

# Colonial Hangover and ‘Invited’ Migration: Hong Kongers to the UK

International Studies

59(2) 180–191, 2022

© 2022 Jawaharlal Nehru University

Reprints and permissions:

[in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india](https://in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india)

DOI: 10.1177/00208817221101222

[journals.sagepub.com/home/isq](https://journals.sagepub.com/home/isq)

A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah<sup>1</sup>  and Muhammad Azizuddin<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

Protests in Hong Kong over plans to allow extradition from Hong Kong to mainland China is going on since mid-2019. These reforms are seen as a threat to Hong Kongers' freedom. The protesters expanded their demands for democratic reform and opposition to Beijing's introduction to a new national security law. Following the continued protests, the UK government invited over five million Hong Kong residents to relocate to the country. The purpose of this article is to delve into why the UK welcomes Hong Kong residents to apply for citizenship. During the economic impact of COVID-19 and Brexit on the UK, this invitation raises questions about its intention. Since the Brexit referendum, immigration has plummeted, perhaps resulting in a labour shortage. This study has significant policy implications for Hong Kong, China and the UK.

## Keywords

Hong Kong, China, migration by invitation, Brexit, COVID-19, protest

## Background

Apart from a period of Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945, Hong Kong was a British Empire colony and dependent territory from 1841 to 1997 (Smith, 1995). Only about 7,000 Chinese lived in Hong Kong at the time. After the Second Opium War in 1860, Hong Kong expanded to the Kowloon Peninsula, and in 1898, Britain gained a 99-year lease of the New Territories (Lau, 1997). With the lease's expiration approaching in 1982, British and Chinese leaders discussed the handover. The British colony of Hong Kong was handed over to the People's Republic of China on 1 July 1997. The relationship between China and Hong

<sup>1</sup> FASS, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Gadong, Bander, Brunei

<sup>2</sup> Coventry University, UK

## Corresponding author:

A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah, FASS, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Gadong, Bander BE1410, Brunei.

E-mail: [akmahsanullah@gmail.com](mailto:akmahsanullah@gmail.com)

Kong as one country, two systems (Palivos et al., 2011) would continue until 2047 provided Hong Kong remained a special administrative region (SAR). The notion of one nation, two systems refer to Hong Kongers having a 'great degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs', for 50 years under the People's Republic of China's rule.

On the basis of the Sino-British Joint Declaration (JD) of 1984 and the Basic Law promulgated by the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) in 1990, Hong Kong was designated as an SAR in 1997, with the principles of 'one country, two systems', a 'high degree of autonomy', except in foreign and defence affairs (Summers, 2016). The handover in 1997 represented a significant shift in the UK's relationship with Hong Kong. The UK was no longer a player in Hong Kong politics. However, a slew of political and constitutional reform challenges, as well as Hong Kong's 79-day 'Occupy' movement in October 2014, drew unprecedented global attention to the city's politics. On the one hand, worldwide backing is one of the tactics used by Hong Kong politicians to fight Beijing (Hartcher, 2016).

Hong Kong has extradition treaties with 20 nations, including the UK and the USA, but none with mainland China (BBC, 2019). President Xi Jinping of China has signed into law a contentious national security law (NSL) for Hong Kong, which Beijing claims is necessary to combat separatism and foreign interference, but critics say this will criminalize dissent and erode the autonomy promised in 1997 during the handover (Aljazeera, 2020). Extradition requests from mainland China will allow China under the new law to try those accused of crimes like murder and rape (BBC, 2019). Doubts loomed and questions were raised about how Beijing would handle Hong Kong citizens in the coming years. The 2019 protests, which were sparked by the passage of an extradition law, are seen as a continuation of earlier protests that are likely to continue (Dapiran, 2020).

