesh

China's strategic presence in the Bay of Bengal region can hardly be dismissed regarding trade, commerce, or military aspects. Beijing has quietly undermined New Delhi's regional dominance in South Asia through arms sales to India's neighbour. From 2011 to 2015, China became the world's third-largest arms supplier, exporting 71% of its weapons to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Between 2016 and 2020, Dhaka was the world's second largest buyer of Chinese arms, importing over 80% of its total arms from Beijing (Nahreen, 2017). Bangladesh has heavily depended on China for its military equipment and modernisation since 2002. All three defence sectors of the country, especially the army, air force, and navy, heavily depend on China for procuring the required weapons and military equipment. Defense cooperation between the two countries includes training, regular exchanges of senior military personnel, and technical assistance. China has assisted the Bangladesh Air Force in setting up a surface-to-air missile system. The Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, Lieutenant General Xu Qiliang, visited Bangladesh in May 2014 and signed some agreements to develop the capabilities of Bangladesh's defense sector. Also from Bangladesh, many high-ranking officers, including the Chief of Army, Naval, and Air Staff, have visited China recently. In addition, more and more officers from the Bangladesh Armed Forces have paid an official visit to China to be trained at Chinese naval, army, and air force academies. On 20 June 2018, China signed a new contract to supply 23 Hongdu K-8W Intermediate Trainers to the Bangladesh Air Force (Mushtaq, 2018).

China has supplied five coastal patrol boats and two sizeable semi-submarine patrol boats being built at Khulna Shipyard. The anti-ship cruise missile C-802A, with a range of 120 km, test-fired from the corvette BNS Osman near Kutubdia Island in the Bay of Bengal and exploded shortly afterward (Rao, 2013). The Bangladesh Navy has acquired two 1350-tonne Type 056 corvettes, BNS Shadhinota and BNS Prottoy, built by the Chinese Shipbuilding and Offshore International Company. "Each corvette is armed with 76 and 30 mm anti-ship guns as well as C-802A anti-ship missiles and a FN-3000N surface-to-air missile system (Jha, 2016)". In 2008, Bangladesh built a missile launch pad near Chittagong port with Chinese assistance. The first missile test was conducted on 12 May 2008 with the active participation of Chinese specialists. India accused Dhaka of violating protocol by not informing New Delhi about the missile test (Sen, 2008). The Bangladesh Navy plans to acquire several corvettes, a large patrol aircraft, two landing craft, a hydrographic unit, a rescue ship, and missile ships from China within five years and to equip several ships with missiles (Rahman, 2015).

In November 2016, Bangladesh took delivery of its two submarines purchased from Beijing. Chinese personnel led the construction and design of the submarines,

which will be stationed at the Kutubdia naval base in Bangladesh. Dhaka also plans to build a large naval base on the Rabanabad Canal in southwestern Bangladesh to dock submarines and house aviation facilities (Jha, 2016). China's geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), including the BoB, have raised concerns among other regional and trans-regional actors such as Japan, India, and the United States. They suspect that growing Chinese influence in the BoB makes their security and strategic interests vulnerable and vice versa (Uddin, 2015). Increasing military cooperation between China and Bangladesh has made India suspicious of a possible mutual security threat from these countries in India's northeastern region. The northeastern region is home to some of India's strategic air bases, such as Hashimara, Bagdogra, and Tezpur. Therefore, to counter a possible crisis, India has deployed a large part of the Indian military with a well-equipped, sophisticated arsenal, including missiles, tanks, MiG-21s, MiG-27s, Su-30s, etc., in this area (Sarker, 2014).

Bangladesh is seeking substantial investment from China in various sectors such as roads and highways, railways, energy sector, deep seaports in the Bay of Bengal region, etc. Many Chinese state-owned and private companies are already involved in infrastructure development in Bangladesh. China has been given the right to extract Bangladesh's natural gas in Barapukuria. Beijing is developing the Chittagong port, one of Bangladesh's most essential ports. The location of this port is also strategically important for China and India. Recently, Beijing has also committed to cooperate with India to construct the Payra Port in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has already joined the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will help Bangladesh build a blue economy in the BoB region. During Xi Jinping's visit to Bangladesh in 2016, both countries signed 27 agreements on various development projects worth US\$24.45 billion as soft loans (Anwar, 2019; Karim & Liton, 2016). It is worth noting that most of these projects are related to BRI projects, such as the Karnaphuli Multi-Channel Tunnel, Payra Coal Power Project, Marine Drive Expressway, Power Grid Network Strengthening Project, etc. Such a significant contract is a clear sign of Beijing's spontaneous commitment to a safe, stable, and friendly economic environment in Bangladesh. According to many experts, Beijing intends to lure Dhaka through substantial infrastructure investments to create an alternative power bloc called China's 'chequebook diplomacy' (Nahreen, 2017). The increasing naval and ocean assets in the IOR, China's growing PLA presence in South Asia, and Chinese military support to the smaller countries, especially in Bangladesh, create a threat perception for India (Wolf, 2014). On the contrary, China claims that India has nothing to fear. The Chinese state-run Global Times newspaper published an article stating, "India need not be jealous of the increasingly close relations between Beijing and Dhaka as the improvement in local infrastructure and overall economic ecology in Bangladesh will create favourable external conditions for linking up with markets in India, China and Southeast Asia (Deccan Herald, 2016)."

India's Counter-Engagement with Bangladesh

China and India strive for economic and political influence in the South Asian region. Both countries are trying to achieve regional power status and take a leadership role by investing in various ways, maintaining security ties, and engaging diplomatically with small countries in this region. India is aware that South Asian countries are engaged in a kind of 'hedging' and are trying to ensure that South Asia as a region does not ally with China. For this reason, India is willing to pursue a 'counter-engagement' strategy to embrace its neighbours. India is pursuing a 'multiple engagement' policy with key political actors in South Asia. India is trying to weaken bilateral relations between China and Bangladesh. India has understood that without the support of its neighbouring countries, it will find it difficult to become a world power. As Mohan rightly pointed out, "India's rapid economic development is no guarantee of stability in South Asia. Unless all boats in South Asia rise simultaneously, India can neither prosper nor be secure" (Mohan, 2006).

Whenever China supplies heavy weapons like tanks, missiles, and submarines to a country, the recipient country is tied up with China for a long time to train, maintain, and repair these weapons. One of the senior military officials, Shahedul Anam Khan, said, "China became the biggest supplier of military equipment to Bangladesh when relations with India were strained" (Miglani, 2015). Former Indian ambassador Pinaki Chakravarty said in Dhaka, "The concern is not about Bangladesh's military capabilities," adding, "It's about Chinese influence next door (Miglani, 2015)." Sun Shihai, director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, explained in an interview with a Global Times reporter that Bangladesh-China military cooperation is perceived as so sensitive by India for several reasons: First, when Narendra Modi became Indian Prime Minister, he introduced a policy of 'priority for neighbouring countries' so that the diplomatic activities of neighbours are monitored more carefully; second, military or security relations are more sensitive than any other relations, such as cultural, economic, etc.; third, India still firmly believes that South Asia is its own 'backyard'; fourth, China is comparatively stronger than India, which creates a lack of self-confidence in New Delhi, in addition to the non-existent mutual trust between the two nations (Global Times, 2016).

India is concerned that China is a major supplier of military equipment to Bangladesh. Beijing sees its position in Dhaka as part of its motive to boost its regional power profile and, in this way, intends to challenge New Delhi in its backyard (Rao, 2013). Under the Modi Neighbourhood Policy, India has begun to counter Chinese involvement in the BoB region. Small countries like Bangladesh are also actively responding to India's initiatives. For example, Modi has promoted the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation plan for development cooperation between India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar in the marine economy. In June 2015, Modi approved six agreements with Bangladesh on maritime cooperation. These agreements include arrangements for joint patrolling, passenger and cruise services on protocol routes, counter-terrorism exercises, shipping cooperation, and fairway development. In addition, New Delhi signed a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

with Dhaka, which is linked to the Coastal Shipping Agreement (Singhini & Tuli, 2017).

Bangladesh and India are engaged in the fight against terrorism and insurgent groups in the region. During the Bangladesh Prime Minister's visit to India in 2017, India concluded a comprehensive defense agreement with Bangladesh. Although the motive of the Bangladesh-India defense agreement has yet to be apparent, media reports suggest that India originally had defense cooperation between China and Bangladesh in mind with the agreement. The defense agreement included training the Bangladeshi military, selling military equipment, and providing military assistance. Although India is the leading importer of arms from various countries, there is no logic behind buying arms from New Delhi. Therefore, it is clear that New Delhi is doing everything possible to involve Bangladesh's armed forces to prevent rapprochement with China. India also wants to gain access to the defense market through a treaty with Bangladesh to displace China's share there.

India has signed a memorandum of understanding with Bangladesh to install a network of twenty coastal surveillance radar systems. This radar system will improve surveillance of Bangladesh's maritime domain and ultimately pave the way for a white ship agreement between India and Bangladesh in the coming years. Nevertheless, it will be suitable for New Delhi to contain Beijing's growing presence in the BoB region. According to Humayun Kabir, president of the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (a think tank), "India is understandably not giving them [the radar systems] to Bangladesh; it aims to monitor China's movements in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean (Uddin, 2019)." India also signed another memorandum of understanding with Bangladesh for a standard procedure for using Bangladesh's Chittagong and Mongla ports.