In June 2014, the central government published 'The Practice of the One Country, Two Systems Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region', a 'white paper' on Hong Kong. The 'pan-democratic' opposition leaders responded intensely to this, saying it was an attempt to influence Hong Kong politics, jeopardizing the city's high degree of autonomy, particularly in terms of judicial independence. Others, including the SAR administration, contended that the piece was simply a reiteration of Beijing's long-held positions and did not represent a policy shift. The British government's first reaction was cautious. The UK's favourable assessment of Hong Kong's 'unique constitutional structure' and commitment to 'one country, two systems' was reiterated in the first biannual report for 2014 (Foreign & Commonwealth Office [FCO], 2014, pp. 2, 8–10).

This underlying rift between pan-democrats and Beijing is mirrored in differing interpretations of 'one Country, two systems', with pan-democrats emphasizing 'two systems' and Beijing emphasizing 'one country' in terms of the central government's primacy (World Politics Review, 2018). China, according to Bush (2014), used Hong Kong's electoral system to manipulate the August 2014 National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (NPCSC's) decision and the June 2014 white paper to make sure that the chief executive (CE)-elect is trustworthy to Beijing and that the LegCo should not be under the control of a party that Beijing dislikes (Bush, 2014). During the British-led direct legislative

council (LegCo) elections in 1988, the Chinese authorities, according to Lau (1999), expressed significant opposition to a 'representative government' in Hong Kong. According to Beijing, it was a 'sinister British plan' to deny China of sovereignty over Hong Kong (Lau, 2019).

The greater framework under which the UK handles foreign policy has shifted. For British policy in the Asia-Pacific region, the emergence of China has provided new chances and challenges, reinforcing the UK's complex relationship with China and including the opportunities presented by bilateral UK–Hong Kong relationships, particularly in the commercial and financial spheres (FCO, 2014, p. 23). During the global financial crisis of 2008, Britain's declining worldwide influence may have been hastened. As a result, the British government implemented an austerity strategy that included periodic cuts to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office budget (Whitman, 2016, p. 517). Meanwhile, the UK has altered its global foreign policy to a more commercial focus and emphasized on economic security (Summers, 2016).

While Yahuda claims that the UK has 'supported those within Hong Kong who have pressed for the extension of the franchise' (Yahuda, 2007, p. 26), this would be consistent with the UK's global 'democracy promotion' policy with those involved with British policy showing a consistent effort to remain apolitical and speaking out on democratic development matters with extreme caution, not least because the JD contains extremely inadequate provisions (Summers, 2016).

The UK and China agreed to implement 'one nation, two systems' in order to preserve Hong Kong's capitalist system, as opposed to China's communist model (Giles, 2020). Hong Kong also has its own laws as well as basic rights. A decline in China's 'one nation, two systems' paradigm for Hong Kong, following the 1997 handover, has been seen. International attention has been drawn to the people of Hong Kong in 2019 for their persistent efforts to secure the autonomy, rule of law and fundamental freedoms they had been promised. Beijing's new NSL, which took effect in 2020, aims to put an end to protests (Davis, 2020).

Pro-democracy demonstrators believe Beijing is gradually reducing Hong Kong's democratic space as it appears to strengthen its grip through new changes like the NSL.

Obviously, China's introduction of the NSL is a response to what Beijing called the eruption of 'Black-clad rioters' in 2019. And the 2014 Umbrella Movement was sparked by the NPC Standing Committee's decision on Hong Kong's 2017 CE and the LegCo.

Protests erupted in 2019 in response to a planned bill that would allow extradition to mainland China. Analysts have noticed a rise in separatist feeling among Hong Kong residents in recent years, as indicated by movements like 'anti-Chinese tourists' and the 'Hong Kong independence movement' (Ma, 2015; Hung, 2012). Young Hong Kongers have led the charge against 'Hong Kong–Mainland China' integration initiatives that have brought the domestic provision close to the mainland (Ramzy, 2019). While the Chinese authorities have attempted to manage the situation with caution, dozens of activists and politicians have been arrested. According to some commentators, the arrests are part of a campaign in Hong Kong SAR to quell political dissent.

In reaction to mounting tensions between Hong Kong and Beijing, the UK government indicated that it would provide a ‘road to citizenship’ for at least five million Hong Kong residents (holders of British National Overseas—BNOs) <sup>1</sup> if Beijing persisted in enacting the new national security law. The British foreign secretary declared in July 2020, after Beijing enacted the law, that BNOs will be permitted to the UK for a 5-year resident period, with full British citizenship awarded a year afterwards (Kane, 2020). As a result, the UK will be able to admit an additional 5.4 million Hong Kong citizens, opening up a new immigration route. This is nearly three-quarters of Hong Kong’s population of 7.5 million people (Hong Kong Government [HKG], 2020; Zhao, 2005). Hong Kong residents are encouraged to apply for a new BNO visa, which will lead to citizenship. The BNO passport gave little rights when the UK handed Hong Kong over to China in 1997. All of that changed last year when China tightened its grip over the region. For the nearly three million BNO passports eligible as well as their families, the British government has proposed a road to citizenship. Prior to the protests, 167,000 Hong Kong residents had BNO passports; by August of last year, that number had risen to 612,000 (*The Economist*, 2021).

In this context, we try to understand why the UK invites such a large population for permanent residence and eventually citizenship, considering the UK’s unstable economic situation as a result of the COVID-19 debacle and the Brexit debts, and how Hong Kongers would respond to the invitation. We attempt to examine Beijing’s policy shift towards Hong Kong (especially the ‘one country, two systems’ and debate surrounding the universal suffrage) and the relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing since 1997.

## Migration or Refuge?

Why is the UK willing to accept this population at this time and what led to this decision? Between three million and five million Hong Kong residents have been encouraged to apply for permanent residency. However, how many Hong Kong citizens will seize the chance to relocate to the UK? There is no rational way to forecast the expected migratory movements when a new immigration route is implemented, like the BNO visa.

We work on two assumptions: one, that this welcome may send a strong message to the Chinese government that if wealthy Hong Kong people leave the country to seek citizenship in the UK, there will be two major consequences for the Chinese government in the long run: the first is that they will lose a large capital base, and the second is that strong anti-Chinese dissent may emerge. The UK is expecting currency flow from Hong Kong as a result of this welcome. This inflow could help to alleviate the fiscal burden that the UK is experiencing as a result of Brexit.

Could these Hong Kong residents be considered persecuted or have their lives jeopardized? Analysts wonder if this is the UK’s attempt to adhere to the 1951 Refugee Convention’s ideals. However, it is difficult to tell what this invitation’s

motivations are. What would this type of migration entail? Are they anticipatory refugees, potential displaced persons or another type of indentured migrants?<sup>22</sup> Many of the 19 colonies where British indentured workers were sent until the conclusion of the First World War (Jonathan, 2018). During the British colonial administration in India, however, indentured servants tried to escape poverty and starvation. However, both categories have a colonial past (Darity, 1982). All of these forecasts should be taken with a grain of salt.

We are trying to figure out why the UK invites so many Hong Kong citizens at a time when the UK is in a difficult position (in terms of battling COVID-19 and fixing Brexit issues). It is critical that we grasp the concept of British citizenship's coloniality, which refers to the country's long history of colonialism and how that plays a role in the country's current citizenship–migration nexus (Benson, 2021). BNO, British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTC) and British Overseas Citizens were legal designations granted to specific populations in the UK's former colonies and overseas territories under British nationality legislation. They give nominal British nationality but not the right to remain in the UK, essentially making their holders aliens for the purposes of UK immigration rules to this day (Benson, 2021).