India believes the People's Liberation Army (PLAN) has started spreading its wings in the IOR. Chinese conventional and nuclear submarines have regularly patrolled the Bay of Bengal for five years (Singhini & Tuli, 2017). Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, Chief of Air Staff, told The Indian Express that China's increasing influence on India's neighbouring countries poses a significant security threat. India claims that Bangladesh is only an alternative element of China's approach to significantly expanding its global naval position in the BoB.

As Smith said,

This is the real strategic significance of selling submarines to Bangladesh. Imagine you are an Indian military planner. You have China on your western border (through its Pakistan proxy), and increasingly, you have China on the Eastern border (increasingly close relations with Bangladesh). China is also making diplomatic and military inroads in Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and Mauritius. This is the new 'great game' in the Indian Ocean region; just as the United States 'pivoted' to the Asia-Pacific, China has 'pivoted' to the Indian Ocean. Again, the Bangladesh submarine story is part of this giant strategic game (Miller, 2014).

A Bangladeshi official told Reuters news agency, "Bangladesh has never hosted a Chinese naval vessel and has no plans to do so. But a few days later, two Chinese guided-missile corvettes and a supply ship docked in Chittagong without first conducting exercises with the Bangladesh Navy (Smith, 2017)." A senior Indian

foreign ministry official told 'bdnews24': "We are trying to find out how far relations between Dhaka and Beijing will go (Global Times, 2016)."

China and Bangladesh have expressed that their growing cooperation is based on mutual understanding and a desire to expand trade and economic ties. Indian security experts claim that many of India's strategic resources are located on the east coast near Bangladesh. When Chinese President Xi Jinping declared Bangladesh an important partner of China in the South Asia and Indian Ocean region, India was naturally upset (Bhattacharjee, 2016). Ali Riaz, professor of political science at Illinois State University, USA, said, "Bangladesh is within India's sphere of influence," adding, "Understandably, India is watching Bangladesh's growing relations with Beijing. But Bangladesh is carefully improving its relations with China to not jeopardise its relations with India (Dawn, 2016)."

New Delhi is trying to keep its neighbouring country from Chinese influence by exerting pressure or financially supporting the smaller countries even though it cannot financially support them. As Bangladesh's Security Analyst, Major General Abdur Rashid (retd.) said that

None but China came forward with the billion-dollar economic support. We must not [mix up] this strategic relation[ship] with security and geopolitics because China is investing and giving financial support for our infrastructure, power and energy, information and communication technology, investment, and blue economy (Habib, 2016).

Jayanta Ray, author of 'India Bangladesh Relations: Current Perspectives', mentioned in the South Asian Morning Post, "India cannot match the scale of Chinese funding in South Asia even if we wanted to. This worries Delhi, but neighbours like Bangladesh cannot be prevented from seeking development funds from China because they want to grow fast (Zakaria, 2017)." Lalit Mansingh has made almost the same argument: "India should understand that its neighbouring countries have options and are unwilling to be under India's umbrella forever." He added, "We must restore relations and treat them as equal sovereign states. We need to strengthen their constraints and also understand them. China has promised more development assistance than India. This has to change. India must take advantage of its proximity (Ganapathy, 2017)".

China's military involvement places an additional burden on Bangladesh to maintain its friendly relations with India. For example, India is very concerned about the security of its Siliguri corridor due to the deepened and expanded military partnership between China and Bangladesh in the BoB region. Bangladesh has monopolised its military dependence on China, which makes India unhappy. For instance, China expert Kondapalli said, "China has established close relations with Bangladesh as part of its South Asia diplomacy, and this is a cause of concern for India (Miglani, 2015)." This dependence could also make Dhaka vulnerable to Chinese pressure and influence in the future. Of course, buying arms from China has specific technical and logistical advantages for Bangladesh's armed forces. Still, at the same time, such a close supply chain could create dependencies and risks from a political and economic perspective. According to Wolf, Beijing's support for Bangladesh's armed forces limits the state's national sovereignty and decision-making power (Wolf, 2014).

India had tried to conclude a military treaty or pact with Bangladesh to counter Chinese military involvement. However, Bangladesh did not agree to this and instead concluded a less formal and less binding agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Limited alliances are a suitable way to deal with these uncertainties simultaneously, especially for hedgers. Bangladesh could not see the need for a defense agreement between the two countries, while India did. On the contrary, Bangladesh was very uneasy about a particular defense agreement with India because it could violate the country's sovereignty. Moreover, Bangladesh was concerned that it might upset China as both Bangladesh and China have strategic relations.

It is believed that India wanted to be happier about Bangladesh buying a submarine from China. But there is not only competition between China and India but also a remarkable degree of conflict. When Bangladesh received the submarine, Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar visited Bangladesh a few weeks later with senior military officials. During his visit, he met with the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and explained India's dissatisfaction with Bangladesh's proximity to China, especially in the field of defense (Ahmed, 2017). In response to the Bangladesh submarine deals, the Indian Navy has taken several countermeasures. For example, India wants to build missile batteries on Sagar Island near the coast of Bangladesh. There are also plans to build a deep-sea port to facilitate the docking of large naval vessels. In addition, the Indian Navy plans to establish bases for land-to-ship and surface-to-air missiles on Sagar Island (Miller, 2014). Another exciting effort by India is its offer to train Bangladeshi submarine sailors at three schools: the Submarine School, the Advanced Undersea Warfare School, and the Escape Training School. According to Saurav Jha, "Bangladesh's new submarines will be accompanied by Chinese crews for training and familiarisation purposes while operating in waters near India's future Ballistic Missile Submarine Bastion (SSBN)" (INS Varsha), a new Indian naval base under construction. He added: "Bangladesh's submarine pool will allow China to expand its sensor network into the [Bay of Bengal] and gather intelligence that could prove useful for its submarine operations (Smith, 2017)."

Migration and Security Nexus

Migration is a widespread phenomenon in human history. However, a remarkable trend in international politics has been to secure migration and introduce stricter border controls worldwide. Significant international and internal movements in South Asia have been influenced by political, economic, and sub-regional social factors that continue to shape migration patterns today. The India-Bangladesh border and migration from Bangladesh to India serve as illustrative examples. The meaning of "migration" and "borders" and the discourse around their securitisation (Ullah & Huque, 2020) have received renewed attention given the implementation of controversial laws such as the Indian National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) since 2019, and the inflammatory election campaigns

on migration during the same period (Tier, 2021). There is concern that implementing the CAA-NRC could potentially exacerbate identity politics in Bangladesh and increase the number of illegal border crossings from India. This is because, in the eastern and north-eastern regions of India, these measures have been portrayed as targeting illegal migrants from Bangladesh (Tier, 2021). China's proximity and proactive approach significantly influence India's attitude towards its northeastern region. The corridor also includes factors that have the potential to disrupt stability in the area. The presence of undocumented migrants from Bangladesh and the existence of Indian insurgent groups, such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which have taken refuge in Bangladesh, contribute to the movement across porous borders. This movement can foment social unrest, unrest, and insurgency (Sakhuja, 2009). The confrontations between the Chinese and Indian armies along the Western Line of Control in the Himalayas in June 2020 were a reminder of the volatile nature of the northeastern region, which continues to be a flashpoint for the ongoing rivalry between India and China (Tier, 2021). In recent years, anti-India sentiment has increased in Bangladesh due to migration communal and identity politics.

There are about one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, most of whom live in poor settlements in the already densely populated southeast (Lintner, 2020). They have become a significant security concern for Bangladesh from traditional and non-traditional security perspectives. In addition, the Rohingya refugee crisis poses a considerable problem for Bangladesh as it risks encouraging militancy along the border (Ullah, 2011, 2014). The Rohingya crisis worries Bangladesh in two respects: the need to strike a delicate balance between the interests of two prominent world powers, China and India. Both major Asian powers have significant strategic interests and investments in Myanmar.

Moreover, there are allegations that they have supported the Myanmar government after the Rohingya refugee crisis (Rahman & Sakib, 2021). Thus, the Rohingya refugees pose a significant challenge to Dhaka, which requires international assistance from influential nations such as India and China to exert diplomatic pressure on Myanmar (Aditya, 2021). When it comes to Myanmar, India and China share a similar view. China's veto power in the United Nations Security Council has effectively prevented any possible resolution of the Rohingya issue (Hossain & Islam, 2021). Subsequently, the Chinese foreign minister visited Bangladesh and proposed a three-step solution to resolve the issue. He made an identical proposal in Myanmar. Eventually, an agreement was reached between Bangladesh and Myanmar based on the circumstances mentioned above. China exerted influence in this context in various capacities. Given China's strategic importance, it is of primary importance for it to maintain close relations with Myanmar, as it is the only state that provides China with direct land access to the Indian Ocean. The Rohingya crisis has allowed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to demonstrate leadership and play an important role. Unfortunately, policymakers in India have failed to seize this unique opportunity.

India and Bangladesh have introduced a biometric system to register citizens and issued intelligent national identity cards (Chowdhury, 2020). By establishing a mutual exchange of databases between the two nations, it will be possible to effectively manage and regulate illegal migration (Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018) and curb

unanticipated border-related deaths. India and China will seek to endear themselves to the Bangladeshi people to advance their respective geopolitical goals of mutual surveillance and intimidation (Chowdhury, 2020). Bangladesh has the potential to use the complex dynamics of India-China relations to improve its economic situation gradually.