The changes in the status of Hong Kong from colonization to decolonization, to the Sino-British JD and 1997 reveal a long-standing and consistent presentation of the conditions tailored for them as a special case within the wider perspective of Britain's emerging citizenship–migration nexus, with Hong Kong residents appearing as the perennial exception. The most recent manifestation of this history of exception is the HK BNO visa, with these provisions being highlighted as an instance of the UK's 'fair and generous' tactic of immigration—which appears to contradict the government's stance that its immigration regime is 'tough on immigration' (Benson, 2021).

In analysing decolonization of citizenship and migration, Shachar (2009) pioneered scholarships by uncovering the nexus between citizenship and property inheritance. She underlined that both were portrayed as membership-restricting measures and were bound by birthright. The alternative vision, she argued, was that of citizenship as a birthright luxury, with those born outside of wealthy states barred from the privileges that come along with being a citizen (Benson, 2021).

From a decolonial perspective, Manuela Boatcă and Julia Roth underline the importance of citizenship and gender in explaining the 'serious disparities between individuals in destitute and rich countries in the twenty-first century' (Boatcă & Roth, 2016, p. 198). As a way to highlight the racial and gender disparities generated by colonialism in the current global citizenship system, they focus on the colonial aspect of citizenship. In the modern era, colonial entanglements can be seen in European countries' reactions to their former colonial colonies (Boatcă, 2021).

A decade-long 'hostile environment' (the UK's 'tough-on-immigration' strategy) and increasingly rigorous immigration regulations, which were implemented after Brexit, have established the framework for allegations that the Hong Kong visa is an exception. In the wake of the Brexit vote victory in 2016, the voice of the people was mobilized by successive Conservative governments to

push through Brexit, which was depicted as the end of free movement in the European Union (EU). A 'Global Britain' that has 'reclaimed control' of its borders is being hailed for the policies and laws put in place to achieve these goals. As a result, the precedent was set for citizens of EU member nations seeking entry to the UK after 31 December 2020 to be subject to UK's immigration laws. This effectively ended the freedom of movement.

It served as the impetus for comprehensive immigration reform. The policy statement that accompanied it highlighted the prospect of a points-based immigration system, which the UK government claimed would level the playing field for immigrants from all around the world. While its supporters paint it as a levelling of the playing field, the UK's putative liberalization of immigration has come at the price of the progressive approach to migration that upheld the principle of free mobility and exempted EU residents from the UK's immigration laws. This expanding of the scope of the UK's migration laws shows that, according to Benson (2021), it should be regarded as a levelling down.

In July 2020, the Home Office issued a policy statement amending BNO entitlements by announcing changes to migration legislation and policy to establish a bespoke visa route, citing the imposition of the NSL in the Hong Kong SAR as a 'clear violation of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration' (Home Office, 2020, foreword, para. 2). While the immigration reform was hotly debated, the UK government's aim to grant Hong Kong residents a path to residency and citizenship gained extraordinary cross-party and cross-house support. The Hong Kong BNO visa became a recognized immigration route for BNOs on 31 January 2021 (and their dependents). Following the JD, modifications to the British Nationality Act of 1981 resulted in the creation of the BNO category on which this new visa is based. This category was developed to accommodate Hong Kong residents who became Chinese nationals on 1 July 1997. They were placed in a closed category that could not be passed down to their successors in order to confirm their British identity and entitlement to remain in Hong Kong, while disqualifying them from settling in the UK (Benson, 2021).

## **Rationalizing the Decision**

Leaving one country to permanently relocate to another is akin to being plucked from one country and rerouted and re-rooted in another. As a result, Hong Kong residents must assess what other benefits the UK may provide. Taking up the UK citizenship offer could threaten their future return to Hong Kong, their existing business or investment in Hong Kong or China, and the future of their left/remaining family members.

According to Wintour (2020), the estimation of whether it is a worthwhile decision to move to the UK is dependent on at least five volatile criteria: how much control does the Chinese government exercise over Hong Kong; the rivalry from other countries such as Taiwan, the USA and Australia; the criteria imposed by the UK's Home Office; and the UK's future prospects.



According to Walsh (2021), around three-quarters of individuals seeking to go to the UK had a university degree and a high pay base, with more than half of their income exceeding the Hong Kong median income. This indicates that their economic impact to the UK is likely to be bigger than that of other migrant groups. Is this going to be a win-win situation for everyone involved? Is it true that the UK invites these organizations to invest in the country in the hopes of alleviating the strains of economic austerity? It is worth noting that the UK now has a US\$370 billion budget deficit (Goodman, 2021).

Following the UK's declaration of BNO approval, a chain migration may be in work (Wintour, 2020). The likelihood of Hong Kong residents migrating may be determined by the level of aid provided by the chain (social networks) as well as the level of pressure that may build in Hong Kong.

According to a survey of 315 persons conducted by Hong Kongers in Britain (HKB, 2020), 97% of them expressed their interest in relocating. The findings of the HKB, of course, may not be indicative of the entire population. So far, Hong Kongers and those considering a migration to the UK have increased by over 50% to 84% of all emigration inquiries this year (Ka-sing, 2020). This could be due to the fact that because Hong Kongers hold BNO passports, applying to move to the UK is easier for them than for others. However, the numbers may fall short of the UK's expectations, owing to Hong Kongers' desire to join Taiwan's vast communities through chain migration. Taiwan, too, is intending to welcome migrants from Hong Kong (Yang, 2020; Tsai, 2011), implying that the UK must come up with a stronger offer to control the flow. Though the offer is significant, including the ability to live and work in the UK, it is laced with uncertainty, including the price of citizenship applications, as well as settlement and career possibilities.

## **Fortune or Blow?**

Based on some assumptions, the Oxford Migration Observatory believes that BNO migrants will offer a net budgetary gain to the government of £2.65 billion in the first 5 years (IMF, 2021; Walsh, 2021). However, this estimate is not based on a random sample. It is understandable that some people will refuse to resettle to the UK. They will make every effort to remain in the country and continue the battle for democracy. We do not know how many people have already arrived in the UK at this time. Whatever is the figure, the property market in the UK is already booming, according to several of our respondents. As a result, the housing market is expected to benefit from the potential influx. Thousands of Hong Kongers currently own property in the UK, and this number is expected to grow. The money flow predictions we made regarding Hong Kong appear to be correct. According to Jim (2020), property agents traded more than twice the number of flats to Hong Kong purchasers in the past months, owing to a surge in purchases mostly for personal use and the fact that superior residences were all sold out due to soaring prices. Hong Kong investors are increasingly turning up outside of London, such as Manchester and Bristol, for cheaper possibilities, with prices ranging from £300,000 to £50 million pounds (US\$390,000–65.50 million; Jim &

William, 2020). Hong Kong buyers and investors have been drawn to London, Manchester and Liverpool in particular. As visa applications open (*The Straits Times*, 2021), and Hong Kong residents begin immigrating to the UK via the new visa route, interest in these locations will likely grow even more.

Others may be put off by the exorbitant cost, which is roughly £3,500 for a single adult (including the £250 BNO visa and the immigration health surcharge), with the complete route to citizenship costing around £7,000 in fees (Walsh, 2021). The Brexit settlement was predicted to be worth £39 billion, but much of that was paid as regular contributions to the EU budget by the UK. By 2057, there will be over £25 billion remaining to pay, with nearly £18 billion paid in the first 5 years (BBC, 2020).

What is the number of EU migrants in the UK? What has changed in terms of EU citizens' migration after the Brexit vote? However, the number of immigrants from other EU nations living in the UK tripled between 1995 and 2015, from 0.9 million to 3.3 million (Wadsworth et al., 2016). Immigration declined by 23,000 to 596,000 in the year to September 2016, while emigration increased by 26,000–323,000 (Travis, 2017). From July 2019 to September 2020, as many as 1.3 million people born overseas fled the UK (Child, 2021). This suggests that the UK may face a significant human resource shortage in the years to come. However, there is a prediction that EU citizens are more likely to come to the UK for work than non-EU citizens (BBC, 2020). In 2019, 48% of EU residents migrated to the UK for at least a year primarily because they migrated for a job hunt or a job offer. As a result, migration by invitation could aid in the correction of a potential demographic imbalance in the UK.