Conclusion

India and China are trying to get involved in Bangladesh by investing in various sectors, maintaining security ties, and making diplomatic efforts to gain a leading position in this region. The simultaneous rise of China and India and their engagement with small countries in South Asia have significantly changed the dynamics in South Asia. At the same time, small countries like Bangladesh are also playing an active role in the power shifts in this region. While China is increasing its engagement with Bangladesh, India is also involved in countering Chinese engagement. Bangladesh is not willing to choose sides between India and China but instead pursues hedging strategies between the two. India's neighbouring countries, like Bangladesh, need to be able to follow anti-India policies; conversely, they are only partially dependent on the Chinese economy. Moreover, an aggravation of tensions between China and India is not in the interest of smaller countries like Bangladesh; instead, a peaceful coexistence of these two giants benefits them.

India's efforts to keep China out of the South Asian region have undoubtedly not worked. Indeed, India's territorial size, population, military might, and economic growth argue for it being a regional power in South Asia in the first place. But from an eagle's eye view, it is clear that China seems to have taken a stronger position in recent decades. China is in a naturally advantageous position to negotiate with Bangladesh because it has no bilateral problems with Bangladesh due to its geographical location. However, it doesn't seem very easy for Bangladesh to build balanced relations with both countries. Small countries like Bangladesh are caught between these two powers and try to benefit from both countries. Although China's influence on Bangladesh has grown immensely, the relationship between the two countries is more commercial and economic and less strategic. It is noticeable that the role of the Bangladesh government in dealing with both China and India has increased its bargaining power, ultimately making it an essential player in geopolitics. Bangladesh tends to diversify its economic, diplomatic, military, and political relations as a small state, especially with the two regional powers, India and China. Bangladesh does this for two reasons: (i). It wants to avoid over-dependence on any one country, especially India, and (ii). It wants to avoid having to choose sides in the rivalry between China and India.

Overall, Bangladesh has to be cautious in dealing with the changing dynamics for two reasons: first, it has to constantly keep India's concerns in mind as Bangladesh is closely intertwined with New Delhi politically, security-wise, and economically; second, it is another challenge for Bangladesh to find a way to leverage China's debt and investment to its advantage. Thus, the rival relationship between India and China

poses a problem for Bangladesh. While Bangladesh emphasises cooperation, India and China emphasise their competition. Their geopolitical competition for control of the IOOC and BoB has peaked. Given this conflict, Bangladesh needs to tread carefully without antagonising either power. A typical relationship between India and China would enable Bangladesh to assert its interests.

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Chapter 8

Renewed Agenda for International Relations and Implications for Migration



Jannatul Ferdous and Niaz Ahmed Khan

Introduction

Migration is one of the most pressing issues facing the world today, and it requires a comprehensive and cooperative approach at the international level. The key areas that could be part of a contemporary international relations agenda on migration include addressing the root causes of migration in countries of origin, such as poverty, conflict, and environmental degradation. This requires international cooperation and support to promote economic development, conflict resolution, and environmental sustainability.

The international community must ensure that the rights of migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, are protected. This includes access to basic needs such as food, shelter, health care, and protection from discrimination, exploitation, and violence. Managing migration flows requires a cooperative approach between countries of origin, transit, and destination (Ullah, 2009). This includes measures to facilitate legal and safe migration and cooperation in managing irregular migration and combating human trafficking. Migration can lead to social and cultural tensions in receiving countries. The international community must support policies and programmes that promote social cohesion and the integration of migrants into host societies. A coordinated and comprehensive approach to migration at the global level is needed. This includes establishing global governance mechanisms such as the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, which provides a framework for international cooperation on migration. A contemporary international relations agenda on migration should focus on addressing the root causes of migration, protecting migrants' rights, managing migration flows,

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strengthening social cohesion, and establishing global governance mechanisms. By working together, the international community can build a more just and humane system of migration that benefits all (Ullah, 2008).

Multilateralism is the best instrument to regulate international interactions in a mutually beneficial manner in today's world, which is characterised by significant geopolitical and economic power fluctuations. The need for multilateral cooperation based on fundamental principles of international law and universal values is becoming increasingly evident in the face of growing global challenges such as the pandemic, climate change, conflict, and extreme poverty in many parts of the world (EU, 2021). In addition, there has been a decentralised globalisation of knowledge circulation, with more importance given to regional differences and non-Western epistemological traditions (D'Amato et al., 2022). There have been influential political eras that have affected both the way world politics is organised and the way it is researched (Lawson, 2002). Our current aim is to pave the way towards a genuinely inclusive discipline by acknowledging its many and varied foundations, as scholars in international relations (IR) worldwide are actively engaged in finding their voices and reassessing their traditions. This article introduces the concept of a "Global IR" that connects the Western world and the rest of the globe. The first section of this article provides an overview of the six main facets of international relations (IR). These facets are a commitment to pluralistic universalism; a grounding in world history; a reinterpretation of current IR theories and methods, and the creation of new theories and methods from civilisations previously disregarded as sources of IR knowledge; an integration of the study of regions and regionalisms into the fundamental concerns of IR; and an avoidance of ethnocentrism. It then offers a curriculum to support the concept of global IR (Acharya, 2014).

Nowadays, agenda-setting is a well-established and defined method in public policy studies (Zahariadis, 2016). Most of these studies have focused on how different levels of government set their priorities (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). However, the strategy has also been used in studies of social movements and development (Ullah, 2021) and in international relations (Risse-Kappen, 2002). These different subfields overlap, so there are likely intersections that can contribute to our understanding of international affairs and transnational management. The concept allows us to examine the power and influence of actors outside of typical IOs, such as global commissions, multinational police forces, and multilateral alliances (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019). Much research has already been done on the factors that influence how and when such global policy linkages emerge, how they function in terms of the actors involved and their roles, and why specific issues are brought to the fore. Others are not, and how they contribute to changing global politics. While empirically based on the case study method, this work is situated within a set of theoretical traditions in agenda development, social movements, and international relations. The lack of a clear, convincing theoretical framework complicates the study of this new paradigm of global governance (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019).

Once they are legally institutionalized, global networks act as gatekeepers, imposing stringent limitations on the entrance of new topics and proposed policies that do not adhere to the beliefs, values, and interests of funders, intergovernmental groups, and other major players with the power of veto. They fulfil their duties to persuade others of the advantages of particular points of view and to halt the growth of opposing viewpoints. They institutionalize a variety of shared beliefs and perspectives on political matters. They thus contribute to the stability of policy (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019). Nonviolent conflict resolution became an increasingly common topic of discussion among scholars of international politics as the field developed over the turbulent 20th century. This concept has been explicitly stated in “world order thinking,” a term commonly used to refer to the method of handling world relations outlined in President Wilson’s 14 Points for the following years of the First World War. This idea has taken on many different forms over time. Proponents of a world order prioritize strengthening international organizations, enhancing international law, and fostering more nation-to-nation confidence.

The possibility of fair war, the distinction between aggression wars and self-defense, the elements of universal human rights, such as nation equity, the guarantee of human rights, such as the political and legal cases for international intervention in cases of domestic genocide and ethnic cleansing as well as other themes are all covered by world system philosophy, which emphasizes global rather than strategic interests (McClelland & Pfaltzgraff, 2022). The pandemic outbreak 2019 has caused a sense of vulnerability to permeate the world. It has quickly and dramatically altered our daily lives, making us aware of the frailty of things we previously believed to be robust and the malleability of things we believed to be unchangeable. We are far more conscious of the speed and force with which unforeseen developments can take hold today. The epidemic has served as a stark reminder of the shortcomings of our warning systems and our lack of crisis management readiness. We collectively need a retest if COVID-19 was a test of some sort. The joy of being able to eradicate the virus and restore some lost normality will be tempered by the unease felt by large segments of the populace, those left behind after the crisis is over, and in the worst cases, the rage of those whose social, economic, and health wounds from the pandemic remain unhealed (Lecha, 2020). The COVID-19 epidemic impacts all nations, but political factors determine how governments will react. Amid this, the World Health Organization (WHO) has tried to coordinate state-level recommendations and provide continuing epidemic management. However, political decisions about who should be trusted in the international arena, who should be consulted, who should provide advice, what policies should be implemented, how such policies should be enforced, and what models should be used are evident from the various government responses to the outbreak itself (Davies & Wenham, 2020).

Actors of International Relations

Since the Westphalian order (1648), which is considered the beginning of the international relations system, there have been numerous instances when different primary actors have taken the lead role in altering the system governing international relations. The fundamental actors in the system have changed due to the system shift, and either new concepts are emerging, or the meanings of the pre-existing ones are beginning to alter. For example, while the nation-state was the most significant player in the Westphalian system (Opello & Rosow, 1999), international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization (WHO), and NATO, which were founded in the 1940s to find a solution to the problem, started to take place as actors in the international system alongside the states, and cooperative connections were maintained between these actors (Kanapiyanova, 2020). We can observe that the state and other international institutions occasionally have less power in the system of international relations, allowing other actors to take center stage. The struggle against terrorism, for instance, has reduced the influence of international organizations in the system, such that they can only provide short-term fixes to international problems like the Israel-Palestinian and Syrian crises. Al-Qaeda, Daesh, and other terrorism-related religious groups formed after September 11th, 2001, and they joined national governments and other international actors as new actors in the international relations system. The September 11th events in the system of international relations demonstrated that non-state actors could employ force, and their occurrence was considered the start of a new era (Kanapiyanova, 2020). The events of September 11th, according to specialists like Steve Smith, rattled the entire system and caused its overhaul (Smith, 2003). Since then, the COVID-19 pandemic, which began in China in December 2019 and spread worldwide, has forced us to doubt the new approach to international relations, and this circumstance has done so once more (Kanapiyanova, 2020).