Many analysts think that the current Hong Kong situation seems like an opportunity for the UK to clean up the mess left behind by the pandemic and Brexit. The Immigration and Social Security Coordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill is now being used by the government to restructure the law on immigration and residency in light of Brexit (Gilly, 2006; Linda, 2006). The decision to provide Hong Kong residents automatic residency rights has already elevated BNO status to a level that is similar to Goldsmith's proposed associate citizenship. There has never been a better time to straighten out the UK's jumbled nationality laws (Kane, 2020).

## Conclusions

Evolving conditions in Hong Kong make it impossible to predict how many people would respond positively to the offer in the long term. China's relationship with the UK is strained because of the fact that the Chinese government views that UK's invitation of the Hong Kongers constitutes a significant interference into the country's internal affairs. According to sceptics, this 'invitation to migrate' is unusual. Why? Numerous people all across the world are on the brink of starvation because they are facing persecution because of their political or religious beliefs or ethnic identity, like Syrians and Rohingyas (Ashan Ullah, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2016; Ashan Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018; Ashan Ullah et al., 2020). The world has



turned a blind eye to these population groups. It is tough to speculate on why this is the case. Is it just about the colonial ties or is there anything else at play?

This could be one of the first indications that, following Brexit, the UK will be able to decide who comes in what numbers and who and how many leave. Of course, Hong Kong will suffer as a result of this invitation, since it may lose a big number of young people and professionals.

The decision to migrate over remains a difficult one for Hong Kong residents, as it may compromise the possibility of their future return if they so desire or if they fail to resettle in the UK successfully. They may be recognized once they have left Hong Kong by the authority. Hong Kong residents are unsure if they will be able to keep their Hong Kong passports after they go to the UK or if they will have to surrender their Hong Kong passport to obtain a British passport.

We feel that a slew of studies might be conducted to look deeper into the mobility pattern, volition and whether policy changes have anything to do with future Hong Kong–UK migration and how British society reacts to the (possible) enormous influx of Hong Kongers.

### Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.


### Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

### Notes

1. Following China's 1997 seizure of the territory, BNO status was established, allowing Hong Kong citizens to preserve ties to the UK. At the time, it was largely a matter of symbolism. It gave the right to live in Hong Kong but not in the UK. Everything is about to change at this point. There will be no restriction to the number of family members a BNO citizen can bring into the UK under the new route. They will be eligible to apply for permanent residency after 5 years in the UK and British citizenship after one more year.
2. Several British colonies used indentured labour to build sugar cane, cotton and tea plantations, and also to build railroad lines.

### ORCID iD

A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1441-141X>

### References

- Ullah, Ahsan, & A. K., M. (2010). *Rationalizing migration decisions: Labour migrants in South and South-East Asia*. Ashgate.
- Ullah, Ahsan, & A. K., M. (2011). Rohingya refugee to Bangladesh: Historical exclusions and contemporary marginalization. *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*, 9(2), 139–168.
- Ullah, Ahsan, & A. K., M. (2014). *Refugee politics in the Middle East and north Africa: Human rights, safety and identity*. Palgrave MacMillan.