The COVID-19 virus, discovered for the first time in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, and then rapidly spread throughout the rest of the world, continues to be a significant problem. The WHO labelled this pandemic on March 12, 2020, which compelled each state to care for themselves (self-help) and find a national solution. As a result, the resurgence of nation-states, the ineffectiveness of international organizations in resolving issues, the weakening of international cooperation, the decline in foreign dependency, and the increasing importance of the sciences, the humanities, and information technology have all been indicators of a new era in the international system (Kanapiyanova, 2020). Because of COVID-19, all levels of government operate in an environment of great uncertainty. The COVID-19 issue has a wide range of regional and local effects that significantly impact catastrophe management and policy responses (OECD, 2020a). The concepts of “military power,” “economic power,” and the phenomenon of “strong state” have taken on new significance in the COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 anarchic international system, where nation-states act unilaterally and there is no supreme authority. These concepts include “health

system,” “supply chain,” and “emergency capacity,” among others. In light of these ideas, efforts have been made to redefine the international system (Ulutas, 2020).

The response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak is an excellent illustration of how governments adapt their crisis management to match a complicated crisis and organizational landscape. Governments, particularly those that are led or endorsed by the centre of government, frequently develop alternate emergency management methods. They had to do this since they dealt with numerous “unknown unknowns” (OECD, 2020b). The concept of a “strong state” had a minimal definition before the COVID-19 era, solely referring to political, military, and economic strength. A strong economy, strong management, strong state institutions and infrastructure (especially aid organizations and funds working for health and public welfare), crisis management capability, strong supply network, and food security have all been added to the phenomenon of “strong state” in the COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 (Ullah & Ferdous, 2022; Ullah & Chatteraj, 2022). The idea of “failed states,” which realism advanced, has given new meaning to weak states incapable of confronting the pandemic. The nation-states have completely abandoned globalization and international interaction at this time when public health is at the forefront to preserve human life and safeguard persons. The lack of full-scale operations by international organizations like WHO and the European Union in addressing global issues like the COVID-19 pandemic in international relations has once again highlighted the need for a self-sufficient state. Before COVID-19, international organizations also proposed a stopgap measure instead of a long-term fix. As a result, international organizations’ contributions to the fight against the virus continued to be ineffective and problematic (Kanapiyanova, 2020).

International Agenda Setting

The appearance of a new coronavirus in 2019 (SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19), which has the potential to be the most significant event of the early 21st century, might turn modern life, globalization, and relations between countries on their heads. Over 200,000 deaths and over 3 million cases of COVID-19 have made this a public health emergency. The economic impact of the numerous stay-at-home regulations and travel restrictions implemented to break the chain of transmission is significant. This has resulted in a worldwide decrease in economic activity, a surge in unemployment, and a loss of income for people worldwide (Busby, 2020). The international news media cover tales about incidents involving other governments and their citizens daily. The tales that are covered under the headings “foreign affairs” or “global news” all too often tell of political bloodshed, the loss of life and limb, the violation of human rights, the destruction of infrastructure, and the failure of aspirations for the restoration of peace and prosperity (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al., 1985). The general phrase “global policy networks” describes institutional arrangements focused on “global public goods” and are frequently established by countries and international organizations.

These institutional arrangements are also known as global commissions, international task forces, or transnational advocacy networks (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019). They typically comprise a wide range of parties and drafted agreements intended to impact how international issues are governed. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dominate some, while multinational corporations, foundations, and expert and epistemic communities dominate others (Kehoane & Nye, 1977; Risse-Kappen, 2002). Some are deadline-driven initiatives to finish a specific objective, like raising money for a particular cause. In contrast, others are more long-lasting institutions designed to create and uphold new norms and standards around particular issues. Others are built around hundreds of people, while some only have a small number of actors (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019). The longevity of collaboration in the event of hegemonic decline has long been discussed in international relations. As economic multipolarity increases, the hegemon may be less able and willing to offer public goods. The up-and-coming challenger may also be reluctant to do so. The United States does not want to take the lead on the coronavirus because of its problems. But as the *New York Times* noted, this may be the first global catastrophe in more than a century in which nobody is even looking to the United States for leadership.

Nevertheless, it is still being determined that this results from its structural weakness. The world's wealthiest nation, the United States, nevertheless stands to earn or lose the most from the collapse of the current economic system. Hegemonic stability theory assumes that the hegemony is a benign actor rather than a coercive one, albeit this assumption may not always hold. It's possible that a putative hegemon's coerciveness or benignity isn't fundamentally specified but depends on the states' or individuals' characteristics (Busby, 2020).

To influence policy development at the national and supranational levels, a global policy network, an institutional framework, brings together a broad range of public and commercial organizations. Their ability to accomplish their aims varies based on factors like the availability of funding and information, the degree of integration and professional growth, and the respect they receive as participants in a particular policy arena. In terms of its membership, commitment, and function, each system has distinctive institutional characteristics, which may affect its capacity to set the agenda. The characteristics that must be considered while determining the importance of structural elements for the efficacy of international policy networks are a matter of debate among academics (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019). The ethical framework of international relations evolves with the times, altering focus based on the most pressing challenges of the day. The result is the identification of new research fields, which in turn stimulates the examination of novel policy alternatives and the improvement of current theories of international relations. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, research focused on terrorism, religious and ethnic conflict, state dissolution, the emergence of substate and non-state entities, the proliferation of WMDs and methods to stop nuclear proliferation, and the expansion of international institutions. The differences between academics' and practitioners' interests in international affairs have repeatedly seemed to outweigh the commonalities. Due to the reality that they often advocate for a fundamentally different international order, intellectuals have long avoided the fact and reputation of being cheerleaders

for governmental foreign policies. Experts have been able to investigate international competitions and advances from a global viewpoint rather than from the standpoint of any one nation's foreign policy because of scientific objectivity (McClelland & Pfaltzgraff, 2022).

The Reagan administration's attempt to drop North–South ties off the world agenda in the early 1980s is studied to provide a method for international agenda-setting. Despite popular belief, the administration initially needed help to achieve the anticipated agenda change. The problem's global significance decreased due to subsequent, unanticipated developments in interstate information, decision-making processes, and diplomatic practices. This implies that achieving the international agenda depends on current international conventions and the entry points they create. Agenda politics are carried out through agenda access points, locations where actors couple problem definition, policy choices, and global salience. For the agenda to succeed, one must have control or be present at these points. This, however, is a dynamic process due to the ongoing change of practices (Livingston, 1992). The environment, drug trafficking, AIDS, terrorism, religious fanaticism, migration, and human rights were some of the issues mentioned in an early draft of the new agenda proposed in 1991. Other issues were the environment and human rights. The phenomenon of globalization and what appeared to be opposing tendencies towards fragmentation were identified as among the most critical “macro” challenges on a more significant, systemic level. These topics have all gained prominence in the study of world politics, along with the concept of global policy itself and fresh interpretations of such fundamental issues as security, which has broadened from a purely military perspective to embrace many new agenda items. But given how we now define our subject areas, whether within the broad field of IR or specialty areas like environmental politics or security studies, these developments provide new issues and challenges for scholars of international politics. This begs the question of whether the integrity of the discipline itself is compromised by the agenda's expansion to embrace an almost infinite range of themes and problems. In a time when globalization is often believed to result in the nearly complete “unbounding” of the world, this subject is highly intriguing (Lawson, 2002).

In contrast, practitioners' attitude toward academics in international relations has been one that leans more toward indifference than it does toward animosity. They typically assert that little from the area has indeed been helpful for their everyday work. There are not many indications of direct influence in either direction; nonetheless, significant covert exchanges have indirectly impacted how international relations are managed. New international programs or foreign policy philosophies adopted by governments in open societies have prompted the establishment of new study programs and even new subfields in international studies. This is because governments in free cultures are considerably more likely to be willing to test out cutting-edge solutions to global issues. Area studies developed after World War II as Western governments sought to understand the Soviet Union and other nations better. National security studies emerged due to the significant impact of armed factors, particularly the threat of nuclear war during the Cold War era, the proliferation of atomic weapons, and other consequences of nuclear weapons (McClelland & Pfaltzgraff, 2022).

Influence on International Relations

The spreading and deepening of international relations (IR) must proceed to keep up with the widening and deepening of globalization and the progression toward a deeply pluralistic world. There has been a proliferation of interests and ideas from researchers in the Global South as well as their non-mainstream Western equivalents on how to redefine and broaden international relations (IR), which has led to discussions such as “Non-Western” or “post-Western” IR, and “Global IR” (Acharya & Buzan, 2019). Since the middle of the 20th century, there have been several significant instances where the indirect impact of international relations studies on official thought and policymaking has been noticeable. For example, the realist interpretation of power politics has permeated the American government’s foreign policy thinking to the point where choices have occasionally been justified by justifications based on national interest and power calculations. At the same time, competing viewpoints have been disregarded as lacking sufficient “hard-nosed” realism. Strategic nuclear planning during the Cold War was built mainly on deterrent ideas developed in the civilian sector, frequently by university professionals. As the 20th century came to a close, academics and policymakers alike focused once again on deterrence’s theoretical and operational aspects. This was in response to the emergence of new actors and weapons of mass devastation (McClelland & Pfaltzgraff, 2022). The parameters of the changing agenda of international relations are outlined in Devetak’s (2007) work. This movement is one that some academics characterize as a transition from world politics to international relations or from the ‘traditional’ to the ‘new’ agenda (Ullah, 2017, 2023). Devetak’s work may be found here. There is little doubt that new theoretical and conceptual tools have been required as political reality has evolved. Still, we shouldn’t presume that a complete rupture with the past has rendered the ‘conventional’ agenda and its theories irrelevant. Far from it, as we shall see, the ‘new’ plan complements but does not replace the “old” agenda. The link between “traditional” and “modern” theories and issues must be considered more.

The U.S. administration created a national security strategy based on the idea that the growth of free-market democracies would lead to a more peaceful world in the final decade of the 20th century. This method mirrored the interplay between the academic and public policy communities, one of which is the migration of academics and practitioners between academia and government (at least in Western democracies). It remains to be seen if this will improve ties between scholars and professionals in international relations. The ability of theories of international relations to foresee the conclusion of the Cold War could have been much better. Additionally, the difficulties in creating realistic assessments of the globe internationally have increased due to the profound and quickening changes that have reshaped it since the turn of the 20th century. However, there is general agreement that more sophisticated applications of quantitative, computer-assisted studies in academic institutions, research institutions, and governments will support scholars in their efforts to more fully comprehend and account for the state of the world today and to generate more timely and accurate reports. However, the academic sector has typically needed more

funding and qualified workers to meet the expanding demand for knowledge (McClelland & Pfaltzgraff, 2022). The international politics of health have been primarily addressed by two methods, according to Davies (2010). The statist approach, which strongly emphasizes security, aims to connect health efforts with a focus on foreign or defense policy. The globalist perspective, in contrast, tries to enhance health because it advances people's rights and well-being rather than because it has an inherent security value.

Impact on Migrants

Every asylum seeker and immigrant has the potential to be a viral carrier. So goes the latest bigoted justification offered by those calling for impenetrable borders, tighter regulations, and express repatriations. It will be simpler to demand the construction of walls and the use of extraordinary measures to keep borders sealed and to deter immigration if internal border closures have become commonplace in the fight against the epidemic. Mismanagement, short-termism, dehumanization, episodic crises, securitization, erosion of rights, and an attempt to relocate the actual border further and further from the official one are all things that will continue to characterize the international migration landscape in 2021 (Ullah et al., 2021a, b). However, regardless of whether they have an irregular status, resolving how resident immigrants fit into society would be a real challenge. This discussion will be done in terms of interest, rationality, morality, and moral considerations. The pandemic and its impacts are having conflicting results.

On the one hand, a portion of the population is increasingly susceptible to the politics of hate; on the other hand, substantial migrant communities that operate in specific sectors have become more visible (Ullah et al., 2021a, b). These populations include individuals employed in the cleaning industry, as carers, as workers in the home delivery industry, as smallholders, as workers in the food industry, and as seasonal agricultural laborers. These workers are starting to be seen as crucial components of the social and economic system (Lecha, 2020). On the other hand, the pandemic strengthens the conversation in European countries, the United States, the Middle East, and the rest of Asia about the hazards to public health that portions of society pose when they are ignored or live outside of official channels. This is the case because of the spread of the pandemic. One of the groups that is most frequently overlooked or purposefully ignored is undocumented immigrants. Amid a public health crisis, the government and its people realized once again what should have been obvious all along: that it is responsible for the health of every person living within its borders, that it is difficult to keep "their" issues from becoming "our" problems, and that "their" health is everyone's health (Lecha, 2020).

Agenda-Setting and Back to Normal Life and International Relations

Global policy networks play a critical role in setting the agenda by increasing public awareness of issues and presenting challenges in ways that best align with the ideas and values of both actual and potential allies. Global networks frequently serve as policy entrepreneurs, trying to change political agendas at the international and national levels, as argued in this chapter. Their ability to produce information and indicators that quantify the extent of issues, and the repercussion of inactivity depends on their ability to take advantage of opportunities generated by political transformations and choice shifts (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019). Additionally, their capacity to produce information and indicators that can quantify the magnitude of issues and the consequence of inaction depends on their ability to take advantage of openings generated by political transformations and preference shifts. The COVID-19 changes were most quickly felt in how we work, travel, consume, interact, and even manage international relations. Diplomacy may be one of the first fields to return to business as usual when the gloomy 75th anniversary of the United Nations, the massive shortcomings of “zoom diplomacy,” and the security vulnerabilities of virtual meetings fade from memory. The G7 summit in America and the bi-continental summit between the European and African Union were two gatherings postponed for 2020. International agendas will be quickly filled with summits, official excursions, and pending visits as soon as health circumstances permit. Although at a higher technical level, distant communication and information exchange methods are likely to become standard (Lecha, 2020).

As Chaqués-Bonafont (2019) explains, the ending of the Cold War, shifting political elites, and the evolution of citizens’ views and understanding of issues are all key factors that help illustrate how global networks can periodically have an impact on the politics agendas of national and international political institutions. Although it may not appear so initially, the changes in other facets of daily life may have been more profound and will affect the global agenda. A remote job is one of the most obvious. Significant differences occur across nations, economic sectors, and income levels, just like there are many other concerns. Consolidating remote work practices may promote networking and forming teams headquartered in different cities or even continents after the health crisis has passed, thereby increasing diversity and inclusion at the global level.

Additionally, it might hasten the transfer of some administrative tasks to regions with cheaper labour costs. As a result, the rise of cloud data storage will be elevated to the top of the list of essential topics for 2021. Large corporations will engage in cutthroat competition for market share in the data storage industry, thereby reviving the arguments around the concept of “digital sovereignty” and heightening their nation’s susceptibility to cyberattacks and industrial espionage carried out either at the behest of the state or by non-state actors (Lecha, 2020).

However, if global networks are institutionalized correctly, they can become powerful gatekeepers that prevent specific issues and ideas from being included in the

political agenda. There are several reasons why a case may go unaddressed, including immediate worries about organizational success, a lack of money or human resources, the refusal of possible donors, a contradiction between the organization's principles and goals and the present issue framing, and a lack of realistic chances of achievement. Some concerns are thereby removed from the political agenda of international networks (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019). A megatrend that is difficult to halt, digitalization unexpectedly picked up speed in 2020. In 2021, giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft will continue to dominate. Still, its Chinese competitors and new enterprises that arise nearly from nothing will have the quickest growth. TikTok gained popularity in 2019 as the epidemic was in full swing. In December 2019, there were 10 million Zoom meetings every day. By April 2020, there were 300 million. We can never predict who may shock us in 2021.

In the meantime, several substitute platforms, such as booksellers combining their resources to take on Amazon, appeared in 2020. It's unlikely that such an attempt will directly threaten the large tech companies, but it will be intriguing to see if it can solidify. Before the pandemic, the concept of "digital sovereignty" was becoming increasingly popular, and this trend will likely continue as two domains of technical power centered on China and the United States emerge (Lecha, 2020). If and when the epidemic is brought under control, any economic recovery may, far from relieving these tensions, instead worsen them. This is because any road out of the crisis is likely to be just as unequal of a process as the crisis itself or possibly more unequal. In an urban setting, the visibility of this imbalance will lead to much more resentment and possibly violence. Some may view this circumstance as a chance to stop the rural areas' population decline. The dominant tendency will be different in quantitative terms. First, metropolitan government becomes more crucial as peri-urban areas grow more desirable. Second, more people will live in overcrowded conditions in low-income neighbourhoods, and in the worst circumstances, homelessness may also increase. Third, especially in informal settlements, the populace of the world's largest cities will keep growing (Lecha, 2020).

Conclusion

Even if states remain the primary actors in international relations in the post-COVID-19 period, the system of international relations itself has devolved into a lawless state, and international institutions no longer hold the same level of significance as they once did. Cooperation and globalization, on the other hand, have remained in the background even though the content of the concepts of self-acting and security, power, and prosperous state have altered. However, new ideas, such as new nationalism and protectionism, started to appear in the literature as the meanings of the previous ideas shifted (Kanapiyanova, 2020). In general, the ability of global networks to shape the agenda and help legitimize the provision of global public goods like those outlined in the Sustainable Development Goals is a crucial answer. A solution like this is necessary to justify global public goods. While their rise highlights the need

for collaborative, novel, and alternative responses to the new millennium's political, economic, and social challenges, consolidating networks as significant agenda-setters presents severe questions of legitimacy and political representation (Carpenter, 2007; Stone, 2008). (Held, 2006). States have created and assigned tasks to international organizations (IOs) to promote cooperation and collective action. Most governments typically need help carrying out coordination and information gathering independently, but IOs may do so by pooling and centralizing resources through a single agency. Additionally, because of their apparent relative impartiality, IOs are more likely to be trusted with information from states, especially information on disease surveillance and the status of outbreaks (Busby, 2020).

The academic field of international relations will resemble government analysis and planning organizations significantly more in terms of the circumstances and relationships of the global social systems if computer systems and the Internet are used to their total capacity. The final result might be creating more creative methods for formulating and executing foreign policy and conducting a more comprehensive study of international relations (McClelland & Pfaltzgraff, 2022). Global networks are increasingly influencing national and supranational political agendas, yet the rules of democratic accountability do not constrain them. The analysis of how global networks create their plans does not follow the logic of political responsiveness simply because these networks' members are not elected and are not required to follow an electoral mandate or define their actions by the general public's preferences (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019).