- Ullah, Ahsan, & A. K., M. (2016). Rohingya crisis in Myanmar: Seeking justice for the 'stateless'. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 32(3), 285–301.
- Ullah, Ahsan, A. K., M., & Chatteraj, D. (2018). Roots of discrimination against Rohingya minorities: Society, ethnicity and international relations. *Intellectual Discourse*, 26(2): 541–465.
- Ullah, Ahsan, A. K., M., Hossain, M. A., & Chatteraj, D. (2020). Covid-19 and Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. *Intellectual Discourse*, 28(2), 791–804.
- Aljazeera. (2020). *China passes Hong Kong security law, deepening fears for future*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/30/china-passes-hong-kong-security-law-deepening-fears-for-future>
- BBC. (2019). *Hong Kong protesters demonstrate against extradition bill*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48572130>
- BBC. (2020). *Brexit divorce bill: How much does the UK owe the EU?* <https://www.bbc.com/news/51110096>
- Benson, M. (2021). Hong Kongers and the coloniality of British citizenship from decolonisation to 'Global Britain'. *Current Sociology*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921211048530>
- Boatcă, M. (2021). Thinking Europe otherwise: Lessons from the Caribbean. *Current Sociology*, 69(3), 389–414.
- Boatcă, M., & Roth, J. (2016). Unequal and gendered: Notes on the coloniality of citizenship. *Current Sociology*, 64(2), 191–212.
- Bush, R. C. (2014, December 3). *Hong Kong: Examining the impact of the 'umbrella movement'*. Testimony before the subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/hong-kong-examining-the-impact-of-the-umbrella-movement/>
- Smith, C. T. (1995). Wan Chai: In search of an identity. In C. T. Smith (Ed.), *A sense of history: Studies in the social and urban history of Hong Kong* (pp. 199–213). Hong Kong Educational Publishing.
- Child, D. (2021). 'Unprecedented exodus': Why are migrant workers leaving the UK? <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/15/uk-twin-pandemic-and-brexit-crises-prompt-unprecedented-exodus>
- Dapiran, A. (2020). *City on fire: The fight for Hong Kong*. SCRIBE.
- Darity, W. (1982). The end of slave trade and indentured immigration. *Canadian Journal of African Studies [Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines]*, 16(1), 45–150. <https://doi.org/10.2307/484604>
- Davis, M. C. (2020). *Making Hong Kong China: The rollback of human rights and the rule of law*. Columbia University Press. <https://cup.columbia.edu/book/making-hong-kong-china/9781952636134>
- Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). (2014). *Six monthly reports on Hong Kong: January to June 2014*. Deposited in Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- Giles, C. (2020). *Why are UK and China relations getting worse?* <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48868140>
- Gilly, B. (2006). The meaning and measure of state legitimacy. *European Journal of Political Research*, 3, 499–525.
- Goodman, D. (2021). *UK deficit at \$370 billion highlights Sunak's fiscal challenge*. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-22/u-k-deficit-at-370-billion-highlights-sunak-s-fiscal-challenge>
- Hartcher, P.. (2016). *China's treatment of Hong Kong is a lesson for Australia*. <https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/chinas-treatment-of-hong-kong-is-a-lesson-for-australia-20161010-gryvnnv.html>