There is considerable controversy about the best way to classify these international agreements. To explain the differences and similarities in the features of global networks and the possible repercussions for the agenda-setting process, a more systematic analysis is required based on a uniform set of categories that identify the institutional elements of global policy networks. If this is feasible, it should be possible to give a more thorough explanation of how and why particular issues and ideas end up on the political agenda, what motivates global policy networks to function over time as agents of policy stability or agents of policy diffusion, and whether or not global networks replicate power relations on a worldwide scale (Chaqués-Bonafont, 2019). International solidarity and cooperation will also necessitate political solutions. This essay aims to bridge the divide between the public health and IR sectors by investigating what contribution IR studies may offer to in-the-moment decisions during such outbreaks and in the post-hoc analysis of emergencies. The possibility of diseases and even survival for people who live under numerous different governments around the world are now being affected in the actual world by this deficiency. To develop a means for public healthcare practitioners to acclimate operating in these global political frameworks, it will be vital to comprehend the function of diplomacy and opposing political objectives (Davies & Wenham, 2020).

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Chapter 9

Migration, International Relations, Governance, and Security Fallacies Debunked



Jannatul Ferdous and A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah

Introduction: The Emergence of Security Concerns in International Migration

The intricate web of governance, migration, international relations, and security has become increasingly complex in an era characterized by unprecedented connectivity, globalization, and interdependence. As we navigate the tumultuous currents of the 21st century, we must seek a deeper understanding of the multifaceted relationships between these domains. This edited volume, “Governance, Migration, International Relations & Security,” emerges as a timely and illuminating exploration of the intricate dynamics at the nexus of these critical areas.

Today’s world witnesses various challenges and opportunities that transcend borders and traditional boundaries. In its myriad forms, governance shapes the policies and decisions that underpin societies. Migration, both voluntary and forced, reshapes demographics and challenges societal norms. International relations dictate the interactions between nations, and security considerations weigh heavily on the minds of policymakers and citizens alike. In this tapestry of global affairs, the relationships between these four domains are inextricably intertwined.

This book, comprising nine insightful chapters, delves into the intersections of governance, migration, international relations, and security, comprehensively analyzing the evolving landscape. The chapters collectively provide a nuanced and holistic perspective, helping readers navigate the complex currents of our interconnected world. The journey begins with the “Introduction: Connecting Governance, Migration, International Relations, and Security.” This foundational chapter sets the

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stage, explaining the intricate relationships between these domains and their relevance in our contemporary world. It is a roadmap that guides us through the rest of the book, demonstrating how governance, migration, international relations, and security are not isolated silos but threads interwoven into the fabric of global affairs.

“Revisiting International Migration Governance” invites us to explore the ever-evolving landscape of migration globally. The chapter reflects on the challenges and prospects of managing human mobility in an era of increased movement and shifting political landscapes. It highlights the importance of international cooperation in addressing migration challenges. “International Relations vs. Migration: Complements or Substitutes?” delves into the complex interplay between these two domains. It challenges conventional wisdom and explores how international relations can either complement or substitute for migration as a means of achieving global goals. This chapter provides fresh insights into the dynamics between diplomacy and migration.

“Migration and Governance in the Global South: Outlook and Challenges in Bangladesh” offers a specific lens into the experiences of a nation grappling with the governance of migration. Bangladesh’s unique position as a source, transit, and destination country for migrants underscores the complexities faced by countries in the Global South. The chapter explores the outlook and challenges faced by Bangladesh in managing migration.

“Re-imagining Migration and Security” probes the intricate relationship between migration and security. It challenges conventional notions of security and explores how the securitization of migration can impact both migrants and host societies. This chapter raises thought-provoking questions about balancing security imperatives and humanitarian concerns. “Great Power Competition and Cyber Security” shifts our focus to contemporary international relations and security challenges. It examines the growing importance of cyber security in the context of great power competition. As nations vie for dominance, the digital realm has emerged as a critical arena for cooperation and conflict. “China’s Strategic Engagement in South Asia: India and Bangladesh at Crossroads” offers a deep dive into China’s strategic maneuvers in South Asia, particularly in India and Bangladesh. It sheds light on the complex web of economic, political, and security interests that define China’s engagement in the region, providing valuable insights into the evolving geopolitics of South Asia.

“Renewed Agenda for International Relations” invites us to contemplate the future of international relations in an ever-changing world. It outlines a renewed agenda considering the shifting power dynamics, emerging global challenges, and the imperative for multilateral cooperation. The final chapter, “Migration, International Relations, Governance, and Security Fallacies Debunked,” challenges prevailing misconceptions and fallacies in understanding the relationships between governance, migration, international relations, and security. It critically examines common assumptions and encourages readers to rethink their perspectives.

As editors of this volume, we are honored to present this collection of thought-provoking chapters from esteemed scholars and experts in the field. These chapters collectively form a mosaic that enriches our comprehension of the complex interplay between governance, migration, international relations, and security. We hope this

book is a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, and students alike, fostering a deeper appreciation of the intricate dynamics that shape our interconnected world. We thank the contributors who have dedicated their expertise and insights to this project. Their collective wisdom illuminates the path forward as we grapple with the profound challenges and opportunities of governance, migration, international relations, and security in the 21st century.

Once upon a time, the landscape of international migration was characterised by a free flow of people seeking better opportunities, adventures, and new beginnings (Smith & Johnson, 2021; Ullah, 2010). Countries welcomed the newcomers with open arms and were eager to benefit from the diversity and skills they brought. However, as the world evolved and faced unprecedented challenges, migration dynamics began to change, and security concerns gradually took centre stage (Ullah et al., 2019).

In the late 20th century, the world experienced significant changes in global politics and economics. The end of the Cold War brought new geopolitical realities that led to increased regional conflicts, failed states, and increased displacement of people (Berger, 2004). Suddenly, large-scale forced migration, such as refugee flows, became more pronounced and complex (Ullah, 2014). States struggled to cope with the influx of refugees and asylum seekers, sparking debates about border controls and security measures.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the world experienced tragic events that heightened security concerns about migration. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States shook the entire international community (Johnstone, 2011). Terrorism and the fear of infiltration by extremist elements dominated and influenced immigration policies worldwide. Governments began to view migration through a security lens, focusing on potential risks associated with border crossings and undocumented movements (Ogbonna, Lenshie, & Nwangwu, 2023). The idea of “securitisation” of migration emerged, where migration issues were presented as security threats that justify extraordinary measures such as increased border controls, detention centres, and increased surveillance.

In this changing landscape, the media plays an essential role in reinforcing security concerns related to migration (Ullah & Chatteraj, 2023). Sensational news stories about human trafficking, illegal immigration, and violence by certain migrant groups fuelled public fear and reinforced the impression that migration threatened national security. The rise of populism and nationalism in some parts of the world further influenced the discourse on migration. Politicians exploited security fears to gain support and advocated for stricter immigration policies to appease their voter base (Bergmann & Bergmann, 2020). Anti-immigrant sentiments escalated and fuelled a divisive narrative that pitted migrants against the native population.

The impact of the global financial crisis in 2008 exacerbated the perception that migrants were taking jobs away from locals, which increased concerns about economic security in host countries (Kwak & Wallace, 2018). Fears of economic instability led to calls for more restrictive immigration policies as nations sought to protect their citizens from perceived threats to their livelihoods. As the 21st century progressed, new challenges, such as climate change and cyber threats, were added,

making migration-related security concerns even more complex. Environmental degradation and natural disasters displaced millions of people, strained resources, and led to potential conflicts over scarce resources. Today, security concerns related to international migration are firmly entrenched in the policies and practices of nations worldwide (Heath, 2022). The issue is no longer confined to a single region or group of people but is a global problem. Governments wrestle with the delicate balance between ensuring national security and preserving humanitarian values, seeking solutions that ensure both.

The increasing importance of security in the international migration landscape is due to various factors, including geopolitical changes, terrorist attacks, media sensationalism, and economic fears. These issues have shaped the image of migration, with the human aspects often taking a back seat, leading to policies that prioritise security over compassion. To effectively address these challenges, a balanced approach that recognises both the security concerns and humanitarian dimensions of migration is essential for a safer and more inclusive world.

International Relations in the Landscape of International Migration

Long ago, the world was a vast expanse of isolated countries, each with its own culture, language, and way of life. Migration between these distant regions was relatively limited, and interactions between nations were sparse. But as time passed and humanity evolved, international relations began to shape the landscape of international migration, leading to interconnectedness and global cooperation like never before (Hollifield, 1992). The first seeds of the importance of international relations to migration were planted during the Age of Discovery in the 15th and 16th centuries. European explorers encountered unfamiliar territories and peoples as they set sail to discover new lands (Herrington, 2013). This clash of civilisations triggered an era of intercultural exchange in which migration played a crucial role in shaping different regions' demographic and cultural composition.

With the expansion of empires and colonisation in the 17th and 18th centuries, migration patterns took on a new dimension (Adas, 1998). Forced migration, often driven by exploitative practises, brought millions of enslaved Africans to the Americas. This marked the dark side of international migration, where relations between nations were often characterised by exploitation, power struggles, and inequality. The 19th century saw the rise of industrialisation and modern transport, which allowed for more extensive and efficient migration. People were drawn to regions with thriving economies and sought opportunities in distant lands. This led to massive waves of migration across continents, such as the mass migration of Europeans to the Americas and Australasia (Buzan & Lawson, 2013). International relations played a crucial role in shaping the policies and diplomatic agreements that regulated these migration flows.

However, the aftermath of the War II truly changed the importance of international relations in the migration landscape. The devastation caused by the war prompted the creation of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). These organisations sought to address the challenges of millions of displaced persons and refugees in the post-war period. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, recognised the right to seek asylum from persecution and thus established the concept of refugee protection (Ullah, 2014). This was a defining moment in international relations when human rights and humanitarian considerations began to influence migration policy and practise.

In the second half of the 20th century, global events continued to shape the landscape of international migration. The decolonisation process brought new waves of migration as people from former colonies sought to build new lives in their home countries or with their former colonisers (Smith, 2003). Economic globalisation and advances in communication technology further accelerated migration and led to an increase in transnational movements.

In the 21st century, the complexity of international migration has increased exponentially. Issues of international security, economic interdependence, and environmental challenges have become increasingly intertwined with migration. Due to armed conflicts, economic inequalities, and climate change, states faced unprecedented flows of refugees and migrants. International relations played a crucial role in forging cooperation and agreements to address these global challenges. Today, international relations remain at the forefront of shaping the international migration landscape. Diplomatic efforts aim to foster cooperation between nations in managing migration flows, protecting migrants' rights, and addressing the root causes of displacement (Ullah & Kumpoh, 2019). Multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations, and international treaties are crucial in shaping migration policy and advocating inclusive and compassionate responses.

The importance of international relations in international migration has evolved over centuries, reflecting the changing dynamics of global interactions. From the early days of discovery to the modern era of interconnectedness, migration has been heavily influenced by diplomatic relations between nations. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and faces new challenges, international relations will play a central role in shaping migration policy, promoting cooperation, and ensuring a safer and more inclusive world.

International Migration and Security—Misconceptions Debunked

In recent years, international migration and its impact on security have been the subject of intense debate and analysis. As people cross borders searching for better opportunities, security, or asylum, concerns about security risks are often

raised (Ullah & Kumpoh, 2018). Unfortunately, some of these concerns have led to misconceptions and misunderstandings that misrepresent the complex relationship between international migration and security. This section aims to debunk some common misconceptions surrounding this issue and shed light on a more nuanced understanding of the problem.

Migrants are a security threat? One of the most common misconceptions is the belief that migrants, especially those who enter a country irregularly or seek asylum, pose a significant security threat. This misconception is often fuelled by media reports and political rhetoric that can stoke fear and hostility towards migrants. However, empirical research shows that most migrants are not criminals or terrorists but people seeking to improve their lives or escape persecution.

Studies consistently show that the crime rate of migrants, including irregular migrants, is lower than that of the native population in many countries. In addition, many migrants contribute positively to their host society by bringing different skills, cultural enrichment, and economic benefits (Nese, 2023). It is essential to distinguish between the actions of a few individuals and the broader migrant population and not to paint all migrants with the same brush of suspicion.

Tightening borders guarantee security? Another common misconception is that stricter border controls and deterrents will ensure greater security. While border protection is a legitimate concern for any country, overly restrictive measures can have unintended consequences (Bermejo, 2009). Tighter border controls can push migrants onto riskier routes controlled by traffickers and criminal networks, exacerbating human rights violations and security risks. Moreover, an excessive focus on border fortifications may divert attention and resources from addressing the root causes of migration. Economic inequalities, political instability, and environmental problems often drive people to migrate. By addressing these root causes, countries can effectively manage migration and promote regional stability.

Migration and Terrorism are Linked? One of the most dangerous fallacies is the unfounded belief that migration per se is linked to terrorism. This misconception can lead to discriminatory policies and stigmatisation of specific migrant communities, fostering social divisions and perpetuating discrimination (Ullah et al., 2020a, b). In reality, most migrants are not involved in terrorist activities. Counter-terrorism efforts must focus on evidence-based approaches that target real threats, regardless of the nationality or migration status of the perpetrator. Inclusive policies promoting social cohesion, advancing integration, and counter radicalisation are more effective in combating terrorism than sweeping generalisations about migrant populations.

Security takes precedence over human rights? A troubling fallacy is the notion that national security concerns justify neglecting or undermining the human rights of migrants. International human rights law explicitly protects the rights of all people, regardless of their migration status (Ullah & Sagor, 2018). The detention of migrants, the separation of families, and the denial of access to essential services based on migration status violate fundamental human rights principles. Respect for human rights is a moral imperative and contributes to more effective migration management. When migrants' rights are respected, they are more likely to cooperate with the

authorities, which facilitates the identification of potential security risks (Androff & Mathis, 2022).

Debunking misconceptions surrounding international migration and security is crucial to promoting a more informed and balanced discussion on these complex issues. The evidence presented in this section makes it clear that we need to move away from fear-driven narratives and focus on evidence-based policy (Ullah & Haque, 2020). Understanding the multi-faceted nature of international migration and its security implications is critical to promoting inclusive and effective policies that respect human rights while protecting the legitimate security interests of nations (Weiner, 1992). We can create a more just and secure global community for all through a comprehensive and nuanced approach.

In the book we have examined the intricate interplay of these fundamental aspects that shape the global landscape. In this book, we witness the complexities and challenges that arise from the ever-evolving dynamics of governance, migration, international relations, and security. One of the critical insights that have emerged from our analysis is the undeniable interconnectedness of these issues. The actions and decisions of one nation or region have far-reaching consequences for others, crossing borders and impacting the global community. Migration, a prominent feature of our modern world, has become a catalyst that shapes demographic patterns and influences the cultural, economic, and political landscape worldwide (Massey, 1990).

The book highlights the importance of effective governance in addressing the multi-faceted issues arising from migration, international relations, and security. Good governance, with its principles of transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness, is critical to managing the complexity of cross-border movements, ensuring equitable distribution of resources, and mitigating security threats (He et al., 2021). Moreover, our research has highlighted the crucial role of international cooperation and diplomacy in addressing global challenges. In an increasingly interconnected world, every nation can only effectively address migration, security, or international relations in isolation. Cooperation, dialogue, and diplomatic efforts are essential to find peaceful solutions and foster positive relations between nations. The study of security-related issues has revealed the significance of striking a delicate balance between protecting national interests and promoting global collective security. As asymmetric threats and non-state actors evolve, traditional security paradigms must be modified to ensure the safety and well-being of people across international borders.

While acknowledging the progress made in certain areas, we must also confront the persistent gaps and shortcomings in addressing the complex challenges discussed in this book. The ever-changing patterns of migration, the emergence of new security threats and the intricacies of international relations require constant adaptation and innovation in policy formulation and implementation (Clapham, 2006).

No singular approach or solution will suffice to address the multifaceted problems of governance, migration, international relations, and security in the future. To successfully navigate the complexities of an interconnected world, it is necessary to adopt a nuanced and comprehensive strategy that takes into consideration the diverse perspectives of various stakeholders (Efsthathopoulos et al., 2020). As

academics, policymakers, and global citizens, it is our duty to continue the necessary dialogue, research, and action to develop effective strategies and policies. We can work together to create a more just, peaceful, and secure world by cultivating empathy and understanding, defending human rights, and ensuring equitable resource distribution.

Governance, Migration, International Relations & Security is not merely an examination of four distinct topics, but instead of the intricate web that binds them together. Our exploration of these themes has demonstrated that addressing the challenges and opportunities arising from this interconnectedness requires collective effort, collaboration, and an unwavering commitment to a shared vision of a better future for all humanity. Only by embracing our global interconnectedness can we hope to overcome the hurdles ahead and create a world that values diversity, promotes understanding, and upholds the principles of peace and prosperity for generations to come.

Critics of Existing Theories

Studying international migration, international relations, governance, and security is critical to understanding the dynamics of our interconnected world. Over the years, several theories have emerged to explain and guide our understanding of these complex phenomena. While some theories have provided valuable insights, some inherent limitations and gaps must be addressed for a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of global issues (Kelly & Cordeiro, 2020). This critique aims to highlight the shortcomings of existing theories and call for further research and refinement in these critical areas.

International migration theories: Many migration theories are based on the assumption of rational choice and assume that people move for purely economic reasons. This gross simplification neglects the influence of social, cultural, and political factors on migration decisions. It also fails to capture the complexity of forced migration, such as refugee movements, often triggered by conflict and persecution. Existing theories often overlook the role of structural inequalities between countries as essential drivers of migration. Economic inequalities, political instability, and environmental degradation in regions of origin are essential push factors that must be better integrated into migration theories.

Theories of international relations: Traditional theories of international relations focus predominantly on the actions of nation-states, overlooking the growing importance of non-state actors such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, and terrorist organisations. This narrow perspective prevents a comprehensive analysis of global interactions and cooperation. Many theories of international relations are historically Eurocentric and disproportionately represent Western perspectives and experiences. This Eurocentric bias limits our understanding of non-Western regions' diverse cultures, histories, and perspectives.

Governance theories: Governance theories often need a more explicit normative framework, leaving the concept of good governance to be clarified. The lack of universally accepted norms can lead to divergent governance practises and hinder efforts to address global challenges effectively. Existing governance theories need to sufficiently consider the participation and contribution of marginalised groups and stakeholders, leading to policy outcomes that may not reflect the needs and interests of all stakeholders.

Security theories: Many security theories emphasise military responses and the securitisation of problems. This undermines efforts to address the root causes of conflict and insecurity, such as poverty, inequality, and political grievances. Neglect of non-traditional security threats: Traditional security theories often overlook non-military threats such as climate change, pandemics, and cyber warfare, which are increasingly important in the modern world. These new challenges require new approaches to security analysis and response.