- Home Office. (2020). *Hong Kong British National (Overseas) visa policy statement*. Her Majesty's Stationery Office (CP280). [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/902976/CCS207\\_CCS0720898728-001\\_HK\\_BN\\_Visa\\_Policy\\_Statement\\_A4\\_4\\_-FINAL.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/902976/CCS207_CCS0720898728-001_HK_BN_Visa_Policy_Statement_A4_4_-FINAL.pdf)
- Hong Kongers in Britain (HKB). (2020). *Coming for hope: Policy study on British National (Overseas) holders intending to come to the UK*. <https://www.hongkongers.org.uk/policy-study-coming-for-hope>
- Hong Kong Government (HKG). (2020). *Population and households*. Census and Statistics department. <https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20.jsp>
- Hung, H. F. (2012). Hong Kong's democratic movement and the making of China's off-shore civil society. *Asian Survey*, 52(3), 504–527.
- IMF. (2021). *World Economic Outlook update*. IMF.
- Jim, C., & William, J. (2020). *Hong Kong buyers rush for UK properties after security law*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-britain-property-idUSKBN25K0MY>
- Jonathan, C. (2018). Indentured labour migration and the meaning of emancipation: Free trade, race, and labour in British Public Debate, 1838–1860. *Past & Present*, 238(1), 85–119. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtx060>
- Kane, J. (2020). *Britain, Brexit and Hong Kong: The problems of UK nationality law*. Institute for Government.
- Ka-sing, L. (2020). Easy path to citizenship makes UK top choice for Hong Kongers fleeing political upheaval. *South China Morning Post*. <https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3114213/easy-path-citizenship-makes-uk-top-choice-hongkongers-fleeing-political>
- Lau, C. K. (1997). *Colonial legacy: A Hong Kong Chinese's view of the British heritage*. The Chinese University Press.
- Lau, S.-K. (1999). The making of the electoral system. In H.-C. Kuan, S.-K. Lau, K.-S. Louie, & W. K.-Y. Timothy (Eds.), *Power Transfer and Electoral Politics: The first legislative election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (pp. 3–35). The Chinese University Press.
- Lau, R. K.-S. (2019). The political predicament of the pan-democrats in Hong Kong under Chinese rule: Being victims or beneficiaries? *Asian Education and Development Studies*, 8(4), 498–510.
- Linda, B. (2006). *The citizen and the alien: Dilemmas of contemporary membership*. Princeton University Press.
- Ma, N. (2015). The rise of 'anti-China' sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012 Legislative Council elections. *The China Review*, 15(1), 39–66.
- Palivos, T., Wang, P., & Yip, C. (2011). The colonization of Hong Kong: Establishing the Pearl of Britain-China Trade (MPRA Paper No. 32271). Munich Personal RePEc Archive. [https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32271/1/MPRA\\_paper\\_32271.pdf](https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32271/1/MPRA_paper_32271.pdf)
- Ramzy, A. (2019, June 9). Hong Kong march: Vast protest of extradition bill shows fear of eroding freedoms. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-protest.html>
- Shachar, A. (2009). *The birthright lottery: Citizenship and global inequality*. Harvard University Press.
- Summers, T. (2016). British policy toward Hong Kong and its political reform. *Issues & Studies*, 52(4), 1650013.
- The Economist*. (2021). Hong Kongers eye British citizenship but fear retaliation from China. <https://www.economist.com/britain/2021/01/30/hong-kongers-eye-british-citizenship-but-fear-retaliation-from-china>

- The Straits Times*. (2021). 5,000 HK citizens said to have applied for new UK visa. <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/5000-hk-citizens-said-to-have-applied-for-new-uk-visa>
- Travis, A. (2017). *Net migration to UK falls sharply after Brexit vote*. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/feb/23/net-migration-to-uk-falls-by-49000-after-brexit-vote>
- Tsai, M. (2011). 'Foreign Brides' meet ethnic politics in Taiwan. *International Migration Review*, 45(2), 243–268.
- Vargas-Silva, C., & Walsh P., W. (2020). *EU migration to and from the UK* (Briefing, 3rd revision). The University of Oxford.
- Wadsworth, J., Swati., D., Gianmarco, O., & Van Reenen, J. (2016). *Brexit and the impact of immigration on the UK*. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Whitman, R. (2016). Brexit or Bremain: What future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy? *International Affairs*, 92(3), 509–529.
- World Politics Review. (2018, January 30). *Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement splits over more radical ambitions..* <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24091/hong-kong-s-pro-democracy-movement-splits-over-more-radical-ambitions>
- Yahuda, M. (2007). A British perspective on Hong Kong: A decade later. In Y.-M. Yeung (Ed.), *The first decade: The Hong Kong SAR in retrospective and introspective perspectives* (pp. 23–41). Chinese University Press.
- Zhao Zhong (2005). Migration, labor market flexibility, and wage determination in China: A review. *The Developing Economies*, XLIII-2, 285–312.