Existing theories of international migration, international relations, governance, and security have provided valuable insights but also suffer from limitations and biases that hinder a comprehensive understanding of global phenomena. From now on, scholars and policymakers must strive to develop more comprehensive, nuanced, and context-specific theories that consider the interconnectedness of various factors and the different perspectives of different regions. By addressing these criticisms, we can work towards more effective policies and strategies to manage the complexity of our ever-changing world.

Integrative Approaches

The interconnectedness of the globalized world necessitates an approach that simultaneously addresses migration, international relations, governance, and security. Each of these aspects influences and is influenced by the others, creating a complex web of interdependencies that shape the global landscape. This book examines the benefits and challenges of an integrative approach to these crucial areas and emphasizes the potential for holistic solutions that promote global peace, prosperity, and stability.

Understanding the Nexus: At the heart of the integrative approach is a recognition of the interdependence of migration, international relations, governance, and security. Geopolitical realities, economic conditions, and policies influence migration flows. Migration patterns, in turn, affect international relations, as the movement of people across borders influences cultural exchanges, demographic shifts, and economic dynamics. In addition, effective governance is critical to managing migration flows and addressing security challenges. At the same time, international cooperation can play a central role in addressing the root causes of migration and enhancing global security.

An integrative approach enables policymakers to develop comprehensive solutions considering the interconnectedness of migration, international relations, governance, and security. Instead of addressing each problem in isolation, policies can

be designed to consider the underlying linkages and lead to more effective and sustainable outcomes.

The inclusive approach provides a deeper understanding of the factors driving migration and can help identify potential causes of conflict. By addressing these causes, such as economic inequalities, political instability, or environmental challenges, governments and international organisations can work to prevent conflict and promote stability. An inclusive approach puts the human experience at the forefront of policy-making. It takes into account the rights and well-being of migrants, recognises their agency, and ensures that their integration into the host society is conducive to their long-term success. Human rights considerations are embedded throughout the policy-making process and promote dignity and social cohesion. Migration, international relations, governance, and security challenges are rarely confined to individual nations. An inclusive approach promotes regional cooperation and dialogue so neighbouring countries can work together to address common challenges. Regional cooperation can enhance collective security and promote economic development, benefiting all stakeholders.

Challenges and Obstacles: While the integrative approach offers many advantages, it also faces challenges that must be acknowledged. Integrating the different dimensions of complex problems requires political will and commitment from governments and international organisations. Political considerations and short-term agendas can hinder efforts to implement comprehensive and long-term solutions.

Achieving effective coordination and cooperation between diverse actors, such as national administrations, international organizations, and civil society, can be challenging. For a project to be successful, it is essential to overcome divergent perspectives and interests. An inclusive strategy is supported by robust data and research spanning multiple disciplines and regions. Collecting and analysing this information can be resource- and time-intensive, but it is necessary for evidence-based policymaking. Migration, international relations, governance, and security challenges are interconnected and cannot be addressed independently. Creating a more stable, prosperous, and secure global community is facilitated by an inclusive strategy that acknowledges these interdependencies and seeks to address them holistically. We can navigate the complexities of our interconnected world and build a future that prioritizes the well-being and dignity of all people, regardless of their nationality or immigration status, by promoting international cooperation, respecting human rights, and implementing comprehensive policies. As we progress, governments, policymakers, and stakeholders must adopt an inclusive approach and collaborate to create a more harmonious and sustainable global community.

The Imperative of Further Research: Today's world faces many complex challenges that require comprehensive and innovative solutions. Migration, international relations, governance, and security are critical issues shaping our global landscape. An integrative approach that recognises the interconnections between these multi-layered challenges is necessary to address the complexity of our rapidly changing world. This essay explores why more research is essential for developing an integrative approach and its potential benefits for promoting peace, stability, and prosperity.

The increasing complexity of global problems: Global challenges such as forced migration, transnational terrorism, climate change, and economic interdependence have become increasingly interconnected and complex. Traditional approaches that isolate these issues in separate silos may no longer be practical. An integrative approach recognises the interplay of these challenges and offers a more nuanced understanding of the underlying causes and consequences.

Addressing the root causes: An integrative approach enables researchers and policymakers to understand the root causes of migration, international tensions, governance problems, and security threats. Rather than treating symptoms in isolation, a holistic examination identifies common underlying factors. By understanding the interconnectedness of these challenges, we can develop more effective strategies to address root causes, reduce the likelihood of recurrence, and promote long-term stability.

Exploiting synergies: Migration, international relations, governance, and security are not isolated phenomena but interconnected aspects of global dynamics. By studying them together, researchers can identify potential synergies and opportunities for collaboration. For example, integrating migration policies with economic development initiatives can promote human capital mobility and economic growth, benefiting both countries of origin and destination.

Improving the Effectiveness of the Policy

An inclusive approach facilitates evidence-based policymaking. Research that explores the links between migration, international relations, governance, and security can lead to policy decisions that are more comprehensive and coherent. Policymakers can better anticipate unintended consequences and avoid solutions that could exacerbate other challenges.

Balancing national interests and global responsibilities: Pursuing national interests cannot ignore global responsibilities in an increasingly interconnected world. Issues such as migration, climate change, and security threats transcend borders and require cooperation between nations. Research on an integrative approach can help identify win-win strategies that balance national interests with collective global responsibility.

Human rights and social cohesion: An inclusive approach greatly emphasizes respecting human rights and promoting social cohesion. By recognising the human dimensions of migration and security challenges, policies can be developed to protect the dignity and well-being of the affected people. This approach promotes inclusiveness and social integration, reduces tensions, and contributes to peaceful coexistence.

In contemporary reality, the challenges of migration, international relations, governance and security are inextricably linked. An integrative approach is essential to address the complexity arising from their interplay and to provide comprehensive solutions to these multi-faceted global problems. More research on this integrative

approach is imperative as it can improve political effectiveness, conflict prevention, and respect for human rights. By fostering international cooperation, understanding common causes, and harnessing synergies, we can manage the complexity of our interconnected world and build a more harmonious and secure future for all. Researchers, policymakers, and stakeholders must invest in further research to develop an inclusive approach that addresses global challenges holistically and paves the way for a more sustainable and prosperous world.

Contributions of the Research to Knowledge

This book has proven to be a crucial resource for comprehending the complexities of our globalized world. As research advances, new insights, and novel perspectives significantly contribute to the ongoing discourse on these vital issues. This book examines the new research contributions that enrich the existing body of knowledge and cast light on emerging trends, challenges, and possible solutions.

Understanding Changing Migration Patterns: Research in recent years has provided new insights into changing migration patterns. Research into factors influencing human mobility, such as climate change, demographic shifts, and technological advances, has contributed to a deeper understanding of migration trends. In addition, advanced data analysis and sophisticated modelling techniques have enabled researchers to project future migration scenarios and inform policymakers about potential challenges and opportunities. For example, studies have highlighted the impact of environmental disasters on forced migration and led to discussions on climate-induced displacement and the need for effective adaptation and resilience strategies.

Intersectionality in migration: Recent research has highlighted the importance of considering intersectionality in migration studies. Intersectionality recognises that multiple factors, such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and socio-economic status, shape people's experiences. By examining migration through an intersectional lens, researchers have uncovered the challenges faced by marginalised groups such as women, LGBTQ+, and ethnic minorities. These findings have led to broader policy recommendations that address the specific needs of different migrant groups.

Putting international relations to the test: The research contributions in this book have led to a rethinking of traditional notions of international relations. In an era of globalisation and increasing interdependence, studies have highlighted the importance of soft power, diplomacy, and non-state actors in shaping international relations. New research has examined the role of international organisations, transnational advocacy networks, and multinational corporations in influencing global politics and migration dynamics. In addition, research has highlighted the interconnectedness of regional issues and recognised that crises in one region could impact global stability. This perspective has led to calls for increased regional cooperation and coordination in addressing migration-related challenges.

Innovations in governance: The book benefits from research identifying governance innovations that address migration and security challenges more effectively. Research on digital technologies, blockchain, and artificial intelligence has explored their potential applications to improve border management, identity verification, and information sharing between governments. These advances offer new opportunities for secure and efficient migration processes while addressing the need for privacy and data security. The research on multi-stakeholder partnerships has shown the importance of including civil society organisations, academia, and the private sector in governance efforts. This collaboration promotes more inclusive and participatory approaches to migration and security governance.

Addressing security threats: New research has also contributed to a more nuanced understanding of security threats today. Studies have explored the complex links between migration, terrorism, and extremism, highlighting the need for targeted, evidence-based counter-terrorism strategies that do not exclude migrant communities. In addition, research has examined the role of global cooperation and information sharing in addressing transnational security challenges and emphasised the need for collective efforts to combat emerging threats.

New contributions from research have enriched this book and offered valuable insights into the complexity of our interconnected world. As research continues to evolve, the book will remain a living document reflecting the ever-changing dynamics of migration, international relations, governance, and security. By incorporating new evidence and diverse perspectives, the book will continue to guide policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders in addressing the challenges and opportunities that arise from these critical issues. The ongoing commitment to research ensures that the book remains a relevant and influential resource for addressing the complexities of our globalised reality.

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Author Index

B

Bhuiyan, H. M. Khalid Hossain, [49](#)

C

Chattoraj, Diotima, [33](#)

F

Ferdous, Jannatul, [3](#), [17](#), [73](#), [117](#), [131](#)

K

Karim, Mohammad Razaul, [89](#), [103](#)

Khan, Niaz Ahmed, [73](#), [117](#)

P

Pavićević, Marko, [89](#)

R

Rahman, Warefta, [49](#)

U

Ullah, A. K. M. Ahsan, [3](#), [131](#)